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Type and lint pass over the openapi controllers, auth pipeline, and
oauth bearer/device-flow plumbing. Down from 36 pyright errors and 16
ruff errors to 0/0; 93 openapi unit tests pass.
Logic fixes:
- libs/oauth_bearer.py: drop private-naming on the friend-API methods
consumed by _VariantResolver (cache_get / cache_set_positive /
cache_set_negative / hard_expire / session_factory). They were always
cross-class accessors — leading underscore was misleading. Add public
registry property on BearerAuthenticator. _hard_expire row_id widened
to UUID | str (matches the StringUUID column type).
- libs/oauth_bearer.py: type validate_bearer / bearer_feature_required
with ParamSpec / PEP-695 so wrapped routes preserve their signature.
- libs/rate_limit.py: same — typed rate_limit decorator.
- services/oauth_device_flow.py: mint_oauth_token / _upsert accept
Session | scoped_session (Flask-SQLAlchemy proxy). Guard row-is-None
after upsert.
- controllers/openapi/{chat,completion,workflow}_messages.py: tuple-vs-
Mapping shape narrowing on AppGenerateService.generate return —
production returns Mapping, tests mock as (body, status). Validate
through Pydantic Response model in both shapes.
- controllers/openapi/oauth_device.py: replace flask_restx.reqparse (banned)
with Pydantic Request/Query models — DeviceCodeRequest, DevicePollRequest,
DeviceLookupQuery, DeviceMutateRequest. Two PEP-695 generic helpers
(_validate_json / _validate_query) translate ValidationError to BadRequest.
- controllers/openapi/auth/strategies.py: Protocol param-name match
(subject_type), Optional narrowing on app/tenant/account_id/subject_email.
- controllers/openapi/auth/steps.py: subject_type-is-None guard before
mounter dispatch.
- core/app/apps/workflow/generate_task_pipeline.py + models/workflow.py:
add WorkflowAppLogCreatedFrom.OPENAPI + matching match-case branch.
Fixes match-exhaustiveness and possibly-unbound created_from.
- libs/device_flow_security.py: pyright ignore on flask after_request
hook (registered by the framework, pyright sees as unused).
- services/oauth_device_flow.py: rename Exceptions to *Error suffix
(StateNotFoundError / InvalidTransitionError / UserCodeExhaustedError);
same for libs/oauth_bearer.py (InvalidBearerError / TokenExpiredError).
Update all callers across openapi controllers.
- controllers/openapi/{oauth_device,oauth_device_sso}.py +
services/oauth_device_flow.py: switch logger.error in except blocks
to logger.exception (TRY400) — keeps the traceback for ops.
- configs/feature/__init__.py: OPENAPI_KNOWN_CLIENT_IDS computed_field
needs an @property alongside for pyright to see it as a value, not a
method. Matches the existing line-451 pattern.
Plus ruff format + import-sort across the openapi tree (pure formatting).
288 lines
9.2 KiB
Python
288 lines
9.2 KiB
Python
"""SSO-branch device-flow endpoints under /openapi/v1/oauth/device/*.
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EE-only. Browser flow:
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GET /oauth/device/sso-initiate → 302 to IdP authorize URL
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GET /oauth/device/sso-complete → ACS callback, sets approval-grant cookie
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GET /oauth/device/approval-context → SPA reads cookie claims (idempotent)
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POST /oauth/device/approve-external → mints dfoe_ token + clears cookie
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Function-based (raw @bp.route) rather than Resource classes because the
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handlers do redirects + cookie kwargs that don't fit the Resource shape.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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import secrets
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from flask import jsonify, make_response, redirect, request
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from werkzeug.exceptions import (
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BadGateway,
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BadRequest,
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Conflict,
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Forbidden,
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NotFound,
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Unauthorized,
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)
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from controllers.openapi import bp
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from extensions.ext_database import db
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from extensions.ext_redis import redis_client
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from libs import jws
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from libs.device_flow_security import (
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APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_NAME,
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ApprovalGrantClaims,
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approval_grant_cleared_cookie_kwargs,
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approval_grant_cookie_kwargs,
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consume_approval_grant_nonce,
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consume_sso_assertion_nonce,
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enterprise_only,
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mint_approval_grant,
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verify_approval_grant,
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)
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from libs.oauth_bearer import SubjectType
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from libs.rate_limit import (
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LIMIT_APPROVE_EXT_PER_EMAIL,
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LIMIT_SSO_INITIATE_PER_IP,
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enforce,
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rate_limit,
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)
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from services.enterprise.enterprise_service import EnterpriseService
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from services.oauth_device_flow import (
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PREFIX_OAUTH_EXTERNAL_SSO,
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DeviceFlowRedis,
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DeviceFlowStatus,
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InvalidTransitionError,
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StateNotFoundError,
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mint_oauth_token,
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oauth_ttl_days,
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)
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Matches DEVICE_FLOW_TTL_SECONDS so the signed state can't outlive the
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# device_code it references.
