fix(guard): align tool guard rule names with runtime @Tool method names and add audit config

mateclaw-server/src/main/java/vip/mate/tool/builtin/ShellExecuteTool.java

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ public class ShellExecuteTool {
 
     @Tool(description = "在本地服务器上执行 Shell 命令。用于执行系统命令、查看文件、运行脚本等操作。"
             + "Windows 下使用 cmd.exe，Linux/macOS 下使用 /bin/sh。"
-            + "注意：每次执行都需要用户审批确认。返回包含 exitCode、stdout、stderr、timedOut 的结构化结果。")
+            + "危险操作（如 rm -rf、格式化磁盘等）会触发安全审批。返回包含 exitCode、stdout、stderr、timedOut 的结构化结果。")
     public String execute_shell_command(
             @ToolParam(description = "要执行的 Shell 命令") String command,
             @ToolParam(description = "超时秒数，默认 60 秒", required = false) Integer timeoutSeconds) {

mateclaw-server/src/main/java/vip/mate/tool/guard/config/ToolGuardSchemaMigration.java

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ public class ToolGuardSchemaMigration implements ApplicationRunner {
         createGuardRuleTable();
         createGuardConfigTable();
         createAuditLogTable();
+        migrateGuardConfigAuditColumns();
     }
 
     private void createGuardRuleTable() {
@@ -108,6 +109,16 @@ public class ToolGuardSchemaMigration implements ApplicationRunner {
         }
     }
 
+    /**
+     * 为 mate_tool_guard_config 补充审计配置列（向已有表兼容迁移）
+     */
+    private void migrateGuardConfigAuditColumns() {
+        safeExecute("ALTER TABLE mate_tool_guard_config ADD COLUMN audit_enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT TRUE");
+        safeExecute("ALTER TABLE mate_tool_guard_config ADD COLUMN audit_min_severity VARCHAR(16) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'INFO'");
+        safeExecute("ALTER TABLE mate_tool_guard_config ADD COLUMN audit_retention_days INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 90");
+        log.info("[ToolGuardSchemaMigration] audit columns migration done");
+    }
+
     private void safeExecute(String sql) {
         try {
             jdbcTemplate.execute(sql);

mateclaw-server/src/main/java/vip/mate/tool/guard/guardian/ShellCommandGuardian.java

@@ -186,6 +186,13 @@ public class ShellCommandGuardian implements ToolGuardGuardian {
                 "此命令可能被用于远程控制，请勿执行"));
 
         // === 高风险（HIGH）===
+        list.add(new ShellRule("SHELL_RM",
+                "(^|[;&|]|\\s)rm\\s",
+                GuardSeverity.HIGH, GuardCategory.COMMAND_INJECTION,
+                "rm 删除命令",
+                "检测到 rm 删除操作，可能导致文件永久丢失",
+                "请确认要删除的文件列表，考虑使用 trash 替代 rm"));
+
         list.add(new ShellRule("SHELL_RM_RF",
                 "rm\\s+-(rf|fr)",
                 GuardSeverity.HIGH, GuardCategory.COMMAND_INJECTION,

mateclaw-server/src/main/java/vip/mate/tool/guard/model/ToolGuardConfigEntity.java

@@ -22,6 +22,13 @@ public class ToolGuardConfigEntity {
     private Boolean fileGuardEnabled;
     private String sensitivePathsJson;
 
+    /** 审计日志总开关 */
+    private Boolean auditEnabled;
+    /** 最低记录等级（INFO/LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH/CRITICAL） */
+    private String auditMinSeverity;
+    /** 审计日志保留天数（0=永不清理） */
+    private Integer auditRetentionDays;
+
     @TableField(fill = FieldFill.INSERT)
     private LocalDateTime createTime;
 

mateclaw-server/src/main/java/vip/mate/tool/guard/service/ToolGuardAuditService.java

@@ -8,16 +8,20 @@ import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
 import lombok.RequiredArgsConstructor;
 import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;
 import org.springframework.scheduling.annotation.Async;
+import org.springframework.scheduling.annotation.Scheduled;
 import org.springframework.stereotype.Service;
 import vip.mate.tool.guard.model.*;
 import vip.mate.tool.guard.repository.ToolGuardAuditLogMapper;
 
