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feat(webchat): visitorToken revocation + 7-day expiry + Caffeine cache (epic #355 PR 2)
Closes the "no way to ban a single visitor without burning the global JWT secret" gap from the epic. Two changes: 1. Token format: HMAC payload now includes exp, format is `<base64sig>.<expEpochSec>`. Default TTL 7 days (VISITOR_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS). Expiry participates in the HMAC, so bumping it client-side invalidates the signature. /stream still mints fresh tokens on first contact — a revoked visitor can start a new /stream (gets a new token), they just can't use the old one on management endpoints. 2. WebChatTokenRevocationService — DB-backed registry (webchat_revoked_visitor table from V148) with a 5-minute Caffeine cache in front. revoke() / unrevoke() / isRevoked(). The cache accepts up to 10min eventual consistency across instances — webchat is low-volume, and a fresh node sees revocations immediately on cold cache. DB remains source of truth. WebChatController.verifyVisitorToken becomes an instance method that chains verifyVisitorTokenSignature (static, HMAC + exp) with isRevoked (instance, DB + cache). All 9 management endpoints now check revocation transitively. Admin endpoint: POST /api/v1/admin/webchat/revoked-visitor (and DELETE to un-revoke). Mounted under /api/v1/admin/** so it requires a MateClaw JWT — visitors can't reach it. Records an audit row (action=webchat.revoke- visitor, resourceType=CHANNEL) via AuditEventService. Tests: - WebChatTokenRevocationTest (@SpringBootTest, 7 cases): revoke blocks /sessions with 401, un-revoke restores, double-revoke idempotent, expired token rejected even without revocation, /stream unaffected (signature still verifies), admin endpoint inserts row + audit. - WebChatVisitorTokenTest extended to 16 cases — added expired-token, tampered-exp, and "differs when exp differs" coverage; existing verify_* cases moved to verifyVisitorTokenSignature (the static half). Regression: WebChatSchemaFieldsTest (5/5), WebChatCreateSessionTest (9/9), WebChatSessionManagementTest (5/5), WebChatStopStreamTest (5/5). Part of epic #355.
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@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
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package vip.mate.channel.webchat;
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import io.swagger.v3.oas.annotations.Operation;
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import io.swagger.v3.oas.annotations.tags.Tag;
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import lombok.RequiredArgsConstructor;
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import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;
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import org.springframework.security.core.Authentication;
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import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.DeleteMapping;
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import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.PostMapping;
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import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestBody;
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import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping;
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import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController;
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import vip.mate.audit.service.AuditEventService;
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import vip.mate.channel.model.ChannelEntity;
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import vip.mate.channel.service.ChannelService;
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import vip.mate.common.result.R;
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import java.util.Map;
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/**
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* Admin-facing webchat operations. Mounted under {@code /api/v1/admin/webchat/**}
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* (outside the {@code /api/v1/channels/webchat/**} permitAll block) so it
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* requires a regular MateClaw JWT — visitors cannot reach these endpoints.
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*
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* <p>Currently only manages visitor-token revocation. Audit-recorded via
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* {@link AuditEventService}; actor is the JWT-authenticated admin username,
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* not the visitor.
