feat(acp): visual env editor with per-endpoint key suggestions

This commit is contained in:
matevip 2026-05-01 20:14:49 +08:00
parent 5e6764ecf1
commit 888200e1cd
4 changed files with 26 additions and 101 deletions

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@ -84,22 +84,6 @@ public class AcpRuntimeSupport {
* and the cost of a false positive (a slightly more verbose error
* banner) is much smaller than a false negative (user staring at a
* raw JSON-RPC blob).
*
* <p>Special case: a claude-code endpoint returning {@code 403
* "Request not allowed"} is almost always the keychain-hijack
* scenario rather than a wrong API key. The third-party
* {@code @zed-industries/claude-agent-acp} package wraps
* {@code @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk}, whose auth dispatcher
* checks the macOS keychain ({@code Claude Code-credentials}) /
* {@code ~/.claude/credentials.json} BEFORE the
* {@code ANTHROPIC_API_KEY} env var. So a host that's done
* {@code claude login} silently shadows whatever API key the user
* configured in the endpoint env, and Anthropic's API rejects the
* subscription OAuth token (first-party-only) with the very
* specific {@code "Request not allowed"} error string. We detect
* that exact combination and surface the keychain-clearing remedy
* instead of the generic "set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY" hint, which
* doesn't apply here.
*/
public String translateAuthError(AcpEndpointEntity endpoint, String originalMessage) {
if (originalMessage == null) return null;
@ -115,32 +99,8 @@ public class AcpRuntimeSupport {
|| lower.contains("authenticate");
if (!looksLikeAuth) return null;
String name = endpoint != null && endpoint.getName() != null ? endpoint.getName() : "(unknown)";
String slug = lower(name);
String command = endpoint != null ? lower(endpoint.getCommand()) : "";
// Keychain-hijack detection must come before the generic env-
// missing branch because both would superficially match.
boolean keychainHijack = lower.contains("request not allowed")
&& (slug.contains("claude") || command.contains("claude-agent-acp"));
if (keychainHijack) {
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
sb.append("ACP endpoint '").append(name).append("' upstream auth failed with ");
sb.append("'Request not allowed' — almost always means the host CLI's OAuth ");
sb.append("credentials are hijacking the SDK auth path. ");
sb.append("The Claude Agent SDK reads ~/.claude/ / macOS keychain BEFORE the ");
sb.append("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var, so the API key you configured here is ");
sb.append("never sent — Anthropic rejects the subscription OAuth token because ");
sb.append("third-party processes aren't allowed to use it. ");
sb.append("To fix: ");
sb.append("(macOS) run `claude logout`, or `security delete-generic-password ");
sb.append("-s \"Claude Code-credentials\"`; ");
sb.append("(Linux / Windows) delete ~/.claude/credentials.json. ");
sb.append("Then click Test connection again. Original: ").append(originalMessage);
return sb.toString();
}
String envVar = expectedAuthEnvVar(endpoint);
String name = endpoint != null && endpoint.getName() != null ? endpoint.getName() : "(unknown)";
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
sb.append("ACP endpoint '").append(name).append("' upstream auth failed. ");
sb.append("Most likely the endpoint env has no API key. ");

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@ -228,41 +228,25 @@ public class AgentBindingService {
* {@link #getEffectiveToolNames} allowlist completely.
*/
private static final Set<String> SYSTEM_LEVEL_TOOLS = Set.of(
// Structured memory primitives used by every agent regardless
// of skill bindings, otherwise the self-evolution path collapses
// (§11.3 / §11.4).
// Memory write/read primitives every agent needs these
// regardless of skill bindings, otherwise the self-evolution
// path collapses (§11.3 / §11.4).
"record_lesson",
"remember",
"remember_structured",
"recall_structured",
"forget_structured",
// Workspace memory file CRUD (PROFILE.md / MEMORY.md / SOUL.md /
// memory/YYYY-MM-DD.md). Prior versions whitelisted
// "read_workspace_file" / "write_workspace_file" /
// "list_workspace_files" those names match no @Tool bean; the
// actual function names carry the "_memory" segment, so the
// earlier carve-out was silently dead.
"list_workspace_memory_files",
"read_workspace_memory_file",
"write_workspace_memory_file",
"edit_workspace_memory_file",
// Workspace memory file CRUD (PROFILE.md / MEMORY.md / SOUL.md)
"read_workspace_file",
"write_workspace_file",
"list_workspace_files",
// Skill discovery / dispatch skills are docs, not callables;
// these helpers let the LLM read SKILL.md / run scripts.
"readSkillFile",
"runSkillScript",
"listSkillFiles",
"listAvailableSkills",
// Date / time prior whitelist had a fictional "datetime"; the
// real DateTimeTool exposes three separate methods.
"getCurrentDate",
"getCurrentDateTime",
"getCurrentTime",
// Multi-agent delegation prior whitelist had "delegate_agent",
// but DelegateAgentTool's @Tool methods are delegateToAgent /
// delegateParallel / listAvailableAgents. Same dead-name bug.
"delegateToAgent",
"delegateParallel",
"listAvailableAgents",
// Date/time + delegate fundamental cross-skill utilities
"datetime",
"delegate_agent",
// Document / media generation agent-wide capabilities, never
// declared inside any skill manifest. Pre-Phase-2b these were
// universally visible; the new gate silently strips them whenever
@ -276,26 +260,7 @@ public class AgentBindingService {
"renderDocxFromFiles",
"image_generate",
"music_generate",
"video_generate",
// Universal capabilities the global system prompts (SOUL.md /
// AGENTS.md / "Web Search Capability" / "File Reading Guidelines")
// explicitly tell the LLM exist. Pre-Phase-2b they were globally
// available; the new gate silently hid them on any agent with
// skills bound, so the prompt promises a tool the registry then
// refuses ("Tool not found: search"). Observed 2026-05-01 on the
// Code Reviewer agent the model called search got
// not-found gave up before ever reaching renderDocx.
"search",
"browser_use",
"read_file",
"write_file",
"edit_file",
"execute_shell_command",
"detect_file_type",
"extract_document_text",
"extract_pdf_text",
"extract_docx_text",
"readMateClawDoc"
"video_generate"
);
private ResolvedSkill findResolvedSkillById(Long skillId) {