+import java.time.LocalDateTime;
 import java.util.HashMap;
 import java.util.List;
 import java.util.Map;
 
 /**
  * 工具安全审计服务
+ * <p>
+ * 支持审计开关、最低记录等级过滤、过期日志自动清理。
  */
 @Slf4j
 @Service
@@ -26,13 +30,33 @@ public class ToolGuardAuditService {
 
     private final ToolGuardAuditLogMapper auditMapper;
     private final ObjectMapper objectMapper;
+    private final ToolGuardConfigService configService;
 
     /**
      * 异步记录审计日志
+     * <p>
+     * 受审计开关和最低等级过滤控制：
+     * <ul>
+     *   <li>auditEnabled=false → 不记录</li>
+     *   <li>maxSeverity 低于 auditMinSeverity → 不记录</li>
+     * </ul>
      */
     @Async
     public void record(ToolInvocationContext context, GuardEvaluation evaluation, String pendingId) {
         try {
+            // 审计开关检查
+            if (!configService.isAuditEnabled()) {
+                return;
+            }
+
+            // 等级过滤：无 finding 时 maxSeverity 为 null，视为 INFO 级
+            GuardSeverity minSeverity = configService.getAuditMinSeverity();
+            GuardSeverity actualSeverity = evaluation.maxSeverity() != null
+                    ? evaluation.maxSeverity() : GuardSeverity.INFO;
+            if (!actualSeverity.isAtLeast(minSeverity)) {
+                return;
+            }
+
             ToolGuardAuditLogEntity entity = new ToolGuardAuditLogEntity();
             entity.setConversationId(context.conversationId());
             entity.setAgentId(context.agentId());
@@ -99,6 +123,27 @@ public class ToolGuardAuditService {
         return stats;
     }
 
+    /**
+     * 定时清理过期审计日志（每天凌晨 3 点）
+     */
+    @Scheduled(cron = "0 0 3 * * ?")
+    public void cleanExpiredAuditLogs() {
+        try {
+            int days = configService.getAuditRetentionDays();
+            if (days <= 0) return;
+
+            LocalDateTime cutoff = LocalDateTime.now().minusDays(days);
+            int deleted = auditMapper.delete(
+                    new LambdaQueryWrapper<ToolGuardAuditLogEntity>()
+                            .lt(ToolGuardAuditLogEntity::getCreateTime, cutoff));
+            if (deleted > 0) {
+                log.info("[ToolGuardAudit] Cleaned {} expired records (older than {} days)", deleted, days);
+            }
+        } catch (Exception e) {
+            log.warn("[ToolGuardAudit] Failed to clean expired logs: {}", e.getMessage());
+        }
+    }
+
     private String serializeFindings(GuardEvaluation evaluation) {
         try {
             return objectMapper.writeValueAsString(evaluation.findingsToMapList());

mateclaw-server/src/main/java/vip/mate/tool/guard/service/ToolGuardConfigService.java

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ import org.springframework.stereotype.Service;
 import vip.mate.tool.guard.model.ToolGuardConfigEntity;
 import vip.mate.tool.guard.repository.ToolGuardConfigMapper;
 
+import vip.mate.tool.guard.model.GuardSeverity;
+
 import java.util.List;
 import java.util.Set;
 
@@ -51,6 +53,9 @@ public class ToolGuardConfigService {
         if (config.getDeniedToolsJson() != null) existing.setDeniedToolsJson(config.getDeniedToolsJson());
         if (config.getFileGuardEnabled() != null) existing.setFileGuardEnabled(config.getFileGuardEnabled());
         if (config.getSensitivePathsJson() != null) existing.setSensitivePathsJson(config.getSensitivePathsJson());
+        if (config.getAuditEnabled() != null) existing.setAuditEnabled(config.getAuditEnabled());
+        if (config.getAuditMinSeverity() != null) existing.setAuditMinSeverity(config.getAuditMinSeverity());
+        if (config.getAuditRetentionDays() != null) existing.setAuditRetentionDays(config.getAuditRetentionDays());
         configMapper.updateById(existing);
         // 通知 AgentService 刷新缓存（denied 工具列表变更需要重建 agent 的工具集）
         eventPublisher.publishEvent(new ToolGuardConfigChangedEvent(this));
@@ -90,6 +95,27 @@ public class ToolGuardConfigService {
         return parseJsonList(json);
     }
 