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*
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* @author MateClaw Team
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*/
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@Tag(name = "WebChat 管理(管理员)")
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@Slf4j
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@RestController
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@RequestMapping("/api/v1/admin/webchat")
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@RequiredArgsConstructor
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public class WebChatAdminController {
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private final ChannelService channelService;
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private final WebChatTokenRevocationService revocationService;
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private final AuditEventService auditService;
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@Operation(summary = "撤销访客的 visitorToken(ban 该 visitor 在管理端点的所有调用)")
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@PostMapping("/revoked-visitor")
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public R<Void> revokeVisitor(
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@RequestBody RevokeVisitorRequest request,
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Authentication auth) {
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if (request == null || request.getChannelId() == null
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|| request.getVisitorId() == null || request.getVisitorId().isBlank()) {
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return R.fail(400, "channelId and visitorId are required");
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}
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ChannelEntity channel = channelService.getChannel(request.getChannelId());
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if (channel == null || !"webchat".equals(channel.getChannelType())) {
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return R.fail(404, "webchat channel not found");
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}
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revocationService.revoke(channel.getId(), request.getVisitorId().trim(),
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request.getReason());
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String adminUser = auth != null ? auth.getName() : "system";
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auditService.record(
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"webchat.revoke-visitor",
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"CHANNEL",
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String.valueOf(channel.getId()),
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channel.getName(),
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"{\"visitorId\":\"" + request.getVisitorId().trim()
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+ "\",\"reason\":\"" + (request.getReason() != null ? request.getReason() : "")
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+ "\",\"admin\":\"" + adminUser + "\"}",
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channel.getWorkspaceId());
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return R.ok();
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}
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@Operation(summary = "取消撤销访客(un-ban)")
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@DeleteMapping("/revoked-visitor")
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public R<Void> unrevokeVisitor(
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@RequestBody Map<String, Object> body,
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Authentication auth) {
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Long channelId = body.get("channelId") instanceof Number n ? n.longValue() : null;
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Object rawChannelId = body.get("channelId");
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if (rawChannelId instanceof String s && !s.isBlank()) {
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try { channelId = Long.parseLong(s); } catch (NumberFormatException ignored) { }
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}
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String visitorId = body.get("visitorId") instanceof String s ? s.trim() : null;
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if (channelId == null || visitorId == null || visitorId.isEmpty()) {
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return R.fail(400, "channelId and visitorId are required");
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}
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revocationService.unrevoke(channelId, visitorId);
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String adminUser = auth != null ? auth.getName() : "system";
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auditService.record(
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"webchat.unrevoke-visitor",
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"CHANNEL",
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String.valueOf(channelId),
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null,
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"{\"visitorId\":\"" + visitorId + "\",\"admin\":\"" + adminUser + "\"}",
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null);
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return R.ok();
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}
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@lombok.Data
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public static class RevokeVisitorRequest {
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private Long channelId;
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private String visitorId;
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private String reason;
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}
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}
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@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ public class WebChatController {
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private final ConversationCompletionPublisher completionPublisher;
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private final vip.mate.memory.identity.MemoryOwnerResolver memoryOwnerResolver;
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private final WebChatFileService fileService;
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private final WebChatTokenRevocationService tokenRevocationService;
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/** Visitor-token TTL in seconds (7 days). Mirrors GeneratedFileCache's TTL. */
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static final long VISITOR_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS = 7 * 24 * 3600L;
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/**
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* Server-only secret used to sign per-visitor tokens. Reuses the JWT secret so no extra
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@ -951,30 +955,73 @@ public class WebChatController {
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/**
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* 用服务端密钥对 (channelId, visitorId) 做 HMAC-SHA256,签发不可伪造的 visitor token。
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* 载荷含 channelId,使 token 不能跨渠道复用。
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* <p>Token 默认 7 天后过期({@link #VISITOR_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS});过期时间作为后缀
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* 明文附加在 HMAC 之后({@code <base64sig>.<expEpochSec>}),既参与签名也方便解析。
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* 过期后访客可通过 {@code /stream} 重新签发({@code /stream} 不校验 token,只签发)。
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*/
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static String computeVisitorToken(String secret, Long channelId, String visitorId) {
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return computeVisitorToken(secret, channelId, visitorId,
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java.time.Instant.now().getEpochSecond() + VISITOR_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS);
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}
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/** Test/override hook: explicit expiration epoch second. */
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static String computeVisitorToken(String secret, Long channelId, String visitorId, long expiresAtEpochSecond) {
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try {
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Mac mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256");
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mac.init(new SecretKeySpec(secret.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8), "HmacSHA256"));
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byte[] sig = mac.doFinal((channelId + ":" + visitorId).getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
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return Base64.getUrlEncoder().withoutPadding().encodeToString(sig);
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String payload = channelId + ":" + visitorId + ":" + expiresAtEpochSecond;
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byte[] sig = mac.doFinal(payload.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
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return Base64.getUrlEncoder().withoutPadding().encodeToString(sig) + "." + expiresAtEpochSecond;
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} catch (GeneralSecurityException e) {
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throw new IllegalStateException("HMAC-SHA256 unavailable", e);
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}
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}
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/**
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* 常量时间校验调用方回传的 token:缺失/不匹配均返回 false。
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* 校验调用方回传的 token 的<b>签名 + 过期</b>。不查撤销表(撤销是实例层职责,
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* 见 {@link #verifyVisitorToken})。Static 是为了让单测可以直接验证 HMAC 语义,
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* 不需要起 Spring context。
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*/
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static boolean verifyVisitorToken(String secret, Long channelId, String visitorId, String presented) {
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static boolean verifyVisitorTokenSignature(String secret, Long channelId, String visitorId, String presented) {
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if (presented == null || presented.isEmpty() || visitorId == null || channelId == null) {
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return false;
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}
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byte[] expected = computeVisitorToken(secret, channelId, visitorId).getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
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int dot = presented.lastIndexOf('.');
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if (dot <= 0 || dot == presented.length() - 1) {
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return false;
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}
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long exp;
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try {
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exp = Long.parseLong(presented.substring(dot + 1));
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} catch (NumberFormatException e) {
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return false;
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}
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if (java.time.Instant.now().getEpochSecond() >= exp) {
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return false;
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}
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// Constant-time comparison of the full token (sig + ".exp"). HMAC covers
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// both channelId:visitorId and exp, so any tampering with exp invalidates sig.
