feat(api,web,cli): difyctl v1.0 — OAuth device flow, /openapi/v1 auth pipeline, CLI client

.github/CODEOWNERS

@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@
 # Docs
 /docs/ @crazywoola
 
+# CLI
+/cli/ @langgenius/maintainers
+/.github/workflows/cli-tests.yml @langgenius/maintainers
+
 # Backend (default owner, more specific rules below will override)
 /api/ @QuantumGhost
 

.github/workflows/cli-release.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+name: CLI Release
+
+on:
+  release:
+    types: [published]
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      dify_release_tag:
+        description: "dify release tag to attach cli artifacts to (e.g. 1.14.0). Bare semver — dify tags are NOT v-prefixed."
+        type: string
+        required: true
+
+concurrency:
+  group: cli-release-${{ github.event.release.tag_name || inputs.dify_release_tag }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  release:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    if: >-
+      github.repository == 'langgenius/dify' &&
+      (github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' ||
+       (vars.CLI_AUTO_RELEASE == 'true' && !github.event.release.prerelease))
+    env:
+      DIFY_TAG: ${{ github.event.release.tag_name || inputs.dify_release_tag }}
+    permissions:
+      contents: write
+      id-token: write
+    defaults:
+      run:
+        shell: bash
+        working-directory: ./cli
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+          fetch-depth: 0
+
+      - name: Setup web environment
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-web
+
+      - name: Setup Node registry auth
+        uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+        with:
+          node-version-file: .nvmrc
+          registry-url: 'https://registry.npmjs.org'
+
+      - name: Read cli/package.json
+        id: manifest
+        run: |
+          version=$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")
+          channel=$(node -p "require('./package.json').difyctl.channel")
+          minDify=$(node -p "require('./package.json').difyctl.compat.minDify")
+          maxDify=$(node -p "require('./package.json').difyctl.compat.maxDify")
+          {
+              echo "version=$version"
+              echo "channel=$channel"
+              echo "minDify=$minDify"
+              echo "maxDify=$maxDify"
+          } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+
+      - name: Validate manifest
+        run: scripts/release-validate-manifest.sh
+
+      - name: Bump guard (auto-path only)
+        if: github.event_name == 'release'
+        run: scripts/release-bump-guard.sh
+        env:
+          NEW_VERSION:  ${{ steps.manifest.outputs.version }}
+          NEW_MIN_DIFY: ${{ steps.manifest.outputs.minDify }}
+          NEW_MAX_DIFY: ${{ steps.manifest.outputs.maxDify }}
+
+      - name: Build cli
+        run: |
+          DIFYCTL_VERSION="${{ steps.manifest.outputs.version }}" \
+          DIFYCTL_CHANNEL="${{ steps.manifest.outputs.channel }}" \
+          DIFYCTL_MIN_DIFY="${{ steps.manifest.outputs.minDify }}" \
+          DIFYCTL_MAX_DIFY="${{ steps.manifest.outputs.maxDify }}" \
+          DIFYCTL_COMMIT="$(git rev-parse HEAD)" \
+          DIFYCTL_BUILD_DATE="$(git log -1 --format=%cI HEAD)" \
+          pnpm build
+
+      - name: Pack tarballs
+        run: pnpm pack:tarballs
+
+      - name: Verify target dify release exists
+        run: gh release view "$DIFY_TAG" --repo langgenius/dify > /dev/null
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+
+      - name: Publish to npm (idempotent)
+        run: scripts/release-npm-publish.sh
+        env:
+          CHANNEL:         ${{ steps.manifest.outputs.channel }}
+          NEW_VERSION:     ${{ steps.manifest.outputs.version }}
+          NODE_AUTH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
+
+      - name: Generate sha256 checksum file
+        run: scripts/release-write-checksums.sh
+        env:
+          CLI_VERSION: ${{ steps.manifest.outputs.version }}
+
+      - name: Install cosign
+        uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@v3
+
+      - name: Keyless-sign tarballs + checksum file (Sigstore)
+        run: scripts/release-cosign-sign.sh
+        env:
+          CLI_VERSION:         ${{ steps.manifest.outputs.version }}
+          COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL: '1'
+
+      - name: Snapshot tarballs + checksum + signatures as workflow artifact
+        if: always()
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: difyctl-${{ steps.manifest.outputs.version }}-${{ env.DIFY_TAG }}
+          path: |
+            cli/dist/difyctl-v*.tar.xz
+            cli/dist/difyctl-v*-checksums.txt
+            cli/dist/difyctl-v*.sig
+            cli/dist/difyctl-v*.pem
+          retention-days: 90
+          if-no-files-found: error
+
+      - name: Upload tarballs + checksum + signatures to dify GH release (idempotent)
+        run: scripts/release-upload-tarballs.sh
+        env:
+          CLI_VERSION: ${{ steps.manifest.outputs.version }}
+          GH_TOKEN:    ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}

.github/workflows/cli-smoke.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+name: CLI Smoke (live dify)
+
+on:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      dify_version:
+        description: "Dify image tag to test against (e.g. 1.7.0)"
+        type: string
+        required: true
+      cli_ref:
+        description: "Git ref to build the cli from (default: current branch)"
+        type: string
+        required: false
+
+jobs:
+  smoke:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    defaults:
+      run:
+        shell: bash
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout cli ref
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ inputs.cli_ref || github.ref }}
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Setup web environment
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-web
+
+      - name: Bring up dify
+        env:
+          DIFY_VERSION: ${{ inputs.dify_version }}
+        run: |
+          cd docker
+          cp .env.example .env
+          DIFY_API_IMAGE_TAG="$DIFY_VERSION" \
+          DIFY_WEB_IMAGE_TAG="$DIFY_VERSION" \
+          docker compose up -d api worker web db redis
+          for i in $(seq 1 60); do
+              if curl -fsS http://localhost:5001/health >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                  echo "dify api ready after ${i}s"
+                  break
+              fi
+              sleep 1
+          done
+
+      - name: Run smoke against live dify
+        working-directory: ./cli
+        run: pnpm exec tsx scripts/run-smoke.ts --base-url http://localhost:5001
+
+      - name: Dump dify logs on failure
+        if: failure()
+        run: |
+          cd docker
+          docker compose logs api worker web --tail=200

.github/workflows/cli-tests.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+name: CLI Tests
+
+on:
+  workflow_call:
+    secrets:
+      CODECOV_TOKEN:
+        required: false
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+concurrency:
+  group: cli-tests-${{ github.head_ref || github.run_id }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    name: CLI Tests
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    env:
+      CODECOV_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN }}
+    defaults:
+      run:
+        shell: bash
+        working-directory: ./cli
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout code
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Setup web environment
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-web
+
+      - name: CI pipeline (typecheck, lint, coverage, build)
+        run: make ci
+
+      - name: Report coverage
+        if: ${{ env.CODECOV_TOKEN != '' }}
+        uses: codecov/codecov-action@57e3a136b779b570ffcdbf80b3bdc90e7fab3de2 # v6.0.0
+        with:
+          directory: cli/coverage
+          flags: cli
+        env:
+          CODECOV_TOKEN: ${{ env.CODECOV_TOKEN }}

.github/workflows/main-ci.yml

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     outputs:
       api-changed: ${{ steps.changes.outputs.api }}
+      cli-changed: ${{ steps.changes.outputs.cli }}
       e2e-changed: ${{ steps.changes.outputs.e2e }}
       web-changed: ${{ steps.changes.outputs.web }}
       vdb-changed: ${{ steps.changes.outputs.vdb }}
@@ -63,6 +64,16 @@ jobs:
               - 'docker/generate_docker_compose'
               - 'docker/ssrf_proxy/**'
               - 'docker/volumes/sandbox/conf/**'
+            cli:
+              - 'cli/**'
+              - 'package.json'
+              - 'pnpm-lock.yaml'
+              - 'pnpm-workspace.yaml'
+              - 'eslint.config.mjs'
+              - '.npmrc'
+              - '.nvmrc'
+              - '.github/workflows/cli-tests.yml'
+              - '.github/actions/setup-web/**'
             web:
               - 'web/**'
               - 'packages/**'
@@ -186,6 +197,66 @@ jobs:
           echo "API tests were not required, but the skip job finished with result: $SKIP_RESULT" >&2
           exit 1
 
+  cli-tests-run:
+    name: Run CLI Tests
+    needs:
+      - pre_job
+      - check-changes
+    if: needs.pre_job.outputs.should_skip != 'true' && needs.check-changes.outputs.cli-changed == 'true'
+    uses: ./.github/workflows/cli-tests.yml
+    secrets: inherit
+
+  cli-tests-skip:
+    name: Skip CLI Tests
+    needs:
+      - pre_job
+      - check-changes
+    if: needs.pre_job.outputs.should_skip != 'true' && needs.check-changes.outputs.cli-changed != 'true'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Report skipped CLI tests
+        run: echo "No CLI-related changes detected; skipping CLI tests."
+
+  cli-tests:
+    name: CLI Tests
+    if: ${{ always() }}
+    needs:
+      - pre_job
+      - check-changes
+      - cli-tests-run
+      - cli-tests-skip
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Finalize CLI Tests status
+        env:
+          SHOULD_SKIP_WORKFLOW: ${{ needs.pre_job.outputs.should_skip }}
+          TESTS_CHANGED: ${{ needs.check-changes.outputs.cli-changed }}
+          RUN_RESULT: ${{ needs.cli-tests-run.result }}
+          SKIP_RESULT: ${{ needs.cli-tests-skip.result }}
+        run: |
+          if [[ "$SHOULD_SKIP_WORKFLOW" == 'true' ]]; then
+            echo "CLI tests were skipped because this workflow run duplicated a successful or newer run."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+
+          if [[ "$TESTS_CHANGED" == 'true' ]]; then
+            if [[ "$RUN_RESULT" == 'success' ]]; then
+              echo "CLI tests ran successfully."
+              exit 0
+            fi
+
+            echo "CLI tests were required but finished with result: $RUN_RESULT" >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+          if [[ "$SKIP_RESULT" == 'success' ]]; then
+            echo "CLI tests were skipped because no CLI-related files changed."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+
+          echo "CLI tests were not required, but the skip job finished with result: $SKIP_RESULT" >&2
+          exit 1
+
   web-tests-run:
     name: Run Web Tests
     needs:

.gitignore

@@ -115,6 +115,12 @@ venv/
 ENV/
 env.bak/
 venv.bak/
+
+# cli/ has a src/env/ module (DIFY_* registry) — don't treat it as a venv
+!/cli/src/env/
+!/cli/src/commands/env/
+# cli/scripts/lib/ holds TS build helpers (resolve-buildinfo etc.) — don't treat as Python lib/
+!/cli/scripts/lib/
 .conda/
 
 # Spyder project settings
@@ -240,6 +246,7 @@ scripts/stress-test/reports/
 # settings
 *.local.json
 *.local.md
+*.local.toml
 
 # Code Agent Folder
 .qoder/*

api/app_factory.py

@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ def initialize_extensions(app: DifyApp):
         ext_logstore,
         ext_mail,
         ext_migrate,
+        ext_oauth_bearer,
         ext_orjson,
         ext_otel,
         ext_proxy_fix,
@@ -203,6 +204,7 @@ def initialize_extensions(app: DifyApp):
         ext_enterprise_telemetry,
         ext_request_logging,
         ext_session_factory,
+        ext_oauth_bearer,
     ]
     for ext in extensions:
         short_name = ext.__name__.split(".")[-1]

api/configs/feature/__init__.py

@@ -499,6 +499,35 @@ class HttpConfig(BaseSettings):
     def WEB_API_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS(self) -> list[str]:
         return self.inner_WEB_API_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS.split(",")
 
+    inner_OPENAPI_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS: str = Field(
+        description=(
+            "Comma-separated allowlist for /openapi/v1/* CORS. "
+            "Default empty = same-origin only. Browser-cookie routes within "
+            "the group reject cross-origin OPTIONS regardless of this list."
+        ),
+        validation_alias=AliasChoices("OPENAPI_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS"),
+        default="",
+    )
+
+    @computed_field
+    def OPENAPI_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS(self) -> list[str]:
+        return [o for o in self.inner_OPENAPI_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS.split(",") if o]
+
+    inner_OPENAPI_KNOWN_CLIENT_IDS: str = Field(
+        description=(
+            "Comma-separated client_id values accepted at "
+            "POST /openapi/v1/oauth/device/code. New CLIs / SDKs added here "
+            "without code changes. Unknown client_id returns 400 unsupported_client."
+        ),
+        validation_alias=AliasChoices("OPENAPI_KNOWN_CLIENT_IDS"),
+        default="difyctl",
+    )
+
+    @computed_field  # type: ignore[misc]
+    @property
+    def OPENAPI_KNOWN_CLIENT_IDS(self) -> frozenset[str]:
+        return frozenset(c for c in self.inner_OPENAPI_KNOWN_CLIENT_IDS.split(",") if c)
+
     HTTP_REQUEST_MAX_CONNECT_TIMEOUT: int = Field(
         ge=1, description="Maximum connection timeout in seconds for HTTP requests", default=10
     )
@@ -874,6 +903,17 @@ class AuthConfig(BaseSettings):
         default=86400,
     )
 
+    ENABLE_OAUTH_BEARER: bool = Field(
+        description="Enable OAuth bearer authentication (device-flow + Service API /v1/* bearer middleware).",
+        default=True,
+    )
+
+    OPENAPI_RATE_LIMIT_PER_TOKEN: PositiveInt = Field(
+        description="Per-token rate limit on /openapi/v1/* (requests per minute). "
+        "Bucket keyed on sha256(token), shared across api replicas via Redis.",
+        default=60,
+    )
+
 
 class ModerationConfig(BaseSettings):
     """
@@ -1148,6 +1188,14 @@ class CeleryScheduleTasksConfig(BaseSettings):
         description="Enable scheduled workflow run cleanup task",
         default=False,
     )
+    ENABLE_CLEAN_OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKENS_TASK: bool = Field(
+        description="Enable scheduled cleanup of revoked/expired OAuth access-token rows past retention.",
+        default=True,
+    )
+    OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_RETENTION_DAYS: PositiveInt = Field(
+        description="Days to retain revoked OAuth access-token rows before deletion.",
+        default=30,
+    )
     ENABLE_MAIL_CLEAN_DOCUMENT_NOTIFY_TASK: bool = Field(
         description="Enable mail clean document notify task",
         default=False,

api/controllers/openapi/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+from flask import Blueprint
+from flask_restx import Namespace
+
+from libs.device_flow_security import attach_anti_framing
+from libs.external_api import ExternalApi
+
+bp = Blueprint("openapi", __name__, url_prefix="/openapi/v1")
+attach_anti_framing(bp)
+
+api = ExternalApi(
+    bp,
+    version="1.0",
+    title="OpenAPI",
+    description="User-scoped programmatic API (bearer auth)",
+)
+
+openapi_ns = Namespace("openapi", description="User-scoped operations", path="/")
+
+from . import (
+    account,
+    app_run,
+    apps,
+    apps_permitted_external,
+    index,
+    oauth_device,
+    oauth_device_sso,
+    workspaces,
+)
+
+__all__ = [
+    "account",
+    "app_run",
+    "apps",
+    "apps_permitted_external",
+    "index",
+    "oauth_device",
+    "oauth_device_sso",
+    "workspaces",
+]
+
+api.add_namespace(openapi_ns)

api/controllers/openapi/_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+"""Audit emission for openapi app-run endpoints.
+
+Pattern: logger.info with extra={"audit": True, "event": "app.run.openapi", ...}
+matches the existing oauth_device convention. The EE OTel exporter consults
+its own allowlist to decide whether to ship the line.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+EVENT_APP_RUN_OPENAPI = "app.run.openapi"
+EVENT_OPENAPI_WRONG_SURFACE_DENIED = "openapi.wrong_surface_denied"
+
+
+def emit_app_run(
+    *,
+    app_id: str,
+    tenant_id: str,
+    caller_kind: str,
+    mode: str,
+    surface: str,
+) -> None:
+    logger.info(
+        "audit: %s app_id=%s tenant_id=%s caller_kind=%s mode=%s surface=%s",
+        EVENT_APP_RUN_OPENAPI,
+        app_id,
+        tenant_id,
+        caller_kind,
+        mode,
+        surface,
+        extra={
+            "audit": True,
+            "event": EVENT_APP_RUN_OPENAPI,
+            "app_id": app_id,
+            "tenant_id": tenant_id,
+            "caller_kind": caller_kind,
+            "mode": mode,
+            "surface": surface,
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def emit_wrong_surface(
+    *,
+    subject_type: str | None,
+    attempted_path: str,
+    client_id: str | None,
+    token_id: str | None,
+) -> None:
+    logger.warning(
+        "audit: %s subject_type=%s attempted_path=%s",
+        EVENT_OPENAPI_WRONG_SURFACE_DENIED,
+        subject_type,
+        attempted_path,
+        extra={
+            "audit": True,
+            "event": EVENT_OPENAPI_WRONG_SURFACE_DENIED,
+            "subject_type": subject_type,
+            "attempted_path": attempted_path,
+            "client_id": client_id,
+            "token_id": token_id,
+        },
+    )

api/controllers/openapi/_input_schema.py

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+"""Server-side JSON Schema derivation from Dify `user_input_form`."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any, cast
+
+from controllers.service_api.app.error import AppUnavailableError
+from models import App
+from models.model import AppMode
+
+JSON_SCHEMA_DRAFT = "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
+
+EMPTY_INPUT_SCHEMA: dict[str, Any] = {
+    "$schema": JSON_SCHEMA_DRAFT,
+    "type": "object",
+    "properties": {},
+    "required": [],
+}
+
+_CHAT_FAMILY = frozenset({AppMode.CHAT, AppMode.AGENT_CHAT, AppMode.ADVANCED_CHAT})
+
+
+def _file_object_shape() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Single-file value shape. Forward-compat placeholder; refine when file-API contract pins."""
+    return {
+        "type": "object",
+        "properties": {
+            "type": {"type": "string"},
+            "transfer_method": {"type": "string"},
+            "url": {"type": "string"},
+            "upload_file_id": {"type": "string"},
+        },
+        "additionalProperties": True,
+    }
+
+
+def _row_to_schema(row_type: str, row: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    label = row.get("label") or row.get("variable", "")
+    base: dict[str, Any] = {"title": label} if label else {}
+
+    if row_type in ("text-input", "paragraph"):
+        out = {"type": "string"} | base
+        max_length = row.get("max_length")
+        if isinstance(max_length, int) and max_length > 0:
+            out["maxLength"] = max_length
+        return out
+
+    if row_type == "select":
+        return {"type": "string"} | base | {"enum": list(row.get("options") or [])}
+
+    if row_type == "number":
+        return {"type": "number"} | base
+
+    if row_type == "file":
+        return _file_object_shape() | base
+
+    if row_type == "file-list":
+        return {
+            "type": "array",
+            "items": _file_object_shape(),
+        } | base
+
+    return None
+
+
+def _form_to_jsonschema(form: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], list[str]]:
+    """Translate a user_input_form row list into (properties, required-list).
+
+    Each row is a single-key dict: `{"text-input": {variable, label, required, ...}}`.
+    Unknown variable types are skipped (forward-compat).
+    """
+    properties: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    required: list[str] = []
+    for row in form:
+        if not isinstance(row, dict) or len(row) != 1:
+            continue
+        ((row_type, row_body),) = row.items()
+        if not isinstance(row_body, dict):
+            continue
+        variable = row_body.get("variable")
+        if not variable:
+            continue
+        schema = _row_to_schema(row_type, row_body)
+        if schema is None:
+            continue
+        properties[variable] = schema
+        if row_body.get("required"):
+            required.append(variable)
+    return properties, required
+
+
+def resolve_app_config(app: App) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], list[dict[str, Any]]]:
+    """Resolve `(features_dict, user_input_form)` for parameters / schema derivation.
+
+    Raises `AppUnavailableError` on misconfigured apps.
+    """
+    if app.mode in {AppMode.ADVANCED_CHAT, AppMode.WORKFLOW}:
+        workflow = app.workflow
+        if workflow is None:
+            raise AppUnavailableError()
+        return (
+            workflow.features_dict,
+            cast(list[dict[str, Any]], workflow.user_input_form(to_old_structure=True)),
+        )
+
+    app_model_config = app.app_model_config
+    if app_model_config is None:
+        raise AppUnavailableError()
+    features_dict = cast(dict[str, Any], app_model_config.to_dict())
+    return features_dict, cast(list[dict[str, Any]], features_dict.get("user_input_form", []))
+
+
+def build_input_schema(app: App) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Derive Draft 2020-12 JSON Schema from `user_input_form` + app mode.
+
+    chat / agent-chat / advanced-chat: top-level `query` (required, minLength=1) + `inputs` object.
+    completion / workflow: `inputs` object only.
+    Raises `AppUnavailableError` on misconfigured apps.
+    """
+    _, user_input_form = resolve_app_config(app)
+    inputs_props, inputs_required = _form_to_jsonschema(user_input_form)
+
+    properties: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    required: list[str] = []
+
+    if app.mode in _CHAT_FAMILY:
+        properties["query"] = {"type": "string", "minLength": 1}
+        required.append("query")
+
+    properties["inputs"] = {
+        "type": "object",
+        "properties": inputs_props,
+        "required": inputs_required,
+        "additionalProperties": False,
+    }
+    required.append("inputs")
+
+    return {
+        "$schema": JSON_SCHEMA_DRAFT,
+        "type": "object",
+        "properties": properties,
+        "required": required,
+    }

api/controllers/openapi/_models.py

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+"""Shared response substructures for openapi endpoints."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any, Literal
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
+
+# Server-side cap on `limit` query param for any /openapi/v1/* list endpoint.
+# Sibling endpoints (`/apps`, `/account/sessions`, future routes) all clamp to
+# this; do not introduce per-endpoint caps without raising the constant.
+MAX_PAGE_LIMIT = 200
+
+
+class UsageInfo(BaseModel):
+    prompt_tokens: int = 0
+    completion_tokens: int = 0
+    total_tokens: int = 0
+
+
+class MessageMetadata(BaseModel):
+    usage: UsageInfo | None = None
+    retriever_resources: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+
+class PaginationEnvelope[T](BaseModel):
+    """Canonical pagination envelope for `/openapi/v1/*` list endpoints."""
+
+    page: int
+    limit: int
+    total: int
+    has_more: bool
+    data: list[T]
+
+    @classmethod
+    def build(cls, *, page: int, limit: int, total: int, items: list[T]) -> PaginationEnvelope[T]:
+        return cls(page=page, limit=limit, total=total, has_more=page * limit < total, data=items)
+
+
+class AppListRow(BaseModel):
+    id: str
+    name: str
+    description: str | None = None
+    mode: str
+    tags: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+    updated_at: str | None = None
+    created_by_name: str | None = None
+    workspace_id: str | None = None
+    workspace_name: str | None = None
+
+
+class AppInfoResponse(BaseModel):
+    id: str
+    name: str
+    description: str | None = None
+    mode: str
+    author: str | None = None
+    tags: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+
+
+class AppDescribeInfo(AppInfoResponse):
+    updated_at: str | None = None
+    service_api_enabled: bool
+
+
+class AppDescribeResponse(BaseModel):
+    info: AppDescribeInfo | None = None
+    parameters: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+    input_schema: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+
+
+class ChatMessageResponse(BaseModel):
+    event: str
+    task_id: str
+    id: str
+    message_id: str
+    conversation_id: str
+    mode: str
+    answer: str
+    metadata: MessageMetadata = Field(default_factory=MessageMetadata)
+    created_at: int
+
+
+class CompletionMessageResponse(BaseModel):
+    event: str
+    task_id: str
+    id: str
+    message_id: str
+    mode: str
+    answer: str
+    metadata: MessageMetadata = Field(default_factory=MessageMetadata)
+    created_at: int
+
+
+class WorkflowRunData(BaseModel):
+    id: str
+    workflow_id: str
+    status: str
+    outputs: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict)
+    error: str | None = None
+    elapsed_time: float | None = None
+    total_tokens: int | None = None
+    total_steps: int | None = None
+    created_at: int | None = None
+    finished_at: int | None = None
+
+
+class WorkflowRunResponse(BaseModel):
+    workflow_run_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    mode: Literal["workflow"] = "workflow"
+    data: WorkflowRunData

api/controllers/openapi/account.py

@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+"""User-scoped account endpoints. /account is the bearer-authed
+identity read; /account/sessions and /account/sessions/<id> manage
+the user's active OAuth tokens.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import UTC, datetime
+
+from flask import g, request
+from flask_restx import Resource
+from sqlalchemy import and_, select, update
+from werkzeug.exceptions import BadRequest, NotFound
+
+from controllers.openapi import openapi_ns
+from controllers.openapi._models import MAX_PAGE_LIMIT, PaginationEnvelope
+from extensions.ext_database import db
+from extensions.ext_redis import redis_client
+from libs.oauth_bearer import (
+    ACCEPT_USER_ANY,
+    TOKEN_CACHE_KEY_FMT,
+    AuthContext,
+    SubjectType,
+    validate_bearer,
+)
+from libs.rate_limit import (
+    LIMIT_ME_PER_ACCOUNT,
+    LIMIT_ME_PER_EMAIL,
+    enforce,
+)
+from models import Account, OAuthAccessToken, Tenant, TenantAccountJoin
+
+
+@openapi_ns.route("/account")
+class AccountApi(Resource):
+    @validate_bearer(accept=ACCEPT_USER_ANY)
+    def get(self):
+        ctx = g.auth_ctx
+
+        if ctx.subject_type == SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO:
+            enforce(LIMIT_ME_PER_EMAIL, key=f"subject:{ctx.subject_email}")
+        else:
+            enforce(LIMIT_ME_PER_ACCOUNT, key=f"account:{ctx.account_id}")
+
+        if ctx.subject_type == SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO:
+            return {
+                "subject_type": ctx.subject_type,
+                "subject_email": ctx.subject_email,
+                "subject_issuer": ctx.subject_issuer,
+                "account": None,
+                "workspaces": [],
+                "default_workspace_id": None,
+            }
+
+        account = (
+            db.session.query(Account).filter(Account.id == ctx.account_id).one_or_none() if ctx.account_id else None
+        )
+        memberships = _load_memberships(ctx.account_id) if ctx.account_id else []
+        default_ws_id = _pick_default_workspace(memberships)
+
+        return {
+            "subject_type": ctx.subject_type,
+            "subject_email": ctx.subject_email or (account.email if account else None),
+            "account": _account_payload(account) if account else None,
+            "workspaces": [_workspace_payload(m) for m in memberships],
+            "default_workspace_id": default_ws_id,
+        }
+
+
+@openapi_ns.route("/account/sessions/self")
+class AccountSessionsSelfApi(Resource):
+    @validate_bearer(accept=ACCEPT_USER_ANY)
+    def delete(self):
+        ctx = g.auth_ctx
+        _require_oauth_subject(ctx)
+        _revoke_token_by_id(str(ctx.token_id))
+        return {"status": "revoked"}, 200
+
+
+@openapi_ns.route("/account/sessions")
+class AccountSessionsApi(Resource):
+    @validate_bearer(accept=ACCEPT_USER_ANY)
+    def get(self):
+        ctx = g.auth_ctx
+        now = datetime.now(UTC)
+        page = int(request.args.get("page", "1"))
+        limit = min(int(request.args.get("limit", "100")), MAX_PAGE_LIMIT)
+
+        all_rows = db.session.execute(
+            select(
+                OAuthAccessToken.id,
+                OAuthAccessToken.prefix,
+                OAuthAccessToken.client_id,
+                OAuthAccessToken.device_label,
+                OAuthAccessToken.created_at,
+                OAuthAccessToken.last_used_at,
+                OAuthAccessToken.expires_at,
+            )
+            .where(
+                and_(
+                    *_subject_match(ctx),
+                    OAuthAccessToken.revoked_at.is_(None),
+                    OAuthAccessToken.token_hash.is_not(None),
+                    OAuthAccessToken.expires_at > now,
+                )
+            )
+            .order_by(OAuthAccessToken.created_at.desc())
+        ).all()
+
+        total = len(all_rows)
+        sliced = all_rows[(page - 1) * limit : page * limit]
+
+        items = [
+            {
+                "id": str(r.id),
+                "prefix": r.prefix,
+                "client_id": r.client_id,
+                "device_label": r.device_label,
+                "created_at": _iso(r.created_at),
+                "last_used_at": _iso(r.last_used_at),
+                "expires_at": _iso(r.expires_at),
+            }
+            for r in sliced
+        ]
+
+        return (
+            PaginationEnvelope.build(page=page, limit=limit, total=total, items=items).model_dump(mode="json"),
+            200,
+        )
+
+
+@openapi_ns.route("/account/sessions/<string:session_id>")
+class AccountSessionByIdApi(Resource):
+    @validate_bearer(accept=ACCEPT_USER_ANY)
+    def delete(self, session_id: str):
+        ctx = g.auth_ctx
+        _require_oauth_subject(ctx)
+
+        # Subject-match guard. 404 (not 403) on cross-subject so the
+        # endpoint doesn't leak token IDs that belong to other subjects.
+        owns = db.session.execute(
+            select(OAuthAccessToken.id).where(
+                and_(
+                    OAuthAccessToken.id == session_id,
+                    *_subject_match(ctx),
+                )
+            )
+        ).first()
+        if owns is None:
+            raise NotFound("session not found")
+
+        _revoke_token_by_id(session_id)
+        return {"status": "revoked"}, 200
+
+
+def _subject_match(ctx: AuthContext) -> tuple:
+    """Where-clauses that scope a query to the bearer's subject. Works
+    for both account (account_id) and external_sso (email + issuer).
+    """
+    if ctx.subject_type == SubjectType.ACCOUNT:
+        return (OAuthAccessToken.account_id == str(ctx.account_id),)
+    return (
+        OAuthAccessToken.subject_email == ctx.subject_email,
+        OAuthAccessToken.subject_issuer == ctx.subject_issuer,
+        OAuthAccessToken.account_id.is_(None),
+    )
+
+
+def _require_oauth_subject(ctx: AuthContext) -> None:
+    if not ctx.source.startswith("oauth"):
+        raise BadRequest(
+            "this endpoint revokes OAuth bearer tokens; use /openapi/v1/personal-access-tokens/self for PATs"
+        )
+
+
+def _revoke_token_by_id(token_id: str) -> None:
+    # Snapshot pre-revoke hash for cache invalidation; UPDATE WHERE
+    # makes double-revoke idempotent.
+    row = (
+        db.session.query(OAuthAccessToken.token_hash)
+        .filter(
+            OAuthAccessToken.id == token_id,
+            OAuthAccessToken.revoked_at.is_(None),
+        )
+        .one_or_none()
+    )
+    pre_revoke_hash = row[0] if row else None
+
+    stmt = (
+        update(OAuthAccessToken)
+        .where(
+            OAuthAccessToken.id == token_id,
+            OAuthAccessToken.revoked_at.is_(None),
+        )
+        .values(revoked_at=datetime.now(UTC), token_hash=None)
+    )
+    db.session.execute(stmt)
+    db.session.commit()
+
+    if pre_revoke_hash:
+        redis_client.delete(TOKEN_CACHE_KEY_FMT.format(hash=pre_revoke_hash))
+
+
+def _iso(dt: datetime | None) -> str | None:
+    if dt is None:
+        return None
+    if dt.tzinfo is None:
+        dt = dt.replace(tzinfo=UTC)
+    return dt.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _load_memberships(account_id):
+    return (
+        db.session.query(TenantAccountJoin, Tenant)
+        .join(Tenant, Tenant.id == TenantAccountJoin.tenant_id)
+        .filter(TenantAccountJoin.account_id == account_id)
+        .all()
+    )
+
+
+def _pick_default_workspace(memberships) -> str | None:
+    if not memberships:
+        return None
+    for join, tenant in memberships:
+        if getattr(join, "current", False):
+            return str(tenant.id)
+    return str(memberships[0][1].id)
+
+
+def _workspace_payload(row) -> dict:
+    join, tenant = row
+    return {"id": str(tenant.id), "name": tenant.name, "role": getattr(join, "role", "")}
+
+
+def _account_payload(account) -> dict:
+    return {"id": str(account.id), "email": account.email, "name": account.name}

api/controllers/openapi/app_run.py

@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+"""POST /openapi/v1/apps/<app_id>/run — mode-agnostic runner."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+from collections.abc import Callable, Iterator, Mapping
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from typing import Any, Literal
+from uuid import UUID
+
+from flask import request
+from flask_restx import Resource
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ValidationError, field_validator
+from werkzeug.exceptions import BadRequest, HTTPException, InternalServerError, NotFound, UnprocessableEntity
+
+import services
+from controllers.openapi import openapi_ns
+from controllers.openapi._audit import emit_app_run
+from controllers.openapi._models import (
+    ChatMessageResponse,
+    CompletionMessageResponse,
+    WorkflowRunResponse,
+)
+from controllers.openapi.auth.composition import OAUTH_BEARER_PIPELINE
+from controllers.service_api.app.error import (
+    AppUnavailableError,
+    CompletionRequestError,
+    ConversationCompletedError,
+    ProviderModelCurrentlyNotSupportError,
+    ProviderNotInitializeError,
+    ProviderQuotaExceededError,
+)
+from controllers.web.error import InvokeRateLimitError as InvokeRateLimitHttpError
+from core.app.entities.app_invoke_entities import InvokeFrom
+from core.errors.error import (
+    ModelCurrentlyNotSupportError,
+    ProviderTokenNotInitError,
+    QuotaExceededError,
+)
+from graphon.model_runtime.errors.invoke import InvokeError
+from libs import helper
+from libs.helper import UUIDStrOrEmpty
+from libs.oauth_bearer import Scope
+from models.model import App, AppMode
+from services.app_generate_service import AppGenerateService
+from services.errors.app import (
+    IsDraftWorkflowError,
+    WorkflowIdFormatError,
+    WorkflowNotFoundError,
+)
+from services.errors.llm import InvokeRateLimitError
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+class AppRunRequest(BaseModel):
+    inputs: dict[str, Any]
+    query: str | None = None
+    files: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = None
+    response_mode: Literal["blocking", "streaming"] | None = None
+    conversation_id: UUIDStrOrEmpty | None = None
+    auto_generate_name: bool = True
+    workflow_id: str | None = None
+    workspace_id: UUIDStrOrEmpty | None = None
+
+    @field_validator("conversation_id", mode="before")
+    @classmethod
+    def _normalize_conv(cls, value: str | UUID | None) -> str | None:
+        if isinstance(value, str):
+            value = value.strip()
+        if not value:
+            return None
+        try:
+            return helper.uuid_value(value)
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            raise ValueError("conversation_id must be a valid UUID") from exc
+
+
+@contextmanager
+def _translate_service_errors() -> Iterator[None]:
+    try:
+        yield
+    except WorkflowNotFoundError as ex:
+        raise NotFound(str(ex))
+    except (IsDraftWorkflowError, WorkflowIdFormatError) as ex:
+        raise BadRequest(str(ex))
+    except services.errors.conversation.ConversationNotExistsError:
+        raise NotFound("Conversation Not Exists.")
+    except services.errors.conversation.ConversationCompletedError:
+        raise ConversationCompletedError()
+    except services.errors.app_model_config.AppModelConfigBrokenError:
+        logger.exception("App model config broken.")
+        raise AppUnavailableError()
+    except ProviderTokenNotInitError as ex:
+        raise ProviderNotInitializeError(ex.description)
+    except QuotaExceededError:
+        raise ProviderQuotaExceededError()
+    except ModelCurrentlyNotSupportError:
+        raise ProviderModelCurrentlyNotSupportError()
+    except InvokeRateLimitError as ex:
+        raise InvokeRateLimitHttpError(ex.description)
+    except InvokeError as e:
+        raise CompletionRequestError(e.description)
+
+
+def _unpack_blocking(response: Any) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    if isinstance(response, tuple):
+        response = response[0]
+    if not isinstance(response, Mapping):
+        raise InternalServerError("blocking generate returned non-mapping response")
+    return response
+
+
+def _generate(app: App, caller: Any, args: dict[str, Any], streaming: bool):
+    return AppGenerateService.generate(
+        app_model=app,
+        user=caller,
+        args=args,
+        invoke_from=InvokeFrom.OPENAPI,
+        streaming=streaming,
+    )
+
+
+def _run_chat(app: App, caller: Any, payload: AppRunRequest, streaming: bool):
+    if not payload.query or not payload.query.strip():
+        raise UnprocessableEntity("query_required_for_chat")
+    args = payload.model_dump(exclude_none=True)
+    with _translate_service_errors():
+        response = _generate(app, caller, args, streaming)
+    if streaming:
+        return response, None
+    return None, ChatMessageResponse.model_validate(_unpack_blocking(response)).model_dump(mode="json")
+
+
+def _run_completion(app: App, caller: Any, payload: AppRunRequest, streaming: bool):
+    args = payload.model_dump(exclude_none=True)
+    args["auto_generate_name"] = False
+    args.setdefault("query", "")
+    with _translate_service_errors():
+        response = _generate(app, caller, args, streaming)
+    if streaming:
+        return response, None
+    return None, CompletionMessageResponse.model_validate(_unpack_blocking(response)).model_dump(mode="json")
+
+
+def _run_workflow(app: App, caller: Any, payload: AppRunRequest, streaming: bool):
+    if payload.query is not None:
+        raise UnprocessableEntity("query_not_supported_for_workflow")
+    args = payload.model_dump(exclude={"query", "conversation_id", "auto_generate_name"}, exclude_none=True)
+    with _translate_service_errors():
+        response = _generate(app, caller, args, streaming)
+    if streaming:
+        return response, None
+    return None, WorkflowRunResponse.model_validate(_unpack_blocking(response)).model_dump(mode="json")
+
+
+_DISPATCH: dict[AppMode, Callable[[App, Any, AppRunRequest, bool], tuple[Any, dict[str, Any] | None]]] = {
+    AppMode.CHAT: _run_chat,
+    AppMode.AGENT_CHAT: _run_chat,
+    AppMode.ADVANCED_CHAT: _run_chat,
+    AppMode.COMPLETION: _run_completion,
+    AppMode.WORKFLOW: _run_workflow,
+}
+
+
+@openapi_ns.route("/apps/<string:app_id>/run")
+class AppRunApi(Resource):
+    @OAUTH_BEARER_PIPELINE.guard(scope=Scope.APPS_RUN)
+    def post(self, app_id: str, app_model: App, caller, caller_kind: str):
+        body = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
+        body.pop("user", None)
+        try:
+            payload = AppRunRequest.model_validate(body)
+        except ValidationError as exc:
+            raise UnprocessableEntity(exc.json())
+
+        handler = _DISPATCH.get(app_model.mode)
+        if handler is None:
+            raise UnprocessableEntity("mode_not_runnable")
+
+        streaming = payload.response_mode == "streaming"
+        try:
+            stream_obj, blocking_body = handler(app_model, caller, payload, streaming)
+        except HTTPException:
+            raise
+        except Exception:
+            logger.exception("internal server error.")
+            raise InternalServerError()
+
+        emit_app_run(
+            app_id=app_model.id,
+            tenant_id=app_model.tenant_id,
+            caller_kind=caller_kind,
+            mode=str(app_model.mode),
+            surface="apps",
+        )
+
+        if streaming:
+            return helper.compact_generate_response(stream_obj)
+        return blocking_body, 200