+    // ==================== 审计配置 ====================
+
+    public boolean isAuditEnabled() {
+        return Boolean.TRUE.equals(getConfig().getAuditEnabled());
+    }
+
+    public GuardSeverity getAuditMinSeverity() {
+        String s = getConfig().getAuditMinSeverity();
+        if (s == null || s.isBlank()) return GuardSeverity.INFO;
+        try {
+            return GuardSeverity.valueOf(s);
+        } catch (IllegalArgumentException e) {
+            return GuardSeverity.INFO;
+        }
+    }
+
+    public int getAuditRetentionDays() {
+        Integer days = getConfig().getAuditRetentionDays();
+        return days != null ? days : 90;
+    }
+
     // ==================== 内部方法 ====================
 
     private ToolGuardConfigEntity createDefaultConfig() {

mateclaw-server/src/main/java/vip/mate/tool/guard/service/ToolGuardRuleSeedService.java

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package vip.mate.tool.guard.service;
 
 import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.core.conditions.query.LambdaQueryWrapper;
+import com.baomidou.mybatisplus.core.conditions.update.LambdaUpdateWrapper;
 import lombok.RequiredArgsConstructor;
 import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;
 import org.springframework.boot.ApplicationArguments;
@@ -9,17 +10,23 @@ import org.springframework.core.annotation.Order;
 import org.springframework.stereotype.Component;
 import vip.mate.tool.guard.model.GuardCategory;
 import vip.mate.tool.guard.model.GuardSeverity;
+import vip.mate.tool.guard.model.ToolGuardConfigEntity;
 import vip.mate.tool.guard.model.ToolGuardRuleEntity;
+import vip.mate.tool.guard.repository.ToolGuardConfigMapper;
 import vip.mate.tool.guard.repository.ToolGuardRuleMapper;
 
-import java.util.ArrayList;
+import java.util.*;
-import java.util.List;
+import java.util.stream.Collectors;
 
 /**
  * 规则种子服务
  * <p>
- * 首次启动时将内置规则写入 DB。
+ * 启动时完成三项工作：
- * 已存在则跳过（通过 rule_id UNIQUE 约束）。
+ * <ol>
+ *   <li>迁移旧版工具名（类名 → @Tool 方法名）+ 清理旧 legacy 规则</li>
+ *   <li>按 rule_id 逐条 upsert 内置规则（不存在则插入，已存在则同步更新）</li>
+ *   <li>迁移 guardedToolsJson 中的旧工具名</li>
+ * </ol>
  */
 @Slf4j
 @Component
@@ -28,38 +35,176 @@ import java.util.List;
 public class ToolGuardRuleSeedService implements ApplicationRunner {
 
     private final ToolGuardRuleMapper ruleMapper;
+    private final ToolGuardConfigMapper configMapper;
+
+    /** 旧类名 → 新 @Tool 方法名 */
+    private static final Map<String, String> TOOL_NAME_RENAMES = Map.of(
+            "ShellExecuteTool", "execute_shell_command",
+            "WriteFileTool", "write_file",
+            "EditFileTool", "edit_file"
+    );
+
+    /** 旧 SQL 种子中的 legacy rule_id，已被 Java 种子的新规则完全覆盖 */
+    private static final Set<String> LEGACY_RULE_IDS = Set.of(
+            "write_file_any",
+            "edit_file_any",
+            "shell_rm_approval",
+            "shell_rm_rf_block",
+            "shell_write_system_file",
+            "shell_chmod_777"
+    );
 
     @Override
     public void run(ApplicationArguments args) {
+        migrateOldData();
         seedBuiltinRules();
     }
 