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STATE_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS = 15 * 60
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# Canonical sso-complete path. IdP-side ACS callback URL must point here.
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_SSO_COMPLETE_PATH = "/openapi/v1/oauth/device/sso-complete"
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@bp.route("/oauth/device/sso-initiate", methods=["GET"])
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@enterprise_only
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@rate_limit(LIMIT_SSO_INITIATE_PER_IP)
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def sso_initiate():
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user_code = (request.args.get("user_code") or "").strip().upper()
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if not user_code:
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raise BadRequest("user_code required")
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store = DeviceFlowRedis(redis_client)
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found = store.load_by_user_code(user_code)
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if found is None:
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raise BadRequest("invalid_user_code")
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_, state = found
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if state.status is not DeviceFlowStatus.PENDING:
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raise BadRequest("invalid_user_code")
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keyset = jws.KeySet.from_shared_secret()
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signed_state = jws.sign(
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keyset,
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payload={
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"redirect_url": "",
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"app_code": "",
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"intent": "device_flow",
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"user_code": user_code,
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"nonce": secrets.token_urlsafe(16),
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"return_to": "",
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"idp_callback_url": f"{request.host_url.rstrip('/')}{_SSO_COMPLETE_PATH}",
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},
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aud=jws.AUD_STATE_ENVELOPE,
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ttl_seconds=STATE_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS,
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)
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try:
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reply = EnterpriseService.initiate_device_flow_sso(signed_state)
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except Exception as e:
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logger.warning("sso-initiate: enterprise call failed: %s", e)
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raise BadGateway("sso_initiate_failed") from e
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url = (reply or {}).get("url")
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if not url:
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raise BadGateway("sso_initiate_missing_url")
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# Clear stale approval-grant — defends against cross-tab/back-button mixing.
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resp = redirect(url, code=302)
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resp.set_cookie(**approval_grant_cleared_cookie_kwargs())
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return resp
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@bp.route("/oauth/device/sso-complete", methods=["GET"])
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@enterprise_only
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def sso_complete():
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blob = request.args.get("sso_assertion")
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if not blob:
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raise BadRequest("sso_assertion required")
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keyset = jws.KeySet.from_shared_secret()
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try:
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claims = jws.verify(keyset, blob, expected_aud=jws.AUD_EXT_SUBJECT_ASSERTION)
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except jws.VerifyError as e:
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logger.warning("sso-complete: rejected assertion: %s", e)
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raise BadRequest("invalid_sso_assertion") from e
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if not consume_sso_assertion_nonce(redis_client, claims.get("nonce", "")):
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raise BadRequest("invalid_sso_assertion")
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user_code = (claims.get("user_code") or "").strip().upper()
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store = DeviceFlowRedis(redis_client)
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found = store.load_by_user_code(user_code)
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if found is None:
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raise Conflict("user_code_not_pending")
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_, state = found
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if state.status is not DeviceFlowStatus.PENDING:
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raise Conflict("user_code_not_pending")
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iss = request.host_url.rstrip("/")
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cookie_value, _ = mint_approval_grant(
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keyset=keyset,
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iss=iss,
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subject_email=claims["email"],
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subject_issuer=claims["issuer"],
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user_code=user_code,
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)
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resp = redirect("/device?sso_verified=1", code=302)
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resp.set_cookie(**approval_grant_cookie_kwargs(cookie_value))
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return resp
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@bp.route("/oauth/device/approval-context", methods=["GET"])
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@enterprise_only
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def approval_context():
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token = request.cookies.get(APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_NAME)
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if not token:
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raise Unauthorized("no_session")
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keyset = jws.KeySet.from_shared_secret()
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try:
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claims = verify_approval_grant(keyset, token)
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except jws.VerifyError as e:
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logger.warning("approval-context: bad cookie: %s", e)
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raise Unauthorized("no_session") from e
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return jsonify(
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{
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"subject_email": claims.subject_email,
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"subject_issuer": claims.subject_issuer,