api/controllers/openapi/apps.py

@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
+"""GET /openapi/v1/apps and per-app reads.
+
+Decorator order: `method_decorators` is innermost-first. `validate_bearer`
+is last → outermost → sets `g.auth_ctx` before `require_scope` reads it.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import uuid as _uuid
+from typing import Any
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from flask import g, request
+from flask_restx import Resource
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, ValidationError, field_validator
+from werkzeug.exceptions import Conflict, NotFound, UnprocessableEntity
+
+from controllers.common.fields import Parameters
+from controllers.openapi import openapi_ns
+from controllers.openapi._input_schema import EMPTY_INPUT_SCHEMA, build_input_schema, resolve_app_config
+from controllers.openapi._models import (
+    MAX_PAGE_LIMIT,
+    AppDescribeInfo,
+    AppDescribeResponse,
+    AppListRow,
+    PaginationEnvelope,
+)
+from controllers.openapi.auth.surface_gate import accept_subjects
+from controllers.service_api.app.error import AppUnavailableError
+from core.app.app_config.common.parameters_mapping import get_parameters_from_feature_dict
+from extensions.ext_database import db
+from libs.oauth_bearer import (
+    ACCEPT_USER_ANY,
+    AuthContext,
+    Scope,
+    SubjectType,
+    require_scope,
+    require_workspace_member,
+    validate_bearer,
+)
+from models import App, Tenant
+from models.model import AppMode
+from services.app_service import AppService
+from services.openapi.visibility import apply_openapi_gate, is_openapi_visible
+from services.tag_service import TagService
+
+# method_decorators applies left-to-right innermost-first; flask_restx wraps
+# in order, so the LAST entry is the outermost. Execution flows
+# validate_bearer → accept_subjects → require_scope → handler.
+_APPS_READ_DECORATORS = [
+    require_scope(Scope.APPS_READ),
+    accept_subjects(SubjectType.ACCOUNT),
+    validate_bearer(accept=ACCEPT_USER_ANY),
+]
+
+_ALLOWED_DESCRIBE_FIELDS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"info", "parameters", "input_schema"})
+
+
+class AppDescribeQuery(BaseModel):
+    """`?fields=` allow-list for GET /apps/<id>/describe.
+
+    Empty / omitted → all blocks. Unknown member → ValidationError → 422.
+    """
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid")
+
+    fields: set[str] | None = None
+    workspace_id: str | None = None
+
+    @field_validator("workspace_id", mode="before")
+    @classmethod
+    def _validate_workspace_id(cls, v: object) -> str | None:
+        if v is None or v == "":
+            return None
+        if not isinstance(v, str):
+            raise ValueError("workspace_id must be a string")
+        try:
+            _uuid.UUID(v)
+        except ValueError:
+            raise ValueError("workspace_id must be a valid UUID")
+        return v
+
+    @field_validator("fields", mode="before")
+    @classmethod
+    def _parse_fields(cls, v: object) -> set[str] | None:
+        if v is None or v == "":
+            return None
+        if not isinstance(v, str):
+            raise ValueError("fields must be a comma-separated string")
+        members = {m.strip() for m in v.split(",") if m.strip()}
+        unknown = members - _ALLOWED_DESCRIBE_FIELDS
+        if unknown:
+            raise ValueError(f"unknown field(s): {sorted(unknown)}")
+        return members
+
+
+_EMPTY_PARAMETERS: dict[str, Any] = {
+    "opening_statement": None,
+    "suggested_questions": [],
+    "user_input_form": [],
+    "file_upload": None,
+    "system_parameters": {},
+}
+
+
+class AppReadResource(Resource):
+    """Base for per-app read endpoints; subclasses call `_load()` for SSO/membership/exists checks."""
+
+    method_decorators = _APPS_READ_DECORATORS
+
+    def _load(self, app_id: str, workspace_id: str | None = None) -> tuple[App, AuthContext]:
+        ctx: AuthContext = g.auth_ctx
+
+        try:
+            parsed_uuid = _uuid.UUID(app_id)
+            is_uuid = True
+        except ValueError:
+            parsed_uuid = None
+            is_uuid = False
+
+        if is_uuid:
+            app = db.session.get(App, str(parsed_uuid))  # normalised dashed form
+            if not app or app.status != "normal" or not is_openapi_visible(app):
+                raise NotFound("app not found")
+        else:
+            if not workspace_id:
+                raise UnprocessableEntity("workspace_id is required for name-based lookup")
+            matches = list(
+                db.session.execute(
+                    apply_openapi_gate(
+                        sa.select(App).where(
+                            App.name == app_id,
+                            App.tenant_id == workspace_id,
+                            App.status == "normal",
+                        )
+                    )
+                ).scalars()
+            )
+            if len(matches) == 0:
+                raise NotFound("app not found")
+            if len(matches) > 1:
+                lines = [f"app name {app_id!r} is ambiguous — re-run with a UUID:\n\n"]
+                lines.append(f"  {'ID':<36}  {'MODE':<12}  NAME\n")
+                for m in matches:
+                    lines.append(f"  {str(m.id):<36}  {str(m.mode.value):<12}  {m.name}\n")
+                raise Conflict("".join(lines))
+            app = matches[0]
+
+        require_workspace_member(ctx, str(app.tenant_id))
+        return app, ctx
+
+
+def parameters_payload(app: App) -> dict:
+    """Mirrors service_api/app/app.py::AppParameterApi response body."""
+    features_dict, user_input_form = resolve_app_config(app)
+    parameters = get_parameters_from_feature_dict(features_dict=features_dict, user_input_form=user_input_form)
+    return Parameters.model_validate(parameters).model_dump(mode="json")
+
+
+@openapi_ns.route("/apps/<string:app_id>/describe")
+class AppDescribeApi(AppReadResource):
+    def get(self, app_id: str):
+        try:
+            query = AppDescribeQuery.model_validate(request.args.to_dict(flat=True))
+        except ValidationError as exc:
+            raise UnprocessableEntity(exc.json())
+
+        app, _ = self._load(app_id, workspace_id=query.workspace_id)
+
+        requested = query.fields
+        want_info = requested is None or "info" in requested
+        want_params = requested is None or "parameters" in requested
+        want_schema = requested is None or "input_schema" in requested
+
+        info = (
+            AppDescribeInfo(
+                id=str(app.id),
+                name=app.name,
+                mode=app.mode,
+                description=app.description,
+                tags=[{"name": t.name} for t in app.tags],
+                author=app.author_name,
+                updated_at=app.updated_at.isoformat() if app.updated_at else None,
+                service_api_enabled=bool(app.enable_api),
+            )
+            if want_info
+            else None
+        )
+
+        parameters: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+        input_schema: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+        if want_params:
+            try:
+                parameters = parameters_payload(app)
+            except AppUnavailableError:
+                parameters = dict(_EMPTY_PARAMETERS)
+        if want_schema:
+            try:
+                input_schema = build_input_schema(app)
+            except AppUnavailableError:
+                input_schema = dict(EMPTY_INPUT_SCHEMA)
+
+        return (
+            AppDescribeResponse(
+                info=info,
+                parameters=parameters,
+                input_schema=input_schema,
+            ).model_dump(mode="json", exclude_none=False),
+            200,
+        )
+
+
+class AppListQuery(BaseModel):
+    """`mode` is a closed enum — unknown values 422 instead of silently-empty data."""
+
+    workspace_id: str
+    page: int = Field(1, ge=1)
+    limit: int = Field(20, ge=1, le=MAX_PAGE_LIMIT)
+    mode: AppMode | None = None
+    name: str | None = Field(None, max_length=200)
+    tag: str | None = Field(None, max_length=100)
+
+
+@openapi_ns.route("/apps")
+class AppListApi(Resource):
+    method_decorators = _APPS_READ_DECORATORS
+
+    def get(self):
+        ctx: AuthContext = g.auth_ctx
+
+        try:
+            query = AppListQuery.model_validate(request.args.to_dict(flat=True))
+        except ValidationError as exc:
+            raise UnprocessableEntity(exc.json())
+
+        workspace_id = query.workspace_id
+        require_workspace_member(ctx, workspace_id)
+
+        empty = (
+            PaginationEnvelope[AppListRow]
+            .build(page=query.page, limit=query.limit, total=0, items=[])
+            .model_dump(mode="json"),
+            200,
+        )
+
+        if query.name:
+            try:
+                parsed_uuid = _uuid.UUID(query.name)
+            except ValueError:
+                parsed_uuid = None
+        else:
+            parsed_uuid = None
+
+        if parsed_uuid is not None:
+            app = db.session.get(App, str(parsed_uuid))
+            if (
+                not app
+                or app.status != "normal"
+                or str(app.tenant_id) != workspace_id
+                or not is_openapi_visible(app)
+            ):
+                return empty
+            tenant_name = db.session.execute(
+                sa.select(Tenant.name).where(Tenant.id == workspace_id)
+            ).scalar_one_or_none()
+            item = AppListRow(
+                id=str(app.id),
+                name=app.name,
+                description=app.description,
+                mode=app.mode,
+                tags=[{"name": t.name} for t in app.tags],
+                updated_at=app.updated_at.isoformat() if app.updated_at else None,
+                created_by_name=getattr(app, "author_name", None),
+                workspace_id=str(workspace_id),
+                workspace_name=tenant_name,
+            )
+            env = PaginationEnvelope[AppListRow].build(page=1, limit=1, total=1, items=[item])
+            return env.model_dump(mode="json"), 200
+
+        tag_ids: list[str] | None = None
+        if query.tag:
+            tags = TagService.get_tag_by_tag_name("app", workspace_id, query.tag)
+            if not tags:
+                return empty
+            tag_ids = [tag.id for tag in tags]
+
+        args: dict[str, Any] = {
+            "page": query.page,
+            "limit": query.limit,
+            "mode": query.mode.value if query.mode else "",
+            "name": query.name,
+            "status": "normal",
+            # Visibility gate pushed into the query — pagination.total stays
+            # consistent across pages because invisible rows never count.
+            "openapi_visible": True,
+        }
+        if tag_ids:
+            args["tag_ids"] = tag_ids
+
+        pagination = AppService().get_paginate_apps(ctx.account_id, workspace_id, args)
+        if pagination is None:
+            return empty
+
+        tenant_name: str | None = None
+        if pagination.items:
+            tenant_name = db.session.execute(
+                sa.select(Tenant.name).where(Tenant.id == workspace_id)
+            ).scalar_one_or_none()
+
+        items = [
+            AppListRow(
+                id=str(r.id),
+                name=r.name,
+                description=r.description,
+                mode=r.mode,
+                tags=[{"name": t.name} for t in r.tags],
+                updated_at=r.updated_at.isoformat() if r.updated_at else None,
+                created_by_name=getattr(r, "author_name", None),
+                workspace_id=str(workspace_id),
+                workspace_name=tenant_name,
+            )
+            for r in pagination.items
+        ]
+        env = PaginationEnvelope[AppListRow].build(
+            page=query.page,
+            limit=query.limit,
+            total=int(pagination.total),
+            items=items,
+        )
+        return env.model_dump(mode="json"), 200

api/controllers/openapi/apps_permitted_external.py

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+"""GET /openapi/v1/permitted-external-apps — external-subject app discovery (EE only).
+
+`dfoe_` (External SSO) callers reach apps gated by ACL access-mode
+(public / sso_verified). License-gated: CE deploys never enable the
+EE blueprint chain so this module is unreachable there.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from flask import request
+from flask_restx import Resource
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, ValidationError
+from werkzeug.exceptions import UnprocessableEntity
+
+from controllers.openapi import openapi_ns
+from controllers.openapi._models import (
+    MAX_PAGE_LIMIT,
+    AppListRow,
+    PaginationEnvelope,
+)
+from controllers.openapi.auth.surface_gate import accept_subjects
+from extensions.ext_database import db
+from libs.device_flow_security import enterprise_only
+from libs.oauth_bearer import (
+    ACCEPT_USER_ANY,
+    Scope,
+    SubjectType,
+    require_scope,
+    validate_bearer,
+)
+from models import App, Tenant
+from models.model import AppMode
+from services.enterprise.app_permitted_service import list_permitted_apps
+from services.openapi.license_gate import license_required
+from services.openapi.visibility import apply_openapi_gate
+
+
+class PermittedExternalAppsListQuery(BaseModel):
+    """Strict (`extra='forbid'`) — rejects `workspace_id`/`tag`/etc. that are valid on /apps but not here."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid")
+
+    page: int = Field(1, ge=1)
+    limit: int = Field(20, ge=1, le=MAX_PAGE_LIMIT)
+    mode: AppMode | None = None
+    name: str | None = Field(None, max_length=200)
+
+
+@openapi_ns.route("/permitted-external-apps")
+class PermittedExternalAppsListApi(Resource):
+    # method_decorators applies left-to-right innermost-first; execution
+    # flows enterprise_only → validate_bearer → accept_subjects →
+    # license_required → require_scope → handler. validate_bearer is
+    # widened to ACCEPT_USER_ANY so accept_subjects can emit the
+    # `openapi.wrong_surface_denied` audit on dfoa_→external misses
+    # instead of validate_bearer rejecting silently with "subject type
+    # not accepted here".
+    method_decorators = [
+        require_scope(Scope.APPS_READ_PERMITTED_EXTERNAL),
+        license_required,
+        accept_subjects(SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO),
+        validate_bearer(accept=ACCEPT_USER_ANY),
+        enterprise_only,
+    ]
+
+    def get(self):
+        try:
+            query = PermittedExternalAppsListQuery.model_validate(request.args.to_dict(flat=True))
+        except ValidationError as exc:
+            raise UnprocessableEntity(exc.json())
+
+        page_result = list_permitted_apps(
+            page=query.page,
+            limit=query.limit,
+            mode=query.mode.value if query.mode else None,
+            name=query.name,
+        )
+
+        if not page_result.app_ids:
+            env = PaginationEnvelope[AppListRow].build(
+                page=query.page, limit=query.limit, total=page_result.total, items=[]
+            )
+            return env.model_dump(mode="json"), 200
+
+        apps_by_id = {
+            str(a.id): a
+            for a in db.session.execute(
+                apply_openapi_gate(sa.select(App).where(App.id.in_(page_result.app_ids)))
+            ).scalars().all()
+        }
+        tenant_ids = list({a.tenant_id for a in apps_by_id.values()})
+        tenants_by_id = {
+            str(t.id): t for t in db.session.execute(sa.select(Tenant).where(Tenant.id.in_(tenant_ids))).scalars().all()
+        }
+
+        items: list[AppListRow] = []
+        for app_id in page_result.app_ids:
+            app = apps_by_id.get(app_id)
+            if not app or app.status != "normal":
+                continue
+            tenant = tenants_by_id.get(str(app.tenant_id))
+            items.append(
+                AppListRow(
+                    id=str(app.id),
+                    name=app.name,
+                    description=app.description,
+                    mode=app.mode,
+                    tags=[],  # tenant-scoped; not surfaced cross-tenant
+                    updated_at=app.updated_at.isoformat() if app.updated_at else None,
+                    created_by_name=None,  # cross-tenant author leak prevention
+                    workspace_id=str(app.tenant_id),
+                    workspace_name=tenant.name if tenant else None,
+                )
+            )
+
+        # total/has_more reflect the EE-side allow-list; len(items) may be < limit when local rows are dropped.
+        env = PaginationEnvelope[AppListRow].build(
+            page=query.page, limit=query.limit, total=page_result.total, items=items
+        )
+        return env.model_dump(mode="json"), 200

api/controllers/openapi/auth/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+from controllers.openapi.auth.composition import OAUTH_BEARER_PIPELINE
+
+__all__ = ["OAUTH_BEARER_PIPELINE"]

api/controllers/openapi/auth/composition.py

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+"""`OAUTH_BEARER_PIPELINE` — the auth scheme for openapi `/run` endpoints.
+
+Endpoints attach via `@OAUTH_BEARER_PIPELINE.guard(scope=…)`. No alternative
+paths. Read endpoints (`/apps`, `/info`, `/parameters`, `/describe`) skip
+the pipeline and use `validate_bearer + require_scope + require_workspace_member`
+inline — they don't need `AppAuthzCheck`/`CallerMount`.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from controllers.openapi.auth.pipeline import Pipeline
+from controllers.openapi.auth.steps import (
+    AppAuthzCheck,
+    AppResolver,
+    BearerCheck,
+    CallerMount,
+    ScopeCheck,
+    SurfaceCheck,
+    WorkspaceMembershipCheck,
+)
+from controllers.openapi.auth.strategies import (
+    AccountMounter,
+    AclStrategy,
+    AppAuthzStrategy,
+    EndUserMounter,
+    MembershipStrategy,
+)
+from libs.oauth_bearer import SubjectType
+from services.feature_service import FeatureService
+
+
+def _resolve_app_authz_strategy() -> AppAuthzStrategy:
+    if FeatureService.get_system_features().webapp_auth.enabled:
+        return AclStrategy()
+    return MembershipStrategy()
+
+
+# Pipeline currently serves only `/openapi/v1/apps/<id>/run` — an account
+# (dfoa_) surface route. SurfaceCheck runs right after BearerCheck so
+# pipeline-guarded routes get the same wrong_surface 403 + audit emit as
+# the inline `@accept_subjects` decorator on read endpoints. When the
+# external-surface run route lands, swap in an external-pipeline builder
+# that constructs SurfaceCheck(accepted=frozenset({USER_EXT_SSO})).
+OAUTH_BEARER_PIPELINE = Pipeline(
+    BearerCheck(),
+    SurfaceCheck(accepted=frozenset({SubjectType.ACCOUNT})),
+    ScopeCheck(),
+    AppResolver(),
+    WorkspaceMembershipCheck(),
+    AppAuthzCheck(_resolve_app_authz_strategy),
+    CallerMount(AccountMounter(), EndUserMounter()),
+)

api/controllers/openapi/auth/context.py

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+"""Mutable per-request context for the openapi auth pipeline.
+
+Every field starts None / empty and is filled in by a step. The pipeline
+is the only thing that should construct or mutate Context — handlers
+read populated values via the decorator's kwargs unpacking.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Literal, Protocol
+
+from flask import Request
+
+from libs.oauth_bearer import Scope, SubjectType
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from models import App, Tenant
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Context:
+    request: Request
+    required_scope: Scope
+    subject_type: SubjectType | None = None
+    subject_email: str | None = None
+    subject_issuer: str | None = None
+    account_id: uuid.UUID | None = None
+    scopes: frozenset[Scope] = field(default_factory=frozenset)
+    token_id: uuid.UUID | None = None
+    token_hash: str | None = None
+    cached_verified_tenants: dict[str, bool] | None = None
+    source: str | None = None
+    expires_at: datetime | None = None
+    app: App | None = None
+    tenant: Tenant | None = None
+    caller: object | None = None
+    caller_kind: Literal["account", "end_user"] | None = None
+
+
+class Step(Protocol):
+    """One responsibility. Mutate ctx or raise to short-circuit."""
+
+    def __call__(self, ctx: Context) -> None: ...

api/controllers/openapi/auth/pipeline.py

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+"""Pipeline IS the auth scheme.
+
+`Pipeline.guard(scope=…)` is the only attachment point for endpoints —
+that is the design lock-in: forgetting an auth layer is structurally
+impossible because there is no "sometimes wrap, sometimes don't" choice.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from functools import wraps
+
+from flask import request
+
+from controllers.openapi.auth.context import Context, Step
+from libs.oauth_bearer import Scope
+
+
+class Pipeline:
+    def __init__(self, *steps: Step) -> None:
+        self._steps = steps
+
+    def run(self, ctx: Context) -> None:
+        for step in self._steps:
+            step(ctx)
+
+    def guard(self, *, scope: Scope):
+        def decorator(view):
+            @wraps(view)
+            def decorated(*args, **kwargs):
+                ctx = Context(request=request, required_scope=scope)
+                self.run(ctx)
+                kwargs.update(
+                    app_model=ctx.app,
+                    caller=ctx.caller,
+                    caller_kind=ctx.caller_kind,
+                )
+                return view(*args, **kwargs)
+
+            return decorated
+
+        return decorator

api/controllers/openapi/auth/steps.py

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+"""Pipeline steps. Each is one responsibility.
+
+`BearerCheck` is the only step that touches the token registry; downstream
+steps see only the populated `Context`. `BearerCheck` also assigns
+``g.auth_ctx`` (the same way ``validate_bearer`` does) so the surface gate
++ any handler reading the request-scoped context has a single source of
+truth across both auth-attach paths.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import Callable
+
+from flask import g
+from werkzeug.exceptions import BadRequest, Forbidden, NotFound, Unauthorized
+
+from configs import dify_config
+from controllers.openapi.auth.context import Context
+from controllers.openapi.auth.strategies import AppAuthzStrategy, CallerMounter
+from controllers.openapi.auth.surface_gate import check_surface
+from extensions.ext_database import db
+from libs.oauth_bearer import (
+    AuthContext,
+    InvalidBearerError,
+    Scope,
+    SubjectType,
+    _extract_bearer,  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    check_workspace_membership,
+    get_authenticator,
+)
+from models import App, Tenant, TenantStatus
+
+
+class BearerCheck:
+    """Resolve bearer → populate identity fields. Rate-limit is enforced
+    inside `BearerAuthenticator.authenticate`, so no separate step here.
+    Also attaches the resolved `AuthContext` to ``g.auth_ctx`` — same shape
+    the decorator-level ``validate_bearer`` writes — so the surface gate
+    + downstream readers don't see two different identity sources."""
+
+    def __call__(self, ctx: Context) -> None:
+        token = _extract_bearer(ctx.request)
+        if not token:
+            raise Unauthorized("bearer required")
+
+        try:
+            authn = get_authenticator().authenticate(token)
+        except InvalidBearerError as e:
+            raise Unauthorized(str(e))
+
+        ctx.subject_type = authn.subject_type
+        ctx.subject_email = authn.subject_email
+        ctx.subject_issuer = authn.subject_issuer
+        ctx.account_id = authn.account_id
+        ctx.scopes = frozenset(authn.scopes)
+        ctx.source = authn.source
+        ctx.token_id = authn.token_id
+        ctx.expires_at = authn.expires_at
+        ctx.token_hash = authn.token_hash
+        ctx.cached_verified_tenants = dict(authn.verified_tenants)
+
+        # Single source of truth for the request-scoped identity. Surface
+        # gate + handlers read `g.auth_ctx` regardless of whether the route
+        # ran the decorator path (`validate_bearer`) or the pipeline path.
+        g.auth_ctx = authn
+
+
+class ScopeCheck:
+    """Verify ctx.scopes (already populated by BearerCheck) covers required."""
+
+    def __call__(self, ctx: Context) -> None:
+        if Scope.FULL in ctx.scopes or ctx.required_scope in ctx.scopes:
+            return
+        raise Forbidden("insufficient_scope")
+
+
+class SurfaceCheck:
+    """Reject the request if `g.auth_ctx.subject_type` is not in `accepted`.
+
+    Delegates to `surface_gate.check_surface` so the inline decorator and
+    the pipeline step emit identical audit events. Relies on `BearerCheck`
+    (above) having set `g.auth_ctx`.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, *, accepted: frozenset[SubjectType]) -> None:
+        self._accepted = accepted
+
+    def __call__(self, ctx: Context) -> None:
+        check_surface(self._accepted)
+
+
+class AppResolver:
+    """Read app_id from request.view_args, populate ctx.app + ctx.tenant.
+
+    Every endpoint using the OAuth bearer pipeline must declare
+    ``<string:app_id>`` in its route — that is the design lock-in (no body /
+    header coupling).
+    """
+
+    def __call__(self, ctx: Context) -> None:
+        app_id = (ctx.request.view_args or {}).get("app_id")
+        if not app_id:
+            raise BadRequest("app_id is required in path")
+        app = db.session.get(App, app_id)
+        if not app or app.status != "normal":
+            raise NotFound("app not found")
+        if not app.enable_api:
+            raise Forbidden("service_api_disabled")
+        tenant = db.session.get(Tenant, app.tenant_id)
+        if tenant is None or tenant.status == TenantStatus.ARCHIVE:
+            raise Forbidden("workspace unavailable")
+        ctx.app, ctx.tenant = app, tenant
+
+
+class WorkspaceMembershipCheck:
+    """Layer 0 — workspace membership gate.
+
+    CE-only (skipped when ENTERPRISE_ENABLED). Account-subject bearers
+    (dfoa_) only — SSO subjects skip.
+    """
+
+    def __call__(self, ctx: Context) -> None:
+        if dify_config.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED:
+            return
+        if ctx.subject_type != SubjectType.ACCOUNT:
+            return
+        if ctx.account_id is None or ctx.tenant is None:
+            raise Unauthorized("account_id or tenant unset — BearerCheck or AppResolver did not run")
+        if ctx.token_hash is None:
+            raise Unauthorized("token_hash unset — BearerCheck did not run")
+
+        check_workspace_membership(
+            account_id=ctx.account_id,
+            tenant_id=ctx.tenant.id,
+            token_hash=ctx.token_hash,
+            cached_verdicts=ctx.cached_verified_tenants or {},
+        )
+
+
+class AppAuthzCheck:
+    def __init__(self, resolve_strategy: Callable[[], AppAuthzStrategy]) -> None:
+        self._resolve = resolve_strategy
+
+    def __call__(self, ctx: Context) -> None:
+        if not self._resolve().authorize(ctx):
+            raise Forbidden("subject_no_app_access")
+
+
+class CallerMount:
+    def __init__(self, *mounters: CallerMounter) -> None:
+        self._mounters = mounters
+
+    def __call__(self, ctx: Context) -> None:
+        if ctx.subject_type is None:
+            raise Unauthorized("subject_type unset — BearerCheck did not run")
+        for m in self._mounters:
+            if m.applies_to(ctx.subject_type):
+                m.mount(ctx)
+                return
+        raise Unauthorized("no caller mounter for subject type")
+
+
+# AuthContext re-export so callers reading `g.auth_ctx` after a pipeline
+# run get a consistent import location next to the step that writes it.
+__all__ = [
+    "AppAuthzCheck",
+    "AppResolver",
+    "AuthContext",
+    "BearerCheck",
+    "CallerMount",
+    "ScopeCheck",
+    "SurfaceCheck",
+    "WorkspaceMembershipCheck",
+]

api/controllers/openapi/auth/strategies.py

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+"""Strategy classes for the openapi auth pipeline.
+
+App authorization (Acl/Membership) and caller mounting (Account/EndUser)
+vary along independent axes; each strategy is one class so the pipeline
+composition stays a flat list.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import uuid
+from typing import Protocol
+
+from flask import current_app
+from flask_login import user_logged_in
+from sqlalchemy import select
+
+from controllers.openapi.auth.context import Context
+from core.app.entities.app_invoke_entities import InvokeFrom
+from extensions.ext_database import db
+from libs.oauth_bearer import SubjectType
+from models import Account, TenantAccountJoin
+from services.end_user_service import EndUserService
+from services.enterprise.enterprise_service import (
+    EnterpriseService,
+    WebAppAccessMode,
+)
+
+
+class AppAuthzStrategy(Protocol):
+    def authorize(self, ctx: Context) -> bool: ...
+
+
+class AclStrategy:
+    """Per-app ACL, evaluated in two stages.
+
+    The EE gateway has already enforced tenancy and workspace membership
+    by the time this strategy runs, so AclStrategy only owns per-app ACL:
+
+    1. Subject vs access-mode compatibility (pure rule table). External-SSO
+       bearers belong to public-facing apps only; account bearers cover the
+       full set. A mismatch is an immediate deny — no IO.
+    2. For modes that pair with the subject, decide whether the inner
+       permission API must run. Only `PRIVATE` (per-app selected-user list)
+       requires it; the remaining modes are pass-through.
+    """
+
+    _ALLOWED_MODES_BY_SUBJECT: dict[SubjectType, frozenset[WebAppAccessMode]] = {
+        SubjectType.ACCOUNT: frozenset(
+            {
+                WebAppAccessMode.PUBLIC,
+                WebAppAccessMode.SSO_VERIFIED,
+                WebAppAccessMode.PRIVATE_ALL,
+                WebAppAccessMode.PRIVATE,
+            }
+        ),
+        SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO: frozenset(
+            {
+                WebAppAccessMode.PUBLIC,
+                WebAppAccessMode.SSO_VERIFIED,
+            }
+        ),
+    }
+
+    _MODES_REQUIRING_INNER_CHECK: frozenset[WebAppAccessMode] = frozenset(
+        {WebAppAccessMode.PRIVATE}
+    )
+
+    def authorize(self, ctx: Context) -> bool:
+        if ctx.app is None:
+            return False
+        access_mode = self._fetch_access_mode(ctx.app.id)
+        if access_mode is None:
+            return False
+        if not self._subject_allowed_for_mode(ctx.subject_type, access_mode):
+            return False
+        if access_mode not in self._MODES_REQUIRING_INNER_CHECK:
+            return True
+        return self._inner_permission_check(ctx)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _fetch_access_mode(app_id: str) -> WebAppAccessMode | None:
+        settings = EnterpriseService.WebAppAuth.get_app_access_mode_by_id(app_id=app_id)
+        if settings is None:
+            return None
+        try:
+            return WebAppAccessMode(settings.access_mode)
+        except ValueError:
+            return None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def _subject_allowed_for_mode(
+        cls, subject_type: SubjectType, access_mode: WebAppAccessMode
+    ) -> bool:
+        return access_mode in cls._ALLOWED_MODES_BY_SUBJECT.get(subject_type, frozenset())
+
+    def _inner_permission_check(self, ctx: Context) -> bool:
+        if ctx.app is None:
+            return False
+        user_id = self._resolve_user_id(ctx)
+        if user_id is None:
+            return False
+        return EnterpriseService.WebAppAuth.is_user_allowed_to_access_webapp(
+            user_id=user_id,
+            app_id=ctx.app.id,
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _resolve_user_id(ctx: Context) -> str | None:
+        if ctx.subject_type == SubjectType.ACCOUNT:
+            return str(ctx.account_id) if ctx.account_id is not None else None
+        if ctx.subject_email is None:
+            return None
+        account = db.session.execute(
+            select(Account).where(Account.email == ctx.subject_email),
+        ).scalar_one_or_none()
+        return str(account.id) if account is not None else None
+
+
+class MembershipStrategy:
+    """Tenant-membership fallback.
+
+    Used when webapp-auth is disabled (CE deployment). Account-bearing
+    subjects pass if they have a TenantAccountJoin row; EXTERNAL_SSO is
+    denied (it requires the webapp-auth surface).
+    """
+
+    def authorize(self, ctx: Context) -> bool:
+        if ctx.subject_type == SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO:
+            return False
+        if ctx.tenant is None:
+            return False
+        return _has_tenant_membership(ctx.account_id, ctx.tenant.id)
+
+
+def _has_tenant_membership(account_id: uuid.UUID | str | None, tenant_id: str) -> bool:
+    if not account_id:
+        return False
+    row = db.session.execute(
+        select(TenantAccountJoin.id).where(
+            TenantAccountJoin.tenant_id == tenant_id,
+            TenantAccountJoin.account_id == account_id,
+        )
+    ).scalar_one_or_none()
+    return row is not None
+
+
+def _login_as(user) -> None:
+    """Set Flask-Login request user so downstream services see the caller."""
+    current_app.login_manager._update_request_context_with_user(user)
+    user_logged_in.send(current_app._get_current_object(), user=user)
+
+
+class CallerMounter(Protocol):
+    def applies_to(self, subject_type: SubjectType) -> bool: ...
+
+    def mount(self, ctx: Context) -> None: ...
+
+
+class AccountMounter:
+    def applies_to(self, subject_type: SubjectType) -> bool:
+        return subject_type == SubjectType.ACCOUNT
+
+    def mount(self, ctx: Context) -> None:
+        if ctx.account_id is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("AccountMounter: account_id unset — BearerCheck did not run")
+        account = db.session.get(Account, ctx.account_id)
+        if account is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("AccountMounter: account row missing for resolved bearer")
+        account.current_tenant = ctx.tenant
+        _login_as(account)
+        ctx.caller, ctx.caller_kind = account, "account"
+
+
+class EndUserMounter:
+    def applies_to(self, subject_type: SubjectType) -> bool:
+        return subject_type == SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO
+
+    def mount(self, ctx: Context) -> None:
+        if ctx.tenant is None or ctx.app is None or ctx.subject_email is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("EndUserMounter: tenant/app/subject_email unset — earlier steps did not run")
+        end_user = EndUserService.get_or_create_end_user_by_type(
+            InvokeFrom.OPENAPI,
+            tenant_id=ctx.tenant.id,
+            app_id=ctx.app.id,
+            user_id=ctx.subject_email,
+        )
+        _login_as(end_user)
+        ctx.caller, ctx.caller_kind = end_user, "end_user"

api/controllers/openapi/auth/surface_gate.py

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+"""Surface gate.
+
+`@accept_subjects(...)` is the route-level form. `SurfaceCheck` (pipeline
+step) is the pipeline-level form. Both delegate to `check_surface` so the
+audit emit + canonical-path message are single-sourced.
+
+Subjects come from `libs.oauth_bearer.SubjectType` directly — no parallel
+vocabulary. Caller hits the wrong surface → 403 ``wrong_surface`` + audit
+``openapi.wrong_surface_denied``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from functools import wraps
+from typing import TypeVar
+
+from flask import g, request
+from werkzeug.exceptions import Forbidden
+
+from controllers.openapi._audit import emit_wrong_surface
+from libs.oauth_bearer import SubjectType
+
+_CANONICAL_PATH: dict[SubjectType, str] = {
+    SubjectType.ACCOUNT: "/openapi/v1/apps",
+    SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO: "/openapi/v1/permitted-external-apps",
+}
+
+F = TypeVar("F", bound=Callable[..., object])
+
+
+def check_surface(accepted: frozenset[SubjectType]) -> None:
+    """Enforce that ``g.auth_ctx.subject_type`` is in ``accepted``.
+
+    Raises ``Forbidden`` with ``wrong_surface`` + canonical-path hint on
+    miss; emits ``openapi.wrong_surface_denied`` audit. If ``g.auth_ctx``
+    is missing the bearer layer didn't run — that's a wiring bug, not a
+    user-driven failure, so surface it as a ``RuntimeError`` instead of
+    a silent 403.
+    """
+    ctx = getattr(g, "auth_ctx", None)
+    if ctx is None:
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            "check_surface called without g.auth_ctx; "
+            "stack validate_bearer or BearerCheck above the surface gate"
+        )
+
+    subject = _coerce_subject_type(getattr(ctx, "subject_type", None))
+    if subject in accepted:
+        return
+
+    canonical = _CANONICAL_PATH.get(subject, "/openapi/v1/") if subject else "/openapi/v1/"
+    emit_wrong_surface(
+        subject_type=subject.value if subject else None,
+        attempted_path=request.path,
+        client_id=getattr(ctx, "client_id", None),
+        token_id=_stringify(getattr(ctx, "token_id", None)),
+    )
+    raise Forbidden(description=f"wrong_surface (canonical: {canonical})")
+
+
+def accept_subjects(*accepted: SubjectType) -> Callable[[F], F]:
+    accepted_set: frozenset[SubjectType] = frozenset(accepted)
+
+    def deco(fn: F) -> F:
+        @wraps(fn)
+        def wrapper(*args: object, **kwargs: object) -> object:
+            check_surface(accepted_set)
+            return fn(*args, **kwargs)
+
+        return wrapper  # type: ignore[return-value]
+
+    return deco
+
+
+def _coerce_subject_type(raw: object) -> SubjectType | None:
+    if raw is None:
+        return None
+    if isinstance(raw, SubjectType):
+        return raw
+    try:
+        return SubjectType(raw)
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+
+
+def _stringify(value: object) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    return str(value)