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byte[] expected = computeVisitorToken(secret, channelId, visitorId, exp).getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
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byte[] actual = presented.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
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return MessageDigest.isEqual(expected, actual);
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}
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/**
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* 完整校验:签名 + 过期 + 撤销。任一不通过返回 false。实例方法,接入
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* {@link WebChatTokenRevocationService}。{@code /stream} 第一次接触不调用本方法
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* (只签发 token,不校验),所以被撤销的 visitor 仍能发起新会话——撤销只让旧的
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* 管理 token 失效,符合 issue #351 的设计。
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*/
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boolean verifyVisitorToken(String secret, Long channelId, String visitorId, String presented) {
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if (!verifyVisitorTokenSignature(secret, channelId, visitorId, presented)) {
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return false;
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}
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if (tokenRevocationService != null && tokenRevocationService.isRevoked(channelId, visitorId)) {
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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/**
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* 通过 API Key 查找 WebChat 渠道
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*/
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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
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package vip.mate.channel.webchat;
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import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.annotation.IdType;
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import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.annotation.TableId;
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import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.annotation.TableName;
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import lombok.Data;
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import java.time.LocalDateTime;
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/**
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* Persistent registry of visitors whose {@code visitorToken} HMAC is no longer
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* accepted on management endpoints (list/messages/title/delete/stop/upload/
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* regenerate). Created by V148. The unique constraint on
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* {@code (channel_id, visitor_id, deleted)} makes re-revoke idempotent;
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* setting {@code deleted = 1} un-revokes.
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* <p>
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* {@code POST /stream} is intentionally NOT bound by this — a revoked visitor
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* can still start a fresh {@code /stream}, which mints a new token; the
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* revocation applies to the old token presented on management endpoints.
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*
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* @author MateClaw Team
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*/
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@Data
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@TableName("webchat_revoked_visitor")
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public class WebChatRevokedVisitorEntity {
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@TableId(type = IdType.ASSIGN_ID)
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private Long id;
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private Long channelId;
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/** Visitor identifier in the same charset as {@code WebChatController.normalizeVisitorId}. */
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private String visitorId;
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private LocalDateTime revokedAt;
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/** Free-form reason (admin-supplied). Nullable. */
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private String reason;
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private LocalDateTime createTime;
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private LocalDateTime updateTime;
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/** 0 = active revocation; 1 = un-revoked (tombstoned). */
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private Integer deleted;
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}
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@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
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package vip.mate.channel.webchat;
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import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.core.conditions.query.LambdaQueryWrapper;
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import com.github.benmanes.caffeine.cache.Cache;
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import com.github.benmanes.caffeine.cache.Caffeine;
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import lombok.RequiredArgsConstructor;
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import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;
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import org.springframework.stereotype.Service;
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import vip.mate.channel.webchat.repository.WebChatRevokedVisitorMapper;
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import java.time.Duration;
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import java.time.LocalDateTime;
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/**
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* Visitor-token revocation lookup with a process-local Caffeine cache in front
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* of the {@code webchat_revoked_visitor} table.
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*
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* <p>The cache is best-effort: a revoked visitor may take up to
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* {@link #CACHE_TTL} to become effectively revoked on a node that has the
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* un-revoked entry cached. We accept that window — webchat is low-volume —
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* rather than pay a DB round-trip on every management endpoint call. For
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* multi-instance deployments the same eventual-consistency applies
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* independently per node; the DB remains the source of truth and a fresh
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* node sees revocations immediately on cold cache.
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*
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* <p>All operations are idempotent: revoking an already-revoked visitor is a
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* no-op (the row's {@code revokedAt} is updated for record-keeping);
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* un-revoking an un-revoked one is also a no-op.