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"user_code": claims.user_code,
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"csrf_token": claims.csrf_token,
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"expires_at": claims.expires_at.isoformat(),
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}
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), 200
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@bp.route("/oauth/device/approve-external", methods=["POST"])
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@enterprise_only
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def approve_external():
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token = request.cookies.get(APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_NAME)
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if not token:
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raise Unauthorized("invalid_session")
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keyset = jws.KeySet.from_shared_secret()
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try:
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claims: ApprovalGrantClaims = verify_approval_grant(keyset, token)
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except jws.VerifyError as e:
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logger.warning("approve-external: bad cookie: %s", e)
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raise Unauthorized("invalid_session") from e
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enforce(LIMIT_APPROVE_EXT_PER_EMAIL, key=f"subject:{claims.subject_email}")
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csrf_header = request.headers.get("X-CSRF-Token", "")
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if not csrf_header or csrf_header != claims.csrf_token:
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raise Forbidden("csrf_mismatch")
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data = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
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body_user_code = (data.get("user_code") or "").strip().upper()
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if body_user_code != claims.user_code:
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raise BadRequest("user_code_mismatch")
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store = DeviceFlowRedis(redis_client)
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found = store.load_by_user_code(claims.user_code)
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if found is None:
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raise NotFound("user_code_not_pending")
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device_code, state = found
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if state.status is not DeviceFlowStatus.PENDING:
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raise Conflict("user_code_not_pending")
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if not consume_approval_grant_nonce(redis_client, claims.nonce):
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raise Unauthorized("session_already_consumed")
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ttl_days = oauth_ttl_days(tenant_id=None)
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mint = mint_oauth_token(
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db.session,
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redis_client,
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subject_email=claims.subject_email,
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subject_issuer=claims.subject_issuer,
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account_id=None,
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client_id=state.client_id,
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device_label=state.device_label,
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prefix=PREFIX_OAUTH_EXTERNAL_SSO,
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ttl_days=ttl_days,
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)
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poll_payload = {
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"token": mint.token,
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"expires_at": mint.expires_at.isoformat(),
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"subject_type": SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO,
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"subject_email": claims.subject_email,
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"subject_issuer": claims.subject_issuer,
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"account": None,
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"workspaces": [],
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"default_workspace_id": None,
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"token_id": str(mint.token_id),
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}
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try:
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store.approve(
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device_code,
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subject_email=claims.subject_email,
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account_id=None,
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subject_issuer=claims.subject_issuer,
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minted_token=mint.token,
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token_id=str(mint.token_id),
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poll_payload=poll_payload,
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)
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except (StateNotFoundError, InvalidTransitionError) as e:
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logger.exception("approve-external: state transition raced")
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raise Conflict("state_lost") from e
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_emit_approve_external_audit(state, claims, mint)
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resp = make_response(jsonify({"status": "approved"}), 200)
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resp.set_cookie(**approval_grant_cleared_cookie_kwargs())
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return resp
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def _emit_approve_external_audit(state, claims, mint) -> None:
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logger.warning(
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"audit: oauth.device_flow_approved subject_type=%s subject_email=%s subject_issuer=%s token_id=%s",
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SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO,
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claims.subject_email,
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claims.subject_issuer,
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mint.token_id,
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extra={
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"audit": True,
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"event": "oauth.device_flow_approved",
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"subject_type": SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO,
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"subject_email": claims.subject_email,
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"subject_issuer": claims.subject_issuer,
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"token_id": str(mint.token_id),
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"client_id": state.client_id,
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"device_label": state.device_label,
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"scopes": ["apps:run"],
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"expires_at": mint.expires_at.isoformat(),
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},
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)
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