api/controllers/openapi/index.py

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+from flask_restx import Resource
+
+from controllers.openapi import openapi_ns
+
+
+@openapi_ns.route("/_health")
+class HealthApi(Resource):
+    def get(self):
+        return {"ok": True}

api/controllers/openapi/oauth_device.py

@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+"""Device-flow endpoints under /openapi/v1/oauth/device/*. Two
+sub-groups in one module:
+
+  Protocol (RFC 8628, public + rate-limited):
+    POST /oauth/device/code
+    POST /oauth/device/token
+    GET  /oauth/device/lookup
+
+  Approval (account branch, console-cookie authed):
+    POST /oauth/device/approve
+    POST /oauth/device/deny
+
+SSO branch lives in oauth_device_sso.py.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+
+from flask import request
+from flask_login import login_required
+from flask_restx import Resource
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ValidationError
+from werkzeug.exceptions import BadRequest
+
+from configs import dify_config
+from controllers.console.wraps import account_initialization_required, setup_required
+from controllers.openapi import openapi_ns
+from extensions.ext_database import db
+from extensions.ext_redis import redis_client
+from libs.helper import extract_remote_ip
+from libs.login import current_account_with_tenant
+from libs.oauth_bearer import MINTABLE_PROFILES, SubjectType, bearer_feature_required
+from libs.rate_limit import (
+    LIMIT_APPROVE_CONSOLE,
+    LIMIT_DEVICE_CODE_PER_IP,
+    LIMIT_LOOKUP_PUBLIC,
+    rate_limit,
+)
+from services.oauth_device_flow import (
+    ACCOUNT_ISSUER_SENTINEL,
+    DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS,
+    DEVICE_FLOW_TTL_SECONDS,
+    DeviceFlowRedis,
+    DeviceFlowStatus,
+    InvalidTransitionError,
+    SlowDownDecision,
+    StateNotFoundError,
+    mint_oauth_token,
+    oauth_ttl_days,
+)
+from services.openapi.mint_policy import MintPolicyViolation, validate_mint_policy
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+# =========================================================================
+# Request / query schemas
+# =========================================================================
+
+
+class DeviceCodeRequest(BaseModel):
+    client_id: str
+    device_label: str
+
+
+class DevicePollRequest(BaseModel):
+    device_code: str
+    client_id: str
+
+
+class DeviceLookupQuery(BaseModel):
+    user_code: str
+
+
+class DeviceMutateRequest(BaseModel):
+    user_code: str
+
+
+def _validate_json[M: BaseModel](model: type[M]) -> M:
+    body = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
+    try:
+        return model.model_validate(body)
+    except ValidationError as exc:
+        raise BadRequest(str(exc))
+
+
+def _validate_query[M: BaseModel](model: type[M]) -> M:
+    try:
+        return model.model_validate(request.args.to_dict(flat=True))
+    except ValidationError as exc:
+        raise BadRequest(str(exc))
+
+
+# =========================================================================
+# Protocol endpoints — RFC 8628 (public + per-IP rate limit)
+# =========================================================================
+
+
+@openapi_ns.route("/oauth/device/code")
+class OAuthDeviceCodeApi(Resource):
+    @rate_limit(LIMIT_DEVICE_CODE_PER_IP)
+    def post(self):
+        payload = _validate_json(DeviceCodeRequest)
+        client_id = payload.client_id
+        device_label = payload.device_label
+
+        if client_id not in dify_config.OPENAPI_KNOWN_CLIENT_IDS:
+            return {"error": "unsupported_client"}, 400
+
+        store = DeviceFlowRedis(redis_client)
+        ip = extract_remote_ip(request)
+        device_code, user_code, expires_in = store.start(client_id, device_label, created_ip=ip)
+
+        return {
+            "device_code": device_code,
+            "user_code": user_code,
+            "verification_uri": _verification_uri(),
+            "expires_in": expires_in,
+            "interval": DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS,
+        }, 200
+
+
+@openapi_ns.route("/oauth/device/token")
+class OAuthDeviceTokenApi(Resource):
+    """RFC 8628 poll."""
+
+    def post(self):
+        payload = _validate_json(DevicePollRequest)
+        device_code = payload.device_code
+
+        store = DeviceFlowRedis(redis_client)
+
+        # slow_down beats every other branch — polling-too-fast clients
+        # see only that response regardless of underlying state.
+        if store.record_poll(device_code, DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS) is SlowDownDecision.SLOW_DOWN:
+            return {"error": "slow_down"}, 400
+
+        state = store.load_by_device_code(device_code)
+        if state is None:
+            return {"error": "expired_token"}, 400
+
+        if state.status is DeviceFlowStatus.PENDING:
+            return {"error": "authorization_pending"}, 400
+
+        terminal = store.consume_on_poll(device_code)
+        if terminal is None:
+            return {"error": "expired_token"}, 400
+
+        if terminal.status is DeviceFlowStatus.DENIED:
+            return {"error": "access_denied"}, 400
+
+        poll_payload = terminal.poll_payload or {}
+        if "token" not in poll_payload:
+            logger.error("device_flow: approved state missing poll_payload for %s", device_code)
+            return {"error": "expired_token"}, 400
+
+        _audit_cross_ip_if_needed(state)
+        return poll_payload, 200
+
+
+@openapi_ns.route("/oauth/device/lookup")
+class OAuthDeviceLookupApi(Resource):
+    """Read-only — public for pre-validate before login. user_code is
+    high-entropy + short-TTL; per-IP rate limit blocks enumeration.
+    """
+
+    @rate_limit(LIMIT_LOOKUP_PUBLIC)
+    def get(self):
+        payload = _validate_query(DeviceLookupQuery)
+        user_code = payload.user_code.strip().upper()
+
+        store = DeviceFlowRedis(redis_client)
+        found = store.load_by_user_code(user_code)
+        if found is None:
+            return {"valid": False, "expires_in_remaining": 0, "client_id": None}, 200
+
+        _device_code, state = found
+        if state.status is not DeviceFlowStatus.PENDING:
+            return {"valid": False, "expires_in_remaining": 0, "client_id": state.client_id}, 200
+
+        return {
+            "valid": True,
+            "expires_in_remaining": DEVICE_FLOW_TTL_SECONDS,
+            "client_id": state.client_id,
+        }, 200
+
+
+# =========================================================================
+# Approval endpoints — account branch (cookie-authed)
+# =========================================================================
+
+
+_APPROVE_GUARD_KEY_FMT = "device_code:{code}:approving"
+_APPROVE_GUARD_TTL_SECONDS = 10
+
+
+@openapi_ns.route("/oauth/device/approve")
+class DeviceApproveApi(Resource):
+    @setup_required
+    @login_required
+    @account_initialization_required
+    @bearer_feature_required
+    @rate_limit(LIMIT_APPROVE_CONSOLE)
+    def post(self):
+        payload = _validate_json(DeviceMutateRequest)
+        user_code = payload.user_code.strip().upper()
+
+        account, tenant = current_account_with_tenant()
+        store = DeviceFlowRedis(redis_client)
+
+        found = store.load_by_user_code(user_code)
+        if found is None:
+            return {"error": "expired_or_unknown"}, 404
+        device_code, state = found
+        if state.status is not DeviceFlowStatus.PENDING:
+            return {"error": "already_resolved"}, 409
+
+        # SET NX guard — without it, two in-flight approves both pass
+        # PENDING, both mint, and the second upsert silently rotates the
+        # first caller into an already-revoked token.
+        guard_key = _APPROVE_GUARD_KEY_FMT.format(code=device_code)
+        if not redis_client.set(guard_key, "1", nx=True, ex=_APPROVE_GUARD_TTL_SECONDS):
+            return {"error": "approve_in_progress"}, 409
+
+        try:
+            profile = MINTABLE_PROFILES[SubjectType.ACCOUNT]
+            try:
+                validate_mint_policy(
+                    subject_type=profile.subject_type,
+                    prefix=profile.prefix,
+                    scopes=profile.scopes,
+                )
+            except MintPolicyViolation as e:
+                raise BadRequest(description=str(e)) from None
+            ttl_days = oauth_ttl_days(tenant_id=tenant)
+            mint = mint_oauth_token(
+                db.session,
+                redis_client,
+                subject_email=account.email,
+                subject_issuer=ACCOUNT_ISSUER_SENTINEL,
+                account_id=str(account.id),
+                client_id=state.client_id,
+                device_label=state.device_label,
+                prefix=profile.prefix,
+                ttl_days=ttl_days,
+            )
+
+            poll_payload = _build_account_poll_payload(account, tenant, mint)
+            try:
+                store.approve(
+                    device_code,
+                    subject_email=account.email,
+                    account_id=str(account.id),
+                    subject_issuer=ACCOUNT_ISSUER_SENTINEL,
+                    minted_token=mint.token,
+                    token_id=str(mint.token_id),
+                    poll_payload=poll_payload,
+                )
+            except (StateNotFoundError, InvalidTransitionError):
+                # Row minted but state vanished — roll forward; the orphan
+                # token is revocable via auth devices list / Authorized Apps.
+                logger.exception("device_flow: approve raced on %s", device_code)
+                return {"error": "state_lost"}, 409
+        finally:
+            redis_client.delete(guard_key)
+
+        _emit_approve_audit(state, account, tenant, mint)
+        return {"status": "approved"}, 200
+
+
+@openapi_ns.route("/oauth/device/deny")
+class DeviceDenyApi(Resource):
+    @setup_required
+    @login_required
+    @account_initialization_required
+    @bearer_feature_required
+    @rate_limit(LIMIT_APPROVE_CONSOLE)
+    def post(self):
+        payload = _validate_json(DeviceMutateRequest)
+        user_code = payload.user_code.strip().upper()
+
+        store = DeviceFlowRedis(redis_client)
+        found = store.load_by_user_code(user_code)
+        if found is None:
+            return {"error": "expired_or_unknown"}, 404
+        device_code, state = found
+        if state.status is not DeviceFlowStatus.PENDING:
+            return {"error": "already_resolved"}, 409
+
+        try:
+            store.deny(device_code)
+        except (StateNotFoundError, InvalidTransitionError):
+            logger.exception("device_flow: deny raced on %s", device_code)
+            return {"error": "state_lost"}, 409
+
+        _emit_deny_audit(state)
+        return {"status": "denied"}, 200
+
+
+# =========================================================================
+# Helpers
+# =========================================================================
+
+
+def _verification_uri() -> str:
+    base = getattr(dify_config, "CONSOLE_WEB_URL", None)
+    if base:
+        return f"{base.rstrip('/')}/device"
+    return f"{request.host_url.rstrip('/')}/device"
+
+
+def _audit_cross_ip_if_needed(state) -> None:
+    poll_ip = extract_remote_ip(request)
+    if state.created_ip and poll_ip and poll_ip != state.created_ip:
+        logger.warning(
+            "audit: oauth.device_code_cross_ip_poll token_id=%s creation_ip=%s poll_ip=%s",
+            state.token_id,
+            state.created_ip,
+            poll_ip,
+            extra={
+                "audit": True,
+                "token_id": state.token_id,
+                "creation_ip": state.created_ip,
+                "poll_ip": poll_ip,
+            },
+        )
+
+
+def _build_account_poll_payload(account, tenant, mint) -> dict:
+    """Pre-render the poll-response body so the unauthenticated poll
+    handler doesn't re-query accounts/tenants for authz data.
+    """
+    from models import Tenant, TenantAccountJoin
+
+    rows = (
+        db.session.query(Tenant, TenantAccountJoin)
+        .join(TenantAccountJoin, TenantAccountJoin.tenant_id == Tenant.id)
+        .filter(TenantAccountJoin.account_id == account.id)
+        .all()
+    )
+    workspaces = [{"id": str(t.id), "name": t.name, "role": getattr(m, "role", "")} for t, m in rows]
+    # Prefer active session tenant → DB-flagged current join → first membership.
+    default_ws_id = None
+    if tenant and any(w["id"] == str(tenant) for w in workspaces):
+        default_ws_id = str(tenant)
+    if default_ws_id is None:
+        for _t, m in rows:
+            if getattr(m, "current", False):
+                default_ws_id = str(m.tenant_id)
+                break
+    if default_ws_id is None and workspaces:
+        default_ws_id = workspaces[0]["id"]
+
+    return {
+        "token": mint.token,
+        "expires_at": mint.expires_at.isoformat(),
+        "subject_type": SubjectType.ACCOUNT,
+        "account": {"id": str(account.id), "email": account.email, "name": account.name},
+        "workspaces": workspaces,
+        "default_workspace_id": default_ws_id,
+        "token_id": str(mint.token_id),
+    }
+
+
+def _emit_approve_audit(state, account, tenant, mint) -> None:
+    logger.warning(
+        "audit: oauth.device_flow_approved token_id=%s subject=%s client_id=%s device_label=%s rotated=? expires_at=%s",
+        mint.token_id,
+        account.email,
+        state.client_id,
+        state.device_label,
+        mint.expires_at,
+        extra={
+            "audit": True,
+            "event": "oauth.device_flow_approved",
+            "token_id": str(mint.token_id),
+            "subject_type": SubjectType.ACCOUNT,
+            "subject_email": account.email,
+            "account_id": str(account.id),
+            "tenant_id": tenant,
+            "client_id": state.client_id,
+            "device_label": state.device_label,
+            "scopes": ["full"],
+            "expires_at": mint.expires_at.isoformat(),
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def _emit_deny_audit(state) -> None:
+    logger.warning(
+        "audit: oauth.device_flow_denied client_id=%s device_label=%s",
+        state.client_id,
+        state.device_label,
+        extra={
+            "audit": True,
+            "event": "oauth.device_flow_denied",
+            "client_id": state.client_id,
+            "device_label": state.device_label,
+        },
+    )

api/controllers/openapi/oauth_device_sso.py

@@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
+"""SSO-branch device-flow endpoints under /openapi/v1/oauth/device/*.
+EE-only. Browser flow:
+
+  GET  /oauth/device/sso-initiate     → 302 to IdP authorize URL
+  GET  /oauth/device/sso-complete     → ACS callback, sets approval-grant cookie
+  GET  /oauth/device/approval-context → SPA reads cookie claims (idempotent)
+  POST /oauth/device/approve-external → mints dfoe_ token + clears cookie
+
+Function-based (raw @bp.route) rather than Resource classes because the
+handlers do redirects + cookie kwargs that don't fit the Resource shape.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import secrets
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+from flask import jsonify, make_response, redirect, request
+from sqlalchemy import func, select
+from werkzeug.exceptions import (
+    BadGateway,
+    BadRequest,
+    Conflict,
+    Forbidden,
+    NotFound,
+    Unauthorized,
+)
+
+from controllers.openapi import bp
+from extensions.ext_database import db
+from extensions.ext_redis import redis_client
+from libs import jws
+from libs.device_flow_security import (
+    APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_NAME,
+    ApprovalGrantClaims,
+    approval_grant_cleared_cookie_kwargs,
+    approval_grant_cookie_kwargs,
+    consume_approval_grant_nonce,
+    consume_sso_assertion_nonce,
+    enterprise_only,
+    mint_approval_grant,
+    verify_approval_grant,
+)
+from libs.oauth_bearer import MINTABLE_PROFILES, SubjectType
+from libs.rate_limit import (
+    LIMIT_APPROVE_EXT_PER_EMAIL,
+    LIMIT_SSO_INITIATE_PER_IP,
+    enforce,
+    rate_limit,
+)
+from models import Account
+from models.account import AccountStatus
+from services.enterprise.enterprise_service import EnterpriseService
+from services.oauth_device_flow import (
+    DeviceFlowRedis,
+    DeviceFlowStatus,
+    InvalidTransitionError,
+    StateNotFoundError,
+    mint_oauth_token,
+    oauth_ttl_days,
+)
+from services.openapi.mint_policy import MintPolicyViolation, validate_mint_policy
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+# Matches DEVICE_FLOW_TTL_SECONDS so the signed state can't outlive the
+# device_code it references.
+STATE_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS = 15 * 60
+
+# Canonical sso-complete path. IdP-side ACS callback URL must point here.
+_SSO_COMPLETE_PATH = "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/sso-complete"
+
+
+@bp.route("/oauth/device/sso-initiate", methods=["GET"])
+@enterprise_only
+@rate_limit(LIMIT_SSO_INITIATE_PER_IP)
+def sso_initiate():
+    user_code = (request.args.get("user_code") or "").strip().upper()
+    if not user_code:
+        raise BadRequest("user_code required")
+
+    store = DeviceFlowRedis(redis_client)
+    found = store.load_by_user_code(user_code)
+    if found is None:
+        raise BadRequest("invalid_user_code")
+    _, state = found
+    if state.status is not DeviceFlowStatus.PENDING:
+        raise BadRequest("invalid_user_code")
+
+    keyset = jws.KeySet.from_shared_secret()
+    signed_state = jws.sign(
+        keyset,
+        payload={
+            "redirect_url": "",
+            "app_code": "",
+            "intent": "device_flow",
+            "user_code": user_code,
+            "nonce": secrets.token_urlsafe(16),
+            "return_to": "",
+            "idp_callback_url": f"{request.host_url.rstrip('/')}{_SSO_COMPLETE_PATH}",
+        },
+        aud=jws.AUD_STATE_ENVELOPE,
+        ttl_seconds=STATE_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS,
+    )
+
+    try:
+        reply = EnterpriseService.initiate_device_flow_sso(signed_state)
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.warning("sso-initiate: enterprise call failed: %s", e)
+        raise BadGateway("sso_initiate_failed") from e
+
+    url = (reply or {}).get("url")
+    if not url:
+        raise BadGateway("sso_initiate_missing_url")
+
+    # Clear stale approval-grant — defends against cross-tab/back-button mixing.
+    resp = redirect(url, code=302)
+    resp.set_cookie(**approval_grant_cleared_cookie_kwargs())
+    return resp
+
+
+@bp.route("/oauth/device/sso-complete", methods=["GET"])
+@enterprise_only
+def sso_complete():
+    blob = request.args.get("sso_assertion")
+    if not blob:
+        raise BadRequest("sso_assertion required")
+
+    keyset = jws.KeySet.from_shared_secret()
+
+    try:
+        claims = jws.verify(keyset, blob, expected_aud=jws.AUD_EXT_SUBJECT_ASSERTION)
+    except jws.VerifyError as e:
+        logger.warning("sso-complete: rejected assertion: %s", e)
+        raise BadRequest("invalid_sso_assertion") from e
+
+    if not consume_sso_assertion_nonce(redis_client, claims.get("nonce", "")):
+        raise BadRequest("invalid_sso_assertion")
+
+    user_code = (claims.get("user_code") or "").strip().upper()
+    store = DeviceFlowRedis(redis_client)
+    found = store.load_by_user_code(user_code)
+    if found is None:
+        raise Conflict("user_code_not_pending")
+    _, state = found
+    if state.status is not DeviceFlowStatus.PENDING:
+        raise Conflict("user_code_not_pending")
+
+    if _email_belongs_to_dify_account(claims["email"]):
+        _emit_external_rejection_audit(
+            state,
+            _RejectedClaims(subject_email=claims["email"], subject_issuer=claims["issuer"]),
+            reason="email_belongs_to_dify_account",
+        )
+        return redirect("/device?sso_error=email_belongs_to_dify_account", code=302)
+
+    iss = request.host_url.rstrip("/")
+    cookie_value, _ = mint_approval_grant(
+        keyset=keyset,
+        iss=iss,
+        subject_email=claims["email"],
+        subject_issuer=claims["issuer"],
+        user_code=user_code,
+    )
+
+    resp = redirect("/device?sso_verified=1", code=302)
+    resp.set_cookie(**approval_grant_cookie_kwargs(cookie_value))
+    return resp
+
+
+@bp.route("/oauth/device/approval-context", methods=["GET"])
+@enterprise_only
+def approval_context():
+    token = request.cookies.get(APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_NAME)
+    if not token:
+        raise Unauthorized("no_session")
+
+    keyset = jws.KeySet.from_shared_secret()
+    try:
+        claims = verify_approval_grant(keyset, token)
+    except jws.VerifyError as e:
+        logger.warning("approval-context: bad cookie: %s", e)
+        raise Unauthorized("no_session") from e
+
+    return jsonify(
+        {
+            "subject_email": claims.subject_email,
+            "subject_issuer": claims.subject_issuer,
+            "user_code": claims.user_code,
+            "csrf_token": claims.csrf_token,
+            "expires_at": claims.expires_at.isoformat(),
+        }
+    ), 200
+
+
+@bp.route("/oauth/device/approve-external", methods=["POST"])
+@enterprise_only
+def approve_external():
+    token = request.cookies.get(APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_NAME)
+    if not token:
+        raise Unauthorized("invalid_session")
+
+    keyset = jws.KeySet.from_shared_secret()
+    try:
+        claims: ApprovalGrantClaims = verify_approval_grant(keyset, token)
+    except jws.VerifyError as e:
+        logger.warning("approve-external: bad cookie: %s", e)
+        raise Unauthorized("invalid_session") from e
+
+    enforce(LIMIT_APPROVE_EXT_PER_EMAIL, key=f"subject:{claims.subject_email}")
+
+    csrf_header = request.headers.get("X-CSRF-Token", "")
+    if not csrf_header or csrf_header != claims.csrf_token:
+        raise Forbidden("csrf_mismatch")
+
+    data = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
+    body_user_code = (data.get("user_code") or "").strip().upper()
+    if body_user_code != claims.user_code:
+        raise BadRequest("user_code_mismatch")
+
+    store = DeviceFlowRedis(redis_client)
+    found = store.load_by_user_code(claims.user_code)
+    if found is None:
+        raise NotFound("user_code_not_pending")
+    device_code, state = found
+    if state.status is not DeviceFlowStatus.PENDING:
+        raise Conflict("user_code_not_pending")
+
+    if _email_belongs_to_dify_account(claims.subject_email):
+        _emit_external_rejection_audit(state, claims, reason="email_belongs_to_dify_account")
+        raise Forbidden("email_belongs_to_dify_account")
+
+    if not consume_approval_grant_nonce(redis_client, claims.nonce):
+        raise Unauthorized("session_already_consumed")
+
+    profile = MINTABLE_PROFILES[SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO]
+    try:
+        validate_mint_policy(
+            subject_type=profile.subject_type,
+            prefix=profile.prefix,
+            scopes=profile.scopes,
+        )
+    except MintPolicyViolation as e:
+        raise BadRequest(description=str(e)) from None
+
+    ttl_days = oauth_ttl_days(tenant_id=None)
+    mint = mint_oauth_token(
+        db.session,
+        redis_client,
+        subject_email=claims.subject_email,
+        subject_issuer=claims.subject_issuer,
+        account_id=None,
+        client_id=state.client_id,
+        device_label=state.device_label,
+        prefix=profile.prefix,
+        ttl_days=ttl_days,
+    )
+
+    poll_payload = {
+        "token": mint.token,
+        "expires_at": mint.expires_at.isoformat(),
+        "subject_type": SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO,
+        "subject_email": claims.subject_email,
+        "subject_issuer": claims.subject_issuer,
+        "account": None,
+        "workspaces": [],
+        "default_workspace_id": None,
+        "token_id": str(mint.token_id),
+    }
+
+    try:
+        store.approve(
+            device_code,
+            subject_email=claims.subject_email,
+            account_id=None,
+            subject_issuer=claims.subject_issuer,
+            minted_token=mint.token,
+            token_id=str(mint.token_id),
+            poll_payload=poll_payload,
+        )
+    except (StateNotFoundError, InvalidTransitionError) as e:
+        logger.exception("approve-external: state transition raced")
+        raise Conflict("state_lost") from e
+
+    _emit_approve_external_audit(state, claims, mint)
+
+    resp = make_response(jsonify({"status": "approved"}), 200)
+    resp.set_cookie(**approval_grant_cleared_cookie_kwargs())
+    return resp
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class _RejectedClaims:
+    """Minimal subject shape consumed by `_emit_external_rejection_audit`.
+
+    Mirrors the attributes used from `ApprovalGrantClaims` so callers holding
+    only a raw JWS claims dict (e.g. `sso_complete`) can emit the same audit
+    event without reaching for the full dataclass.
+    """
+
+    subject_email: str
+    subject_issuer: str
+
+
+def _email_belongs_to_dify_account(email: str) -> bool:
+    """External SSO subjects whose email matches an active Dify Account must
+    authenticate via the internal Dify login path (which mints dfoa_), not via
+    the external SSO device flow. Returning True here blocks dfoe_ minting.
+
+    Pending/uninitialized/banned/closed accounts do not block: pending and
+    uninitialized users may complete invitation via SSO; banned and closed
+    accounts are handled by separate enforcement paths.
+    """
+    if not email:
+        return False
+    normalized = email.strip().lower()
+    if not normalized:
+        return False
+    row = db.session.execute(
+        select(Account.id).where(
+            func.lower(Account.email) == normalized,
+            Account.status == AccountStatus.ACTIVE,
+        ),
+    ).scalar_one_or_none()
+    return row is not None
+
+
+def _emit_external_rejection_audit(state, claims, *, reason: str) -> None:
+    logger.warning(
+        "audit: oauth.device_flow_rejected subject_type=%s subject_email=%s subject_issuer=%s reason=%s",
+        SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO,
+        claims.subject_email,
+        claims.subject_issuer,
+        reason,
+        extra={
+            "audit": True,
+            "event": "oauth.device_flow_rejected",
+            "subject_type": SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO,
+            "subject_email": claims.subject_email,
+            "subject_issuer": claims.subject_issuer,
+            "reason": reason,
+            "client_id": state.client_id,
+            "device_label": state.device_label,
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def _emit_approve_external_audit(state, claims, mint) -> None:
+    logger.warning(
+        "audit: oauth.device_flow_approved subject_type=%s subject_email=%s subject_issuer=%s token_id=%s",
+        SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO,
+        claims.subject_email,
+        claims.subject_issuer,
+        mint.token_id,
+        extra={
+            "audit": True,
+            "event": "oauth.device_flow_approved",
+            "subject_type": SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO,
+            "subject_email": claims.subject_email,
+            "subject_issuer": claims.subject_issuer,
+            "token_id": str(mint.token_id),
+            "client_id": state.client_id,
+            "device_label": state.device_label,
+            "scopes": ["apps:run"],
+            "expires_at": mint.expires_at.isoformat(),
+        },
+    )

api/controllers/openapi/workspaces.py

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+"""User-scoped workspace reads under /openapi/v1/workspaces. Bearer-authed
+counterparts to the cookie-authed /console/api/workspaces endpoints.
+
+Account bearers (dfoa_) see every tenant they're a member of. External
+SSO bearers (dfoe_) have no account_id and so see an empty list — that
+matches /openapi/v1/account.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from itertools import starmap
+
+from flask import g
+from flask_restx import Resource
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from werkzeug.exceptions import NotFound
+
+from controllers.openapi import openapi_ns
+from controllers.openapi.auth.surface_gate import accept_subjects
+from extensions.ext_database import db
+from libs.oauth_bearer import (
+    ACCEPT_USER_ANY,
+    SubjectType,
+    validate_bearer,
+)
+from models import Tenant, TenantAccountJoin
+
+
+@openapi_ns.route("/workspaces")
+class WorkspacesApi(Resource):
+    @validate_bearer(accept=ACCEPT_USER_ANY)
+    @accept_subjects(SubjectType.ACCOUNT)
+    def get(self):
+        ctx = g.auth_ctx
+
+        rows = db.session.execute(
+            select(Tenant, TenantAccountJoin)
+            .join(TenantAccountJoin, TenantAccountJoin.tenant_id == Tenant.id)
+            .where(TenantAccountJoin.account_id == str(ctx.account_id))
+            .order_by(Tenant.created_at.asc())
+        ).all()
+
+        return {"workspaces": list(starmap(_workspace_summary, rows))}, 200
+
+
+@openapi_ns.route("/workspaces/<string:workspace_id>")
+class WorkspaceByIdApi(Resource):
+    @validate_bearer(accept=ACCEPT_USER_ANY)
+    @accept_subjects(SubjectType.ACCOUNT)
+    def get(self, workspace_id: str):
+        ctx = g.auth_ctx
+
+        row = db.session.execute(
+            select(Tenant, TenantAccountJoin)
+            .join(TenantAccountJoin, TenantAccountJoin.tenant_id == Tenant.id)
+            .where(
+                Tenant.id == workspace_id,
+                TenantAccountJoin.account_id == str(ctx.account_id),
+            )
+        ).first()
+        # 404 (not 403) on non-member so workspace IDs don't leak across tenants.
+        if row is None:
+            raise NotFound("workspace not found")
+
+        tenant, membership = row
+        return _workspace_detail(tenant, membership), 200
+
+
+def _workspace_summary(tenant: Tenant, membership: TenantAccountJoin) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "id": str(tenant.id),
+        "name": tenant.name,
+        "role": getattr(membership, "role", ""),
+        "status": tenant.status,
+        "current": getattr(membership, "current", False),
+    }
+
+
+def _workspace_detail(tenant: Tenant, membership: TenantAccountJoin) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "id": str(tenant.id),
+        "name": tenant.name,
+        "role": getattr(membership, "role", ""),
+        "status": tenant.status,
+        "current": getattr(membership, "current", False),
+        "created_at": tenant.created_at.isoformat() if tenant.created_at else None,
+    }

api/controllers/web/wraps.py

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ from libs.passport import PassportService
 from libs.token import extract_webapp_passport
 from models.model import App, EndUser, Site
 from services.app_service import AppService
-from services.enterprise.enterprise_service import EnterpriseService, WebAppSettings
+from services.enterprise.enterprise_service import EnterpriseService, WebAppAccessMode, WebAppSettings
 from services.feature_service import FeatureService
 from services.webapp_auth_service import WebAppAuthService
 
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ def decode_jwt_token(app_code: str | None = None, user_id: str | None = None) ->
             webapp_settings = EnterpriseService.WebAppAuth.get_app_access_mode_by_id(app_id)
             if not webapp_settings:
                 raise NotFound("Web app settings not found.")
-            app_web_auth_enabled = webapp_settings.access_mode != "public"
+            app_web_auth_enabled = webapp_settings.access_mode != WebAppAccessMode.PUBLIC
 
         _validate_webapp_token(decoded, app_web_auth_enabled, system_features.webapp_auth.enabled)
         _validate_user_accessibility(
@@ -88,7 +88,8 @@ def decode_jwt_token(app_code: str | None = None, user_id: str | None = None) ->
                 raise Unauthorized("Please re-login to access the web app.")
             app_id = AppService.get_app_id_by_code(app_code)
             app_web_auth_enabled = (
-                EnterpriseService.WebAppAuth.get_app_access_mode_by_id(app_id=app_id).access_mode != "public"
+                EnterpriseService.WebAppAuth.get_app_access_mode_by_id(app_id=app_id).access_mode
+                != WebAppAccessMode.PUBLIC
             )
             if app_web_auth_enabled:
                 raise WebAppAuthRequiredError()

api/core/app/apps/workflow/generate_task_pipeline.py

@@ -685,6 +685,8 @@ class WorkflowAppGenerateTaskPipeline(GraphRuntimeStateSupport):
         match invoke_from:
             case InvokeFrom.SERVICE_API:
                 created_from = WorkflowAppLogCreatedFrom.SERVICE_API
+            case InvokeFrom.OPENAPI:
+                created_from = WorkflowAppLogCreatedFrom.OPENAPI
             case InvokeFrom.EXPLORE:
                 created_from = WorkflowAppLogCreatedFrom.INSTALLED_APP
             case InvokeFrom.WEB_APP:

api/core/app/entities/app_invoke_entities.py

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ class UserFrom(StrEnum):
 
 class InvokeFrom(StrEnum):
     SERVICE_API = "service-api"
+    OPENAPI = "openapi"
     WEB_APP = "web-app"
     TRIGGER = "trigger"
     EXPLORE = "explore"

api/extensions/ext_blueprints.py

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ AUTHENTICATED_HEADERS: tuple[str, ...] = (*SERVICE_API_HEADERS, HEADER_NAME_CSRF
 FILES_HEADERS: tuple[str, ...] = (*BASE_CORS_HEADERS, HEADER_NAME_CSRF_TOKEN)
 EMBED_HEADERS: tuple[str, ...] = ("Content-Type", HEADER_NAME_APP_CODE)
 EXPOSED_HEADERS: tuple[str, ...] = ("X-Version", "X-Env", "X-Trace-Id")
+OPENAPI_HEADERS: tuple[str, ...] = ("Authorization", "Content-Type", HEADER_NAME_CSRF_TOKEN)
+OPENAPI_MAX_AGE_SECONDS: int = 600
 
 
 def _apply_cors_once(bp, /, **cors_kwargs):
@@ -29,6 +31,7 @@ def init_app(app: DifyApp):
     from controllers.files import bp as files_bp
     from controllers.inner_api import bp as inner_api_bp
     from controllers.mcp import bp as mcp_bp
+    from controllers.openapi import bp as openapi_bp
     from controllers.service_api import bp as service_api_bp
     from controllers.trigger import bp as trigger_bp
     from controllers.web import bp as web_bp
@@ -41,6 +44,22 @@ def init_app(app: DifyApp):
     )
     app.register_blueprint(service_api_bp)
 
