Adds a CLI-friendly authorization flow so difyctl (and future
non-browser clients) can obtain user-scoped tokens without copy-
pasting cookies or raw API keys. Two grant paths share one device
flow surface:
1. Account branch — user signs in via the existing /signin
methods, /device page calls console-authed approve, mints a
dfoa_ token tied to (account_id, tenant).
2. External-SSO branch (EE) — /v1/oauth/device/sso-initiate signs
an SSOState envelope, hands off to Enterprise's external ACS,
receives a signed external-subject assertion, mints a dfoe_
token tied to (subject_email, subject_issuer).
API surface (all under /v1, EE-only endpoints 404 on CE):
POST /v1/oauth/device/code — RFC 8628 start
POST /v1/oauth/device/token — RFC 8628 poll
GET /v1/oauth/device/lookup — pre-validate user_code
GET /v1/oauth/device/sso-initiate — SSO branch entry
GET /v1/device/sso-complete — SSO callback sink
GET /v1/oauth/device/approval-context — /device cookie probe
POST /v1/oauth/device/approve-external — SSO approve
GET /v1/me — bearer subject lookup
DELETE /v1/oauth/authorizations/self — self-revoke
POST /console/api/oauth/device/approve — account approve
POST /console/api/oauth/device/deny — account deny
Core primitives:
- libs/oauth_bearer.py: prefix-keyed TokenKindRegistry +
BearerAuthenticator + validate_bearer decorator. Two-tier scope
(full vs apps:run) stamped from the registry, never from the DB.
- libs/jws.py: HS256 compact JWS keyed on the shared Dify
SECRET_KEY — same key-set verifies the SSOState envelope, the
external-subject assertion (minted by Enterprise), and the
approval-grant cookie.
- libs/device_flow_security.py: enterprise_only gate, approval-
grant cookie mint/verify/consume (Path=/v1/oauth/device,
HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure follows is_secure()), anti-
framing headers.
- libs/rate_limit.py: typed RateLimit / RateLimitScope dispatch
with composite-key buckets; both decorator + imperative form.
- services/oauth_device_flow.py: Redis state machine (PENDING ->
APPROVED|DENIED with atomic consume-on-poll), token mint via
partial unique index uq_oauth_active_per_device (rotates in
place), env-driven TTL policy.
Storage: oauth_access_tokens table with partial unique index on
(subject_email, subject_issuer, client_id, device_label) WHERE
revoked_at IS NULL. account_id NULL distinguishes external-SSO
rows. Hard-expire is CAS UPDATE (revoked_at + nullify token_hash)
so audit events keep their token_id. Retention pruner DELETEs
revoked + zombie-expired rows past OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_RETENTION_DAYS.
Frontend: /device page with code-entry, chooser (account vs SSO),
authorize-account, authorize-sso views. SSO branch detaches from
the URL user_code and reads everything from the cookie via
/approval-context. Anti-framing headers on all responses.
Wiring: ENABLE_OAUTH_BEARER feature flag; ext_oauth_bearer binds
the authenticator at startup; clean_oauth_access_tokens_task
scheduled in ext_celery.
Spec: docs/specs/v1.0/server/{device-flow,tokens,middleware,security}.md