+    // ==================== 旧数据迁移 ====================
+
+    /**
+     * 将 DB 中旧版数据统一迁移：
+     * <ul>
+     *   <li>rule 表旧工具名（类名 → @Tool 方法名）</li>
+     *   <li>清理 legacy rule_id（旧 SQL 种子残留）</li>
+     *   <li>config 表 guardedToolsJson 中的旧工具名</li>
+     * </ul>
+     */
+    private void migrateOldData() {
+        try {
+            // 1. 迁移 rule 表旧工具名
+            for (var entry : TOOL_NAME_RENAMES.entrySet()) {
+                int updated = ruleMapper.update(null,
+                        new LambdaUpdateWrapper<ToolGuardRuleEntity>()
+                                .eq(ToolGuardRuleEntity::getToolName, entry.getKey())
+                                .set(ToolGuardRuleEntity::getToolName, entry.getValue()));
+                if (updated > 0) {
+                    log.info("[RuleSeed] Migrated {} rules: {} -> {}", updated, entry.getKey(), entry.getValue());
+                }
+            }
+
+            // 2. 清理旧 SQL 种子残留的 legacy 规则
+            cleanupLegacyRules();
+
+            // 3. 迁移 config 表 guardedToolsJson
+            migrateGuardedToolsJson();
+        } catch (Exception e) {
+            log.warn("[RuleSeed] Migration failed (table may not exist): {}", e.getMessage());
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * 删除旧 SQL 种子中残留的 legacy builtin 规则。
+     * 这些规则的 rule_id 与新 Java 种子不重叠，增量升级后会形成冗余重复。
+     */
+    private void cleanupLegacyRules() {
+        for (String legacyId : LEGACY_RULE_IDS) {
+            int deleted = ruleMapper.delete(
+                    new LambdaQueryWrapper<ToolGuardRuleEntity>()
+                            .eq(ToolGuardRuleEntity::getRuleId, legacyId)
+                            .eq(ToolGuardRuleEntity::getBuiltin, true));
+            if (deleted > 0) {
+                log.info("[RuleSeed] Removed legacy rule: {}", legacyId);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private void migrateGuardedToolsJson() {
+        try {
+            List<ToolGuardConfigEntity> configs = configMapper.selectList(null);
+            for (ToolGuardConfigEntity config : configs) {
+                String json = config.getGuardedToolsJson();
+                if (json == null || json.isBlank()) continue;
+
+                String updated = json;
+                for (var entry : TOOL_NAME_RENAMES.entrySet()) {
+                    updated = updated.replace("\"" + entry.getKey() + "\"", "\"" + entry.getValue() + "\"");
+                }
+                if (!updated.equals(json)) {
+                    config.setGuardedToolsJson(updated);
+                    configMapper.updateById(config);
+                    log.info("[RuleSeed] Migrated guardedToolsJson: {} -> {}", json, updated);
+                }
+            }
+        } catch (Exception e) {
+            log.debug("[RuleSeed] guardedToolsJson migration skipped: {}", e.getMessage());
+        }
+    }
+
+    // ==================== 规则种子 ====================
+
+    /**
+     * 按 rule_id 逐条 upsert 内置规则：
+     * <ul>
+     *   <li>不存在 → 插入</li>
+     *   <li>已存在 → 同步更新 pattern / severity / decision / priority / toolName 等字段</li>
+     * </ul>
+     * 这样后续版本修正了 regex 或 severity，已有部署也能在重启时自动拿到更新。
+     */
     void seedBuiltinRules() {
         try {
-            Long existingCount = ruleMapper.selectCount(
+            // 加载已有 builtin 规则（按 rule_id 索引）
+            List<ToolGuardRuleEntity> existingList = ruleMapper.selectList(
                     new LambdaQueryWrapper<ToolGuardRuleEntity>()
                             .eq(ToolGuardRuleEntity::getBuiltin, true));
-            if (existingCount > 0) {
+            Map<String, ToolGuardRuleEntity> existingMap = existingList.stream()
-                log.info("[RuleSeed] {} builtin rules already exist, skipping seed", existingCount);
+                    .collect(Collectors.toMap(ToolGuardRuleEntity::getRuleId, e -> e, (a, b) -> a));
-                return;
-            }
 