+    # User-scoped programmatic API. Default empty allowlist = same-origin
+    # only; expand via OPENAPI_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS for third-party
+    # integrations. supports_credentials so cookie-authed approve/deny
+    # work; cross-origin OPTIONS without an allowed origin will fail
+    # the same as on the console blueprint.
+    _apply_cors_once(
+        openapi_bp,
+        resources={r"/*": {"origins": dify_config.OPENAPI_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS}},
+        supports_credentials=True,
+        allow_headers=list(OPENAPI_HEADERS),
+        methods=["GET", "POST", "PATCH", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"],
+        expose_headers=list(EXPOSED_HEADERS),
+        max_age=OPENAPI_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
+    )
+    app.register_blueprint(openapi_bp)
+
     _apply_cors_once(
         web_bp,
         resources={

api/extensions/ext_celery.py

@@ -222,6 +222,12 @@ def init_app(app: DifyApp) -> Celery:
             "task": "schedule.clean_workflow_runs_task.clean_workflow_runs_task",
             "schedule": crontab(minute="0", hour="0"),
         }
+    if dify_config.ENABLE_CLEAN_OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKENS_TASK:
+        imports.append("schedule.clean_oauth_access_tokens_task")
+        beat_schedule["clean_oauth_access_tokens_task"] = {
+            "task": "schedule.clean_oauth_access_tokens_task.clean_oauth_access_tokens_task",
+            "schedule": crontab(minute="0", hour="5", day_of_month=f"*/{day}"),
+        }
     if dify_config.ENABLE_WORKFLOW_SCHEDULE_POLLER_TASK:
         imports.append("schedule.workflow_schedule_task")
         beat_schedule["workflow_schedule_task"] = {

api/extensions/ext_login.py

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ from constants import HEADER_NAME_APP_CODE
 from dify_app import DifyApp
 from extensions.ext_database import db
 from libs.passport import PassportService
-from libs.token import extract_access_token, extract_webapp_passport
+from libs.token import extract_access_token, extract_console_cookie_token, extract_webapp_passport
 from models import Account, Tenant, TenantAccountJoin
 from models.model import AppMCPServer, EndUser
 from services.account_service import AccountService
@@ -84,6 +84,24 @@ def load_user_from_request(request_from_flask_login: Request) -> LoginUser | Non
 
         logged_in_account = AccountService.load_logged_in_account(account_id=user_id)
         return logged_in_account
+    elif request.blueprint == "openapi":
+        # Account-branch device-flow approval routes (approve / deny /
+        # approval-context) sit under @login_required and authenticate via
+        # the console session cookie. Cookie-only on purpose — bearer
+        # tokens (dfoa_/dfoe_) live on the Authorization header and are
+        # validated by AppPipeline, not flask-login.
+        cookie_token = extract_console_cookie_token(request)
+        if not cookie_token:
+            return None
+        try:
+            decoded = PassportService().verify(cookie_token)
+        except Exception:
+            return None
+        user_id = decoded.get("user_id")
+        source = decoded.get("token_source")
+        if source or not user_id:
+            return None
+        return AccountService.load_logged_in_account(account_id=user_id)
     elif request.blueprint == "web":
         app_code = request.headers.get(HEADER_NAME_APP_CODE)
         webapp_token = extract_webapp_passport(app_code, request) if app_code else None

api/extensions/ext_oauth_bearer.py

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+"""Bind the bearer authenticator at startup. Must run after ext_database
+and ext_redis (needs both factories).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from configs import dify_config
+from dify_app import DifyApp
+from extensions.ext_database import db
+from extensions.ext_redis import redis_client
+from libs.oauth_bearer import build_and_bind
+
+
+def is_enabled() -> bool:
+    return dify_config.ENABLE_OAUTH_BEARER
+
+
+def init_app(app: DifyApp) -> None:
+    # scoped_session isn't a context manager; request teardown closes it.
+    def session_factory():
+        return db.session
+
+    build_and_bind(session_factory=session_factory, redis_client=redis_client)

api/libs/device_flow_security.py

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+"""Device-flow security primitives: enterprise_only gate, approval-grant
+cookie mint/verify/consume, and anti-framing headers.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import secrets
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from functools import wraps
+
+from flask import Blueprint
+from werkzeug.exceptions import NotFound
+
+from libs import jws
+from libs.token import is_secure
+from services.feature_service import FeatureService, LicenseStatus
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# enterprise_only decorator
+# ============================================================================
+
+
+# Fail-closed: any non-EE-active status (default NONE on CE, plus INACTIVE / EXPIRED / LOST)
+# is denied. Future LicenseStatus values default to denial unless explicitly admitted.
+_EE_ENABLED_STATUSES = {LicenseStatus.ACTIVE, LicenseStatus.EXPIRING}
+
+
+def enterprise_only[**P, R](view: Callable[P, R]) -> Callable[P, R]:
+    """404 on CE, passthrough on EE. Apply before rate-limit so CE
+    responses don't consume the bucket.
+    """
+
+    @wraps(view)
+    def decorated(*args: P.args, **kwargs: P.kwargs):
+        settings = FeatureService.get_system_features()
+        if settings.license.status not in _EE_ENABLED_STATUSES:
+            raise NotFound()
+        return view(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    return decorated
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# approval_grant cookie
+# ============================================================================
+
+
+APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_NAME = "device_approval_grant"
+APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_PATH = "/openapi/v1/oauth/device"
+APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_TTL_SECONDS = 300  # 5 min
+NONCE_TTL_SECONDS = 600  # 2x cookie TTL — defeats clock-skew late replay
+NONCE_KEY_FMT = "device_approval_grant_nonce:{nonce}"
+SSO_ASSERTION_NONCE_KEY_FMT = "sso_assertion_nonce:{nonce}"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ApprovalGrantClaims:
+    subject_email: str
+    subject_issuer: str
+    user_code: str
+    nonce: str
+    csrf_token: str
+    expires_at: datetime
+
+
+def mint_approval_grant(
+    *,
+    keyset: jws.KeySet,
+    iss: str,
+    subject_email: str,
+    subject_issuer: str,
+    user_code: str,
+) -> tuple[str, ApprovalGrantClaims]:
+    """Use ``approval_grant_cookie_kwargs`` to set the cookie — single
+    source of truth for Path/HttpOnly/Secure/SameSite.
+    """
+    now = datetime.now(UTC)
+    exp = now + timedelta(seconds=APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_TTL_SECONDS)
+    nonce = _random_opaque()
+    csrf_token = _random_opaque()
+
+    payload = {
+        "iss": iss,
+        "subject_email": subject_email,
+        "subject_issuer": subject_issuer,
+        "user_code": user_code,
+        "nonce": nonce,
+        "csrf_token": csrf_token,
+    }
+    token = jws.sign(keyset, payload, aud=jws.AUD_APPROVAL_GRANT, ttl_seconds=APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_TTL_SECONDS)
+
+    return token, ApprovalGrantClaims(
+        subject_email=subject_email,
+        subject_issuer=subject_issuer,
+        user_code=user_code,
+        nonce=nonce,
+        csrf_token=csrf_token,
+        expires_at=exp,
+    )
+
+
+def verify_approval_grant(keyset: jws.KeySet, token: str) -> ApprovalGrantClaims:
+    """Sig + aud + exp only — nonce consumption is the caller's job."""
+    data = jws.verify(keyset, token, expected_aud=jws.AUD_APPROVAL_GRANT)
+    return ApprovalGrantClaims(
+        subject_email=data["subject_email"],
+        subject_issuer=data["subject_issuer"],
+        user_code=data["user_code"],
+        nonce=data["nonce"],
+        csrf_token=data["csrf_token"],
+        expires_at=datetime.fromtimestamp(data["exp"], tz=UTC),
+    )
+
+
+def consume_approval_grant_nonce(redis_client, nonce: str) -> bool:
+    if not nonce:
+        return False
+    return bool(
+        redis_client.set(
+            NONCE_KEY_FMT.format(nonce=nonce),
+            "1",
+            nx=True,
+            ex=NONCE_TTL_SECONDS,
+        )
+    )
+
+
+def consume_sso_assertion_nonce(redis_client, nonce: str) -> bool:
+    if not nonce:
+        return False
+    return bool(
+        redis_client.set(
+            SSO_ASSERTION_NONCE_KEY_FMT.format(nonce=nonce),
+            "1",
+            nx=True,
+            ex=NONCE_TTL_SECONDS,
+        )
+    )
+
+
+def approval_grant_cookie_kwargs(value: str) -> dict:
+    """``secure`` follows is_secure() so HTTP-only deployments don't
+    silently drop the cookie.
+    """
+    return {
+        "key": APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_NAME,
+        "value": value,
+        "max_age": APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_TTL_SECONDS,
+        "path": APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_PATH,
+        "secure": is_secure(),
+        "httponly": True,
+        "samesite": "Lax",
+    }
+
+
+def approval_grant_cleared_cookie_kwargs() -> dict:
+    return {
+        "key": APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_NAME,
+        "value": "",
+        "max_age": 0,
+        "path": APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_PATH,
+        "secure": is_secure(),
+        "httponly": True,
+        "samesite": "Lax",
+    }
+
+
+def _random_opaque() -> str:
+    return secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# Anti-framing headers
+# ============================================================================
+
+
+_ANTI_FRAMING_HEADERS = {
+    "X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
+    "Content-Security-Policy": "frame-ancestors 'none'",
+}
+
+
+def attach_anti_framing(bp: Blueprint) -> None:
+    """X-Frame-Options + CSP on every response from ``bp`` (CI invariant #4)."""
+
+    @bp.after_request
+    def _apply_headers(response):  # pyright: ignore[reportUnusedFunction]
+        for name, value in _ANTI_FRAMING_HEADERS.items():
+            response.headers.setdefault(name, value)
+        return response

api/libs/external_api.py

@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ def register_external_error_handlers(api: Api):
 
     def handle_value_error(e: ValueError):
         got_request_exception.send(current_app, exception=e)
+        current_app.logger.exception("value_error in request handler")
         status_code = 400
         data = {"code": "invalid_param", "message": str(e), "status": status_code}
         return data, status_code

api/libs/helper.py

@@ -542,3 +542,18 @@ class RateLimiter:
 
         self._redis_client.zadd(key, {member: current_time})
         self._redis_client.expire(key, self.time_window * 2)
+
+    def seconds_until_available(self, email: str) -> int:
+        """Seconds until the oldest in-window entry expires, freeing a slot.
+
+        Defensive floor of 1 second. Caller should only invoke this after
+        is_rate_limited() returned True.
+        """
+        key = self._get_key(email)
+        oldest = cast(Any, self._redis_client).zrange(key, 0, 0, withscores=True)
+        if not oldest:
+            return 1
+        _member, score = oldest[0]
+        free_at = int(score) + self.time_window
+        remaining = free_at - int(time.time())
+        return max(remaining, 1)

api/libs/jws.py

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+"""HS256 compact JWS keyed on the shared Dify SECRET_KEY. Used by the SSO
+state envelope, external subject assertion, and approval-grant cookie —
+all three share one key-set so api ↔ enterprise can verify each other.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+
+import jwt
+
+from configs import dify_config
+
+AUD_STATE_ENVELOPE = "api.sso.state_envelope"
+AUD_EXT_SUBJECT_ASSERTION = "api.device_flow.external_subject_assertion"
+AUD_APPROVAL_GRANT = "api.device_flow.approval_grant"
+
+ACTIVE_KID_V1 = "dify-shared-v1"
+
+
+class KeySetError(Exception):
+    pass
+
+
+class KeySet:
+    """``from_entries`` reserves multi-kid construction for rotation slots."""
+
+    def __init__(self, entries: dict[str, bytes], active_kid: str) -> None:
+        if active_kid not in entries:
+            raise KeySetError(f"active kid {active_kid!r} missing from key-set")
+        if not entries[active_kid]:
+            raise KeySetError(f"active kid {active_kid!r} has empty secret")
+        self._entries: dict[str, bytes] = {k: bytes(v) for k, v in entries.items()}
+        self._active_kid = active_kid
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_shared_secret(cls) -> KeySet:
+        secret = dify_config.SECRET_KEY
+        if not secret:
+            raise KeySetError("dify_config.SECRET_KEY is empty; cannot build key-set")
+        return cls({ACTIVE_KID_V1: secret.encode("utf-8")}, ACTIVE_KID_V1)
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_entries(cls, entries: dict[str, bytes], active_kid: str) -> KeySet:
+        return cls(entries, active_kid)
+
+    @property
+    def active_kid(self) -> str:
+        return self._active_kid
+
+    def lookup(self, kid: str) -> bytes | None:
+        return self._entries.get(kid)
+
+
+def sign(keyset: KeySet, payload: dict, aud: str, ttl_seconds: int) -> str:
+    """``iat`` + ``exp`` are injected here; callers must not set them."""
+    if "aud" in payload or "iat" in payload or "exp" in payload:
+        raise ValueError("reserved claim present in payload (aud/iat/exp)")
+    if ttl_seconds <= 0:
+        raise ValueError("ttl_seconds must be positive")
+
+    kid = keyset.active_kid
+    secret = keyset.lookup(kid)
+    if secret is None:
+        raise KeySetError(f"active kid {kid!r} lookup miss")
+
+    iat = datetime.now(UTC)
+    exp = iat + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds)
+    claims = {**payload, "aud": aud, "iat": iat, "exp": exp}
+    return jwt.encode(
+        claims,
+        secret,
+        algorithm="HS256",
+        headers={"kid": kid, "typ": "JWT"},
+    )
+
+
+class VerifyError(Exception):
+    pass
+
+
+def verify(keyset: KeySet, token: str, expected_aud: str) -> dict:
+    """Unknown kid is rejected — never fall back to the active kid, since
+    a past kid value would otherwise be forgeable by anyone who saw it.
+    """
+    try:
+        header = jwt.get_unverified_header(token)
+    except jwt.PyJWTError as e:
+        raise VerifyError(f"decode header: {e}") from e
+    kid = header.get("kid")
+    if not kid:
+        raise VerifyError("no kid in header")
+    secret = keyset.lookup(kid)
+    if secret is None:
+        raise VerifyError(f"unknown kid {kid!r}")
+    try:
+        return jwt.decode(
+            token,
+            secret,
+            algorithms=["HS256"],
+            audience=expected_aud,
+        )
+    except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError as e:
+        raise VerifyError("token expired") from e
+    except jwt.InvalidAudienceError as e:
+        raise VerifyError("aud mismatch") from e
+    except jwt.PyJWTError as e:
+        raise VerifyError(f"decode: {e}") from e

api/libs/oauth_bearer.py

@@ -0,0 +1,650 @@
+"""OAuth bearer primitives.
+
+To add a token kind: write a Resolver, add a SubjectType + Accepts member,
+append a TokenKind to build_registry, and update _SUBJECT_TO_ACCEPT.
+Authenticator + validate_bearer stay untouched.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import logging
+import uuid
+from collections.abc import Callable, Iterable
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import UTC, datetime
+from enum import StrEnum
+from functools import wraps
+from typing import Literal, ParamSpec, Protocol, TypeVar
+
+from flask import g, request
+from sqlalchemy import select, update
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
+from werkzeug.exceptions import Forbidden, ServiceUnavailable, Unauthorized
+
+from configs import dify_config
+from extensions.ext_database import db
+from extensions.ext_redis import redis_client
+from libs.rate_limit import enforce_bearer_rate_limit
+from models import Account, OAuthAccessToken, TenantAccountJoin
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# Contract — types, enums, protocols
+# ============================================================================
+
+
+class SubjectType(StrEnum):
+    ACCOUNT = "account"
+    EXTERNAL_SSO = "external_sso"
+
+
+class Scope(StrEnum):
+    """Catalog of bearer scopes recognised by the openapi surface.
+
+    `FULL` is the catch-all carried by `dfoa_` account tokens — it satisfies
+    any per-route `require_scope`. `dfoe_` tokens carry the per-feature scopes
+    (`APPS_RUN`, `APPS_READ_PERMITTED_EXTERNAL`).
+    """
+
+    FULL = "full"
+    APPS_READ = "apps:read"
+    APPS_READ_PERMITTED_EXTERNAL = "apps:read:permitted-external"
+    APPS_RUN = "apps:run"
+
+
+class Accepts(StrEnum):
+    """Subject types a route is willing to accept as caller."""
+
+    USER_ACCOUNT = "user_account"
+    USER_EXT_SSO = "user_ext_sso"
+
+
+ACCEPT_USER_ANY: frozenset[Accepts] = frozenset({Accepts.USER_ACCOUNT, Accepts.USER_EXT_SSO})
+ACCEPT_USER_EXT_SSO: frozenset[Accepts] = frozenset({Accepts.USER_EXT_SSO})
+
+_SUBJECT_TO_ACCEPT: dict[SubjectType, Accepts] = {
+    SubjectType.ACCOUNT: Accepts.USER_ACCOUNT,
+    SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO: Accepts.USER_EXT_SSO,
+}
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AuthContext:
+    """Attached to ``g.auth_ctx``. ``scopes`` / ``subject_type`` / ``source``
+    come from the TokenKind, not the DB — corrupt rows can't elevate scope.
+
+    `verified_tenants` is a snapshot of the Layer-0 verdict cache at
+    authenticate time. Per-request mutations write through to Redis via
+    `record_layer0_verdict`; this snapshot is not updated in place (frozen).
+    """
+
+    subject_type: SubjectType
+    subject_email: str | None
+    subject_issuer: str | None
+    account_id: uuid.UUID | None
+    client_id: str | None
+    scopes: frozenset[Scope]
+    token_id: uuid.UUID
+    source: str
+    expires_at: datetime | None
+    token_hash: str
+    verified_tenants: dict[str, bool] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ResolvedRow:
+    subject_email: str | None
+    subject_issuer: str | None
+    account_id: uuid.UUID | None
+    client_id: str | None
+    token_id: uuid.UUID
+    expires_at: datetime | None
+    verified_tenants: dict[str, bool] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+    def to_cache(self) -> dict:
+        return {
+            "subject_email": self.subject_email,
+            "subject_issuer": self.subject_issuer,
+            "account_id": str(self.account_id) if self.account_id else None,
+            "client_id": self.client_id,
+            "token_id": str(self.token_id),
+            "expires_at": self.expires_at.isoformat() if self.expires_at else None,
+            "verified_tenants": dict(self.verified_tenants),
+        }
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_cache(cls, data: dict) -> ResolvedRow:
+        return cls(
+            subject_email=data["subject_email"],
+            subject_issuer=data["subject_issuer"],
+            account_id=uuid.UUID(data["account_id"]) if data["account_id"] else None,
+            client_id=data.get("client_id"),
+            token_id=uuid.UUID(data["token_id"]),
+            expires_at=datetime.fromisoformat(data["expires_at"]) if data["expires_at"] else None,
+            verified_tenants=_coerce_verified_tenants(data.get("verified_tenants")),
+        )
+
+
+def _coerce_verified_tenants(raw: object) -> dict[str, bool]:
+    """Tolerate legacy entries that stored 'ok'/'denied' string verdicts.
+
+    TODO(post-v1.0): remove once the AuthContext cache TTL has fully cycled
+    on all live deployments (60s TTL → safe to drop one release after rollout).
+    """
+    if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+        return {}
+    out: dict[str, bool] = {}
+    for k, v in raw.items():
+        if isinstance(v, bool):
+            out[k] = v
+        elif v == "ok":
+            out[k] = True
+        elif v == "denied":
+            out[k] = False
+    return out
+
+
+class Resolver(Protocol):
+    def resolve(self, token_hash: str) -> ResolvedRow | None:  # pragma: no cover - contract
+        ...
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class TokenKind:
+    prefix: str
+    subject_type: SubjectType
+    scopes: frozenset[Scope]
+    source: str
+    resolver: Resolver
+
+    def matches(self, token: str) -> bool:
+        return token.startswith(self.prefix)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class MintProfile:
+    """Single source of truth for (subject_type, prefix, scopes) at mint time.
+
+    Consumers:
+    - ``build_registry`` reads scopes here so the resolve-time TokenKind
+      cannot drift from the mint-time intent.
+    - Device-flow ``approve`` / ``approve-external`` read prefix + scopes
+      here when calling ``mint_oauth_token`` and ``validate_mint_policy``.
+    - ``services.openapi.mint_policy.validate_mint_policy`` cross-checks
+      the (subject_type, prefix, scopes) triple a caller intends to mint
+      against this table — a caller that assembles its own scope set
+      from a non-canonical source will fail closed at approve time.
+    """
+
+    subject_type: SubjectType
+    prefix: str
+    scopes: frozenset[Scope]
+
+
+MINTABLE_PROFILES: dict[SubjectType, MintProfile] = {
+    SubjectType.ACCOUNT: MintProfile(
+        subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT,
+        prefix="dfoa_",
+        scopes=frozenset({Scope.FULL}),
+    ),
+    SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO: MintProfile(
+        subject_type=SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO,
+        prefix="dfoe_",
+        scopes=frozenset({Scope.APPS_RUN, Scope.APPS_READ_PERMITTED_EXTERNAL}),
+    ),
+}
+
+
+class InvalidBearerError(Exception):
+    """Token missing, unknown prefix, or no live row."""
+
+
+class TokenExpiredError(Exception):
+    """Hard-expire bookkeeping is the resolver's job before raising."""
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# Registry
+# ============================================================================
+
+
+class TokenKindRegistry:
+    def __init__(self, kinds: Iterable[TokenKind]) -> None:
+        self._kinds: tuple[TokenKind, ...] = tuple(kinds)
+        prefixes = [k.prefix for k in self._kinds]
+        if len(set(prefixes)) != len(prefixes):
+            raise ValueError(f"duplicate prefix in registry: {prefixes}")
+
+    def find(self, token: str) -> TokenKind | None:
+        for k in self._kinds:
+            if k.matches(token):
+                return k
+        return None
+
+    def kinds(self) -> tuple[TokenKind, ...]:
+        return self._kinds
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# Authenticator
+# ============================================================================
+
+
+def sha256_hex(token: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+class BearerAuthenticator:
+    def __init__(self, registry: TokenKindRegistry) -> None:
+        self._registry = registry
+
+    @property
+    def registry(self) -> TokenKindRegistry:
+        return self._registry
+
+    def authenticate(self, token: str) -> AuthContext:
+        """Identity + per-token rate limit (single source).
+
+        Both the openapi pipeline (`BearerCheck`) and the decorator
+        (`validate_bearer`) call this — rate-limit fires exactly once per
+        request regardless of which path hosts the route.
+        """
+        kind = self._registry.find(token)
+        if kind is None:
+            raise InvalidBearerError("unknown token prefix")
+        token_hash = sha256_hex(token)
+        row = kind.resolver.resolve(token_hash)
+        if row is None:
+            raise InvalidBearerError("token unknown or revoked")
+        enforce_bearer_rate_limit(token_hash)
+        return AuthContext(
+            subject_type=kind.subject_type,
+            subject_email=row.subject_email,
+            subject_issuer=row.subject_issuer,
+            account_id=row.account_id,
+            client_id=row.client_id,
+            scopes=kind.scopes,
+            token_id=row.token_id,
+            source=kind.source,
+            expires_at=row.expires_at,
+            token_hash=token_hash,
+            verified_tenants=dict(row.verified_tenants),
+        )
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# OAuth access token resolver (PAT resolver would be a sibling class)
+# ============================================================================
+
+TOKEN_CACHE_KEY_FMT = "auth:token:{hash}"
+POSITIVE_TTL_SECONDS = 60
+NEGATIVE_TTL_SECONDS = 10
+AUDIT_OAUTH_EXPIRED = "oauth.token_expired"
+
+ScopeVariant = Literal["account", "external_sso"]
+
+
+class OAuthAccessTokenResolver:
+    """``.for_account()`` / ``.for_external_sso()`` are variant-scoped views
+    sharing DB + cache plumbing.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        session_factory,
+        redis_client,
+        positive_ttl: int = POSITIVE_TTL_SECONDS,
+        negative_ttl: int = NEGATIVE_TTL_SECONDS,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.session_factory = session_factory
+        self._redis = redis_client
+        self._positive_ttl = positive_ttl
+        self._negative_ttl = negative_ttl
+
+    def for_account(self) -> Resolver:
+        return _VariantResolver(self, variant="account")
+
+    def for_external_sso(self) -> Resolver:
+        return _VariantResolver(self, variant="external_sso")
+
+    def _cache_key(self, token_hash: str) -> str:
+        return TOKEN_CACHE_KEY_FMT.format(hash=token_hash)
+
+    def cache_get(self, token_hash: str) -> ResolvedRow | None | Literal["invalid"]:
+        raw = self._redis.get(self._cache_key(token_hash))
+        if raw is None:
+            return None
+        text = raw.decode() if isinstance(raw, (bytes, bytearray)) else raw
+        if text == "invalid":
+            return "invalid"
+        try:
+            return ResolvedRow.from_cache(json.loads(text))
+        except (ValueError, KeyError):
+            logger.warning("auth:token cache entry malformed; treating as miss")
+            return None
+
+    def cache_set_positive(self, token_hash: str, row: ResolvedRow) -> None:
+        self._redis.setex(
+            self._cache_key(token_hash),
+            self._positive_ttl,
+            json.dumps(row.to_cache()),
+        )
+
+    def cache_set_negative(self, token_hash: str) -> None:
+        self._redis.setex(self._cache_key(token_hash), self._negative_ttl, "invalid")
+
+    def hard_expire(self, session: Session, row_id: uuid.UUID | str, token_hash: str) -> None:
+        """Atomic CAS — only the worker that flips revoked_at emits audit;
+        replays are idempotent.
+        """
+        stmt = (
+            update(OAuthAccessToken)
+            .where(OAuthAccessToken.id == row_id, OAuthAccessToken.revoked_at.is_(None))
+            .values(revoked_at=datetime.now(UTC), token_hash=None)
+        )
+        result = session.execute(stmt)
+        session.commit()
+        if result.rowcount == 1:
+            logger.warning(
+                "audit: %s token_id=%s",
+                AUDIT_OAUTH_EXPIRED,
+                row_id,
+                extra={"audit": True, "token_id": str(row_id)},
+            )
+        self._redis.delete(self._cache_key(token_hash))
+        self.cache_set_negative(token_hash)
+
+
+class _VariantResolver:
+    def __init__(self, parent: OAuthAccessTokenResolver, variant: ScopeVariant) -> None:
+        self._parent = parent
+        self._variant = variant
+
+    def resolve(self, token_hash: str) -> ResolvedRow | None:
+        cached = self._parent.cache_get(token_hash)
+        if cached == "invalid":
+            return None
+        if cached is not None and not isinstance(cached, str):
+            if not self._matches_variant(cached):
+                return None
+            return cached
+
+        # Flask-SQLAlchemy's scoped_session is request-bound and not a
+        # context manager; use it directly.
+        session = self._parent.session_factory()
+        row = self._load_from_db(session, token_hash)
+        if row is None:
+            self._parent.cache_set_negative(token_hash)
+            return None
+
+        now = datetime.now(UTC)
+        if row.expires_at is not None and row.expires_at <= now:
+            self._parent.hard_expire(session, row.id, token_hash)
+            return None
+
+        if not self._matches_variant_model(row):
+            logger.error(
+                "internal_state_invariant: account_id/prefix mismatch token_id=%s prefix=%s",
+                row.id,
+                row.prefix,
+            )
+            return None
+
+        resolved = ResolvedRow(
+            subject_email=row.subject_email,
+            subject_issuer=row.subject_issuer,
+            account_id=uuid.UUID(str(row.account_id)) if row.account_id else None,
+            client_id=row.client_id,
+            token_id=uuid.UUID(str(row.id)),
+            expires_at=row.expires_at,
+        )
+        self._parent.cache_set_positive(token_hash, resolved)
+        return resolved
+
+    def _matches_variant(self, row: ResolvedRow) -> bool:
+        has_account = row.account_id is not None
+        if self._variant == "account":
+            return has_account
+        return not has_account
+
+    def _matches_variant_model(self, row: OAuthAccessToken) -> bool:
+        has_account = row.account_id is not None
+        if self._variant == "account":
+            return has_account and row.prefix == "dfoa_"
+        return (not has_account) and row.prefix == "dfoe_"
+
+    def _load_from_db(self, session: Session, token_hash: str) -> OAuthAccessToken | None:
+        return (
+            session.query(OAuthAccessToken)
+            .filter(
+                OAuthAccessToken.token_hash == token_hash,
+                OAuthAccessToken.revoked_at.is_(None),
+            )
+            .one_or_none()
+        )
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# Layer 0 — workspace membership cache + helper
+# ============================================================================
+
+
+def record_layer0_verdict(token_hash: str, tenant_id: str, verdict: bool) -> None:
+    """Merge a Layer-0 membership verdict into the AuthContext cache entry at
+    `auth:token:{hash}`. No-op if entry missing/expired/invalid — next request
+    rebuilds via authenticate() and re-runs Layer 0.
+    """
+    cache_key = TOKEN_CACHE_KEY_FMT.format(hash=token_hash)
+    raw = redis_client.get(cache_key)
+    if raw is None:
+        return
+    text = raw.decode() if isinstance(raw, (bytes, bytearray)) else raw
+    if text == "invalid":
+        return
+    try:
+        data = json.loads(text)
+    except (ValueError, KeyError):
+        return
+    ttl = redis_client.ttl(cache_key)
+    if ttl <= 0:
+        return
+    data.setdefault("verified_tenants", {})[tenant_id] = verdict
+    redis_client.setex(cache_key, ttl, json.dumps(data))
+
+
+def check_workspace_membership(
+    *,
+    account_id: uuid.UUID | str,
+    tenant_id: str,
+    token_hash: str,
+    cached_verdicts: dict[str, bool],
+) -> None:
+    """Layer-0 enforcement core. Raises `Forbidden` on deny, returns on allow.
+
+    Shared by the pipeline step (`WorkspaceMembershipCheck`) and the
+    inline helper (`require_workspace_member`). Caller is responsible for
+    short-circuiting on EE / SSO subjects before invoking — this function
+    runs the membership + active-status checks unconditionally.
+    """
+    cached = cached_verdicts.get(tenant_id)
+    if cached is True:
+        return
+    if cached is False:
+        raise Forbidden("workspace_membership_revoked")
+
+    join = db.session.execute(
+        select(TenantAccountJoin.id).where(
+            TenantAccountJoin.account_id == account_id,
+            TenantAccountJoin.tenant_id == tenant_id,
+        )
+    ).scalar_one_or_none()
+    if join is None:
+        record_layer0_verdict(token_hash, tenant_id, False)
+        raise Forbidden("workspace_membership_revoked")
+
+    status = db.session.execute(select(Account.status).where(Account.id == account_id)).scalar_one_or_none()
+    if status != "active":
+        record_layer0_verdict(token_hash, tenant_id, False)
+        raise Forbidden("workspace_membership_revoked")
+
+    record_layer0_verdict(token_hash, tenant_id, True)
+
+
+def require_workspace_member(ctx: AuthContext, tenant_id: str) -> None:
+    """AuthContext-flavoured wrapper around `check_workspace_membership`.
+
+    No-op on EE (gateway RBAC owns tenant isolation) and for SSO subjects
+    (no `tenant_account_joins` row by definition).
+    """
+    if dify_config.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED:
+        return
+    if ctx.subject_type != SubjectType.ACCOUNT or ctx.account_id is None:
+        return
+    check_workspace_membership(
+        account_id=ctx.account_id,
+        tenant_id=tenant_id,
+        token_hash=ctx.token_hash,
+        cached_verdicts=ctx.verified_tenants,
+    )
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# Decorator — route-level bearer gate
+# ============================================================================
+
+
+_authenticator: BearerAuthenticator | None = None
+
+
+def bind_authenticator(authenticator: BearerAuthenticator) -> None:
+    global _authenticator
+    _authenticator = authenticator
+
+
+def get_authenticator() -> BearerAuthenticator:
+    if _authenticator is None:
+        raise RuntimeError("BearerAuthenticator not bound; call bind_authenticator at startup")
+    return _authenticator
+
+
+def _extract_bearer(req) -> str | None:
+    header = req.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+    scheme, _, value = header.partition(" ")
+    if scheme.lower() != "bearer" or not value:
+        return None
+    return value.strip()
+
+
+_DP = ParamSpec("_DP")
+_DR = TypeVar("_DR")
+
+
+def validate_bearer(*, accept: frozenset[Accepts]) -> Callable[[Callable[_DP, _DR]], Callable[_DP, _DR]]:
+    """Opt-in: omitting it leaves the route unauthenticated.
+
+    Resolves user-level OAuth bearers (``dfoa_`` / ``dfoe_``). Legacy
+    ``app-`` keys belong to ``service_api/wraps.py:validate_app_token``
+    and are rejected here as the wrong auth scheme for this surface.
+    """
+
+    def wrap(fn: Callable[_DP, _DR]) -> Callable[_DP, _DR]:
+        @wraps(fn)
+        def inner(*args: _DP.args, **kwargs: _DP.kwargs) -> _DR:
+            token = _extract_bearer(request)
+            if token is None:
+                raise Unauthorized("missing bearer token")
+
+            if _authenticator is None:
+                raise ServiceUnavailable("bearer_auth_disabled: set ENABLE_OAUTH_BEARER=true to enable")
+
+            try:
+                ctx = get_authenticator().authenticate(token)
+            except InvalidBearerError as e:
+                raise Unauthorized(str(e))
+
+            if _SUBJECT_TO_ACCEPT[ctx.subject_type] not in accept:
+                raise Forbidden("token subject type not accepted here")
+
+            g.auth_ctx = ctx
+            return fn(*args, **kwargs)
+
+        return inner
+
+    return wrap
+
+
+def bearer_feature_required[**P, R](fn: Callable[P, R]) -> Callable[P, R]:
+    """503 if ENABLE_OAUTH_BEARER is off — minted tokens would be unusable
+    without the authenticator, so fail fast instead of approving silently.
+    """
+
+    @wraps(fn)
+    def inner(*args: P.args, **kwargs: P.kwargs) -> R:
+        if not dify_config.ENABLE_OAUTH_BEARER:
+            raise ServiceUnavailable("bearer_auth_disabled: set ENABLE_OAUTH_BEARER=true to enable")
+        return fn(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    return inner
+
+
+def require_scope(scope: Scope) -> Callable:
+    """Route-level scope gate — must run AFTER validate_bearer so that
+    g.auth_ctx is set. Raises Forbidden('insufficient_scope: <scope>')
+    when the bearer lacks both the requested scope and `Scope.FULL`.
+    """
+
+    def wrap(fn: Callable) -> Callable:
+        @wraps(fn)
+        def inner(*args, **kwargs):
+            ctx = getattr(g, "auth_ctx", None)
+            if ctx is None:
+                raise RuntimeError(
+                    "require_scope used without validate_bearer; stack @validate_bearer above @require_scope"
+                )
+            if Scope.FULL not in ctx.scopes and scope not in ctx.scopes:
+                raise Forbidden(f"insufficient_scope: {scope}")
+            return fn(*args, **kwargs)
+
+        return inner
+
+    return wrap
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# Wiring — called once from the app factory
+# ============================================================================
+
+
+def build_registry(session_factory, redis_client) -> TokenKindRegistry:
+    oauth = OAuthAccessTokenResolver(session_factory, redis_client)
+    account = MINTABLE_PROFILES[SubjectType.ACCOUNT]
+    external = MINTABLE_PROFILES[SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO]
+    return TokenKindRegistry(
+        [
+            TokenKind(
+                prefix=account.prefix,
+                subject_type=account.subject_type,
+                scopes=account.scopes,
+                source="oauth_account",
+                resolver=oauth.for_account(),
+            ),
+            TokenKind(
+                prefix=external.prefix,
+                subject_type=external.subject_type,
+                scopes=external.scopes,
+                source="oauth_external_sso",
+                resolver=oauth.for_external_sso(),
+            ),
+        ]
+    )
+
+
+def build_and_bind(session_factory, redis_client) -> BearerAuthenticator:
+    registry = build_registry(session_factory, redis_client)
+    auth = BearerAuthenticator(registry)
+    bind_authenticator(auth)
+    return auth

api/libs/rate_limit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+"""Typed rate-limit decorator over ``libs.helper.RateLimiter`` (sliding-
+window Redis ZSET). Apply after auth decorators so scopes can read
+``g.auth_ctx``. Use :func:`enforce` when the bucket key is computed
+in-handler. RFC-8628 ``slow_down`` is inline — its response shape isn't
+generic 429.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import timedelta
+from enum import StrEnum
+from functools import wraps
+from typing import ParamSpec, TypeVar
+
+from flask import g, jsonify, make_response, request, session
+from werkzeug.exceptions import TooManyRequests
+
+from configs import dify_config
+from libs.helper import RateLimiter, extract_remote_ip
+
+
+class RateLimitScope(StrEnum):
+    IP = "ip"
+    SESSION = "session"
+    ACCOUNT = "account"
+    SUBJECT_EMAIL = "subject_email"
+    TOKEN_ID = "token_id"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class RateLimit:
+    limit: int
+    window: timedelta
+    scopes: tuple[RateLimitScope, ...]
+
+
+LIMIT_DEVICE_CODE_PER_IP = RateLimit(60, timedelta(hours=1), (RateLimitScope.IP,))
+LIMIT_SSO_INITIATE_PER_IP = RateLimit(60, timedelta(hours=1), (RateLimitScope.IP,))
+LIMIT_APPROVE_EXT_PER_EMAIL = RateLimit(10, timedelta(hours=1), (RateLimitScope.SUBJECT_EMAIL,))
+LIMIT_APPROVE_CONSOLE = RateLimit(10, timedelta(hours=1), (RateLimitScope.SESSION,))
+LIMIT_LOOKUP_PUBLIC = RateLimit(60, timedelta(minutes=5), (RateLimitScope.IP,))
+LIMIT_ME_PER_ACCOUNT = RateLimit(60, timedelta(minutes=1), (RateLimitScope.ACCOUNT,))
+LIMIT_ME_PER_EMAIL = RateLimit(60, timedelta(minutes=1), (RateLimitScope.SUBJECT_EMAIL,))
+LIMIT_BEARER_PER_TOKEN = RateLimit(
+    limit=dify_config.OPENAPI_RATE_LIMIT_PER_TOKEN,
+    window=timedelta(minutes=1),
+    scopes=(RateLimitScope.TOKEN_ID,),  # bucket key composed by caller from sha256(token)
+)
+
+
+def _one_key(scope: RateLimitScope) -> str:
+    match scope:
+        case RateLimitScope.IP:
+            return f"ip:{extract_remote_ip(request) or 'unknown'}"
+        case RateLimitScope.SESSION:
+            return f"session:{session.get('_id', 'anon')}"
+        case RateLimitScope.ACCOUNT:
+            ctx = getattr(g, "auth_ctx", None)
+            if ctx and ctx.account_id:
+                return f"account:{ctx.account_id}"
+            return "account:anon"
+        case RateLimitScope.SUBJECT_EMAIL:
+            ctx = getattr(g, "auth_ctx", None)
+            if ctx and ctx.subject_email:
+                return f"subject:{ctx.subject_email}"
+            return "subject:anon"
+        case RateLimitScope.TOKEN_ID:
+            ctx = getattr(g, "auth_ctx", None)
+            if ctx and ctx.token_id:
+                return f"token:{ctx.token_id}"
+            return "token:anon"
+
+
+def _composite_key(scopes: tuple[RateLimitScope, ...]) -> str:
+    return "|".join(_one_key(s) for s in scopes)
+
+
+def _limiter_prefix(scopes: tuple[RateLimitScope, ...]) -> str:
+    return "rl:" + "+".join(s.value for s in scopes)
+
+
+def _build_limiter(spec: RateLimit) -> RateLimiter:
+    return RateLimiter(
+        prefix=_limiter_prefix(spec.scopes),
+        max_attempts=spec.limit,
+        time_window=int(spec.window.total_seconds()),
+    )
+
+
+_P = ParamSpec("_P")
+_R = TypeVar("_R")
+
+
+def rate_limit(spec: RateLimit) -> Callable[[Callable[_P, _R]], Callable[_P, _R]]:
+    """Apply after auth decorators that the scopes read from."""
+    limiter = _build_limiter(spec)
+
+    def wrap(fn: Callable[_P, _R]) -> Callable[_P, _R]:
+        @wraps(fn)
+        def inner(*args: _P.args, **kwargs: _P.kwargs) -> _R:
+            key = _composite_key(spec.scopes)
+            if limiter.is_rate_limited(key):
+                raise TooManyRequests("rate_limited")
+            limiter.increment_rate_limit(key)
+            return fn(*args, **kwargs)
+
+        return inner
+
+    return wrap
+
+
+def enforce(spec: RateLimit, *, key: str) -> None:
+    """Imperative form — caller composes the bucket key to match scope
+    semantics (the key is opaque here).
+    """
+    limiter = _build_limiter(spec)
+    if limiter.is_rate_limited(key):
+        raise TooManyRequests("rate_limited")
+    limiter.increment_rate_limit(key)
+
+
+def enforce_bearer_rate_limit(token_hash: str) -> None:
+    """Per-token rate limit on /openapi/v1/* bearer-authed routes.
+
+    Bucket key = ``token:<sha256_hex>`` so the same token shares one
+    bucket across api replicas (Redis-backed sliding window).
+    """
+    limiter = _build_limiter(LIMIT_BEARER_PER_TOKEN)
+    key = f"token:{token_hash}"
+    if limiter.is_rate_limited(key):
+        retry_after = limiter.seconds_until_available(key)
+        response = make_response(
+            jsonify({"error": "rate_limited", "retry_after_ms": retry_after * 1000}),
+            429,
+        )
+        response.headers["Retry-After"] = str(retry_after)
+        raise TooManyRequests(response=response)
+    limiter.increment_rate_limit(key)

api/libs/token.py

@@ -72,11 +72,15 @@ def extract_csrf_token_from_cookie(request: Request) -> str | None:
     return request.cookies.get(_real_cookie_name(COOKIE_NAME_CSRF_TOKEN))
 