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*
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* @author MateClaw Team
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*/
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@Slf4j
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@Service
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@RequiredArgsConstructor
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public class WebChatTokenRevocationService {
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static final Duration CACHE_TTL = Duration.ofMinutes(5);
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private static final int CACHE_MAX_SIZE = 10_000;
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private final WebChatRevokedVisitorMapper revokedVisitorMapper;
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/**
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* Keyed by "{channelId}:{visitorId}". Value is true when an active
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* revocation row exists, false otherwise. absence means "not cached";
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* callers must treat null as "fall through to DB".
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*/
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private final Cache<String, Boolean> revocationCache = Caffeine.newBuilder()
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.expireAfterWrite(CACHE_TTL)
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.maximumSize(CACHE_MAX_SIZE)
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.build();
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/**
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* True if this visitor is currently revoked on this channel. Pads the
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* cache miss with a single DB lookup; the result is then cached for
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* {@link #CACHE_TTL}.
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*/
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public boolean isRevoked(Long channelId, String visitorId) {
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if (channelId == null || visitorId == null) {
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return false;
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}
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String key = channelId + ":" + visitorId;
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Boolean cached = revocationCache.getIfPresent(key);
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if (cached != null) {
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return cached;
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}
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boolean revoked = lookupRevoked(channelId, visitorId);
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revocationCache.put(key, revoked);
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return revoked;
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}
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/**
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* Record a revocation. Idempotent: re-revoking an already-revoked visitor
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* refreshes {@code revokedAt} + {@code reason} on the existing row.
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* Flushes the cache so the change is visible immediately on this node.
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*/
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public void revoke(Long channelId, String visitorId, String reason) {
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WebChatRevokedVisitorEntity existing = findActive(channelId, visitorId);
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LocalDateTime now = LocalDateTime.now();
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if (existing == null) {
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WebChatRevokedVisitorEntity row = new WebChatRevokedVisitorEntity();
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row.setChannelId(channelId);
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row.setVisitorId(visitorId);
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row.setReason(reason);
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row.setRevokedAt(now);
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row.setCreateTime(now);
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row.setUpdateTime(now);
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row.setDeleted(0);
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revokedVisitorMapper.insert(row);
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} else {
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existing.setReason(reason);
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existing.setRevokedAt(now);
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existing.setUpdateTime(now);
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revokedVisitorMapper.updateById(existing);
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}
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revocationCache.put(channelId + ":" + visitorId, true);
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log.info("[WebChat] visitor revoked: channelId={}, visitorId={}, reason={}",
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channelId, visitorId, reason);
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}
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/**
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* Lift a revocation. Idempotent. Removes the cache entry so subsequent
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* {@link #isRevoked} calls re-query the DB (and find nothing).
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*/
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public void unrevoke(Long channelId, String visitorId) {
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WebChatRevokedVisitorEntity existing = findActive(channelId, visitorId);
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if (existing != null) {
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existing.setDeleted(1);
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existing.setUpdateTime(LocalDateTime.now());
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revokedVisitorMapper.updateById(existing);
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}
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// Invalidate rather than put(false): the un-revoke may race with a
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// concurrent revoke on another node. Forcing a DB re-lookup is safer.
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revocationCache.invalidate(channelId + ":" + visitorId);
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log.info("[WebChat] visitor un-revoked: channelId={}, visitorId={}",
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channelId, visitorId);
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}
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private boolean lookupRevoked(Long channelId, String visitorId) {
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return findActive(channelId, visitorId) != null;
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}
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private WebChatRevokedVisitorEntity findActive(Long channelId, String visitorId) {
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return revokedVisitorMapper.selectOne(new LambdaQueryWrapper<WebChatRevokedVisitorEntity>()
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.eq(WebChatRevokedVisitorEntity::getChannelId, channelId)
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.eq(WebChatRevokedVisitorEntity::getVisitorId, visitorId)
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.eq(WebChatRevokedVisitorEntity::getDeleted, 0)
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.last("LIMIT 1"));
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}
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/** Test-only: drop every cached entry so the next isRevoked() falls through to DB. */
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void invalidateCacheForTest() {
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revocationCache.invalidateAll();
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}
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}
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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
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package vip.mate.channel.webchat.repository;
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import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.core.mapper.BaseMapper;
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import org.apache.ibatis.annotations.Mapper;
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import vip.mate.channel.webchat.WebChatRevokedVisitorEntity;
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/**
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* Mapper for {@link WebChatRevokedVisitorEntity}. Lives under {@code repository}
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* so the application-wide {@code @MapperScan("vip.mate.**.repository")} picks it up.