             List<ToolGuardRuleEntity> rules = buildBuiltinRules();
             int inserted = 0;
+            int updated = 0;
+            int unchanged = 0;
+
             for (ToolGuardRuleEntity rule : rules) {
-                try {
+                ToolGuardRuleEntity existing = existingMap.get(rule.getRuleId());
-                    ruleMapper.insert(rule);
+                if (existing == null) {
-                    inserted++;
+                    // 新规则 → 插入
-                } catch (Exception e) {
+                    try {
-                    log.debug("[RuleSeed] Rule {} already exists", rule.getRuleId());
+                        ruleMapper.insert(rule);
+                        inserted++;
+                    } catch (Exception e) {
+                        log.debug("[RuleSeed] Rule {} insert failed: {}", rule.getRuleId(), e.getMessage());
+                    }
+                } else if (needsUpdate(existing, rule)) {
+                    // 已存在但内容有变化 → 更新
+                    ruleMapper.update(null,
+                            new LambdaUpdateWrapper<ToolGuardRuleEntity>()
+                                    .eq(ToolGuardRuleEntity::getRuleId, rule.getRuleId())
+                                    .set(ToolGuardRuleEntity::getName, rule.getName())
+                                    .set(ToolGuardRuleEntity::getDescription, rule.getDescription())
+                                    .set(ToolGuardRuleEntity::getPattern, rule.getPattern())
+                                    .set(ToolGuardRuleEntity::getSeverity, rule.getSeverity())
+                                    .set(ToolGuardRuleEntity::getCategory, rule.getCategory())
+                                    .set(ToolGuardRuleEntity::getDecision, rule.getDecision())
+                                    .set(ToolGuardRuleEntity::getToolName, rule.getToolName())
+                                    .set(ToolGuardRuleEntity::getRemediation, rule.getRemediation())
+                                    .set(ToolGuardRuleEntity::getPriority, rule.getPriority()));
+                    updated++;
+                } else {
+                    unchanged++;
                 }
             }
-            log.info("[RuleSeed] Seeded {} builtin rules", inserted);
+            log.info("[RuleSeed] Builtin rules: {} inserted, {} updated, {} unchanged",
+                    inserted, updated, unchanged);
         } catch (Exception e) {
             log.warn("[RuleSeed] Failed to seed rules (table may not exist): {}", e.getMessage());
         }
     }
 
+    /**
+     * 判断已有 builtin 规则是否需要更新（任一核心字段有变化即需要）
+     */
+    private boolean needsUpdate(ToolGuardRuleEntity existing, ToolGuardRuleEntity expected) {
+        return !Objects.equals(existing.getPattern(), expected.getPattern())
+                || !Objects.equals(existing.getSeverity(), expected.getSeverity())
+                || !Objects.equals(existing.getCategory(), expected.getCategory())
+                || !Objects.equals(existing.getDecision(), expected.getDecision())
+                || !Objects.equals(existing.getToolName(), expected.getToolName())
+                || !Objects.equals(existing.getPriority(), expected.getPriority())
+                || !Objects.equals(existing.getName(), expected.getName())
+                || !Objects.equals(existing.getRemediation(), expected.getRemediation());
+    }
+
     private List<ToolGuardRuleEntity> buildBuiltinRules() {
         List<ToolGuardRuleEntity> rules = new ArrayList<>();
 
@@ -97,6 +242,10 @@ public class ToolGuardRuleSeedService implements ApplicationRunner {
                 "execute_shell_command", "此命令可能被用于远程控制", 200));
 
         // === HIGH Shell Rules ===
+        rules.add(rule("SHELL_RM", "rm 删除命令", "(^|[;&|]|\\s)rm\\s",
+                GuardSeverity.HIGH, GuardCategory.COMMAND_INJECTION, "NEEDS_APPROVAL",
+                "execute_shell_command", "请确认要删除的文件列表，考虑使用 trash 替代 rm", 150));
+
         rules.add(rule("SHELL_RM_RF", "递归强制删除", "rm\\s+-(rf|fr)",
                 GuardSeverity.HIGH, GuardCategory.COMMAND_INJECTION, "NEEDS_APPROVAL",
                 "execute_shell_command", "使用 rm -ri 或指定具体文件", 150));

mateclaw-server/src/main/resources/db/data-en.sql

@@ -1720,149 +1720,26 @@ VALUES (
 
 -- ==================== ToolGuard Default Config & Rule Seed Data ====================
 