 
-def extract_access_token(request: Request) -> str | None:
-    def _try_extract_from_cookie(request: Request) -> str | None:
-        return request.cookies.get(_real_cookie_name(COOKIE_NAME_ACCESS_TOKEN))
+def extract_console_cookie_token(request: Request) -> str | None:
+    """Cookie-only console session token. Used by /openapi/v1/oauth/device/*
+    approval routes, which must not fall through to the Authorization header
+    (that's where dfoa_/dfoe_ bearers live — they aren't JWTs)."""
+    return request.cookies.get(_real_cookie_name(COOKIE_NAME_ACCESS_TOKEN))
 
-    return _try_extract_from_cookie(request) or _try_extract_from_header(request)
+
+def extract_access_token(request: Request) -> str | None:
+    return extract_console_cookie_token(request) or _try_extract_from_header(request)
 
 
 def extract_webapp_access_token(request: Request) -> str | None:

api/migrations/versions/2026_04_23_2200-d4a5e1f3c9b7_add_oauth_access_tokens.py

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+"""add oauth_access_tokens table
+
+Revision ID: d4a5e1f3c9b7
+Revises: 227822d22895, b69ca54b9208, 2a3aebbbf4bb
+Create Date: 2026-04-23 22:00:00.000000
+
+Merges the three open heads at time of authoring (add_workflow_comments_table,
+add_chatbot_color_theme, add_app_tracing) into a single parent so the new
+oauth_access_tokens table sits on a definite linear chain thereafter.
+
+Table stores user-level OAuth bearer tokens minted via the device-flow grant
+(difyctl auth login). PAT storage (personal_access_tokens) is a separate
+table not added in this migration.
+"""
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+from sqlalchemy.dialects import postgresql
+
+# revision identifiers, used by Alembic.
+revision = "d4a5e1f3c9b7"
+down_revision = ("227822d22895", "b69ca54b9208", "2a3aebbbf4bb")
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade():
+    op.create_table(
+        "oauth_access_tokens",
+        sa.Column(
+            "id",
+            postgresql.UUID(as_uuid=True),
+            server_default=sa.text("gen_random_uuid()"),
+            nullable=False,
+            primary_key=True,
+        ),
+        sa.Column("subject_email", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("subject_issuer", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("account_id", postgresql.UUID(as_uuid=True), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("client_id", sa.String(length=64), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("device_label", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("prefix", sa.String(length=8), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("token_hash", sa.String(length=64), nullable=True, unique=True),
+        sa.Column(
+            "created_at",
+            sa.TIMESTAMP(timezone=True),
+            server_default=sa.text("NOW()"),
+            nullable=False,
+        ),
+        sa.Column("last_used_at", sa.TIMESTAMP(timezone=True), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("expires_at", sa.TIMESTAMP(timezone=True), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("revoked_at", sa.TIMESTAMP(timezone=True), nullable=True),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(
+            ["account_id"],
+            ["accounts.id"],
+            name="fk_oauth_access_tokens_account_id",
+            ondelete="SET NULL",
+        ),
+    )
+
+    op.create_index(
+        "idx_oauth_subject_email",
+        "oauth_access_tokens",
+        ["subject_email"],
+        postgresql_where=sa.text("revoked_at IS NULL"),
+    )
+    op.create_index(
+        "idx_oauth_account",
+        "oauth_access_tokens",
+        ["account_id"],
+        postgresql_where=sa.text("revoked_at IS NULL AND account_id IS NOT NULL"),
+    )
+    op.create_index(
+        "idx_oauth_client",
+        "oauth_access_tokens",
+        ["subject_email", "client_id"],
+        postgresql_where=sa.text("revoked_at IS NULL"),
+    )
+    op.create_index(
+        "idx_oauth_token_hash",
+        "oauth_access_tokens",
+        ["token_hash"],
+        postgresql_where=sa.text("revoked_at IS NULL"),
+    )
+    # Partial unique index — rotate-in-place keyed on (subject, client, device).
+    # The app always writes a non-NULL subject_issuer (account flow uses a
+    # sentinel, external-SSO uses the verified IdP issuer); without that the
+    # composite key would never collide because Postgres treats NULLs as
+    # distinct in unique indices.
+    op.create_index(
+        "uq_oauth_active_per_device",
+        "oauth_access_tokens",
+        ["subject_email", "subject_issuer", "client_id", "device_label"],
+        unique=True,
+        postgresql_where=sa.text("revoked_at IS NULL"),
+    )
+
+
+def downgrade():
+    op.drop_index("uq_oauth_active_per_device", table_name="oauth_access_tokens")
+    op.drop_index("idx_oauth_token_hash", table_name="oauth_access_tokens")
+    op.drop_index("idx_oauth_client", table_name="oauth_access_tokens")
+    op.drop_index("idx_oauth_account", table_name="oauth_access_tokens")
+    op.drop_index("idx_oauth_subject_email", table_name="oauth_access_tokens")
+    op.drop_table("oauth_access_tokens")

api/models/__init__.py

@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ from .model import (
     TrialApp,
     UploadFile,
 )
-from .oauth import DatasourceOauthParamConfig, DatasourceProvider
+from .oauth import DatasourceOauthParamConfig, DatasourceProvider, OAuthAccessToken
 from .provider import (
     LoadBalancingModelConfig,
     Provider,
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ __all__ = [
     "MessageChain",
     "MessageFeedback",
     "MessageFile",
+    "OAuthAccessToken",
     "OperationLog",
     "PinnedConversation",
     "Provider",

api/models/oauth.py

@@ -84,3 +84,35 @@ class DatasourceOauthTenantParamConfig(TypeBase):
         onupdate=func.current_timestamp(),
         init=False,
     )
+
+
+class OAuthAccessToken(TypeBase):
+    """Device-flow bearer. account_id NOT NULL ⇒ dfoa_ (Dify account,
+    subject_issuer = "dify:account" sentinel); account_id NULL +
+    subject_issuer = verified IdP issuer ⇒ dfoe_ (external SSO, EE-only).
+    subject_issuer is non-NULL for all rows the app writes — Postgres
+    treats NULLs as distinct in unique indices, so the partial unique
+    index on (subject_email, subject_issuer, client_id, device_label)
+    WHERE revoked_at IS NULL would otherwise fail to rotate in place.
+    """
+
+    __tablename__ = "oauth_access_tokens"
+    __table_args__ = (sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id", name="oauth_access_tokens_pkey"),)
+
+    id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(
+        StringUUID, insert_default=lambda: str(uuidv7()), default_factory=lambda: str(uuidv7()), init=False
+    )
+    subject_email: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(sa.Text, nullable=False)
+    client_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(sa.String(64), nullable=False)
+    device_label: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(sa.Text, nullable=False)
+    prefix: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(sa.String(8), nullable=False)
+    expires_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False)
+    subject_issuer: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(sa.Text, nullable=True, default=None)
+    account_id: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(StringUUID, nullable=True, default=None)
+    token_hash: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(sa.String(64), nullable=True, default=None)
+    last_used_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True, default=None)
+    revoked_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True, default=None)
+
+    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now(), init=False
+    )

api/models/workflow.py

@@ -1206,6 +1206,7 @@ class WorkflowAppLogCreatedFrom(StrEnum):
     SERVICE_API = "service-api"
     WEB_APP = "web-app"
     INSTALLED_APP = "installed-app"
+    OPENAPI = "openapi"
 
     @classmethod
     def value_of(cls, value: str) -> "WorkflowAppLogCreatedFrom":

api/schedule/clean_oauth_access_tokens_task.py

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+"""DELETE oauth_access_tokens past retention. Revocation is UPDATE
+(token_id stays for audits) so rows accumulate across re-logins, and
+expired-but-never-presented rows have no hard-expire trigger — both get
+pruned here. Spec: docs/specs/v1.0/server/tokens.md §Hard-expire.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import time
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+
+import click
+from sqlalchemy import delete, or_, select
+
+import app
+from configs import dify_config
+from extensions.ext_database import db
+from models.oauth import OAuthAccessToken
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+DELETE_BATCH_SIZE = 500
+
+
+@app.celery.task(queue="retention")
+def clean_oauth_access_tokens_task():
+    click.echo(click.style("Start clean oauth_access_tokens.", fg="green"))
+    retention_days = int(dify_config.OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_RETENTION_DAYS)
+    cutoff = datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(days=retention_days)
+    start_at = time.perf_counter()
+
+    candidates = or_(
+        OAuthAccessToken.revoked_at < cutoff,
+        # Zombies: expired but never re-presented, so middleware never flipped them.
+        (OAuthAccessToken.revoked_at.is_(None)) & (OAuthAccessToken.expires_at < cutoff),
+    )
+
+    total = 0
+    while True:
+        ids = db.session.scalars(select(OAuthAccessToken.id).where(candidates).limit(DELETE_BATCH_SIZE)).all()
+        if not ids:
+            break
+        db.session.execute(delete(OAuthAccessToken).where(OAuthAccessToken.id.in_(ids)))
+        db.session.commit()
+        total += len(ids)
+
+    end_at = time.perf_counter()
+    click.echo(
+        click.style(
+            f"Cleaned {total} oauth_access_tokens rows older than {retention_days}d in {end_at - start_at:.2f}s",
+            fg="green",
+        )
+    )

api/services/app_service.py

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ class AppService:
         Get app list with pagination
         :param user_id: user id
         :param tenant_id: tenant id
-        :param args: request args
+        :param args: request args. Optional keys: status (e.g. "normal") restricts App.status.
         :return:
         """
         filters = [App.tenant_id == tenant_id, App.is_universal == False]
@@ -53,6 +53,14 @@ class AppService:
         elif args["mode"] == "agent-chat":
             filters.append(App.mode == AppMode.AGENT_CHAT)
 
+        if args.get("status"):
+            filters.append(App.status == args["status"])
+        # OpenAPI surface visibility gate. Pushed into the query so
+        # `pagination.total` reflects only apps the openapi caller can
+        # actually reach — post-filtering by enable_api after the page
+        # arrives would make `total` page-dependent.
+        if args.get("openapi_visible"):
+            filters.append(App.enable_api.is_(True))
         if args.get("is_created_by_me", False):
             filters.append(App.created_by == user_id)
         if args.get("name"):

api/services/enterprise/app_permitted_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+from werkzeug.exceptions import ServiceUnavailable
+
+from services.enterprise.enterprise_service import EnterpriseService
+from services.errors.enterprise import EnterpriseAPIError
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class PermittedAppsPage:
+    app_ids: list[str]
+    total: int
+    has_more: bool
+
+
+def list_permitted_apps(
+    *,
+    page: int,
+    limit: int,
+    mode: str | None = None,
+    name: str | None = None,
+) -> PermittedAppsPage:
+    try:
+        body = EnterpriseService.WebAppAuth.list_externally_accessible_apps(
+            page=page, limit=limit, mode=mode, name=name
+        )
+    except EnterpriseAPIError as exc:
+        logger.warning(
+            "permitted_apps EE call failed: status=%s message=%s",
+            getattr(exc, "status_code", None),
+            str(exc),
+        )
+        raise ServiceUnavailable("permitted_apps_unavailable") from exc
+
+    return PermittedAppsPage(
+        app_ids=[row["appId"] for row in body.get("data", [])],
+        total=int(body.get("total", 0)),
+        has_more=bool(body.get("hasMore", False)),
+    )

api/services/enterprise/enterprise_service.py

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import enum
 import logging
 import uuid
 from datetime import datetime
@@ -23,10 +24,22 @@ VALID_LICENSE_CACHE_TTL = 600  # 10 minutes — valid licenses are stable
 INVALID_LICENSE_CACHE_TTL = 30  # 30 seconds — short so admin fixes are picked up quickly
 
 
+class WebAppAccessMode(enum.StrEnum):
+    PUBLIC = "public"
+    PRIVATE = "private"
+    PRIVATE_ALL = "private_all"
+    SSO_VERIFIED = "sso_verified"
+
+
+PERMISSION_CHECK_MODES: frozenset[WebAppAccessMode] = frozenset(
+    {WebAppAccessMode.PRIVATE, WebAppAccessMode.PRIVATE_ALL}
+)
+
+
 class WebAppSettings(BaseModel):
     access_mode: str = Field(
-        description="Access mode for the web app. Can be 'public', 'private', 'private_all', 'sso_verified'",
-        default="private",
+        description=f"Access mode for the web app. One of: {', '.join(m.value for m in WebAppAccessMode)}",
+        default=WebAppAccessMode.PRIVATE.value,
         alias="accessMode",
     )
 
@@ -106,6 +119,15 @@ class EnterpriseService:
     def get_workspace_info(cls, tenant_id: str):
         return EnterpriseRequest.send_request("GET", f"/workspace/{tenant_id}/info")
 
+    @classmethod
+    def initiate_device_flow_sso(cls, signed_state: str) -> dict:
+        return EnterpriseRequest.send_request(
+            "POST",
+            "/device-flow/sso-initiate",
+            json={"signed_state": signed_state},
+            raise_for_status=True,
+        )
+
     @classmethod
     def join_default_workspace(cls, *, account_id: str) -> DefaultWorkspaceJoinResult:
         """
@@ -217,8 +239,9 @@ class EnterpriseService:
         def update_app_access_mode(cls, app_id: str, access_mode: str):
             if not app_id:
                 raise ValueError("app_id must be provided.")
-            if access_mode not in ["public", "private", "private_all"]:
-                raise ValueError("access_mode must be either 'public', 'private', or 'private_all'")
+            allowed = {WebAppAccessMode.PUBLIC, WebAppAccessMode.PRIVATE, WebAppAccessMode.PRIVATE_ALL}
+            if access_mode not in allowed:
+                raise ValueError(f"access_mode must be one of: {', '.join(m.value for m in allowed)}")
 
             data = {"appId": app_id, "accessMode": access_mode}
 
@@ -234,6 +257,32 @@ class EnterpriseService:
             params = {"appId": app_id}
             EnterpriseRequest.send_request("DELETE", "/webapp/clean", params=params)
 
+        @classmethod
+        def list_externally_accessible_apps(
+            cls,
+            *,
+            page: int,
+            limit: int,
+            mode: str | None = None,
+            name: str | None = None,
+        ) -> dict:
+            """Call EE InnerListExternallyAccessibleApps; returns raw camelCase response.
+
+            Response shape: ``{"data": [{"appId", "tenantId", "mode", "name", "updatedAt"}],
+            "total": int, "hasMore": bool}``.
+            """
+            body: dict[str, str | int] = {"page": page, "limit": limit}
+            if mode is not None:
+                body["mode"] = mode
+            if name is not None:
+                body["name"] = name
+            return EnterpriseRequest.send_request(
+                "POST",
+                "/webapp/externally-accessible-apps",
+                json=body,
+                timeout=5.0,
+            )
+
     @classmethod
     def get_cached_license_status(cls) -> LicenseStatus | None:
         """Get enterprise license status with Redis caching to reduce HTTP calls.

api/services/oauth_device_flow.py

@@ -0,0 +1,467 @@
+"""Device-flow service layer: Redis state machine, OAuth token mint
+(DB upsert + plaintext generation), and TTL policy. Specs:
+docs/specs/v1.0/server/{device-flow.md, tokens.md}.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import logging
+import os
+import secrets
+import time
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from enum import StrEnum
+
+from sqlalchemy import func, select
+from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import insert as pg_insert
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Session, scoped_session
+
+from libs.oauth_bearer import TOKEN_CACHE_KEY_FMT
+from models.oauth import OAuthAccessToken
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# Redis state machine — device_code + user_code ephemeral state
+# ============================================================================
+
+
+_DEVICE_CODE_KEY_PREFIX = "device_code:"
+_USER_CODE_KEY_PREFIX = "user_code:"
+DEVICE_CODE_KEY_FMT = _DEVICE_CODE_KEY_PREFIX + "{code}"
+USER_CODE_KEY_FMT = _USER_CODE_KEY_PREFIX + "{code}"
+
+# Atomic GET → status-check → DEL(both keys). Two concurrent pollers must
+# not both observe APPROVED — only the winner gets the plaintext token,
+# the loser sees nil and the caller maps that to expired_token.
+_CONSUME_ON_POLL_LUA = """
+local raw = redis.call('GET', KEYS[1])
+if not raw then return nil end
+local ok, decoded = pcall(cjson.decode, raw)
+if not ok then return nil end
+if decoded.status == 'pending' then return nil end
+if decoded.user_code then
+    redis.call('DEL', ARGV[1] .. decoded.user_code)
+end
+redis.call('DEL', KEYS[1])
+return raw
+"""
+
+DEVICE_FLOW_TTL_SECONDS = 15 * 60  # RFC 8628 expires_in
+APPROVED_TTL_SECONDS_MIN = 60  # plaintext-token lifetime floor
+
+USER_CODE_ALPHABET = "ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXY3456789"  # ambiguous chars dropped
+USER_CODE_SEGMENT_LEN = 4
+USER_CODE_MAX_CLAIM_ATTEMPTS = 5
+
+DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 5  # RFC 8628 minimum
+
+
+class DeviceFlowStatus(StrEnum):
+    PENDING = "pending"
+    APPROVED = "approved"
+    DENIED = "denied"
+
+
+class SlowDownDecision(StrEnum):
+    OK = "ok"
+    SLOW_DOWN = "slow_down"
+
+
+@dataclass
+class DeviceFlowState:
+    """``minted_token`` is plaintext between approve and the next poll;
+    DEL'd after the poll reads it.
+    """
+
+    user_code: str
+    client_id: str
+    device_label: str
+    status: DeviceFlowStatus
+    subject_email: str | None = None
+    account_id: str | None = None
+    subject_issuer: str | None = None
+    minted_token: str | None = None
+    token_id: str | None = None
+    created_at: str = ""
+    created_ip: str = ""
+    last_poll_at: str = ""
+    poll_payload: dict | None = field(default=None)
+
+    def to_json(self) -> str:
+        return json.dumps(asdict(self))
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_json(cls, raw: str) -> DeviceFlowState:
+        data = json.loads(raw)
+        if "status" in data:
+            data["status"] = DeviceFlowStatus(data["status"])
+        return cls(**data)
+
+
+def _random_device_code() -> str:
+    return "dc_" + secrets.token_urlsafe(24)
+
+
+def _random_user_code_segment() -> str:
+    return "".join(secrets.choice(USER_CODE_ALPHABET) for _ in range(USER_CODE_SEGMENT_LEN))
+
+
+def _random_user_code() -> str:
+    return f"{_random_user_code_segment()}-{_random_user_code_segment()}"
+
+
+class StateNotFoundError(Exception):
+    pass
+
+
+class InvalidTransitionError(Exception):
+    pass
+
+
+class UserCodeExhaustedError(Exception):
+    pass
+
+
+class DeviceFlowRedis:
+    def __init__(self, redis_client) -> None:
+        self._redis = redis_client
+        self._consume_on_poll_script = redis_client.register_script(_CONSUME_ON_POLL_LUA)
+
+    def start(self, client_id: str, device_label: str, created_ip: str) -> tuple[str, str, int]:
+        device_code = _random_device_code()
+        user_code = self._claim_user_code(device_code)
+        state = DeviceFlowState(
+            user_code=user_code,
+            client_id=client_id,
+            device_label=device_label,
+            status=DeviceFlowStatus.PENDING,
+            created_at=datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
+            created_ip=created_ip,
+        )
+        self._redis.setex(
+            DEVICE_CODE_KEY_FMT.format(code=device_code),
+            DEVICE_FLOW_TTL_SECONDS,
+            state.to_json(),
+        )
+        return device_code, user_code, DEVICE_FLOW_TTL_SECONDS
+
+    def _claim_user_code(self, device_code: str) -> str:
+        for _ in range(USER_CODE_MAX_CLAIM_ATTEMPTS):
+            user_code = _random_user_code()
+            key = USER_CODE_KEY_FMT.format(code=user_code)
+            ok = self._redis.set(key, device_code, nx=True, ex=DEVICE_FLOW_TTL_SECONDS)
+            if ok:
+                return user_code
+        raise UserCodeExhaustedError("could not allocate a unique user_code in 5 attempts")
+
+    def load_by_user_code(self, user_code: str) -> tuple[str, DeviceFlowState] | None:
+        raw_dc = self._redis.get(USER_CODE_KEY_FMT.format(code=user_code))
+        if not raw_dc:
+            return None
+        device_code = raw_dc.decode() if isinstance(raw_dc, (bytes, bytearray)) else raw_dc
+        state = self._load_state(device_code)
+        if state is None:
+            return None
+        return device_code, state
+
+    def load_by_device_code(self, device_code: str) -> DeviceFlowState | None:
+        return self._load_state(device_code)
+
+    def _load_state(self, device_code: str) -> DeviceFlowState | None:
+        raw = self._redis.get(DEVICE_CODE_KEY_FMT.format(code=device_code))
+        if not raw:
+            return None
+        text_ = raw.decode() if isinstance(raw, (bytes, bytearray)) else raw
+        try:
+            return DeviceFlowState.from_json(text_)
+        except (ValueError, KeyError):
+            logger.exception("device_flow: corrupt state for %s", device_code)
+            return None
+
+    def approve(
+        self,
+        device_code: str,
+        subject_email: str,
+        account_id: str | None,
+        minted_token: str,
+        token_id: str,
+        subject_issuer: str | None = None,
+        poll_payload: dict | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        state = self._load_state(device_code)
+        if state is None:
+            raise StateNotFoundError(device_code)
+        if state.status is not DeviceFlowStatus.PENDING:
+            raise InvalidTransitionError(f"cannot approve {state.status}")
+
+        state.status = DeviceFlowStatus.APPROVED
+        state.subject_email = subject_email
+        state.account_id = account_id
+        state.subject_issuer = subject_issuer
+        state.minted_token = minted_token
+        state.token_id = token_id
+        state.poll_payload = poll_payload
+
+        new_ttl = self._remaining_ttl(device_code, floor=APPROVED_TTL_SECONDS_MIN)
+        self._redis.setex(DEVICE_CODE_KEY_FMT.format(code=device_code), new_ttl, state.to_json())
+
+    def deny(self, device_code: str) -> None:
+        state = self._load_state(device_code)
+        if state is None:
+            raise StateNotFoundError(device_code)
+        if state.status is not DeviceFlowStatus.PENDING:
+            raise InvalidTransitionError(f"cannot deny {state.status}")
+        state.status = DeviceFlowStatus.DENIED
+        self._redis.setex(
+            DEVICE_CODE_KEY_FMT.format(code=device_code),
+            self._remaining_ttl(device_code, floor=1),
+            state.to_json(),
+        )
+
+    def consume_on_poll(self, device_code: str) -> DeviceFlowState | None:
+        """Race-safe via Lua EVAL: GET + status-check + DEL execute in a
+        single Redis transaction so only one of N concurrent pollers
+        observes the APPROVED state. Losers get None, mapped to
+        expired_token by the caller.
+        """
+        raw = self._consume_on_poll_script(
+            keys=[DEVICE_CODE_KEY_FMT.format(code=device_code)],
+            args=[_USER_CODE_KEY_PREFIX],
+        )
+        if raw is None:
+            return None
+        text_ = raw.decode() if isinstance(raw, (bytes, bytearray)) else raw
+        try:
+            return DeviceFlowState.from_json(text_)
+        except (ValueError, KeyError):
+            logger.exception("device_flow: corrupt state on consume %s", device_code)
+            return None
+
+    def record_poll(self, device_code: str, interval_seconds: int) -> SlowDownDecision:
+        now = time.time()
+        key = f"device_code:{device_code}:last_poll"
+        prev_raw = self._redis.get(key)
+        self._redis.setex(key, DEVICE_FLOW_TTL_SECONDS, str(now))
+        if prev_raw is None:
+            return SlowDownDecision.OK
+        prev_s = prev_raw.decode() if isinstance(prev_raw, (bytes, bytearray)) else prev_raw
+        try:
+            prev = float(prev_s)
+        except ValueError:
+            return SlowDownDecision.OK
+        if now - prev < interval_seconds:
+            return SlowDownDecision.SLOW_DOWN
+        return SlowDownDecision.OK
+
+    def _remaining_ttl(self, device_code: str, floor: int) -> int:
+        """``max(remaining, floor)`` — guarantees the CLI has at least
+        ``floor`` seconds to poll after a near-expiry approve.
+        """
+        ttl = self._redis.ttl(DEVICE_CODE_KEY_FMT.format(code=device_code))
+        if ttl is None or ttl < 0:
+            return floor
+        return max(int(ttl), floor)
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# Token mint — generate + upsert
+# ============================================================================
+
+
+OAUTH_BODY_BYTES = 32  # ~256 bits entropy
+PREFIX_OAUTH_ACCOUNT = "dfoa_"
+PREFIX_OAUTH_EXTERNAL_SSO = "dfoe_"
+
+# Sentinel issuer for account-flow rows. Postgres' default partial unique
+# index treats NULLs as distinct, which would let two live `dfoa_` rows
+# share (email, client, device) and break rotate-in-place. Storing a
+# non-empty literal makes the composite key collide as intended.
+ACCOUNT_ISSUER_SENTINEL = "dify:account"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class MintResult:
+    """Plaintext token surfaces to the caller once."""
+
+    token: str
+    token_id: uuid.UUID
+    expires_at: datetime
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class UpsertOutcome:
+    token_id: uuid.UUID
+    rotated: bool
+    old_hash: str | None
+
+
+def generate_token(prefix: str) -> str:
+    return prefix + secrets.token_urlsafe(OAUTH_BODY_BYTES)
+
+
+def sha256_hex(token: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def mint_oauth_token(
+    # Accept either Session or Flask-SQLAlchemy's request-scoped wrapper —
+    # the wrapper proxies the same execute/commit surface.
+    session: Session | scoped_session,
+    redis_client,
+    *,
+    subject_email: str,
+    subject_issuer: str | None,
+    account_id: str | None,
+    client_id: str,
+    device_label: str,
+    prefix: str,
+    ttl_days: int,
+) -> MintResult:
+    """Live row rotates in place via partial unique index
+    ``uq_oauth_active_per_device``; hard-expired rows are excluded by the
+    index predicate so re-login INSERTs fresh. Pre-rotate Redis entry is
+    deleted so stale AuthContext drops immediately.
+    """
+    if prefix == PREFIX_OAUTH_ACCOUNT:
+        # Account flow always writes the sentinel — caller may pass None
+        # (for clarity) or the sentinel itself; nothing else is valid.
+        if subject_issuer not in (None, ACCOUNT_ISSUER_SENTINEL):
+            raise ValueError(f"account-flow token must use ACCOUNT_ISSUER_SENTINEL, got {subject_issuer!r}")
+        subject_issuer = ACCOUNT_ISSUER_SENTINEL
+    elif prefix == PREFIX_OAUTH_EXTERNAL_SSO:
+        # Defense in depth: enterprise canonicalises + rejects empty,
+        # but a regression there must not yield a NULL composite key here.
+        if not subject_issuer or not subject_issuer.strip():
+            raise ValueError("external-SSO token requires non-empty subject_issuer")
+    else:
+        raise ValueError(f"unknown oauth prefix: {prefix!r}")
+
+    token = generate_token(prefix)
+    new_hash = sha256_hex(token)
+    expires_at = datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(days=ttl_days)
+
+    outcome = _upsert(
+        session,
+        subject_email=subject_email,
+        subject_issuer=subject_issuer,
+        account_id=account_id,
+        client_id=client_id,
+        device_label=device_label,
+        prefix=prefix,
+        new_hash=new_hash,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+    )
+
+    if outcome.rotated and outcome.old_hash:
+        redis_client.delete(TOKEN_CACHE_KEY_FMT.format(hash=outcome.old_hash))
+
+    return MintResult(token=token, token_id=outcome.token_id, expires_at=expires_at)
+
+
+def _upsert(
+    session: Session | scoped_session,
+    *,
+    subject_email: str,
+    subject_issuer: str | None,
+    account_id: str | None,
+    client_id: str,
+    device_label: str,
+    prefix: str,
+    new_hash: str,
+    expires_at: datetime,
+) -> UpsertOutcome:
+    # Snapshot prior live row's hash for Redis invalidation post-rotate.
+    # subject_issuer is always non-null here (account flow uses sentinel,
+    # external-SSO is validated upstream), so equality matches the index.
+    prior = session.execute(
+        select(OAuthAccessToken.id, OAuthAccessToken.token_hash)
+        .where(
+            OAuthAccessToken.subject_email == subject_email,
+            OAuthAccessToken.subject_issuer == subject_issuer,
+            OAuthAccessToken.client_id == client_id,
+            OAuthAccessToken.device_label == device_label,
+            OAuthAccessToken.revoked_at.is_(None),
+        )
+        .limit(1)
+    ).first()
+    old_hash = prior.token_hash if prior else None
+
+    insert_stmt = pg_insert(OAuthAccessToken).values(
+        subject_email=subject_email,
+        subject_issuer=subject_issuer,
+        account_id=account_id,
+        client_id=client_id,
+        device_label=device_label,
+        prefix=prefix,
+        token_hash=new_hash,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+    )
+    upsert_stmt = insert_stmt.on_conflict_do_update(
+        index_elements=["subject_email", "subject_issuer", "client_id", "device_label"],
+        index_where=OAuthAccessToken.revoked_at.is_(None),
+        set_={
+            "token_hash": insert_stmt.excluded.token_hash,
+            "prefix": insert_stmt.excluded.prefix,
+            "account_id": insert_stmt.excluded.account_id,
+            "expires_at": insert_stmt.excluded.expires_at,
+            "created_at": func.now(),
+            "last_used_at": None,
+        },
+    ).returning(OAuthAccessToken.id)
+    row = session.execute(upsert_stmt).first()
+    session.commit()
+
+    if row is None:
+        raise RuntimeError("oauth_token upsert returned no row")
+    token_id = uuid.UUID(str(row.id))
+    return UpsertOutcome(
+        token_id=token_id,
+        rotated=prior is not None,
+        old_hash=old_hash,
+    )
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# TTL policy — days new OAuth tokens live
+# ============================================================================
+
+
+DEFAULT_OAUTH_TTL_DAYS = 14
+MIN_TTL_DAYS = 1
+MAX_TTL_DAYS = 365
+
+_TTL_ENV_VAR = "OAUTH_TTL_DAYS"
+
+
+def oauth_ttl_days(tenant_id: str | None = None) -> int:
+    """``OAUTH_TTL_DAYS`` env, else default. EE tenant-level lookup
+    is deferred; when it lands it wins over the env (Redis-cached 60s).
+    """
+    _ = tenant_id
+
+    raw = os.environ.get(_TTL_ENV_VAR)
+    if raw is None:
+        return DEFAULT_OAUTH_TTL_DAYS
+    try:
+        value = int(raw)
+    except ValueError:
+        logger.warning(
+            "%s=%r is not an int; falling back to %d",
+            _TTL_ENV_VAR,
+            raw,
+            DEFAULT_OAUTH_TTL_DAYS,
+        )
+        return DEFAULT_OAUTH_TTL_DAYS
+    if value < MIN_TTL_DAYS:
+        logger.warning("%s=%d below min %d; clamping", _TTL_ENV_VAR, value, MIN_TTL_DAYS)
+        return MIN_TTL_DAYS
+    if value > MAX_TTL_DAYS:
+        logger.warning("%s=%d above max %d; clamping", _TTL_ENV_VAR, value, MAX_TTL_DAYS)
+        return MAX_TTL_DAYS
+    return value

api/services/openapi/license_gate.py

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+"""License gate for the /openapi/v1/permitted-external-apps* surface.
+
+EE-only. CE deploys (``ENTERPRISE_ENABLED=false``) skip the gate entirely —
+the EE blueprint chain is what gives CE deploys no callers on this surface
+in practice, but the explicit short-circuit avoids any test/fixture that
+flips the surface on without flipping the license.
+
+Reuses ``FeatureService.get_system_features()`` so the license status
+travels the same path as the console reads.
+
+Companion to ``controllers.console.wraps.enterprise_license_required`` —
+that one is for console (cookie-authed, force-logout 401). This one is
+for bearer surface (token-authed, 403 ``license_required``).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from functools import wraps
+
+from werkzeug.exceptions import Forbidden
+
+from configs import dify_config
+from services.feature_service import FeatureService, LicenseStatus
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+_VALID_LICENSE_STATUSES: frozenset[LicenseStatus] = frozenset(
+    {LicenseStatus.ACTIVE, LicenseStatus.EXPIRING}
+)
+
+
+def license_required[**P, R](view: Callable[P, R]) -> Callable[P, R]:
+    """Decorator form. Raises ``Forbidden('license_required')`` when the EE
+    deployment has no valid license. No-op on CE (``ENTERPRISE_ENABLED=false``).
+    """
+
+    @wraps(view)
+    def decorated(*args: P.args, **kwargs: P.kwargs) -> R:
+        if dify_config.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED and not _is_license_valid():
+            raise Forbidden(description="license_required")
+        return view(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    return decorated
+
+
+def _is_license_valid() -> bool:
+    try:
+        features = FeatureService.get_system_features()
+    except Exception:
+        logger.exception("license_gate: FeatureService.get_system_features failed")
+        return False
+    return features.license.status in _VALID_LICENSE_STATUSES

api/services/openapi/mint_policy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+"""Hard mint policy.
+
+``validate_mint_policy`` cross-checks a (subject_type, prefix, scopes)
+triple a caller intends to mint against ``MINTABLE_PROFILES`` —
+the single source of truth in ``libs.oauth_bearer``.
+
+The defense-in-depth value: if a future caller assembles ``prefix`` or
+``scopes`` from a non-canonical source (env, request body, plug-in
+contribution), the mismatch fails closed at approve time before any
+row hits the DB. When the caller reads straight from
+``MINTABLE_PROFILES``, the check is a structural pin — it confirms the
+table entry is well-formed and the caller picked the right key.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from libs.oauth_bearer import MINTABLE_PROFILES, Scope, SubjectType
+
+
+class MintPolicyViolation(Exception):  # noqa: N818 — spec-defined name, used in BadRequest message
+    """Raised on a (subject_type, prefix, scopes) mismatch. Callers translate
+    to 400 ``mint_policy_violation``."""
+
+
+def validate_mint_policy(
+    *,
+    subject_type: SubjectType,
+    prefix: str,
+    scopes: frozenset[Scope],
+) -> None:
+    """Raise ``MintPolicyViolation`` when the triple does not match the
+    canonical ``MINTABLE_PROFILES`` entry for ``subject_type``.
+    """
+    profile = MINTABLE_PROFILES.get(subject_type)
+    if profile is None:
+        raise MintPolicyViolation(
+            f"mint_policy_violation: unknown subject_type={subject_type!r}"
+        )
+
+    drift = []
+    if profile.prefix != prefix:
+        drift.append(f"prefix got={prefix!r} expected={profile.prefix!r}")
+    if frozenset(scopes) != profile.scopes:
+        got = sorted(s.value for s in scopes)
+        want = sorted(s.value for s in profile.scopes)
+        drift.append(f"scopes got={got} expected={want}")
+
+    if drift:
+        raise MintPolicyViolation(
+            f"mint_policy_violation: subject_type={subject_type.value} — " + "; ".join(drift)
+        )

api/services/openapi/visibility.py

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+"""Single-source visibility filter for the /openapi/v1/* surface.
+
+Keep every openapi-surface app query routed through ``_apply_openapi_gate``;
+retiring or replacing the gate then becomes a one-line change here.
+
+The Service API (/v1/* app-key surface) does NOT use this helper — that
+surface has its own per-request guard (``service_api_disabled``) wired
+into the legacy ``validate_app_token`` decorator.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+
+from models.model import App
+
+
+def apply_openapi_gate(query: Any) -> Any:
+    """Filter a SQLAlchemy Select/Query to apps visible on /openapi/v1/*.
+
+    Works with both legacy ``Query.filter`` and 2.0-style ``Select.filter``
+    (alias of ``.where``).
+    """
+    return query.filter(App.enable_api.is_(True))
+
+
+def is_openapi_visible(app: App) -> bool:
+    """Per-row counterpart for code paths that fetch an App by primary key
+    (``session.get`` / ``session.scalar``) and need the same visibility check
+    the query gate would have applied.
+    """
+    return bool(app.enable_api)

api/services/webapp_auth_service.py

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ from models import Account, AccountStatus
 from models.model import App, EndUser, Site
 from services.account_service import AccountService
 from services.app_service import AppService
-from services.enterprise.enterprise_service import EnterpriseService
+from services.enterprise.enterprise_service import PERMISSION_CHECK_MODES, EnterpriseService, WebAppAccessMode
 from services.errors.account import AccountLoginError, AccountNotFoundError, AccountPasswordError
 from tasks.mail_email_code_login import send_email_code_login_mail_task
 