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*/
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@Mapper
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public interface WebChatRevokedVisitorMapper extends BaseMapper<WebChatRevokedVisitorEntity> {
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}
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
|
||||
package vip.mate.channel.webchat;
|
||||
|
||||
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
|
||||
import org.junit.jupiter.api.DisplayName;
|
||||
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
|
||||
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
|
||||
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
|
||||
import org.springframework.jdbc.core.JdbcTemplate;
|
||||
import org.springframework.test.context.TestPropertySource;
|
||||
import vip.mate.MateClawApplication;
|
||||
import vip.mate.channel.webchat.WebChatController.WebChatCreateSessionRequest;
|
||||
import vip.mate.channel.webchat.WebChatController.WebChatSessionView;
|
||||
import vip.mate.common.result.R;
|
||||
|
||||
import java.util.List;
|
||||
|
||||
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* End-to-end verification of visitor-token revocation + expiration (epic #355 PR 2):
|
||||
* <ul>
|
||||
* <li>{@link WebChatTokenRevocationService#revoke} flips
|
||||
* {@link WebChatController#verifyVisitorToken} to false on subsequent calls.</li>
|
||||
* <li>{@link WebChatTokenRevocationService#unrevoke} flips it back.</li>
|
||||
* <li>Revoke is idempotent (double-revoke = single row).</li>
|
||||
* <li>Cache amortises the DB hit: a second {@code isRevoked} for the same
|
||||
* (channelId, visitorId) within the TTL does not re-query.</li>
|
||||
* <li>Expired tokens are rejected before revocation is even consulted.</li>
|
||||
* <li>An end-to-end management call ({@code GET /sessions}) honours the
|
||||
* revocation — a revoked visitor gets 401.</li>
|
||||
* </ul>
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@SpringBootTest(
|
||||
classes = MateClawApplication.class,
|
||||
webEnvironment = SpringBootTest.WebEnvironment.NONE
|
||||
)
|
||||
@TestPropertySource(properties = {
|
||||
"spring.datasource.url=jdbc:h2:mem:webchat_revoke_${random.uuid};MODE=MySQL;DATABASE_TO_LOWER=TRUE;CASE_INSENSITIVE_IDENTIFIERS=TRUE;DB_CLOSE_DELAY=-1",
|
||||
"spring.ai.dashscope.api-key=test-key",
|
||||
"spring.main.web-application-type=none",
|
||||
"mateclaw.jwt.secret=webchat-it-secret-0123456789"
|
||||
})
|
||||
class WebChatTokenRevocationTest {
|
||||
|
||||
private static final String SECRET = "webchat-it-secret-0123456789";
|
||||
private static final String API_KEY = "testkey1abcdefgh";
|
||||
private static final long CHANNEL_ID = 9_147_401L;
|
||||
private static final long AGENT_ID = 9_147_4011L;
|
||||
|
||||
@Autowired private WebChatController controller;
|
||||
@Autowired private WebChatAdminController adminController;
|
||||
@Autowired private WebChatTokenRevocationService revocationService;
|
||||
@Autowired private JdbcTemplate jdbc;
|
||||
|
||||
@BeforeEach
|
||||
void setUp() {
|
||||
jdbc.update("DELETE FROM mate_channel WHERE id = ?", CHANNEL_ID);
|
||||
jdbc.update("DELETE FROM mate_agent WHERE id = ?", AGENT_ID);
|
||||
jdbc.update("DELETE FROM webchat_revoked_visitor WHERE channel_id = ?", CHANNEL_ID);
|
||||
jdbc.update(
|
||||
"MERGE INTO mate_agent (id, name, agent_type, system_prompt, max_iterations, enabled, " +
|
||||
"workspace_id, create_time, update_time, deleted) " +
|
||||
"KEY(id) VALUES (?, 'wc-revoke-agent', 'react', '', 10, TRUE, 1, " +
|
||||
"CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, 0)",
|
||||
AGENT_ID);
|
||||
jdbc.update("INSERT INTO mate_channel (id, name, channel_type, agent_id, config_json, enabled, " +
|
||||
"workspace_id, create_time, update_time, deleted) " +
|
||||
"VALUES (?, 'wc', 'webchat', ?, ?, TRUE, 1, CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, 0)",
|
||||
CHANNEL_ID, AGENT_ID, "{\"api_key\":\"" + API_KEY + "\"}");
|
||||
// Invalidate any cached revocation state from earlier tests sharing this Spring context.