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@ -1168,7 +1168,7 @@ export default {
openai: 'OpenAI API key (sk-…). Get one at https://platform.openai.com/api-keys',
dashscope: 'Aliyun DashScope key — same value as MateClaw .env DASHSCOPE_API_KEY',
google: 'Google AI Studio API key. Get one at https://aistudio.google.com/apikey',
claudeOauth: 'Heads up: claude-code OAuth login (the one stored in ~/.claude/) does NOT work here, and worse — the Claude Agent SDK reads it BEFORE this env var, silently shadowing your API key. If you have ever run `claude login` on this host, clear the keychain first: (macOS) `claude logout` or `security delete-generic-password -s "Claude Code-credentials"`; (Linux/Windows) delete ~/.claude/credentials.json. Then put a real API key (sk-ant-…) above. Or switch to qwen-code / opencode to reuse a CLI login.',
claudeOauth: 'Heads up: claude-code OAuth login (the one stored in ~/.claude/) does NOT work here. The third-party Zed wrapper uses the public Anthropic API, which only accepts a real API key. Get one at https://console.anthropic.com/settings/keys, or switch to qwen-code / opencode if you want to reuse a CLI login.',
},
},
modal: {

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@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ export default {
mcpConnections: 'MCP 连接',
toolsCatalog: '工具目录',
activity: '活动记录',
acpEndpoints: 'ACP 端点',
acpEndpoints: 'ACP Endpoints',
settingsGroup: '设置',
agents: '智能体',
security: '安全',
@ -1121,23 +1121,23 @@ export default {
},
acp: {
kicker: '外部 Agent',
title: 'ACP 端点',
title: 'ACP Endpoints',
desc: '通过 stdio 委派给外部编码 Agentcodex / claude-code / opencode / qwen-code。安装对应 CLI 后开启该入口。',
addEndpoint: '新增端点',
addEndpoint: '新增 Endpoint',
builtin: '内置',
test: '测试',
testing: '测试中…',
statusUnknown: '未测试',
empty: '暂无 ACP 端点。',
loadFailed: '加载 ACP 端点列表失败',
saveFailed: '保存端点失败',
empty: '暂无 ACP endpoint。',
loadFailed: '加载 ACP endpoint 列表失败',
saveFailed: '保存 endpoint 失败',
deleteTitle: '确认删除',
deleteConfirm: '确认删除 ACP 端点 "{name}"?内置端点不可删除。',
deleteFailed: '删除端点失败',
toggleFailed: '切换端点状态失败',
deleteConfirm: '确认删除 ACP endpoint "{name}"?内置 endpoint 不可删除。',
deleteFailed: '删除 endpoint 失败',
toggleFailed: '切换 endpoint 状态失败',
invalidJson: 'JSON 格式错误',
columns: {
name: '端点',
name: 'Endpoint',
command: '命令',
status: '最近一次测试',
enabled: '启用',
@ -1168,12 +1168,12 @@ export default {
openai: 'OpenAI API keysk-…)。申请: https://platform.openai.com/api-keys',
dashscope: '阿里云 DashScope key — 跟 MateClaw .env 里的 DASHSCOPE_API_KEY 同一个值',
google: 'Google AI Studio API key。申请: https://aistudio.google.com/apikey',
claudeOauth: '注意: claude-code 的 OAuth 登录(~/.claude/ 里那个)在这里不能用——更糟的是 Claude Agent SDK 会"优先读 OAuth、再读 API key",导致你下面填的 key 被静默忽略。如果你这台机器上跑过 `claude login`,先清钥匙串: (macOS) `claude logout` 或 `security delete-generic-password -s "Claude Code-credentials"`(Linux/Windows) 删 ~/.claude/credentials.json。然后再回来填真正的 API keysk-ant-…)。或者改用 qwen-code / opencode 复用各自 CLI 的本地登录态。',
claudeOauth: '注意: claude-code 的 OAuth 登录(~/.claude/ 里那个)在这里不能用。第三方 Zed wrapper 直接调 Anthropic 公开 API只认真正的 API key。请到 https://console.anthropic.com/settings/keys 申请;或改用 qwen-code / opencode 复用各自 CLI 的本地登录态。',
},
},
modal: {
newTitle: '新增 ACP 端点',
editTitle: '编辑 ACP 端点',
newTitle: '新增 ACP Endpoint',
editTitle: '编辑 ACP Endpoint',
},
},
mcp: {