@@ -137,12 +137,8 @@ class WebAppAuthService:
         """
         Check if the app requires permission check based on its access mode.
         """
-        modes_requiring_permission_check = [
-            "private",
-            "private_all",
-        ]
         if access_mode:
-            return access_mode in modes_requiring_permission_check
+            return access_mode in PERMISSION_CHECK_MODES
 
         if not app_code and not app_id:
             raise ValueError("Either app_code or app_id must be provided.")
@@ -153,7 +149,7 @@ class WebAppAuthService:
             raise ValueError("App ID could not be determined from the provided app_code.")
 
         webapp_settings = EnterpriseService.WebAppAuth.get_app_access_mode_by_id(app_id)
-        if webapp_settings and webapp_settings.access_mode in modes_requiring_permission_check:
+        if webapp_settings and webapp_settings.access_mode in PERMISSION_CHECK_MODES:
             return True
         return False
 
@@ -166,11 +162,11 @@ class WebAppAuthService:
             raise ValueError("Either app_code or access_mode must be provided.")
 
         if access_mode:
-            if access_mode == "public":
+            if access_mode == WebAppAccessMode.PUBLIC:
                 return WebAppAuthType.PUBLIC
-            elif access_mode in ["private", "private_all"]:
+            elif access_mode in PERMISSION_CHECK_MODES:
                 return WebAppAuthType.INTERNAL
-            elif access_mode == "sso_verified":
+            elif access_mode == WebAppAccessMode.SSO_VERIFIED:
                 return WebAppAuthType.EXTERNAL
 
         if app_code:

api/tests/integration_tests/controllers/openapi/conftest.py

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+"""Shared fixtures for /openapi/v1/* integration tests."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import uuid
+from collections.abc import Generator
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+
+import pytest
+from flask import Flask
+
+from extensions.ext_database import db
+from extensions.ext_redis import redis_client
+from models import Account, App, OAuthAccessToken, Tenant, TenantAccountJoin
+from models.account import AccountStatus
+
+
+def _sha256(token: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def disable_enterprise(monkeypatch):
+    """Default to CE behaviour for /openapi/v1 tests. Tests that exercise the
+    EE branch override this with their own monkeypatch in-test."""
+    from configs import dify_config
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(dify_config, "ENTERPRISE_ENABLED", False)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def workspace_account(flask_app: Flask) -> Generator[tuple[Account, Tenant, TenantAccountJoin], None, None]:
+    with flask_app.app_context():
+        tenant = Tenant(name="t1", status="normal")
+        account = Account(email="u@example.com", name="u")
+        db.session.add_all([tenant, account])
+        db.session.commit()
+        account.status = AccountStatus.ACTIVE
+        join = TenantAccountJoin(tenant_id=tenant.id, account_id=account.id, role="owner")
+        db.session.add(join)
+        db.session.commit()
+        yield account, tenant, join
+        db.session.delete(join)
+        db.session.delete(account)
+        db.session.delete(tenant)
+        db.session.commit()
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def app_in_workspace(flask_app: Flask, workspace_account) -> Generator[App, None, None]:
+    _, tenant, _ = workspace_account
+    with flask_app.app_context():
+        app = App(tenant_id=tenant.id, name="a", mode="chat", status="normal", enable_site=True, enable_api=True)
+        db.session.add(app)
+        db.session.commit()
+        yield app
+        db.session.delete(app)
+        db.session.commit()
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def mint_token(flask_app: Flask):
+    """Factory fixture; tracks minted rows and deletes them on teardown so
+    the auth-related test runs don't accumulate `oauth_access_tokens` rows."""
+    minted: list[OAuthAccessToken] = []
+
+    def _mint(
+        token: str,
+        *,
+        account_id: str | None,
+        prefix: str,
+        subject_email: str,
+        subject_issuer: str | None,
+    ) -> OAuthAccessToken:
+        with flask_app.app_context():
+            row = OAuthAccessToken(
+                token_hash=_sha256(token),
+                prefix=prefix,
+                account_id=account_id,
+                subject_email=subject_email,
+                subject_issuer=subject_issuer,
+                client_id="difyctl",
+                device_label="test-device",
+                expires_at=datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(hours=1),
+            )
+            db.session.add(row)
+            db.session.commit()
+            minted.append(row)
+            return row
+
+    yield _mint
+
+    with flask_app.app_context():
+        for row in minted:
+            db.session.delete(db.session.merge(row))
+        db.session.commit()
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def account_token(workspace_account, mint_token) -> str:
+    account, _, _ = workspace_account
+    token = "dfoa_" + uuid.uuid4().hex
+    mint_token(
+        token,
+        account_id=account.id,
+        prefix="dfoa_",
+        subject_email=account.email,
+        subject_issuer="dify:account",
+    )
+    return token
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _flush_auth_redis(flask_app: Flask) -> Generator[None, None, None]:
+    def _flush():
+        with flask_app.app_context():
+            for k in redis_client.keys("auth:*"):
+                redis_client.delete(k)
+            for k in redis_client.keys("rl:*"):
+                redis_client.delete(k)
+
+    _flush()
+    yield
+    _flush()

api/tests/integration_tests/controllers/openapi/test_app_run.py

@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+"""Integration tests for POST /openapi/v1/apps/<id>/run."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import uuid
+from collections.abc import Generator
+
+import pytest
+from flask import Flask
+
+from core.app.entities.app_invoke_entities import InvokeFrom
+from extensions.ext_database import db
+from models import App
+
+
+def test_run_chat_dispatches_to_chat_handler(flask_app, account_token, app_in_workspace, monkeypatch):
+    captured = {}
+
+    def _fake_generate(*, app_model, user, args, invoke_from, streaming):
+        captured["mode"] = app_model.mode
+        captured["args"] = args
+        captured["invoke_from"] = invoke_from
+        return {
+            "event": "message",
+            "task_id": "t",
+            "id": "m",
+            "message_id": "m",
+            "conversation_id": "c",
+            "mode": "chat",
+            "answer": "ok",
+            "created_at": 0,
+        }
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        "controllers.openapi.app_run.AppGenerateService.generate", staticmethod(_fake_generate)
+    )
+    client = flask_app.test_client()
+    res = client.post(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/run",
+        json={"inputs": {}, "query": "hi", "response_mode": "blocking", "user": "spoof@x.com"},
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 200
+    assert res.get_json()["mode"] == "chat"
+    assert captured["mode"] == "chat"
+    assert captured["invoke_from"] == InvokeFrom.OPENAPI
+    assert "user" not in captured["args"], "server must strip body.user; identity comes from bearer"
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def app_with_mode(flask_app: Flask, workspace_account):
+    """Factory that creates an App row in the workspace_account tenant with
+    a specified mode. Tracks rows for teardown.
+    """
+    _, tenant, _ = workspace_account
+    created: list[App] = []
+
+    def _make(mode: str) -> App:
+        with flask_app.app_context():
+            app = App(
+                tenant_id=tenant.id,
+                name=f"a-{mode}",
+                mode=mode,
+                status="normal",
+                enable_site=True,
+                enable_api=True,
+            )
+            db.session.add(app)
+            db.session.commit()
+            db.session.refresh(app)
+            db.session.expunge(app)
+            created.append(app)
+            return app
+
+    yield _make
+
+    with flask_app.app_context():
+        for app in created:
+            db.session.delete(db.session.merge(app))
+        db.session.commit()
+
+
+def test_run_chat_without_query_returns_422(flask_app, account_token, app_in_workspace, monkeypatch):
+    client = flask_app.test_client()
+    res = client.post(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/run",
+        json={"inputs": {}, "response_mode": "blocking"},
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 422
+    assert b"query_required_for_chat" in res.data
+
+
+def test_run_completion_dispatches_to_completion_handler(
+    flask_app, account_token, app_with_mode, monkeypatch
+):
+    app = app_with_mode("completion")
+
+    captured: dict = {}
+
+    def _fake_generate(*, app_model, user, args, invoke_from, streaming):
+        captured["mode"] = app_model.mode
+        captured["args"] = args
+        return {
+            "event": "message",
+            "task_id": "t",
+            "id": "m",
+            "message_id": "m",
+            "mode": "completion",
+            "answer": "ok",
+            "created_at": 0,
+        }
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        "controllers.openapi.app_run.AppGenerateService.generate", staticmethod(_fake_generate)
+    )
+    client = flask_app.test_client()
+    res = client.post(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app.id}/run",
+        json={"inputs": {}, "response_mode": "blocking"},
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 200
+    assert res.get_json()["mode"] == "completion"
+    assert captured["mode"] == "completion"
+
+
+def test_run_workflow_with_query_returns_422(flask_app, account_token, app_with_mode, monkeypatch):
+    app = app_with_mode("workflow")
+    client = flask_app.test_client()
+    res = client.post(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app.id}/run",
+        json={"inputs": {}, "query": "hi", "response_mode": "blocking"},
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 422
+    assert b"query_not_supported_for_workflow" in res.data
+
+
+def test_run_workflow_no_query_dispatches_to_workflow_handler(
+    flask_app, account_token, app_with_mode, monkeypatch
+):
+    app = app_with_mode("workflow")
+
+    def _fake_generate(*, app_model, user, args, invoke_from, streaming):
+        return {
+            "workflow_run_id": "wfr",
+            "task_id": "t",
+            "data": {"id": "wf-d", "workflow_id": "wf", "status": "succeeded"},
+        }
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        "controllers.openapi.app_run.AppGenerateService.generate", staticmethod(_fake_generate)
+    )
+    client = flask_app.test_client()
+    res = client.post(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app.id}/run",
+        json={"inputs": {}, "response_mode": "blocking"},
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 200
+    body = res.get_json()
+    assert body["mode"] == "workflow"
+    assert body["workflow_run_id"] == "wfr"
+
+
+def test_run_unsupported_mode_returns_422(flask_app, account_token, app_with_mode, monkeypatch):
+    app = app_with_mode("channel")
+    client = flask_app.test_client()
+    res = client.post(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app.id}/run",
+        json={"inputs": {}, "response_mode": "blocking"},
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 422
+    assert b"mode_not_runnable" in res.data
+
+
+def test_run_without_bearer_returns_401(flask_app, app_in_workspace):
+    client = flask_app.test_client()
+    res = client.post(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/run",
+        json={"inputs": {}, "query": "hi"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_run_with_insufficient_scope_returns_403(
+    flask_app, account_token, app_in_workspace, monkeypatch
+):
+    """Stub the authenticator to return an AuthContext with empty scopes."""
+    from libs import oauth_bearer
+
+    real_authenticate = oauth_bearer.BearerAuthenticator.authenticate
+
+    def _stub_authenticate(self, token: str):
+        ctx = real_authenticate(self, token)
+        from dataclasses import replace
+
+        return replace(ctx, scopes=frozenset())
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(oauth_bearer.BearerAuthenticator, "authenticate", _stub_authenticate)
+
+    client = flask_app.test_client()
+    res = client.post(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/run",
+        json={"inputs": {}, "query": "hi"},
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 403
+
+
+def test_run_with_unknown_app_returns_404(flask_app, account_token):
+    client = flask_app.test_client()
+    res = client.post(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{uuid.uuid4()}/run",
+        json={"inputs": {}, "query": "hi"},
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 404
+
+
+def test_run_streaming_returns_event_stream(
+    flask_app, account_token, app_in_workspace, monkeypatch
+):
+    def _stream() -> Generator[str, None, None]:
+        yield "event: message\ndata: {\"x\": 1}\n\n"
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        "controllers.openapi.app_run.AppGenerateService.generate",
+        staticmethod(lambda **kw: _stream()),
+    )
+
+    client = flask_app.test_client()
+    res = client.post(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/run",
+        json={"inputs": {}, "query": "hi", "response_mode": "streaming"},
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 200
+    assert res.headers["Content-Type"].startswith("text/event-stream")
+    assert b"event: message" in res.data
+
+
+def test_run_without_inputs_returns_422(flask_app, account_token, app_in_workspace):
+    client = flask_app.test_client()
+    res = client.post(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/run",
+        json={"query": "hi"},
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 422

api/tests/integration_tests/controllers/openapi/test_apps.py

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+"""Integration tests for /openapi/v1/apps* read surface."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from flask.testing import FlaskClient
+
+from models import App
+
+
+def test_apps_bare_id_route_404(test_client, app_in_workspace, account_token):
+    resp = test_client.get(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 404
+
+
+def test_apps_parameters_route_404(test_client, app_in_workspace, account_token):
+    resp = test_client.get(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/parameters",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 404
+
+
+def test_apps_info_route_404(test_client, app_in_workspace, account_token):
+    resp = test_client.get(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/info",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 404
+
+
+def test_apps_describe_returns_merged_shape(
+    test_client: FlaskClient,
+    app_in_workspace: App,
+    account_token: str,
+):
+    res = test_client.get(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/describe",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 200
+    body = res.json
+    assert body["info"]["id"] == app_in_workspace.id
+    assert body["info"]["mode"] == "chat"
+    assert isinstance(body["parameters"], dict)
+
+
+def test_apps_describe_full_includes_input_schema(
+    test_client: FlaskClient,
+    app_in_workspace: App,
+    account_token: str,
+):
+    res = test_client.get(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/describe",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 200
+    body = res.json
+    assert body["info"] is not None
+    assert body["parameters"] is not None
+    assert body["input_schema"] is not None
+    assert body["input_schema"]["$schema"] == "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
+
+
+def test_apps_describe_fields_info_only(
+    test_client: FlaskClient,
+    app_in_workspace: App,
+    account_token: str,
+):
+    res = test_client.get(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/describe?fields=info",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 200
+    body = res.json
+    assert body["info"] is not None
+    assert body["parameters"] is None
+    assert body["input_schema"] is None
+
+
+def test_apps_describe_fields_parameters_only(
+    test_client: FlaskClient,
+    app_in_workspace: App,
+    account_token: str,
+):
+    res = test_client.get(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/describe?fields=parameters",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 200
+    body = res.json
+    assert body["info"] is None
+    assert body["parameters"] is not None
+    assert body["input_schema"] is None
+
+
+def test_apps_describe_fields_input_schema_only(
+    test_client: FlaskClient,
+    app_in_workspace: App,
+    account_token: str,
+):
+    res = test_client.get(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/describe?fields=input_schema",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 200
+    body = res.json
+    assert body["info"] is None
+    assert body["parameters"] is None
+    assert body["input_schema"] is not None
+
+
+def test_apps_describe_fields_combined(
+    test_client: FlaskClient,
+    app_in_workspace: App,
+    account_token: str,
+):
+    res = test_client.get(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/describe?fields=info,input_schema",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 200
+    body = res.json
+    assert body["info"] is not None
+    assert body["parameters"] is None
+    assert body["input_schema"] is not None
+
+
+def test_apps_describe_fields_unknown_returns_422(
+    test_client: FlaskClient,
+    app_in_workspace: App,
+    account_token: str,
+):
+    res = test_client.get(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/describe?fields=garbage",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 422
+
+
+def test_apps_describe_fields_extra_param_returns_422(
+    test_client: FlaskClient,
+    app_in_workspace: App,
+    account_token: str,
+):
+    res = test_client.get(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/describe?fields=info&page=1",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 422
+
+
+def test_apps_list_returns_pagination_envelope(
+    test_client: FlaskClient,
+    workspace_account,
+    app_in_workspace: App,
+    account_token: str,
+):
+    _, tenant, _ = workspace_account
+    res = test_client.get(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps?workspace_id={tenant.id}&page=1&limit=20",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 200
+    body = res.json
+    assert body["page"] == 1
+    assert body["limit"] == 20
+    assert body["total"] >= 1
+    assert any(d["id"] == app_in_workspace.id for d in body["data"])
+
+
+def test_apps_list_requires_workspace_id(test_client: FlaskClient, account_token: str):
+    res = test_client.get("/openapi/v1/apps", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"})
+    assert res.status_code == 400
+
+
+def test_apps_list_tag_no_match_returns_empty_data_not_400(
+    test_client: FlaskClient,
+    workspace_account,
+    app_in_workspace: App,
+    account_token: str,
+):
+    _, tenant, _ = workspace_account
+    res = test_client.get(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps?workspace_id={tenant.id}&tag=nonexistent",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 200
+    assert res.json["data"] == []
+
+
+def test_account_sessions_returns_envelope(
+    test_client: FlaskClient,
+    account_token: str,
+):
+    res = test_client.get("/openapi/v1/account/sessions", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"})
+    assert res.status_code == 200
+    body = res.json
+    # canonical envelope shape
+    assert isinstance(body["data"], list)
+    assert "page" in body
+    assert "limit" in body
+    assert "total" in body
+    assert "has_more" in body
+    # the bearer's own minted session must appear
+    assert any(s["prefix"] == "dfoa_" for s in body["data"])
+    # legacy "sessions" key must NOT appear
+    assert "sessions" not in body

api/tests/integration_tests/controllers/openapi/test_auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+"""Integration tests for the /openapi/v1 bearer auth surface.
+
+Layer 0 (workspace membership), per-token rate limit, and read-scope (`apps:read`)
+acceptance/rejection on app-scoped routes.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import Generator
+
+import pytest
+from flask import Flask
+from flask.testing import FlaskClient
+
+from extensions.ext_database import db
+from models import App, Tenant
+
+
+def test_info_accepts_account_bearer_with_apps_read_scope(
+    test_client: FlaskClient,
+    app_in_workspace: App,
+    account_token: str,
+) -> None:
+    res = test_client.get(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/info",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 200
+    assert res.json["id"] == app_in_workspace.id
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def other_workspace_app(flask_app: Flask) -> Generator[App, None, None]:
+    """A fresh app under a *different* tenant — caller has no membership row."""
+    with flask_app.app_context():
+        other_tenant = Tenant(name="other", status="normal")
+        db.session.add(other_tenant)
+        db.session.commit()
+        app = App(
+            tenant_id=other_tenant.id,
+            name="b",
+            mode="chat",
+            status="normal",
+            enable_site=True,
+            enable_api=True,
+        )
+        db.session.add(app)
+        db.session.commit()
+        yield app
+        db.session.delete(app)
+        db.session.delete(other_tenant)
+        db.session.commit()
+
+
+def test_layer0_denies_account_bearer_without_membership(
+    test_client: FlaskClient,
+    account_token: str,
+    other_workspace_app: App,
+) -> None:
+    """Account A bearer hitting an app under tenant B — Layer 0 denies on CE."""
+    res = test_client.get(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{other_workspace_app.id}/info",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 403
+    assert res.json.get("message") == "workspace_membership_revoked"
+
+
+def test_layer0_skipped_when_enterprise_enabled(
+    test_client: FlaskClient,
+    account_token: str,
+    other_workspace_app: App,
+    monkeypatch,
+) -> None:
+    """On EE, Layer 0 short-circuits — gateway RBAC owns tenant isolation.
+
+    /info uses validate_bearer + require_workspace_member inline (no
+    AppAuthzCheck), so a cross-tenant bearer reaches the app lookup and
+    gets 200 — gateway is expected to enforce isolation upstream.
+    """
+    from configs import dify_config
+
+    # Override the conftest autouse default for this test only.
+    monkeypatch.setattr(dify_config, "ENTERPRISE_ENABLED", True)
+
+    res = test_client.get(
+        f"/openapi/v1/apps/{other_workspace_app.id}/info",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"},
+    )
+    assert res.status_code == 200
+    assert res.json.get("message") != "workspace_membership_revoked"
+
+
+def test_rate_limit_returns_429_after_60_requests(
+    test_client: FlaskClient,
+    account_token: str,
+) -> None:
+    """61st sequential GET to /account on the same bearer → 429 with Retry-After."""
+    headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"}
+    for i in range(60):
+        r = test_client.get("/openapi/v1/account", headers=headers)
+        assert r.status_code == 200, f"unexpected fail at i={i}"
+
+    r = test_client.get("/openapi/v1/account", headers=headers)
+    assert r.status_code == 429
+    assert r.headers.get("Retry-After"), "Retry-After header missing"
+    assert int(r.headers["Retry-After"]) >= 1
+    body = r.json or {}
+    assert body.get("error") == "rate_limited"
+    assert isinstance(body.get("retry_after_ms"), int)
+    assert body["retry_after_ms"] >= 1000
+
+
+def test_rate_limit_bucket_shared_across_surfaces(
+    test_client: FlaskClient,
+    app_in_workspace: App,
+    account_token: str,
+) -> None:
+    """30 calls to /account + 30 calls to /apps/<id>/info on same token → 61st 429s."""
+    headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {account_token}"}
+    for _ in range(30):
+        assert test_client.get("/openapi/v1/account", headers=headers).status_code == 200
+    for _ in range(30):
+        assert test_client.get(f"/openapi/v1/apps/{app_in_workspace.id}/info", headers=headers).status_code == 200
+
+    r = test_client.get("/openapi/v1/account", headers=headers)
+    assert r.status_code == 429

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/auth/test_composition.py

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+from controllers.openapi.auth.composition import OAUTH_BEARER_PIPELINE, _resolve_app_authz_strategy
+from controllers.openapi.auth.pipeline import Pipeline
+from controllers.openapi.auth.steps import (
+    AppAuthzCheck,
+    AppResolver,
+    BearerCheck,
+    CallerMount,
+    ScopeCheck,
+    SurfaceCheck,
+    WorkspaceMembershipCheck,
+)
+from controllers.openapi.auth.strategies import (
+    AccountMounter,
+    AclStrategy,
+    EndUserMounter,
+    MembershipStrategy,
+)
+from libs.oauth_bearer import SubjectType
+
+
+def test_pipeline_is_composed():
+    assert isinstance(OAUTH_BEARER_PIPELINE, Pipeline)
+
+
+def test_pipeline_step_order():
+    """BearerCheck → SurfaceCheck → ScopeCheck → AppResolver →
+    WorkspaceMembershipCheck → AppAuthzCheck → CallerMount.
+    SurfaceCheck enforces the dfoa_/dfoe_ surface split + emits
+    `openapi.wrong_surface_denied`. Rate-limit is enforced inside
+    `BearerAuthenticator.authenticate`, not as a separate pipeline step."""
+    steps = OAUTH_BEARER_PIPELINE._steps
+    assert isinstance(steps[0], BearerCheck)
+    assert isinstance(steps[1], SurfaceCheck)
+    assert isinstance(steps[2], ScopeCheck)
+    assert isinstance(steps[3], AppResolver)
+    assert isinstance(steps[4], WorkspaceMembershipCheck)
+    assert isinstance(steps[5], AppAuthzCheck)
+    assert isinstance(steps[6], CallerMount)
+
+
+def test_pipeline_surface_check_accepts_account_only():
+    """Current pipeline serves /apps/<id>/run — account surface only."""
+    surface = OAUTH_BEARER_PIPELINE._steps[1]
+    assert isinstance(surface, SurfaceCheck)
+    assert surface._accepted == frozenset({SubjectType.ACCOUNT})
+
+
+def test_caller_mount_has_both_mounters():
+    cm = OAUTH_BEARER_PIPELINE._steps[6]
+    kinds = {type(m) for m in cm._mounters}
+    assert AccountMounter in kinds
+    assert EndUserMounter in kinds
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.composition.FeatureService")
+def test_strategy_resolver_picks_acl_when_enabled(fs):
+    fs.get_system_features.return_value.webapp_auth.enabled = True
+    assert isinstance(_resolve_app_authz_strategy(), AclStrategy)
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.composition.FeatureService")
+def test_strategy_resolver_picks_membership_when_disabled(fs):
+    fs.get_system_features.return_value.webapp_auth.enabled = False
+    assert isinstance(_resolve_app_authz_strategy(), MembershipStrategy)

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/auth/test_context.py

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+from controllers.openapi.auth.context import Context
+
+
+def test_context_starts_unpopulated():
+    ctx = Context(request=MagicMock(), required_scope="apps:run")
+    assert ctx.subject_type is None
+    assert ctx.subject_email is None
+    assert ctx.account_id is None
+    assert ctx.scopes == frozenset()
+    assert ctx.app is None
+    assert ctx.tenant is None
+    assert ctx.caller is None
+    assert ctx.caller_kind is None
+
+
+def test_context_fields_are_mutable():
+    ctx = Context(request=MagicMock(), required_scope="apps:run")
+    ctx.scopes = frozenset({"full"})
+    assert "full" in ctx.scopes

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/auth/test_pipeline.py

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+import pytest
+from flask import Flask
+
+from controllers.openapi.auth.context import Context
+from controllers.openapi.auth.pipeline import Pipeline
+
+
+def test_run_invokes_each_step_in_order():
+    calls = []
+
+    class S:
+        def __init__(self, tag):
+            self.tag = tag
+
+        def __call__(self, ctx):
+            calls.append(self.tag)
+
+    Pipeline(S("a"), S("b"), S("c")).run(Context(request=MagicMock(), required_scope="x"))
+    assert calls == ["a", "b", "c"]
+
+
+def test_run_short_circuits_on_raise():
+    calls = []
+
+    class Boom:
+        def __call__(self, ctx):
+            raise RuntimeError("boom")
+
+    class Tail:
+        def __call__(self, ctx):
+            calls.append("ran")
+
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError):
+        Pipeline(Boom(), Tail()).run(Context(request=MagicMock(), required_scope="x"))
+    assert calls == []
+
+
+def test_guard_decorator_runs_pipeline_and_unpacks_handler_kwargs():
+    seen = {}
+
+    class FakeStep:
+        def __call__(self, ctx):
+            ctx.app = "APP"
+            ctx.caller = "CALLER"
+            ctx.caller_kind = "account"
+
+    pipeline = Pipeline(FakeStep())
+
+    @pipeline.guard(scope="apps:run")
+    def handler(app_model, caller, caller_kind):
+        seen["app_model"] = app_model
+        seen["caller"] = caller
+        seen["caller_kind"] = caller_kind
+        return "ok"
+
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    with app.test_request_context("/x", method="POST"):
+        assert handler() == "ok"
+    assert seen == {"app_model": "APP", "caller": "CALLER", "caller_kind": "account"}

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/auth/test_step_app_resolver.py

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+from werkzeug.exceptions import BadRequest, Forbidden, NotFound
+
+from controllers.openapi.auth.context import Context
+from controllers.openapi.auth.steps import AppResolver
+from models import TenantStatus
+
+
+def _ctx(view_args):
+    req = MagicMock()
+    req.view_args = view_args
+    return Context(request=req, required_scope="apps:run")
+
+
+def _app(*, status="normal", enable_api=True):
+    return SimpleNamespace(id="app1", tenant_id="t1", status=status, enable_api=enable_api)
+
+
+def _tenant(*, status=TenantStatus.NORMAL):
+    return SimpleNamespace(id="t1", status=status)
+
+
+def test_resolver_rejects_missing_path_param():
+    with pytest.raises(BadRequest):
+        AppResolver()(_ctx({}))
+
+
+def test_resolver_rejects_none_view_args():
+    with pytest.raises(BadRequest):
+        AppResolver()(_ctx(None))
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.steps.db")
+def test_resolver_404_when_app_missing(db):
+    db.session.get.side_effect = [None]
+    with pytest.raises(NotFound):
+        AppResolver()(_ctx({"app_id": "x"}))
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.steps.db")
+def test_resolver_403_when_disabled(db):
+    db.session.get.side_effect = [_app(enable_api=False)]
+    with pytest.raises(Forbidden) as exc:
+        AppResolver()(_ctx({"app_id": "x"}))
+    assert "service_api_disabled" in str(exc.value.description)
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.steps.db")
+def test_resolver_403_when_tenant_archived(db):
+    db.session.get.side_effect = [_app(), _tenant(status=TenantStatus.ARCHIVE)]
+    with pytest.raises(Forbidden):
+        AppResolver()(_ctx({"app_id": "x"}))
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.steps.db")
+def test_resolver_populates_app_and_tenant(db):
+    db.session.get.side_effect = [_app(), _tenant()]
+    ctx = _ctx({"app_id": "x"})
+    AppResolver()(ctx)
+    assert ctx.app.id == "app1"
+    assert ctx.tenant.id == "t1"

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/auth/test_step_authz.py

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+from werkzeug.exceptions import Forbidden
+
+from controllers.openapi.auth.context import Context
+from controllers.openapi.auth.steps import AppAuthzCheck
+from controllers.openapi.auth.strategies import AclStrategy, MembershipStrategy
+from libs.oauth_bearer import SubjectType
+
+
+def _ctx(*, subject_type, account_id="acc1"):
+    c = Context(request=MagicMock(), required_scope="apps:run")
+    c.subject_type = subject_type
+    c.subject_email = "alice@example.com"
+    c.account_id = account_id
+    c.app = SimpleNamespace(id="app1")
+    c.tenant = SimpleNamespace(id="t1")
+    return c
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.strategies.EnterpriseService")
+def test_acl_strategy_private_calls_inner_api(ent):
+    ent.WebAppAuth.get_app_access_mode_by_id.return_value = SimpleNamespace(access_mode="private")
+    ent.WebAppAuth.is_user_allowed_to_access_webapp.return_value = True
+    assert AclStrategy().authorize(_ctx(subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT)) is True
+    ent.WebAppAuth.is_user_allowed_to_access_webapp.assert_called_once_with(
+        user_id="acc1",
+        app_id="app1",
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("access_mode", "subject_type", "expected"),
+    [
+        ("public", SubjectType.ACCOUNT, True),
+        ("public", SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO, True),
+        ("sso_verified", SubjectType.ACCOUNT, True),
+        ("sso_verified", SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO, True),
+        ("private_all", SubjectType.ACCOUNT, True),
+        ("private_all", SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO, False),
+        ("private", SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO, False),
+    ],
+)
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.strategies.EnterpriseService")
+def test_acl_strategy_subject_mode_matrix(ent, access_mode, subject_type, expected):
+    """Step 1 matrix: subject vs access-mode compatibility. No inner API call expected."""
+    ent.WebAppAuth.get_app_access_mode_by_id.return_value = SimpleNamespace(access_mode=access_mode)
+    account_id = "acc1" if subject_type == SubjectType.ACCOUNT else None
+    assert AclStrategy().authorize(_ctx(subject_type=subject_type, account_id=account_id)) is expected
+    ent.WebAppAuth.is_user_allowed_to_access_webapp.assert_not_called()
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.strategies._has_tenant_membership")
+def test_membership_strategy_uses_join_lookup(member):
+    member.return_value = True
+    assert MembershipStrategy().authorize(_ctx(subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT)) is True
+    member.assert_called_once_with("acc1", "t1")
+
+
+def test_membership_strategy_rejects_external_sso():
+    assert MembershipStrategy().authorize(_ctx(subject_type=SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO, account_id=None)) is False
+
+
+def test_app_authz_check_raises_when_strategy_denies():
+    deny = SimpleNamespace(authorize=lambda c: False)
+    with pytest.raises(Forbidden) as exc:
+        AppAuthzCheck(lambda: deny)(_ctx(subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT))
+    assert "subject_no_app_access" in str(exc.value.description)
+
+
+def test_app_authz_check_passes_when_strategy_allows():
+    allow = SimpleNamespace(authorize=lambda c: True)
+    AppAuthzCheck(lambda: allow)(_ctx(subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT))

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/auth/test_step_bearer.py

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+import uuid
+from datetime import UTC, datetime
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+from flask import Flask, g
+from werkzeug.exceptions import Unauthorized
+
+from controllers.openapi.auth.context import Context
+from controllers.openapi.auth.steps import BearerCheck
+from libs.oauth_bearer import AuthContext, InvalidBearerError, Scope, SubjectType
+
+
+def _ctx(headers):
+    req = MagicMock()
+    req.headers = headers
+    return Context(request=req, required_scope="apps:run")
+
+
+def test_bearer_check_rejects_missing_header():
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    with app.test_request_context(), pytest.raises(Unauthorized):
+        BearerCheck()(_ctx({}))
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.steps.get_authenticator")
+def test_bearer_check_rejects_unknown_prefix(get_auth):
+    get_auth.return_value.authenticate.side_effect = InvalidBearerError("unknown token prefix")
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    with app.test_request_context(), pytest.raises(Unauthorized):
+        BearerCheck()(_ctx({"Authorization": "Bearer xxx_abc"}))
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.steps.get_authenticator")
+def test_bearer_check_populates_context_and_g_auth_ctx(get_auth):
+    tok_id = uuid.uuid4()
+    authn = AuthContext(
+        subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT,
+        subject_email="a@x.com",
+        subject_issuer=None,
+        account_id=None,
+        client_id="difyctl",
+        scopes=frozenset({Scope.FULL}),
+        token_id=tok_id,
+        source="oauth-account",
+        expires_at=datetime.now(UTC),
+        token_hash="hash-1",
+        verified_tenants={},
+    )
+    get_auth.return_value.authenticate.return_value = authn
+
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    ctx = _ctx({"Authorization": "Bearer dfoa_abc"})
+    with app.test_request_context():
+        BearerCheck()(ctx)
+
+        assert ctx.subject_type == SubjectType.ACCOUNT
+        assert ctx.subject_email == "a@x.com"
+        assert ctx.scopes == frozenset({Scope.FULL})
+        assert ctx.source == "oauth-account"
+        assert ctx.token_id == tok_id
+        assert ctx.token_hash == "hash-1"
+        # BearerCheck must also publish the same identity on `g.auth_ctx`
+        # so the surface gate + downstream handlers don't see two
+        # different identity sources between the decorator + pipeline paths.
+        assert g.auth_ctx is authn
+        assert g.auth_ctx.client_id == "difyctl"