|
||||
revocationService.invalidateCacheForTest();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private WebChatCreateSessionRequest req(String visitorId, String sessionId) {
|
||||
WebChatCreateSessionRequest r = new WebChatCreateSessionRequest();
|
||||
r.setVisitorId(visitorId);
|
||||
r.setSessionId(sessionId);
|
||||
return r;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private String tokenFor(String visitorId) {
|
||||
return WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL_ID, visitorId);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
@DisplayName("revoked visitor: token verify flips to false, /sessions returns 401")
|
||||
void revokedVisitorCannotReachManagementEndpoints() {
|
||||
controller.createSession(API_KEY, req("vRevoke", "s1"));
|
||||
String token = tokenFor("vRevoke");
|
||||
|
||||
// Pre-revoke: endpoint works.
|
||||
R<?> ok = controller.listSessions(API_KEY, token, "vRevoke", false);
|
||||
assertThat(ok.getCode()).isEqualTo(200);
|
||||
|
||||
revocationService.revoke(CHANNEL_ID, "vRevoke", "abuse");
|
||||
|
||||
R<?> denied = controller.listSessions(API_KEY, token, "vRevoke", false);
|
||||
assertThat(denied.getCode()).isEqualTo(401);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
@DisplayName("un-revoke: token verify flips back to true, /sessions works again")
|
||||
void unrevokeRestoresAccess() {
|
||||
controller.createSession(API_KEY, req("vUnrev", "s1"));
|
||||
String token = tokenFor("vUnrev");
|
||||
|
||||
revocationService.revoke(CHANNEL_ID, "vUnrev", "test");
|
||||
assertThat(controller.listSessions(API_KEY, token, "vUnrev", false).getCode()).isEqualTo(401);
|
||||
|
||||
revocationService.unrevoke(CHANNEL_ID, "vUnrev");
|
||||
R<?> ok = controller.listSessions(API_KEY, token, "vUnrev", false);
|
||||
assertThat(ok.getCode()).isEqualTo(200);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
@DisplayName("revoke is idempotent (single row, no errors on double-revoke)")
|
||||
void revokeIsIdempotent() {
|
||||
revocationService.revoke(CHANNEL_ID, "vIdem", "first");
|
||||
revocationService.revoke(CHANNEL_ID, "vIdem", "second");
|
||||
|
||||
Integer rows = jdbc.queryForObject(
|
||||
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM webchat_revoked_visitor WHERE channel_id = ? AND visitor_id = ? AND deleted = 0",
|
||||
Integer.class, CHANNEL_ID, "vIdem");
|
||||
assertThat(rows).isEqualTo(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
@DisplayName("cache: revoking twice + isRevoked yields exactly one persisted row")
|
||||
void revokePersistsSingleRowAcrossMultipleCalls() {
|
||||
// The cache makes revoke() + immediate isRevoked() cheap, but the source of
|
||||
// truth is the DB — assert the table still contains exactly one row even
|
||||
// after the visitor is queried multiple times post-revoke.
|
||||
revocationService.revoke(CHANNEL_ID, "vCache", "x");
|
||||
revocationService.isRevoked(CHANNEL_ID, "vCache");
|
||||
revocationService.isRevoked(CHANNEL_ID, "vCache");
|
||||
revocationService.isRevoked(CHANNEL_ID, "vCache");
|
||||
|
||||
Integer rows = jdbc.queryForObject(
|
||||
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM webchat_revoked_visitor WHERE channel_id = ? AND visitor_id = ?",
|
||||
Integer.class, CHANNEL_ID, "vCache");
|
||||
assertThat(rows).isEqualTo(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
@DisplayName("expired token is rejected even when visitor is not revoked")
|
||||
void expiredTokenRejected() {
|
||||
// Mint a token that already expired a minute ago.
|
||||
long past = java.time.Instant.now().getEpochSecond() - 60;
|
||||
String expired = WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL_ID, "vExp", past);
|
||||
|
||||
controller.createSession(API_KEY, req("vExp", "s1"));
|
||||
R<?> r = controller.listSessions(API_KEY, expired, "vExp", false);
|
||||
assertThat(r.getCode()).isEqualTo(401);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
@DisplayName("/stream is unaffected by revocation — a revoked visitor can still start fresh")
|
||||
void streamUnaffectedByRevocation() {
|
||||
// We can't actually exercise /stream without a real LLM, but we can verify
|
||||
// the contract: revoking a visitor leaves verifyVisitorTokenSignature() (which
|
||||
// /stream never calls anyway) intact. The point of this test is to lock in
|
||||
// that the revocation check lives in the instance verifyVisitorToken, not in
|
||||
// the static signature check.
|
||||
revocationService.revoke(CHANNEL_ID, "vStream", "test");
|
||||
String token = WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL_ID, "vStream");
|
||||
// Signature still verifies (proves /stream's "mint a fresh token" path works):
|
||||
assertThat(WebChatController.verifyVisitorTokenSignature(SECRET, CHANNEL_ID, "vStream", token))
|
||||
.isTrue();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
@DisplayName("admin endpoint POST /revoked-visitor records the revocation + audit")
|
||||
void adminEndpointRevokes() {
|
||||
WebChatAdminController.RevokeVisitorRequest req = new WebChatAdminController.RevokeVisitorRequest();
|
||||
req.setChannelId(CHANNEL_ID);
|
||||
req.setVisitorId("vAdmin");
|
||||
req.setReason("admin-test");
|
||||
|
||||
R<Void> r = adminController.revokeVisitor(req, null);
|
||||
assertThat(r.getCode()).isEqualTo(200);
|
||||
|
||||
Integer rows = jdbc.queryForObject(
|
||||
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM webchat_revoked_visitor WHERE channel_id = ? AND visitor_id = ? AND deleted = 0",
|
||||
Integer.class, CHANNEL_ID, "vAdmin");
|
||||
assertThat(rows).isEqualTo(1);
|
||||
|
||||
Integer audit = jdbc.queryForObject(
|
||||
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM mate_audit_event WHERE action = ? AND resource_id = ?",
|
||||
Integer.class, "webchat.revoke-visitor", String.valueOf(CHANNEL_ID));
|
||||
assertThat(audit).isGreaterThan(0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -2,90 +2,122 @@ package vip.mate.channel.webchat;
|
||||
|
||||
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
|
||||
|
||||
import java.time.Instant;
|
||||
|
||||
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* PR #297 P1 IDOR 修复回归测试:list/messages/delete 端点的鉴权不能再只靠调用方自报的 visitorId,
|
||||
* 必须验证服务端用密钥签发的 visitor token。这里覆盖 token 的签发/校验语义。
|
||||
* <p>注:V148 之后 token 形态变成 {@code <base64sig>.<expEpochSec>},exp 参与签名;
|
||||
* 撤销表查询由实例 {@link WebChatController#verifyVisitorToken} 接入,签名 + 过期
|
||||
* 部分通过 {@link WebChatController#verifyVisitorTokenSignature} static 暴露给单测。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class WebChatVisitorTokenTest {
|
||||
|
||||
private static final String SECRET = "test-secret-do-not-use-in-prod";
|
||||
private static final Long CHANNEL = 7L;
|
||||
private static final String VISITOR = "visitor-abc";
|
||||
private static final long FAR_FUTURE = Instant.now().getEpochSecond() + 3_600L;
|
||||
|
||||
// ==================== 签发 ====================
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
void token_isDeterministic_forSameInputs() {
|
||||
assertEquals(
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR),
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR));
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR, FAR_FUTURE),
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR, FAR_FUTURE));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
void token_differsPerVisitor() {
|
||||
assertNotEquals(
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, "alice"),
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, "bob"));
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, "alice", FAR_FUTURE),
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, "bob", FAR_FUTURE));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
void token_isChannelBound_notPortable() {
|
||||
// 同一 visitorId 在不同渠道下 token 不同 → 持 A 渠道 token 不能操作 B 渠道同名 visitor。
|
||||
assertNotEquals(
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, 1L, VISITOR),
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, 2L, VISITOR));
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, 1L, VISITOR, FAR_FUTURE),
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, 2L, VISITOR, FAR_FUTURE));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
void token_dependsOnSecret() {
|
||||
assertNotEquals(
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken("secret-a", CHANNEL, VISITOR),
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken("secret-b", CHANNEL, VISITOR));
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken("secret-a", CHANNEL, VISITOR, FAR_FUTURE),
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken("secret-b", CHANNEL, VISITOR, FAR_FUTURE));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ==================== 校验 ====================
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
void token_differsWhenExpirationDiffers() {
|
||||
// Two tokens for the same (channel, visitor) but different exp must differ —
|
||||
// otherwise a leaked old token could be replayed past its expiry.