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/auth/test_step_layer0.py

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+"""Unit tests for WorkspaceMembershipCheck (Layer 0)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import uuid
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+from werkzeug.exceptions import Forbidden
+
+from controllers.openapi.auth.context import Context
+from controllers.openapi.auth.steps import WorkspaceMembershipCheck
+from libs.oauth_bearer import SubjectType
+
+
+def _ctx(*, subject_type, account_id, tenant_id, cached_verified_tenants=None, token_hash=None) -> Context:
+    c = Context(request=MagicMock(), required_scope="apps:read")
+    c.subject_type = subject_type
+    c.account_id = account_id
+    c.tenant = SimpleNamespace(id=tenant_id) if tenant_id else None
+    c.cached_verified_tenants = cached_verified_tenants
+    c.token_hash = token_hash
+    return c
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def step():
+    return WorkspaceMembershipCheck()
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.steps.dify_config")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.record_layer0_verdict")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.db")
+def test_skips_when_enterprise_enabled(mock_db, mock_record, mock_cfg, step):
+    mock_cfg.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED = True
+    ctx = _ctx(
+        subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT,
+        account_id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
+        tenant_id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
+        cached_verified_tenants={},
+        token_hash="hash-1",
+    )
+    step(ctx)  # no raise
+    mock_db.session.execute.assert_not_called()
+    mock_record.assert_not_called()
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.steps.dify_config")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.record_layer0_verdict")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.db")
+def test_skips_for_external_sso(mock_db, mock_record, mock_cfg, step):
+    mock_cfg.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED = False
+    ctx = _ctx(
+        subject_type=SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO,
+        account_id=None,
+        tenant_id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
+        cached_verified_tenants={},
+        token_hash="hash-1",
+    )
+    step(ctx)  # no raise
+    mock_db.session.execute.assert_not_called()
+    mock_record.assert_not_called()
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.steps.dify_config")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.record_layer0_verdict")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.db")
+def test_uses_cached_ok(mock_db, mock_record, mock_cfg, step):
+    mock_cfg.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED = False
+    ctx = _ctx(
+        subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT,
+        account_id="a1",
+        tenant_id="t1",
+        cached_verified_tenants={"t1": True},
+        token_hash="hash-1",
+    )
+    step(ctx)
+    mock_db.session.execute.assert_not_called()
+    mock_record.assert_not_called()
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.steps.dify_config")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.record_layer0_verdict")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.db")
+def test_uses_cached_denied(mock_db, mock_record, mock_cfg, step):
+    mock_cfg.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED = False
+    ctx = _ctx(
+        subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT,
+        account_id="a1",
+        tenant_id="t1",
+        cached_verified_tenants={"t1": False},
+        token_hash="hash-1",
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(Forbidden, match="workspace_membership_revoked"):
+        step(ctx)
+    mock_db.session.execute.assert_not_called()
+    mock_record.assert_not_called()
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.steps.dify_config")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.record_layer0_verdict")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.db")
+def test_denies_when_no_membership(mock_db, mock_record, mock_cfg, step):
+    mock_cfg.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED = False
+    mock_db.session.execute.return_value.scalar_one_or_none.return_value = None
+    ctx = _ctx(
+        subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT,
+        account_id="a1",
+        tenant_id="t1",
+        cached_verified_tenants={},
+        token_hash="hash-1",
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(Forbidden, match="workspace_membership_revoked"):
+        step(ctx)
+    mock_record.assert_called_once_with("hash-1", "t1", False)
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.steps.dify_config")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.record_layer0_verdict")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.db")
+def test_denies_when_account_inactive(mock_db, mock_record, mock_cfg, step):
+    mock_cfg.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED = False
+    mock_db.session.execute.side_effect = [
+        MagicMock(scalar_one_or_none=MagicMock(return_value="join-id")),
+        MagicMock(scalar_one_or_none=MagicMock(return_value="banned")),
+    ]
+    ctx = _ctx(
+        subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT,
+        account_id="a1",
+        tenant_id="t1",
+        cached_verified_tenants={},
+        token_hash="hash-1",
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(Forbidden, match="workspace_membership_revoked"):
+        step(ctx)
+    mock_record.assert_called_once_with("hash-1", "t1", False)
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.steps.dify_config")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.record_layer0_verdict")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.db")
+def test_allows_active_member(mock_db, mock_record, mock_cfg, step):
+    mock_cfg.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED = False
+    mock_db.session.execute.side_effect = [
+        MagicMock(scalar_one_or_none=MagicMock(return_value="join-id")),
+        MagicMock(scalar_one_or_none=MagicMock(return_value="active")),
+    ]
+    ctx = _ctx(
+        subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT,
+        account_id="a1",
+        tenant_id="t1",
+        cached_verified_tenants={},
+        token_hash="hash-1",
+    )
+    step(ctx)  # no raise
+    mock_record.assert_called_once_with("hash-1", "t1", True)

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/auth/test_step_mount.py

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+from werkzeug.exceptions import Unauthorized
+
+from controllers.openapi.auth.context import Context
+from controllers.openapi.auth.steps import CallerMount
+from controllers.openapi.auth.strategies import AccountMounter, EndUserMounter
+from core.app.entities.app_invoke_entities import InvokeFrom
+from libs.oauth_bearer import SubjectType
+
+
+def _ctx(*, subject_type, account_id=None, subject_email=None):
+    c = Context(request=MagicMock(), required_scope="apps:run")
+    c.subject_type = subject_type
+    c.account_id = account_id
+    c.subject_email = subject_email
+    c.app = SimpleNamespace(id="app1")
+    c.tenant = SimpleNamespace(id="t1")
+    return c
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.strategies._login_as")
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.strategies.db")
+def test_account_mounter(db, login):
+    account = SimpleNamespace()
+    db.session.get.return_value = account
+    ctx = _ctx(subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT, account_id="acc1")
+    AccountMounter().mount(ctx)
+    assert ctx.caller is account
+    assert ctx.caller.current_tenant is ctx.tenant
+    assert ctx.caller_kind == "account"
+    login.assert_called_once_with(account)
+
+
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.strategies._login_as")
+@patch("controllers.openapi.auth.strategies.EndUserService")
+def test_end_user_mounter(svc, login):
+    eu = SimpleNamespace()
+    svc.get_or_create_end_user_by_type.return_value = eu
+    ctx = _ctx(subject_type=SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO, subject_email="a@x.com")
+    EndUserMounter().mount(ctx)
+    svc.get_or_create_end_user_by_type.assert_called_once_with(
+        InvokeFrom.OPENAPI,
+        tenant_id="t1",
+        app_id="app1",
+        user_id="a@x.com",
+    )
+    assert ctx.caller is eu
+    assert ctx.caller_kind == "end_user"
+
+
+def test_caller_mount_dispatches_by_subject_type():
+    seen = {}
+
+    class Fake:
+        def __init__(self, st, tag):
+            self._st, self._tag = st, tag
+
+        def applies_to(self, st):
+            return st == self._st
+
+        def mount(self, ctx):
+            seen["who"] = self._tag
+
+    cm = CallerMount(
+        Fake(SubjectType.ACCOUNT, "acct"),
+        Fake(SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO, "sso"),
+    )
+    cm(_ctx(subject_type=SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO))
+    assert seen == {"who": "sso"}
+
+
+def test_caller_mount_raises_when_none_applies():
+    with pytest.raises(Unauthorized):
+        CallerMount()(_ctx(subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT))

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/auth/test_step_scope.py

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+import pytest
+from werkzeug.exceptions import Forbidden
+
+from controllers.openapi.auth.context import Context
+from controllers.openapi.auth.steps import ScopeCheck
+
+
+def _ctx(scopes, required):
+    c = Context(request=MagicMock(), required_scope=required)
+    c.scopes = frozenset(scopes)
+    return c
+
+
+def test_scope_check_passes_on_full():
+    ScopeCheck()(_ctx({"full"}, "apps:run"))
+
+
+def test_scope_check_passes_on_explicit_match():
+    ScopeCheck()(_ctx({"apps:run"}, "apps:run"))
+
+
+def test_scope_check_rejects_when_missing():
+    with pytest.raises(Forbidden) as exc:
+        ScopeCheck()(_ctx({"apps:read"}, "apps:run"))
+    assert "insufficient_scope" in str(exc.value.description)

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/auth/test_surface_gate.py

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+"""Surface gate tests.
+
+The gate has two attachment forms — decorator (`accept_subjects`) and
+pipeline step (`SurfaceCheck`) — and both must:
+- 403 on mismatched subject type with a canonical-path hint
+- emit `openapi.wrong_surface_denied` once with the right payload
+- pass-through on match
+- raise RuntimeError (not 403) if g.auth_ctx is missing — that's a
+  wiring bug, not a user-driven failure
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import uuid
+from datetime import UTC, datetime
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+from flask import Flask, g
+from werkzeug.exceptions import Forbidden
+
+from controllers.openapi.auth.context import Context
+from controllers.openapi.auth.steps import SurfaceCheck
+from controllers.openapi.auth.surface_gate import accept_subjects, check_surface
+from libs.oauth_bearer import AuthContext, Scope, SubjectType
+
+
+def _account_ctx() -> AuthContext:
+    return AuthContext(
+        subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT,
+        subject_email="user@example.com",
+        subject_issuer="dify:account",
+        account_id=uuid.uuid4(),
+        client_id="difyctl",
+        scopes=frozenset({Scope.FULL}),
+        token_id=uuid.uuid4(),
+        source="oauth_account",
+        expires_at=datetime.now(UTC),
+        token_hash="h1",
+        verified_tenants={},
+    )
+
+
+def _sso_ctx() -> AuthContext:
+    return AuthContext(
+        subject_type=SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO,
+        subject_email="sso@partner.com",
+        subject_issuer="https://idp.partner.com",
+        account_id=None,
+        client_id="difyctl",
+        scopes=frozenset({Scope.APPS_RUN, Scope.APPS_READ_PERMITTED_EXTERNAL}),
+        token_id=uuid.uuid4(),
+        source="oauth_external_sso",
+        expires_at=datetime.now(UTC),
+        token_hash="h2",
+        verified_tenants={},
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# check_surface — shared core
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_check_surface_passes_when_subject_in_accepted():
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    with app.test_request_context("/openapi/v1/apps"):
+        g.auth_ctx = _account_ctx()
+        check_surface(frozenset({SubjectType.ACCOUNT}))  # no raise
+
+
+def test_check_surface_rejects_on_wrong_subject_and_emits_audit():
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    with app.test_request_context("/openapi/v1/permitted-external-apps"):
+        g.auth_ctx = _account_ctx()
+        with patch("controllers.openapi.auth.surface_gate.emit_wrong_surface") as emit:
+            with pytest.raises(Forbidden) as exc:
+                check_surface(frozenset({SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO}))
+            assert "wrong_surface" in exc.value.description
+            # canonical-path hint should point at the caller's surface,
+            # not the surface they were rejected from
+            assert "/openapi/v1/apps" in exc.value.description
+            emit.assert_called_once()
+            kwargs = emit.call_args.kwargs
+            assert kwargs["subject_type"] == SubjectType.ACCOUNT.value
+            assert kwargs["attempted_path"] == "/openapi/v1/permitted-external-apps"
+            assert kwargs["client_id"] == "difyctl"
+            assert kwargs["token_id"] is not None
+
+
+def test_check_surface_rejects_sso_on_account_surface():
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    with app.test_request_context("/openapi/v1/apps"):
+        g.auth_ctx = _sso_ctx()
+        with patch("controllers.openapi.auth.surface_gate.emit_wrong_surface") as emit:
+            with pytest.raises(Forbidden):
+                check_surface(frozenset({SubjectType.ACCOUNT}))
+            kwargs = emit.call_args.kwargs
+            assert kwargs["subject_type"] == SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO.value
+
+
+def test_check_surface_runtime_error_when_g_auth_ctx_missing():
+    """Missing g.auth_ctx means the bearer layer didn't run — wiring bug,
+    not a user-driven failure. Surface as RuntimeError (loud) so a future
+    refactor doesn't accidentally let a route skip authentication and
+    return a 403 that looks identical to a legitimate wrong-surface deny.
+    """
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    with app.test_request_context("/openapi/v1/apps"):
+        with pytest.raises(RuntimeError):
+            check_surface(frozenset({SubjectType.ACCOUNT}))
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# @accept_subjects — decorator form
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _make_app() -> Flask:
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+
+    @app.route("/account-only")
+    @accept_subjects(SubjectType.ACCOUNT)
+    def _account_only():
+        return "ok"
+
+    @app.route("/external-only")
+    @accept_subjects(SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO)
+    def _external_only():
+        return "ok"
+
+    return app
+
+
+def test_accept_subjects_decorator_passes_on_match():
+    app = _make_app()
+    with app.test_request_context("/account-only"):
+        g.auth_ctx = _account_ctx()
+        # Re-route through the decorated function by reaching for view_function
+        view = app.view_functions["_account_only"]
+        assert view() == "ok"
+
+
+def test_accept_subjects_decorator_403_on_miss():
+    app = _make_app()
+    with app.test_request_context("/external-only"):
+        g.auth_ctx = _account_ctx()
+        view = app.view_functions["_external_only"]
+        with patch("controllers.openapi.auth.surface_gate.emit_wrong_surface"):
+            with pytest.raises(Forbidden):
+                view()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# SurfaceCheck — pipeline step form
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _pipeline_ctx() -> Context:
+    req = MagicMock()
+    req.path = "/openapi/v1/apps/<id>/run"
+    return Context(request=req, required_scope=Scope.APPS_RUN)
+
+
+def test_surface_check_passes_on_match():
+    step = SurfaceCheck(accepted=frozenset({SubjectType.ACCOUNT}))
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    with app.test_request_context("/openapi/v1/apps/x/run"):
+        g.auth_ctx = _account_ctx()
+        step(_pipeline_ctx())  # no raise
+
+
+def test_surface_check_rejects_on_miss_and_emits_audit():
+    step = SurfaceCheck(accepted=frozenset({SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO}))
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    with app.test_request_context("/openapi/v1/apps/x/run"):
+        g.auth_ctx = _account_ctx()
+        with patch("controllers.openapi.auth.surface_gate.emit_wrong_surface") as emit:
+            with pytest.raises(Forbidden):
+                step(_pipeline_ctx())
+            emit.assert_called_once()

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/conftest.py

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+import pytest
+
+from controllers.openapi.auth.pipeline import Pipeline
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def bypass_pipeline(monkeypatch):
+    """Stub Pipeline.run so endpoint decoration does not invoke real auth.
+
+    Module-level @OAUTH_BEARER_PIPELINE.guard(...) captures the real
+    pipeline at import time; mocking the module attribute does not undo
+    that. Patching Pipeline.run on the class is the bypass that actually
+    works.
+    """
+    monkeypatch.setattr(Pipeline, "run", lambda self, ctx: None)

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_account.py

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+"""User-scoped identity + session endpoints under /openapi/v1/account."""
+
+import builtins
+
+import pytest
+from flask import Flask
+from flask.views import MethodView
+
+from controllers.openapi import bp as openapi_bp
+from controllers.openapi.account import (
+    AccountApi,
+    AccountSessionByIdApi,
+    AccountSessionsApi,
+    AccountSessionsSelfApi,
+)
+
+if not hasattr(builtins, "MethodView"):
+    builtins.MethodView = MethodView  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def openapi_app() -> Flask:
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config["TESTING"] = True
+    app.register_blueprint(openapi_bp)
+    return app
+
+
+def _rule(app: Flask, path: str):
+    return next(r for r in app.url_map.iter_rules() if r.rule == path)
+
+
+def test_account_route_registered(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rules = {r.rule for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    assert "/openapi/v1/account" in rules
+
+
+def test_account_dispatches_to_class(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = _rule(openapi_app, "/openapi/v1/account")
+    assert openapi_app.view_functions[rule.endpoint].view_class is AccountApi
+
+
+def test_account_sessions_self_route_registered(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rules = {r.rule for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    assert "/openapi/v1/account/sessions/self" in rules
+
+
+def test_sessions_self_dispatches_to_class(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = _rule(openapi_app, "/openapi/v1/account/sessions/self")
+    assert openapi_app.view_functions[rule.endpoint].view_class is AccountSessionsSelfApi
+
+
+def test_account_methods(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = _rule(openapi_app, "/openapi/v1/account")
+    assert "GET" in rule.methods
+
+
+def test_sessions_self_methods(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = _rule(openapi_app, "/openapi/v1/account/sessions/self")
+    assert "DELETE" in rule.methods
+
+
+def test_sessions_list_route_registered(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rules = {r.rule for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    assert "/openapi/v1/account/sessions" in rules
+
+
+def test_sessions_list_dispatches_to_sessions_api(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = _rule(openapi_app, "/openapi/v1/account/sessions")
+    assert openapi_app.view_functions[rule.endpoint].view_class is AccountSessionsApi
+    assert "GET" in rule.methods
+
+
+def test_session_by_id_route_registered(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rules = {r.rule for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    assert "/openapi/v1/account/sessions/<string:session_id>" in rules
+
+
+def test_session_by_id_dispatches_to_correct_class(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = _rule(openapi_app, "/openapi/v1/account/sessions/<string:session_id>")
+    assert openapi_app.view_functions[rule.endpoint].view_class is AccountSessionByIdApi
+    assert "DELETE" in rule.methods
+
+
+def test_subject_match_for_account_filters_by_account_id():
+    """Account subject scopes queries via account_id."""
+    import uuid as _uuid
+
+    from controllers.openapi.account import _subject_match
+    from libs.oauth_bearer import AuthContext, SubjectType
+
+    aid = _uuid.uuid4()
+    ctx = AuthContext(
+        subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT,
+        subject_email="user@example.com",
+        subject_issuer="dify:account",
+        account_id=aid,
+        client_id="difyctl",
+        scopes=frozenset({"full"}),
+        token_id=_uuid.uuid4(),
+        source="oauth_account",
+        expires_at=None,
+        token_hash="h1",
+        verified_tenants={},
+    )
+    clauses = _subject_match(ctx)
+    # One predicate, on account_id
+    assert len(clauses) == 1
+    assert "account_id" in str(clauses[0])
+
+
+def test_subject_match_for_external_sso_filters_by_email_and_issuer():
+    """External SSO subject scopes via (subject_email, subject_issuer)
+    AND account_id IS NULL — so a same-email account row from a
+    federated tenant cannot be revoked through an SSO bearer.
+    """
+    import uuid as _uuid
+
+    from controllers.openapi.account import _subject_match
+    from libs.oauth_bearer import AuthContext, SubjectType
+
+    ctx = AuthContext(
+        subject_type=SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO,
+        subject_email="sso@partner.com",
+        subject_issuer="https://idp.partner.com",
+        account_id=None,
+        client_id="difyctl",
+        scopes=frozenset({"apps:run"}),
+        token_id=_uuid.uuid4(),
+        source="oauth_external_sso",
+        expires_at=None,
+        token_hash="h1",
+        verified_tenants={},
+    )
+    clauses = _subject_match(ctx)
+    assert len(clauses) == 3
+    rendered = " ".join(str(c) for c in clauses)
+    assert "subject_email" in rendered
+    assert "subject_issuer" in rendered
+    assert "account_id IS NULL" in rendered

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_app_describe_query.py

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+"""Unit tests for AppDescribeQuery (`?fields=` allow-list)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+from pydantic import ValidationError
+
+from controllers.openapi.apps import AppDescribeQuery
+
+
+def test_no_fields_returns_none() -> None:
+    q = AppDescribeQuery.model_validate({})
+    assert q.fields is None
+
+
+def test_empty_string_returns_none() -> None:
+    q = AppDescribeQuery.model_validate({"fields": ""})
+    assert q.fields is None
+
+
+def test_single_field() -> None:
+    q = AppDescribeQuery.model_validate({"fields": "info"})
+    assert q.fields == {"info"}
+
+
+def test_comma_list() -> None:
+    q = AppDescribeQuery.model_validate({"fields": "info,parameters"})
+    assert q.fields == {"info", "parameters"}
+
+
+def test_whitespace_tolerant() -> None:
+    q = AppDescribeQuery.model_validate({"fields": " info , input_schema "})
+    assert q.fields == {"info", "input_schema"}
+
+
+def test_unknown_member_rejected() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        AppDescribeQuery.model_validate({"fields": "garbage"})
+
+
+def test_unknown_among_known_rejected() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        AppDescribeQuery.model_validate({"fields": "info,garbage"})
+
+
+def test_extra_param_forbidden() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        AppDescribeQuery.model_validate({"fields": "info", "page": "1"})

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_app_list_query.py

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+"""Unit tests for AppListQuery — the /apps query-param validator.
+
+Runs against the model directly, not the HTTP layer. Pins:
+- defaults match the plan (page=1, limit=20).
+- workspace_id is required.
+- numeric bounds enforced (page >= 1, limit in [1, MAX_PAGE_LIMIT]).
+- mode validates against the AppMode enum.
+- name and tag have length caps.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+from pydantic import ValidationError
+
+from controllers.openapi._models import MAX_PAGE_LIMIT
+from controllers.openapi.apps import AppListQuery
+
+
+def test_defaults():
+    q = AppListQuery.model_validate({"workspace_id": "ws-1"})
+    assert q.workspace_id == "ws-1"
+    assert q.page == 1
+    assert q.limit == 20
+    assert q.mode is None
+    assert q.name is None
+    assert q.tag is None
+
+
+def test_workspace_id_required():
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        AppListQuery.model_validate({})
+
+
+def test_page_must_be_positive():
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        AppListQuery.model_validate({"workspace_id": "ws-1", "page": 0})
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        AppListQuery.model_validate({"workspace_id": "ws-1", "page": -1})
+
+
+def test_page_rejects_non_integer_string():
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        AppListQuery.model_validate({"workspace_id": "ws-1", "page": "abc"})
+
+
+def test_limit_must_be_positive():
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        AppListQuery.model_validate({"workspace_id": "ws-1", "limit": 0})
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        AppListQuery.model_validate({"workspace_id": "ws-1", "limit": -1})
+
+
+def test_limit_caps_at_max_page_limit():
+    # Boundary accepts.
+    q = AppListQuery.model_validate({"workspace_id": "ws-1", "limit": MAX_PAGE_LIMIT})
+    assert q.limit == MAX_PAGE_LIMIT
+
+    # Just over rejects.
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        AppListQuery.model_validate({"workspace_id": "ws-1", "limit": MAX_PAGE_LIMIT + 1})
+
+
+def test_mode_whitelisted_against_app_mode():
+    # Valid mode passes.
+    q = AppListQuery.model_validate({"workspace_id": "ws-1", "mode": "chat"})
+    assert q.mode is not None
+    assert q.mode.value == "chat"
+
+    # Invalid mode rejects.
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        AppListQuery.model_validate({"workspace_id": "ws-1", "mode": "not-a-mode"})
+
+
+def test_name_length_capped():
+    AppListQuery.model_validate({"workspace_id": "ws-1", "name": "x" * 200})
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        AppListQuery.model_validate({"workspace_id": "ws-1", "name": "x" * 201})
+
+
+def test_tag_length_capped():
+    AppListQuery.model_validate({"workspace_id": "ws-1", "tag": "x" * 100})
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        AppListQuery.model_validate({"workspace_id": "ws-1", "tag": "x" * 101})
+
+
+def test_all_fields_accept_valid_values():
+    """Pin the happy-path acceptance for every field in one place."""
+    q = AppListQuery.model_validate(
+        {
+            "workspace_id": "ws-1",
+            "page": 5,
+            "limit": 50,
+            "mode": "workflow",
+            "name": "search",
+            "tag": "prod",
+        }
+    )
+    assert q.workspace_id == "ws-1"
+    assert q.page == 5
+    assert q.limit == 50
+    assert q.mode is not None
+    assert q.mode.value == "workflow"
+    assert q.name == "search"
+    assert q.tag == "prod"

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_app_payloads.py

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+"""Unit tests for app payload-rendering helpers — independent of
+HTTP plumbing or DB. Pin the response shapes that are CLI contracts.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+import pytest
+
+from controllers.openapi.apps import (  # pyright: ignore[reportPrivateUsage]
+    _EMPTY_PARAMETERS,
+    parameters_payload,
+)
+from controllers.service_api.app.error import AppUnavailableError
+
+
+def _fake_app(**overrides):
+    base = {
+        "id": "app1",
+        "name": "X",
+        "description": "d",
+        "mode": "chat",
+        "author_name": "alice",
+        "tags": [SimpleNamespace(name="prod")],
+        "updated_at": None,
+        "enable_api": True,
+        "workflow": None,
+        "app_model_config": None,
+    }
+    base.update(overrides)
+    return SimpleNamespace(**base)
+
+
+def test_parameters_payload_raises_app_unavailable_when_no_config():
+    with pytest.raises(AppUnavailableError):
+        parameters_payload(_fake_app(mode="chat", app_model_config=None))
+
+
+def test_empty_parameters_constant_matches_describe_fallback_shape():
+    """The fallback dict served by /describe when an app has no config
+    must match the spec's stated keys (opening_statement, suggested_questions,
+    user_input_form, file_upload, system_parameters)."""
+    assert set(_EMPTY_PARAMETERS.keys()) == {
+        "opening_statement",
+        "suggested_questions",
+        "user_input_form",
+        "file_upload",
+        "system_parameters",
+    }
+    assert _EMPTY_PARAMETERS["suggested_questions"] == []
+    assert _EMPTY_PARAMETERS["user_input_form"] == []
+    assert _EMPTY_PARAMETERS["opening_statement"] is None
+    assert _EMPTY_PARAMETERS["file_upload"] is None
+    assert _EMPTY_PARAMETERS["system_parameters"] == {}

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_app_run_dispatch.py

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+import pytest
+from werkzeug.exceptions import InternalServerError
+
+from controllers.openapi.app_run import (
+    _DISPATCH,
+    AppRunRequest,
+    _unpack_blocking,
+)
+from models.model import AppMode
+
+
+def test_dispatch_covers_runnable_modes():
+    runnable = {AppMode.CHAT, AppMode.AGENT_CHAT, AppMode.ADVANCED_CHAT, AppMode.COMPLETION, AppMode.WORKFLOW}
+    assert set(_DISPATCH) == runnable
+
+
+def test_unpack_blocking_passes_through_mapping():
+    assert _unpack_blocking({"a": 1}) == {"a": 1}
+
+
+def test_unpack_blocking_unwraps_tuple():
+    assert _unpack_blocking(({"a": 1}, 200)) == {"a": 1}
+
+
+def test_unpack_blocking_rejects_non_mapping():
+    with pytest.raises(InternalServerError):
+        _unpack_blocking("not a mapping")
+
+
+def test_app_run_request_strips_blank_conversation_id():
+    payload = AppRunRequest(inputs={}, conversation_id="   ")
+    assert payload.conversation_id is None
+
+
+def test_app_run_request_rejects_invalid_uuid_conversation_id():
+    from pydantic import ValidationError
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError, match="conversation_id must be a valid UUID"):
+        AppRunRequest(inputs={}, conversation_id="not-a-uuid")
+
+
+def test_app_run_request_accepts_valid_uuid_conversation_id():
+    import uuid as _uuid
+    cid = str(_uuid.uuid4())
+    payload = AppRunRequest(inputs={}, conversation_id=cid)
+    assert payload.conversation_id == cid

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_apps_permitted_external_query.py

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+"""Unit tests for PermittedExternalAppsListQuery — the
+/permitted-external-apps query validator.
+
+Strict ConfigDict(extra='forbid'): cross-tenant tag/workspace_id are
+unresolvable, so the model must reject them as 422 instead of silently
+dropping them. Mode/name/page/limit have the same shape as AppListQuery.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+from pydantic import ValidationError
+
+from controllers.openapi.apps_permitted_external import PermittedExternalAppsListQuery
+
+
+def test_query_defaults_match_apps_list():
+    q = PermittedExternalAppsListQuery.model_validate({})
+    assert q.page == 1
+    assert q.limit == 20
+    assert q.mode is None
+    assert q.name is None
+
+
+def test_query_rejects_workspace_id():
+    """workspace_id is meaningless for /permitted-external-apps (cross-tenant);
+    rejecting it forces CLI authors to drop the param rather than send it
+    silently."""
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        PermittedExternalAppsListQuery.model_validate({"workspace_id": "ws-1"})
+
+
+def test_query_rejects_tag():
+    """Tags are tenant-scoped; cross-tenant tag resolution is undefined."""
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        PermittedExternalAppsListQuery.model_validate({"tag": "prod"})
+
+
+def test_query_validates_mode_against_app_mode():
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        PermittedExternalAppsListQuery.model_validate({"mode": "not-a-mode"})
+
+
+def test_query_clamps_limit_at_max():
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        PermittedExternalAppsListQuery.model_validate({"limit": 500})
+
+
+def test_query_accepts_valid_mode():
+    """Pin the happy path: AppMode values pass."""
+    q = PermittedExternalAppsListQuery.model_validate({"mode": "chat"})
+    assert q.mode is not None
+    assert q.mode.value == "chat"

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_audit_app_run.py

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import logging
+
+from controllers.openapi._audit import EVENT_APP_RUN_OPENAPI, emit_app_run
+
+
+def test_event_constant():
+    assert EVENT_APP_RUN_OPENAPI == "app.run.openapi"
+
+
+def test_emit_app_run_logs_with_audit_extra(caplog):
+    with caplog.at_level(logging.INFO, logger="controllers.openapi._audit"):
+        emit_app_run(
+            app_id="app1",
+            tenant_id="t1",
+            caller_kind="account",
+            mode="chat",
+            surface="apps",
+        )
+    record = next(r for r in caplog.records if r.message and "app.run.openapi" in r.message)
+    assert record.audit is True
+    assert record.event == EVENT_APP_RUN_OPENAPI
+    assert record.app_id == "app1"
+    assert record.tenant_id == "t1"
+    assert record.caller_kind == "account"
+    assert record.mode == "chat"
+    assert record.surface == "apps"

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_cors.py

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+"""CORS posture for /openapi/v1/* — default empty allowlist (same-origin),
+expandable via OPENAPI_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS. Cross-origin requests from
+disallowed origins do not receive the Access-Control-Allow-Origin
+header, which the browser then blocks.
+
+Tests use a fresh Blueprint + Flask-CORS per case because the production
+blueprint is a module-level singleton and can't be reconfigured once
+registered.
+"""
+
+import builtins
+
+from flask import Blueprint, Flask
+from flask.views import MethodView
+from flask_cors import CORS
+from flask_restx import Resource
+
+from configs import dify_config
+from extensions.ext_blueprints import OPENAPI_HEADERS, OPENAPI_MAX_AGE_SECONDS
+from libs.external_api import ExternalApi
+
+if not hasattr(builtins, "MethodView"):
+    builtins.MethodView = MethodView  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+
+def _make_app(allowed_origins: list[str], blueprint_name: str) -> Flask:
+    """Build a Flask app with a fresh openapi-style blueprint mirroring
+    production CORS settings, parameterised on the origin allowlist.
+    """
+    bp = Blueprint(blueprint_name, __name__, url_prefix="/openapi/v1")
+    api = ExternalApi(bp, version="1.0", title="OpenAPI Test", description="")
+
+    @api.route("/_health")
+    class _Health(Resource):
+        def get(self):
+            return {"ok": True}
+
+    CORS(
+        bp,
+        resources={r"/*": {"origins": allowed_origins}},
+        supports_credentials=True,
+        allow_headers=list(OPENAPI_HEADERS),
+        methods=["GET", "POST", "PATCH", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"],
+        expose_headers=["X-Version"],
+        max_age=OPENAPI_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
+    )
+
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config["TESTING"] = True
+    app.register_blueprint(bp)
+    return app
+
+
+def test_default_openapi_cors_allowlist_is_empty():
+    """Default config admits no cross-origin until operator opts in."""
+    assert dify_config.OPENAPI_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS == []
+
+
+def test_preflight_allowed_origin_returns_cors_headers():
+    app = _make_app(["https://app.example.com"], "openapi_t1")
+    client = app.test_client()
+    response = client.options(
+        "/openapi/v1/_health",
+        headers={
+            "Origin": "https://app.example.com",
+            "Access-Control-Request-Method": "GET",
+        },
+    )
+
+    assert response.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin") == "https://app.example.com"
+    assert response.headers.get("Access-Control-Max-Age") == str(OPENAPI_MAX_AGE_SECONDS)
+
+
+def test_preflight_disallowed_origin_omits_cors_headers():
+    app = _make_app(["https://app.example.com"], "openapi_t2")
+    client = app.test_client()
+    response = client.options(
+        "/openapi/v1/_health",
+        headers={
+            "Origin": "https://attacker.example",
+            "Access-Control-Request-Method": "GET",
+        },
+    )
+
+    # flask-cors omits Allow-Origin for disallowed origins; browser blocks.
+    assert "Access-Control-Allow-Origin" not in response.headers
+
+
+def test_preflight_with_default_empty_allowlist_omits_cors_headers():
+    app = _make_app([], "openapi_t3")
+    client = app.test_client()
+    response = client.options(
+        "/openapi/v1/_health",
+        headers={
+            "Origin": "https://app.example.com",
+            "Access-Control-Request-Method": "GET",
+        },
+    )
+
+    assert "Access-Control-Allow-Origin" not in response.headers
+
+
+def test_same_origin_request_succeeds_without_origin_header():
+    app = _make_app(["https://app.example.com"], "openapi_t4")
+    client = app.test_client()
+    # Browsers don't send Origin on same-origin GETs.
+    response = client.get("/openapi/v1/_health")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    assert response.get_json() == {"ok": True}
+
+
+def test_authorization_header_is_in_allow_headers():
+    """Bearer-authed routes need Authorization in the preflight response."""
+    app = _make_app(["https://app.example.com"], "openapi_t5")
+    client = app.test_client()
+    response = client.options(
+        "/openapi/v1/_health",
+        headers={
+            "Origin": "https://app.example.com",
+            "Access-Control-Request-Method": "GET",
+            "Access-Control-Request-Headers": "Authorization",
+        },
+    )
+
+    allow_headers = response.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "").lower()
+    assert "authorization" in allow_headers

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_device_approve_deny.py

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+"""Account-branch device-flow approve/deny under /openapi/v1."""
+
+import builtins
+
+import pytest
+from flask import Flask
+from flask.views import MethodView
+
+from controllers.openapi import bp as openapi_bp
+from controllers.openapi.oauth_device import DeviceApproveApi, DeviceDenyApi
+
+if not hasattr(builtins, "MethodView"):
+    builtins.MethodView = MethodView  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def openapi_app() -> Flask:
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config["TESTING"] = True
+    app.register_blueprint(openapi_bp)
+    return app
+
+
+def _rule(app: Flask, path: str):
+    return next(r for r in app.url_map.iter_rules() if r.rule == path)
+
+
+def test_approve_route_registered(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rules = {r.rule for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    assert "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/approve" in rules
+
+
+def test_deny_route_registered(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rules = {r.rule for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    assert "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/deny" in rules
+
+
+def test_approve_dispatches_to_class(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = _rule(openapi_app, "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/approve")
+    assert openapi_app.view_functions[rule.endpoint].view_class is DeviceApproveApi
+
+
+def test_deny_dispatches_to_class(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = _rule(openapi_app, "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/deny")
+    assert openapi_app.view_functions[rule.endpoint].view_class is DeviceDenyApi
+
+
+def test_approve_and_deny_methods(openapi_app: Flask):
+    approve = _rule(openapi_app, "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/approve")
+    deny = _rule(openapi_app, "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/deny")
+    assert "POST" in approve.methods
+    assert "POST" in deny.methods

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_device_code.py

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+"""POST /openapi/v1/oauth/device/code is the canonical RFC 8628 device
+authorization endpoint.
+
+Tests verify URL routing without invoking the handler — invoking would
+require Redis, which the unit-test runtime does not initialise.
+"""
+
+import builtins
+
+import pytest
+from flask import Flask
+from flask.views import MethodView
+
+from controllers.openapi import bp as openapi_bp
+from controllers.openapi.oauth_device import OAuthDeviceCodeApi
+
+if not hasattr(builtins, "MethodView"):
+    builtins.MethodView = MethodView  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def openapi_app() -> Flask:
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config["TESTING"] = True
+    app.register_blueprint(openapi_bp)
+    return app
+
+
+def test_openapi_route_registered(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rules = {r.rule for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    assert "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/code" in rules
+
+
+def test_route_dispatches_to_class(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = next(r for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules() if r.rule == "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/code")
+    assert openapi_app.view_functions[rule.endpoint].view_class is OAuthDeviceCodeApi
+
+
+def test_route_accepts_post(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = next(r for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules() if r.rule == "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/code")
+    assert "POST" in rule.methods
+
+
+def test_known_client_ids_default_includes_difyctl():
+    from configs import dify_config
+
+    assert "difyctl" in dify_config.OPENAPI_KNOWN_CLIENT_IDS

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_device_lookup.py

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+"""GET /openapi/v1/oauth/device/lookup is the canonical user-code lookup."""
+
+import builtins
+
+import pytest
+from flask import Flask
+from flask.views import MethodView
+
+from controllers.openapi import bp as openapi_bp
+from controllers.openapi.oauth_device import OAuthDeviceLookupApi
+
+if not hasattr(builtins, "MethodView"):
+    builtins.MethodView = MethodView  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def openapi_app() -> Flask:
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config["TESTING"] = True
+    app.register_blueprint(openapi_bp)
+    return app
+
+
+def test_openapi_route_registered(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rules = {r.rule for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    assert "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/lookup" in rules
+
+
+def test_route_dispatches_to_class(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = next(r for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules() if r.rule == "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/lookup")
+    assert openapi_app.view_functions[rule.endpoint].view_class is OAuthDeviceLookupApi
+
+
+def test_route_accepts_get(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = next(r for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules() if r.rule == "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/lookup")
+    assert "GET" in rule.methods

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_device_sso.py

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+"""SSO-branch device-flow endpoints under /openapi/v1/oauth/device/."""
+
+import builtins
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+from flask import Flask
+from flask.views import MethodView
+
+from controllers.openapi import bp as openapi_bp
+from controllers.openapi.oauth_device_sso import (
+    _email_belongs_to_dify_account,
+    approval_context,
+    approve_external,
+    sso_complete,
+    sso_initiate,
+)
+
+if not hasattr(builtins, "MethodView"):
+    builtins.MethodView = MethodView  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def openapi_app() -> Flask:
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config["TESTING"] = True
+    app.register_blueprint(openapi_bp)
+    return app
+
+
+def _rule(app: Flask, path: str):
+    return next(r for r in app.url_map.iter_rules() if r.rule == path)
+
+
+def test_sso_initiate_registered(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rules = {r.rule for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    assert "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/sso-initiate" in rules
+
+
+def test_sso_complete_registered(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rules = {r.rule for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    assert "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/sso-complete" in rules
+
+
+def test_approval_context_registered(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rules = {r.rule for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    assert "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/approval-context" in rules
+
+
+def test_approve_external_registered(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rules = {r.rule for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    assert "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/approve-external" in rules
+
+
+def test_sso_initiate_dispatches_to_function(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = _rule(openapi_app, "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/sso-initiate")
+    assert openapi_app.view_functions[rule.endpoint] is sso_initiate
+
+
+def test_sso_complete_dispatches_to_function(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = _rule(openapi_app, "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/sso-complete")
+    assert openapi_app.view_functions[rule.endpoint] is sso_complete
+
+
+def test_approval_context_dispatches_to_function(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = _rule(openapi_app, "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/approval-context")
+    assert openapi_app.view_functions[rule.endpoint] is approval_context
+
+
+def test_approve_external_dispatches_to_function(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = _rule(openapi_app, "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/approve-external")
+    assert openapi_app.view_functions[rule.endpoint] is approve_external
+
+
+def test_sso_complete_idp_callback_url_uses_canonical_path():
+    """sso_initiate hardcodes the IdP callback URL — must point at the
+    canonical /openapi/v1/ path so IdP-side ACS configuration matches.
+    """
+    from controllers.openapi import oauth_device_sso
+
+    assert oauth_device_sso._SSO_COMPLETE_PATH == "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/sso-complete"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("email", "row", "expected"),
+    [
+        ("alice@example.com", "acc1", True),
+        ("alice@example.com", None, False),
+        ("Alice@Example.COM", "acc1", True),  # case-insensitive lookup
+        ("  alice@example.com  ", "acc1", True),  # surrounding whitespace stripped
+        ("", "acc1", False),
+        ("   ", "acc1", False),
+        ("", None, False),
+    ],
+)
+@patch("controllers.openapi.oauth_device_sso.db")
+def test_email_belongs_to_dify_account(db_mock, email, row, expected):
+    exec_result = MagicMock()
+    exec_result.scalar_one_or_none.return_value = row
+    db_mock.session.execute.return_value = exec_result
+    assert _email_belongs_to_dify_account(email) is expected
+    if email.strip():
+        db_mock.session.execute.assert_called_once()
+    else:
+        db_mock.session.execute.assert_not_called()

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_device_token.py

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+"""POST /openapi/v1/oauth/device/token is the canonical poll endpoint."""
+
+import builtins
+
+import pytest
+from flask import Flask
+from flask.views import MethodView
+
+from controllers.openapi import bp as openapi_bp
+from controllers.openapi.oauth_device import OAuthDeviceTokenApi
+
+if not hasattr(builtins, "MethodView"):
+    builtins.MethodView = MethodView  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def openapi_app() -> Flask:
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config["TESTING"] = True
+    app.register_blueprint(openapi_bp)
+    return app
+
+
+def test_openapi_route_registered(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rules = {r.rule for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    assert "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/token" in rules
+
+
+def test_route_dispatches_to_class(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = next(r for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules() if r.rule == "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/token")
+    assert openapi_app.view_functions[rule.endpoint].view_class is OAuthDeviceTokenApi

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_health.py

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+import builtins
+
+import pytest
+from flask import Flask
+from flask.views import MethodView
+
+from controllers.openapi import bp as openapi_bp
+
+if not hasattr(builtins, "MethodView"):
+    builtins.MethodView = MethodView  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def app() -> Flask:
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config["TESTING"] = True
+    app.register_blueprint(openapi_bp)
+    return app
+
+
+def test_health_returns_ok(app: Flask):
+    client = app.test_client()
+    response = client.get("/openapi/v1/_health")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    assert response.get_json() == {"ok": True}
+
+
+def test_health_path_is_under_openapi_v1_prefix(app: Flask):
+    client = app.test_client()
+    assert client.get("/_health").status_code == 404
+    assert client.get("/v1/_health").status_code == 404
+    assert client.get("/openapi/v1/_health").status_code == 200

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_input_schema.py

@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+"""Unit tests for input_schema derivation."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+from controllers.openapi._input_schema import _form_to_jsonschema
+
+
+def _wrap(component: dict) -> list[dict]:
+    """user_input_form rows are single-key dicts: {"text-input": {...}}."""
+    return [component]
+
+
+def test_text_input_required() -> None:
+    form = _wrap({"text-input": {"variable": "industry", "label": "Industry", "required": True, "max_length": 200}})
+    props, required = _form_to_jsonschema(form)
+    assert props == {"industry": {"type": "string", "title": "Industry", "maxLength": 200}}
+    assert required == ["industry"]
+
+
+def test_paragraph_optional() -> None:
+    form = _wrap({"paragraph": {"variable": "context", "label": "Context", "required": False, "max_length": 4000}})
+    props, required = _form_to_jsonschema(form)
+    assert props["context"] == {"type": "string", "title": "Context", "maxLength": 4000}
+    assert required == []
+
+
+def test_select_enum() -> None:
+    form = _wrap(
+        {
+            "select": {
+                "variable": "tier",
+                "label": "Tier",
+                "required": True,
+                "options": ["free", "pro", "enterprise"],
+            }
+        }
+    )
+    props, required = _form_to_jsonschema(form)
+    assert props == {"tier": {"type": "string", "title": "Tier", "enum": ["free", "pro", "enterprise"]}}
+    assert required == ["tier"]
+
+
+def test_number() -> None:
+    form = _wrap({"number": {"variable": "count", "label": "Count", "required": False}})
+    props, _required = _form_to_jsonschema(form)
+    assert props["count"] == {"type": "number", "title": "Count"}
+
+
+def test_file() -> None:
+    form = _wrap({"file": {"variable": "doc", "label": "Doc", "required": True}})
+    props, required = _form_to_jsonschema(form)
+    assert props["doc"]["type"] == "object"
+    assert "title" in props["doc"]
+    assert required == ["doc"]
+
+
+def test_file_list() -> None:
+    form = _wrap({"file-list": {"variable": "attachments", "label": "Attachments", "required": False}})
+    props, _required = _form_to_jsonschema(form)
+    assert props["attachments"]["type"] == "array"
+    assert props["attachments"]["items"]["type"] == "object"
+
+
+def test_unknown_type_skipped() -> None:
+    """Forward-compat: unknown variable types are skipped, not 500'd."""
+    form = _wrap({"future-type": {"variable": "x", "label": "X", "required": False}})
+    props, required = _form_to_jsonschema(form)
+    assert props == {}
+    assert required == []
+
+
+def test_required_order_preserved() -> None:
+    form = [
+        {"text-input": {"variable": "a", "label": "A", "required": True}},
+        {"text-input": {"variable": "b", "label": "B", "required": False}},
+        {"text-input": {"variable": "c", "label": "C", "required": True}},
+    ]
+    _props, required = _form_to_jsonschema(form)
+    assert required == ["a", "c"]
+
+
+def test_max_length_omitted_when_zero() -> None:
+    form = _wrap({"text-input": {"variable": "x", "label": "X", "required": False, "max_length": 0}})
+    props, _ = _form_to_jsonschema(form)
+    assert "maxLength" not in props["x"]
+
+
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+from controllers.openapi._input_schema import EMPTY_INPUT_SCHEMA, build_input_schema
+from controllers.service_api.app.error import AppUnavailableError
+from models.model import AppMode
+
+
+def _stub_app(mode: AppMode, *, form: list[dict] | None = None, has_workflow: bool | None = None):
+    """Returns a MagicMock whose .mode + workflow / app_model_config branch is wired up."""
+    app = MagicMock()
+    app.mode = mode
+    if mode in (AppMode.WORKFLOW, AppMode.ADVANCED_CHAT):
+        if has_workflow is False:
+            app.workflow = None
+        else:
+            app.workflow = MagicMock()
+            app.workflow.user_input_form.return_value = form or []
+            app.workflow.features_dict = {}
+    else:
+        if has_workflow is False:
+            app.app_model_config = None
+        else:
+            app.app_model_config = MagicMock()
+            app.app_model_config.to_dict.return_value = {"user_input_form": form or []}
+    return app
+
+
+def test_chat_mode_includes_query() -> None:
+    app = _stub_app(AppMode.CHAT, form=[{"text-input": {"variable": "x", "label": "X", "required": True}}])
+    schema = build_input_schema(app)
+    assert schema["$schema"] == "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
+    assert "query" in schema["properties"]
+    assert schema["properties"]["query"]["type"] == "string"
+    assert schema["properties"]["query"]["minLength"] == 1
+    assert "query" in schema["required"]
+    assert "inputs" in schema["required"]
+    assert schema["properties"]["inputs"]["additionalProperties"] is False
+
+
+def test_agent_chat_mode_includes_query() -> None:
+    app = _stub_app(AppMode.AGENT_CHAT, form=[])
+    schema = build_input_schema(app)
+    assert "query" in schema["properties"]
+
+
+def test_advanced_chat_mode_includes_query() -> None:
+    app = _stub_app(AppMode.ADVANCED_CHAT, form=[])
+    schema = build_input_schema(app)
+    assert "query" in schema["properties"]
+
+
+def test_workflow_mode_omits_query() -> None:
+    app = _stub_app(AppMode.WORKFLOW, form=[])
+    schema = build_input_schema(app)
+    assert "query" not in schema["properties"]
+    assert schema["required"] == ["inputs"]
+
+
+def test_completion_mode_omits_query() -> None:
+    app = _stub_app(AppMode.COMPLETION, form=[])
+    schema = build_input_schema(app)
+    assert "query" not in schema["properties"]
+    assert schema["required"] == ["inputs"]
+
+
+def test_inputs_required_driven_by_form() -> None:
+    app = _stub_app(
+        AppMode.CHAT,
+        form=[
+            {"text-input": {"variable": "industry", "label": "Industry", "required": True}},
+            {"text-input": {"variable": "context", "label": "Context", "required": False}},
+        ],
+    )
+    schema = build_input_schema(app)
+    assert schema["properties"]["inputs"]["required"] == ["industry"]
+
+
+def test_misconfigured_chat_raises_app_unavailable() -> None:
+    app = _stub_app(AppMode.CHAT, has_workflow=False)
+    with pytest.raises(AppUnavailableError):
+        build_input_schema(app)
+
+
+def test_misconfigured_workflow_raises_app_unavailable() -> None:
+    app = _stub_app(AppMode.WORKFLOW, has_workflow=False)
+    with pytest.raises(AppUnavailableError):
+        build_input_schema(app)
+
+
+def test_empty_input_schema_sentinel_shape() -> None:
+    assert EMPTY_INPUT_SCHEMA["type"] == "object"
+    assert EMPTY_INPUT_SCHEMA["properties"] == {}
+    assert EMPTY_INPUT_SCHEMA["required"] == []

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_models.py

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+from controllers.openapi._models import MessageMetadata, UsageInfo
+
+
+def test_usage_info_defaults_zero():
+    u = UsageInfo()
+    assert u.prompt_tokens == 0
+    assert u.completion_tokens == 0
+    assert u.total_tokens == 0
+
+
+def test_message_metadata_accepts_partial():
+    m = MessageMetadata(usage=UsageInfo(total_tokens=10))
+    assert m.usage.total_tokens == 10
+    assert m.retriever_resources == []
+
+
+def test_describe_response_all_blocks_optional() -> None:
+    from controllers.openapi._models import AppDescribeResponse
+
+    payload = AppDescribeResponse().model_dump(mode="json", exclude_none=False)
+    assert payload == {"info": None, "parameters": None, "input_schema": None}
+
+
+def test_describe_response_input_schema_field() -> None:
+    from controllers.openapi._models import AppDescribeResponse
+
+    schema = {"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "type": "object"}
+    payload = AppDescribeResponse(input_schema=schema).model_dump(mode="json", exclude_none=False)
+    assert payload["input_schema"] == schema
+    assert payload["info"] is None
+    assert payload["parameters"] is None

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_pagination_envelope.py

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+"""Unit tests for PaginationEnvelope generic Pydantic model."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel
+
+from controllers.openapi._models import PaginationEnvelope
+
+
+class _Row(BaseModel):
+    id: str
+    name: str
+
+
+def test_envelope_basic_fields():
+    env = PaginationEnvelope[_Row](page=1, limit=20, total=42, has_more=True, data=[_Row(id="a", name="A")])
+    dumped = env.model_dump(mode="json")
+    assert dumped == {
+        "page": 1,
+        "limit": 20,
+        "total": 42,
+        "has_more": True,
+        "data": [{"id": "a", "name": "A"}],
+    }
+
+
+def test_envelope_empty_data_no_more():
+    env = PaginationEnvelope[_Row](page=1, limit=20, total=0, has_more=False, data=[])
+    assert env.model_dump(mode="json")["data"] == []
+    assert env.model_dump(mode="json")["has_more"] is False
+
+
+def test_envelope_has_more_true_when_total_exceeds_page_window():
+    env = PaginationEnvelope[_Row].build(page=1, limit=20, total=42, items=[_Row(id="a", name="A")])
+    assert env.has_more is True
+
+
+def test_envelope_has_more_false_when_total_within_page_window():
+    env = PaginationEnvelope[_Row].build(page=2, limit=20, total=22, items=[_Row(id="a", name="A")])
+    assert env.has_more is False
+
+
+def test_envelope_has_more_false_for_last_page():
+    env = PaginationEnvelope[_Row].build(page=3, limit=20, total=42, items=[_Row(id="a", name="A")])
+    assert env.has_more is False
+
+
+def test_max_page_limit_is_200():
+    from controllers.openapi._models import MAX_PAGE_LIMIT
+
+    assert MAX_PAGE_LIMIT == 200
+
+
+def test_envelope_uses_pep695_generics():
+    """Verify the class uses PEP 695 native generic syntax (not legacy Generic[T])."""
+    from controllers.openapi._models import PaginationEnvelope
+
+    # PEP 695 syntax populates __type_params__; the legacy Generic[T] form does not.
+    assert PaginationEnvelope.__type_params__, "expected PEP 695 native generic syntax"
+
+    fields = PaginationEnvelope.model_fields
+    assert {"page", "limit", "total", "has_more", "data"} <= set(fields)
+
+
+def test_app_info_response_dump_matches_spec():
+    from controllers.openapi._models import AppInfoResponse
+
+    obj = AppInfoResponse(
+        id="app1",
+        name="X",
+        description="d",
+        mode="chat",
+        author="alice",
+        tags=[{"name": "prod"}],
+    )
+    assert obj.model_dump(mode="json") == {
+        "id": "app1",
+        "name": "X",
+        "description": "d",
+        "mode": "chat",
+        "author": "alice",
+        "tags": [{"name": "prod"}],
+    }
+
+
+def test_app_describe_response_nests_info_and_parameters():
+    from controllers.openapi._models import AppDescribeInfo, AppDescribeResponse
+
+    info = AppDescribeInfo(
+        id="app1",
+        name="X",
+        mode="chat",
+        description=None,
+        tags=[],
+        author=None,
+        updated_at="2026-05-05T00:00:00+00:00",
+        service_api_enabled=True,
+    )
+    obj = AppDescribeResponse(info=info, parameters={"opening_statement": None})
+    dumped = obj.model_dump(mode="json")
+    assert dumped["info"]["service_api_enabled"] is True
+    assert dumped["parameters"]["opening_statement"] is None
+
+
+def test_response_models_dump_per_mode():
+    from controllers.openapi._models import (
+        ChatMessageResponse,
+        CompletionMessageResponse,
+        WorkflowRunData,
+        WorkflowRunResponse,
+    )
+    chat = ChatMessageResponse(
+        event="message", task_id="t1", id="m1", message_id="m1",
+        conversation_id="c1", mode="chat", answer="hi", created_at=0,
+    )
+    assert chat.model_dump(mode="json")["mode"] == "chat"
+    wf = WorkflowRunResponse(
+        workflow_run_id="r1", task_id="t1",
+        data=WorkflowRunData(id="r1", workflow_id="w1", status="succeeded"),
+    )
+    assert wf.model_dump(mode="json")["data"]["status"] == "succeeded"
+    assert wf.model_dump(mode="json")["mode"] == "workflow"
+    comp = CompletionMessageResponse(
+        event="message", task_id="t2", id="m2", message_id="m2",
+        mode="completion", answer="ok", created_at=0,
+    )
+    assert comp.model_dump(mode="json")["mode"] == "completion"

api/tests/unit_tests/controllers/openapi/test_workspaces.py

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+"""Phase E step 17: workspace reads at /openapi/v1/workspaces. Bearer-authed
+list + member-gated detail. No legacy /v1/ equivalent — the cookie-authed
+/console/api/workspaces is a separate consumer that stays in console.
+"""
+
+import builtins
+
+import pytest
+from flask import Flask
+from flask.views import MethodView
+
+from controllers.openapi import bp as openapi_bp
+from controllers.openapi.workspaces import WorkspaceByIdApi, WorkspacesApi
+
+if not hasattr(builtins, "MethodView"):
+    builtins.MethodView = MethodView  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def openapi_app() -> Flask:
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config["TESTING"] = True
+    app.register_blueprint(openapi_bp)
+    return app
+
+
+def _rule(app: Flask, path: str):
+    return next(r for r in app.url_map.iter_rules() if r.rule == path)
+
+
+def test_workspaces_list_route_registered(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rules = {r.rule for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    assert "/openapi/v1/workspaces" in rules
+
+
+def test_workspaces_list_dispatches_to_workspaces_api(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = _rule(openapi_app, "/openapi/v1/workspaces")
+    assert openapi_app.view_functions[rule.endpoint].view_class is WorkspacesApi
+    assert "GET" in rule.methods
+
+
+def test_workspace_by_id_route_registered(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rules = {r.rule for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    assert "/openapi/v1/workspaces/<string:workspace_id>" in rules
+
+
+def test_workspace_by_id_dispatches_to_correct_class(openapi_app: Flask):
+    rule = _rule(openapi_app, "/openapi/v1/workspaces/<string:workspace_id>")
+    assert openapi_app.view_functions[rule.endpoint].view_class is WorkspaceByIdApi
+    assert "GET" in rule.methods
+
+
+def test_console_legacy_workspaces_route_not_remounted_on_openapi(openapi_app: Flask):
+    """Phase E only adds the bearer-authed mounts on /openapi/v1/.
+    The cookie-authed /console/api/workspaces stays where it is.
+    """
+    rules = {r.rule for r in openapi_app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    assert "/console/api/workspaces" not in rules

api/tests/unit_tests/core/app/test_invoke_from.py

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+from core.app.entities.app_invoke_entities import InvokeFrom
+
+
+def test_openapi_variant_present():
+    assert InvokeFrom.OPENAPI.value == "openapi"
+
+
+def test_openapi_distinct_from_service_api():
+    assert InvokeFrom.OPENAPI != InvokeFrom.SERVICE_API

api/tests/unit_tests/libs/test_oauth_bearer.py

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+"""Unit tests for the openapi bearer-scope catalog and TokenKind registry."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+
+def test_apps_read_permitted_external_scope_present():
+    from libs.oauth_bearer import Scope
+
+    assert Scope.APPS_READ_PERMITTED_EXTERNAL.value == "apps:read:permitted-external"
+
+
+def test_dfoe_token_kind_carries_apps_read_permitted_external():
+    from libs.oauth_bearer import Scope, build_registry
+
+    registry = build_registry(MagicMock(), MagicMock())
+    dfoe = next(k for k in registry.kinds() if k.prefix == "dfoe_")
+    assert Scope.APPS_READ_PERMITTED_EXTERNAL in dfoe.scopes
+
+
+def test_dfoa_token_kind_does_not_carry_apps_read_permitted_external():
+    """dfoa_ relies on Scope.FULL umbrella; the explicit permitted scope
+    is reserved for dfoe_."""
+    from libs.oauth_bearer import Scope, build_registry
+
+    registry = build_registry(MagicMock(), MagicMock())
+    dfoa = next(k for k in registry.kinds() if k.prefix == "dfoa_")
+    assert Scope.APPS_READ_PERMITTED_EXTERNAL not in dfoa.scopes

api/tests/unit_tests/libs/test_oauth_bearer_layer0_cache.py

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+"""Unit tests for record_layer0_verdict — merge L0 verdict into AuthContext cache."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+
+from libs.oauth_bearer import record_layer0_verdict
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def mock_redis():
+    return MagicMock()
+
+
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.redis_client")
+def test_no_op_when_cache_entry_missing(mock_redis):
+    mock_redis.get.return_value = None
+    record_layer0_verdict("h1", "t1", True)
+    mock_redis.setex.assert_not_called()
+
+
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.redis_client")
+def test_no_op_when_cache_entry_invalid_marker(mock_redis):
+    mock_redis.get.return_value = b"invalid"
+    record_layer0_verdict("h1", "t1", True)
+    mock_redis.setex.assert_not_called()
+
+
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.redis_client")
+def test_no_op_when_json_malformed(mock_redis):
+    mock_redis.get.return_value = b"not json"
+    record_layer0_verdict("h1", "t1", True)
+    mock_redis.setex.assert_not_called()
+
+
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.redis_client")
+def test_no_op_when_ttl_expired(mock_redis):
+    mock_redis.get.return_value = json.dumps(
+        {
+            "subject_email": "e",
+            "subject_issuer": None,
+            "account_id": None,
+            "token_id": "tid",
+            "expires_at": None,
+        }
+    ).encode()
+    mock_redis.ttl.return_value = -1
+    record_layer0_verdict("h1", "t1", True)
+    mock_redis.setex.assert_not_called()
+
+
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.redis_client")
+def test_merges_new_tenant_verdict(mock_redis):
+    mock_redis.get.return_value = json.dumps(
+        {
+            "subject_email": "e",
+            "subject_issuer": None,
+            "account_id": None,
+            "token_id": "tid",
+            "expires_at": None,
+            "verified_tenants": {"t0": True},
+        }
+    ).encode()
+    mock_redis.ttl.return_value = 42
+
+    record_layer0_verdict("h1", "t1", False)
+
+    mock_redis.setex.assert_called_once()
+    args = mock_redis.setex.call_args
+    assert args.args[0] == "auth:token:h1"
+    assert args.args[1] == 42  # remaining TTL preserved
+    written = json.loads(args.args[2])
+    assert written["verified_tenants"] == {"t0": True, "t1": False}
+
+
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.redis_client")
+def test_merges_when_field_absent_from_legacy_entry(mock_redis):
+    """Backward compat: legacy cache entry without verified_tenants field."""
+    mock_redis.get.return_value = json.dumps(
+        {
+            "subject_email": "e",
+            "subject_issuer": None,
+            "account_id": None,
+            "token_id": "tid",
+            "expires_at": None,
+        }
+    ).encode()
+    mock_redis.ttl.return_value = 42
+    record_layer0_verdict("h1", "t1", True)
+    written = json.loads(mock_redis.setex.call_args.args[2])
+    assert written["verified_tenants"] == {"t1": True}

api/tests/unit_tests/libs/test_oauth_bearer_require_scope.py

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+"""require_scope is a route-level gate run after validate_bearer.
+Tests use a fake auth_ctx attached directly to flask.g — no
+authenticator wiring needed.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import uuid
+
+import pytest
+from flask import Flask, g
+from werkzeug.exceptions import Forbidden
+
+from libs.oauth_bearer import (
+    AuthContext,
+    Scope,
+    SubjectType,
+    require_scope,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def app() -> Flask:
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config["TESTING"] = True
+    return app
+
+
+def _ctx(scopes) -> AuthContext:
+    return AuthContext(
+        subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT,
+        subject_email="user@example.com",
+        subject_issuer="dify:account",
+        account_id=uuid.uuid4(),
+        client_id="difyctl",
+        scopes=scopes,
+        token_id=uuid.uuid4(),
+        source="oauth_account",
+        expires_at=None,
+        token_hash="h1",
+        verified_tenants={},
+    )
+
+
+def test_require_scope_allows_when_scope_present(app: Flask):
+    @require_scope("apps:read")
+    def view():
+        return "ok"
+
+    with app.test_request_context():
+        g.auth_ctx = _ctx(frozenset({"apps:read"}))
+        assert view() == "ok"
+
+
+def test_require_scope_rejects_when_scope_missing(app: Flask):
+    @require_scope("apps:write")
+    def view():
+        return "ok"
+
+    with app.test_request_context():
+        g.auth_ctx = _ctx(frozenset({"apps:read"}))
+        with pytest.raises(Forbidden) as exc:
+            view()
+    assert "insufficient_scope: apps:write" in str(exc.value.description)
+
+
+def test_require_scope_full_passes_any_check(app: Flask):
+    @require_scope("apps:write")
+    def view():
+        return "ok"
+
+    with app.test_request_context():
+        g.auth_ctx = _ctx(frozenset({Scope.FULL}))
+        assert view() == "ok"
+
+
+def test_require_scope_without_validate_bearer_raises_runtime_error(app: Flask):
+    @require_scope("apps:read")
+    def view():
+        return "ok"
+
+    with app.test_request_context():
+        # No g.auth_ctx — validate_bearer was forgotten
+        with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="stack @validate_bearer above @require_scope"):
+            view()

api/tests/unit_tests/libs/test_rate_limit_bearer.py

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+"""Unit tests for the per-token bearer rate limit primitive."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import timedelta
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+from werkzeug.exceptions import TooManyRequests
+
+from libs.helper import RateLimiter
+from libs.rate_limit import (
+    LIMIT_BEARER_PER_TOKEN,
+    enforce_bearer_rate_limit,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def mock_redis():
+    return MagicMock()
+
+
+def test_limit_bearer_per_token_uses_60_per_minute_default():
+    assert LIMIT_BEARER_PER_TOKEN.limit == 60
+    assert LIMIT_BEARER_PER_TOKEN.window == timedelta(minutes=1)
+
+
+def test_seconds_until_available_returns_remaining_window(mock_redis):
+    """ZSET oldest entry score = 100; window = 60s; now = 130s → remaining = 30s."""
+    rl = RateLimiter("rl:bearer:token", max_attempts=60, time_window=60, redis_client=mock_redis)
+    mock_redis.zrange.return_value = [(b"member-1", 100.0)]
+    with patch("libs.helper.time.time", return_value=130):
+        assert rl.seconds_until_available("k1") == 30
+
+
+def test_seconds_until_available_floor_one_second(mock_redis):
+    """Even when math says <1s remaining, return at least 1 so client backs off measurably."""
+    rl = RateLimiter("rl:bearer:token", max_attempts=60, time_window=60, redis_client=mock_redis)
+    mock_redis.zrange.return_value = [(b"member-1", 119.5)]
+    with patch("libs.helper.time.time", return_value=180):
+        # window expired (180 > 119.5+60=179.5 by 0.5s) — bucket is actually free now
+        # but this method only called when is_rate_limited() == True; defensive floor.
+        assert rl.seconds_until_available("k1") >= 1
+
+
+def test_seconds_until_available_empty_bucket(mock_redis):
+    """No entries → 1s sentinel (defensive; should not be reached when limited)."""
+    rl = RateLimiter("rl:bearer:token", max_attempts=60, time_window=60, redis_client=mock_redis)
+    mock_redis.zrange.return_value = []
+    assert rl.seconds_until_available("k1") == 1
+
+
+@patch("libs.rate_limit._build_limiter")
+def test_enforce_bearer_rate_limit_passes_under_limit(mock_build):
+    limiter = MagicMock()
+    limiter.is_rate_limited.return_value = False
+    mock_build.return_value = limiter
+    enforce_bearer_rate_limit("hash-1")
+    limiter.increment_rate_limit.assert_called_once_with("token:hash-1")
+
+
+@patch("libs.rate_limit._build_limiter")
+def test_enforce_bearer_rate_limit_raises_429_with_retry_after(mock_build):
+    limiter = MagicMock()
+    limiter.is_rate_limited.return_value = True
+    limiter.seconds_until_available.return_value = 23
+    mock_build.return_value = limiter
+    with pytest.raises(TooManyRequests) as exc:
+        enforce_bearer_rate_limit("hash-1")
+    headers = dict(exc.value.get_response().headers)
+    assert headers.get("Retry-After") == "23"
+    body = exc.value.get_response().get_json() or {}
+    assert body.get("error") == "rate_limited"
+    assert body.get("retry_after_ms") == 23000

api/tests/unit_tests/libs/test_workspace_member_helper.py

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+"""Unit tests for require_workspace_member."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import uuid
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+from werkzeug.exceptions import Forbidden
+
+from libs.oauth_bearer import AuthContext, Scope, SubjectType, require_workspace_member
+
+
+def _ctx(verified: dict[str, bool] | None = None, *, account: bool = True) -> AuthContext:
+    return AuthContext(
+        subject_type=SubjectType.ACCOUNT if account else SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO,
+        subject_email="e@example.com",
+        subject_issuer=None,
+        account_id=uuid.uuid4() if account else None,
+        client_id="difyctl",
+        scopes=frozenset({Scope.FULL}),
+        token_id=uuid.uuid4(),
+        source="oauth_account",
+        expires_at=None,
+        token_hash="h1",
+        verified_tenants=dict(verified or {}),
+    )
+
+
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.dify_config")
+def test_skips_when_enterprise_enabled(mock_cfg):
+    mock_cfg.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED = True
+    require_workspace_member(_ctx(), "t1")
+
+
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.dify_config")
+def test_skips_for_external_sso(mock_cfg):
+    mock_cfg.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED = False
+    require_workspace_member(_ctx(account=False), "t1")
+
+
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.db")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.dify_config")
+def test_uses_cached_ok_no_db_access(mock_cfg, mock_db):
+    mock_cfg.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED = False
+    require_workspace_member(_ctx({"t1": True}), "t1")
+    mock_db.session.execute.assert_not_called()
+
+
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.db")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.dify_config")
+def test_uses_cached_denied(mock_cfg, mock_db):
+    mock_cfg.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED = False
+    with pytest.raises(Forbidden, match="workspace_membership_revoked"):
+        require_workspace_member(_ctx({"t1": False}), "t1")
+    mock_db.session.execute.assert_not_called()
+
+
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.record_layer0_verdict")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.db")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.dify_config")
+def test_denies_when_no_membership(mock_cfg, mock_db, mock_record):
+    mock_cfg.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED = False
+    mock_db.session.execute.return_value.scalar_one_or_none.return_value = None
+    with pytest.raises(Forbidden, match="workspace_membership_revoked"):
+        require_workspace_member(_ctx({}), "t1")
+    mock_record.assert_called_once_with("h1", "t1", False)
+
+
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.record_layer0_verdict")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.db")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.dify_config")
+def test_denies_when_account_inactive(mock_cfg, mock_db, mock_record):
+    mock_cfg.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED = False
+    mock_db.session.execute.side_effect = [
+        MagicMock(scalar_one_or_none=MagicMock(return_value="join-id")),
+        MagicMock(scalar_one_or_none=MagicMock(return_value="banned")),
+    ]
+    with pytest.raises(Forbidden, match="workspace_membership_revoked"):
+        require_workspace_member(_ctx({}), "t1")
+    mock_record.assert_called_once_with("h1", "t1", False)
+
+
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.record_layer0_verdict")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.db")
+@patch("libs.oauth_bearer.dify_config")
+def test_allows_active_member(mock_cfg, mock_db, mock_record):
+    mock_cfg.ENTERPRISE_ENABLED = False
+    mock_db.session.execute.side_effect = [
+        MagicMock(scalar_one_or_none=MagicMock(return_value="join-id")),
+        MagicMock(scalar_one_or_none=MagicMock(return_value="active")),
+    ]
+    require_workspace_member(_ctx({}), "t1")
+    mock_record.assert_called_once_with("h1", "t1", True)

api/tests/unit_tests/services/enterprise/test_app_permitted_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+import pytest
+
+from services.enterprise.app_permitted_service import PermittedAppsPage, list_permitted_apps
+from services.errors.enterprise import EnterpriseAPIError
+
+WRAPPER = "services.enterprise.app_permitted_service.EnterpriseService.WebAppAuth.list_externally_accessible_apps"
+
+
+def test_list_permitted_apps_decodes_camelcase_response():
+    fake_body = {
+        "data": [{"appId": "a"}, {"appId": "b"}],
+        "total": 2,
+        "hasMore": False,
+    }
+    with patch(WRAPPER, return_value=fake_body) as m:
+        page = list_permitted_apps(page=1, limit=10)
+
+    assert isinstance(page, PermittedAppsPage)
+    assert page.total == 2
+    assert page.has_more is False
+    assert page.app_ids == ["a", "b"]
+    m.assert_called_once_with(page=1, limit=10, mode=None, name=None)
+
+
+def test_list_permitted_apps_passes_filters_to_wrapper():
+    fake_body = {"data": [], "total": 0, "hasMore": False}
+    with patch(WRAPPER, return_value=fake_body) as m:
+        list_permitted_apps(page=2, limit=5, mode="workflow", name="alpha")
+
+    m.assert_called_once_with(page=2, limit=5, mode="workflow", name="alpha")
+
+
+def test_list_permitted_apps_503_on_ee_error():
+    with patch(WRAPPER, side_effect=EnterpriseAPIError("boom", status_code=500)):
+        from werkzeug.exceptions import ServiceUnavailable
+
+        with pytest.raises(ServiceUnavailable):
+            list_permitted_apps(page=1, limit=10)
+
+
+def test_list_permitted_apps_503_on_status_error():
+    with patch(WRAPPER, side_effect=EnterpriseAPIError("bad key", status_code=401)):
+        from werkzeug.exceptions import ServiceUnavailable
+
+        with pytest.raises(ServiceUnavailable):
+            list_permitted_apps(page=1, limit=10)
+
+
+def test_list_permitted_apps_handles_empty_response():
+    fake_body = {"data": [], "total": 0, "hasMore": False}
+    with patch(WRAPPER, return_value=fake_body):
+        page = list_permitted_apps(page=1, limit=10)
+    assert page.app_ids == []
+    assert page.total == 0
+    assert page.has_more is False

api/tests/unit_tests/services/enterprise/test_enterprise_service.py

@@ -188,6 +188,31 @@ class TestWebAppAuth:
 
         req.send_request.assert_called_once_with("DELETE", "/webapp/clean", params={"appId": "a1"})
 
+    def test_list_externally_accessible_apps_minimal_call(self):
+        with patch(f"{MODULE}.EnterpriseRequest") as req:
+            req.send_request.return_value = {"data": [], "total": 0, "hasMore": False}
+            result = EnterpriseService.WebAppAuth.list_externally_accessible_apps(page=1, limit=10)
+
+        assert result == {"data": [], "total": 0, "hasMore": False}
+        req.send_request.assert_called_once_with(
+            "POST",
+            "/webapp/externally-accessible-apps",
+            json={"page": 1, "limit": 10},
+            timeout=5.0,
+        )
+
+    def test_list_externally_accessible_apps_with_filters(self):
+        with patch(f"{MODULE}.EnterpriseRequest") as req:
+            req.send_request.return_value = {"data": [], "total": 0, "hasMore": False}
+            EnterpriseService.WebAppAuth.list_externally_accessible_apps(page=2, limit=5, mode="workflow", name="alpha")
+
+        req.send_request.assert_called_once_with(
+            "POST",
+            "/webapp/externally-accessible-apps",
+            json={"page": 2, "limit": 5, "mode": "workflow", "name": "alpha"},
+            timeout=5.0,
+        )
+
 
 class TestJoinDefaultWorkspace:
     def test_join_default_workspace_success(self):