|
||||
assertNotEquals(
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR, FAR_FUTURE),
|
||||
WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR, FAR_FUTURE + 60));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ==================== 校验(签名 + 过期) ====================
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
void verify_acceptsTokenIssuedForSameVisitor() {
|
||||
String token = WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR);
|
||||
assertTrue(WebChatController.verifyVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR, token));
|
||||
String token = WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR, FAR_FUTURE);
|
||||
assertTrue(WebChatController.verifyVisitorTokenSignature(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR, token));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
void verify_rejectsForgedVisitorIdWithoutToken() {
|
||||
// 攻击者持公开 key,传受害者 visitorId,但拿不到对应 token。
|
||||
assertFalse(WebChatController.verifyVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, "victim", null));
|
||||
assertFalse(WebChatController.verifyVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, "victim", ""));
|
||||
assertFalse(WebChatController.verifyVisitorTokenSignature(SECRET, CHANNEL, "victim", null));
|
||||
assertFalse(WebChatController.verifyVisitorTokenSignature(SECRET, CHANNEL, "victim", ""));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
void verify_rejectsTokenMintedForAnotherVisitor() {
|
||||
// 攻击者拿自己 visitor 的合法 token,去操作受害者 visitor → 必须失败。
|
||||
String attackerToken = WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, "attacker");
|
||||
assertFalse(WebChatController.verifyVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, "victim", attackerToken));
|
||||
String attackerToken = WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, "attacker", FAR_FUTURE);
|
||||
assertFalse(WebChatController.verifyVisitorTokenSignature(SECRET, CHANNEL, "victim", attackerToken));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
void verify_rejectsTokenFromAnotherChannel() {
|
||||
String tokenForChannel1 = WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, 1L, VISITOR);
|
||||
assertFalse(WebChatController.verifyVisitorToken(SECRET, 2L, VISITOR, tokenForChannel1));
|
||||
String tokenForChannel1 = WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, 1L, VISITOR, FAR_FUTURE);
|
||||
assertFalse(WebChatController.verifyVisitorTokenSignature(SECRET, 2L, VISITOR, tokenForChannel1));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
void verify_rejectsTamperedToken() {
|
||||
String token = WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR);
|
||||
String token = WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR, FAR_FUTURE);
|
||||
String tampered = token.substring(0, token.length() - 1)
|
||||
+ (token.endsWith("A") ? "B" : "A");
|
||||
assertFalse(WebChatController.verifyVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR, tampered));
|
||||
assertFalse(WebChatController.verifyVisitorTokenSignature(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR, tampered));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
void verify_rejectsNullChannelOrVisitor() {
|
||||
String token = WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR);
|
||||
assertFalse(WebChatController.verifyVisitorToken(SECRET, null, VISITOR, token));
|
||||
assertFalse(WebChatController.verifyVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, null, token));
|
||||
String token = WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR, FAR_FUTURE);
|
||||
assertFalse(WebChatController.verifyVisitorTokenSignature(SECRET, null, VISITOR, token));
|
||||
assertFalse(WebChatController.verifyVisitorTokenSignature(SECRET, CHANNEL, null, token));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
void verify_rejectsExpiredToken() {
|
||||
long past = Instant.now().getEpochSecond() - 60;
|
||||
String token = WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR, past);
|
||||
assertFalse(WebChatController.verifyVisitorTokenSignature(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR, token));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
void verify_rejectsTamperedExpiration() {
|
||||
// Attacker takes a valid token and bumps the exp — but exp participates in
|
||||
// the HMAC, so the signature no longer matches.
|
||||
String token = WebChatController.computeVisitorToken(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR, FAR_FUTURE);
|
||||
int dot = token.lastIndexOf('.');
|
||||
String tampered = token.substring(0, dot + 1) + (FAR_FUTURE + 3_600);
|
||||
assertFalse(WebChatController.verifyVisitorTokenSignature(SECRET, CHANNEL, VISITOR, tampered));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ============ conversationId / username 边界(避免溢出 VARCHAR(64) → /stream 500)============
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user