--- Global security config (single row)
+-- Global security config (single row, insert only if not exists)
-MERGE INTO mate_tool_guard_config (id, enabled, guard_scope, guarded_tools_json, denied_tools_json,
+-- Note: tool names in guarded_tools_json must match @Tool method names (execute_shell_command / write_file / edit_file)
-    file_guard_enabled, sensitive_paths_json, create_time, update_time)
+-- Use SELECT + INSERT to avoid overwriting user-modified config on restart (H2 MERGE would overwrite all columns)
-KEY (id)
+INSERT INTO mate_tool_guard_config (id, enabled, guard_scope, guarded_tools_json, denied_tools_json,
-VALUES (
+    file_guard_enabled, sensitive_paths_json, audit_enabled, audit_min_severity, audit_retention_days,
+    create_time, update_time)
+SELECT
     1000000001,
     TRUE,
     'all',
-    '["WriteFileTool","EditFileTool","ShellExecuteTool"]',
+    '["write_file","edit_file","execute_shell_command"]',
     '[]',
     TRUE,
     '["/etc","/usr","/bin","/sbin","/boot","/sys","/proc","/dev"]',
+    TRUE, 'INFO', 90,
     NOW(), NOW()
-);
+FROM DUAL
+WHERE NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM mate_tool_guard_config WHERE id = 1000000001);
 
--- Security rule: WriteFileTool — any path write requires approval (HIGH)
+-- Security rules are managed by ToolGuardRuleSeedService (Java) as single source of truth.
-MERGE INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
+-- Removed 6 legacy SQL rules (rule_id: write_file_any, edit_file_any, shell_rm_approval,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
+-- shell_rm_rf_block, shell_write_system_file, shell_chmod_777).
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
+-- Their superset is registered in ToolGuardRuleSeedService.buildBuiltinRules() with correct tool names.
-KEY (id)
-VALUES (
-    1000300001,
-    'write_file_any',
-    'File write requires approval',
-    'Any file write operation requires user confirmation to prevent accidental overwrite of important files',
-    'WriteFileTool',
-    'path',
-    'file_write',
-    'HIGH',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '.+',
-    NULL,
-    'Please confirm write path and content are correct before allowing execution',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 10,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-);
-
--- Security rule: EditFileTool — any file edit requires approval (HIGH)
-MERGE INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-KEY (id)
-VALUES (
-    1000300002,
-    'edit_file_any',
-    'File edit requires approval',
-    'Any file content replacement operation requires user confirmation',
-    'EditFileTool',
-    'path',
-    'file_write',
-    'HIGH',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '.+',
-    NULL,
-    'Please confirm edit path and replacement content are correct before allowing execution',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 10,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-);
-
--- Security rule: ShellExecuteTool — delete commands require approval (HIGH)
-MERGE INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-KEY (id)
-VALUES (
-    1000300003,
-    'shell_rm_approval',
-    'rm command requires approval',
-    'rm / rmdir commands may cause permanent file loss, requires user confirmation',
-    'ShellExecuteTool',
-    'command',
-    'shell_execution',
-    'HIGH',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '(?i)(^|[;&|]|\s)rm\s',
-    NULL,
-    'Consider using trash command instead of rm, or confirm file list before allowing execution',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 20,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-);
-
--- Security rule: ShellExecuteTool — forced recursive delete blocked (CRITICAL)
-MERGE INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-KEY (id)
-VALUES (
-    1000300004,
-    'shell_rm_rf_block',
-    'rm -rf blocked',
-    'rm -rf forced recursive delete is extremely dangerous, blocked directly',
-    'ShellExecuteTool',
-    'command',
-    'shell_execution',
-    'CRITICAL',
-    'BLOCK',
-    '(?i)rm\s+(-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f[a-z]*|-[a-z]*f[a-z]*r[a-z]*)\s+(/|~|\$HOME|\*|\.\s*$)',
-    NULL,
-    'Absolutely forbidden to execute rm -rf on root directory, Home directory, or wildcards',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 5,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-);
-
--- Security rule: ShellExecuteTool — writing system config files requires approval (HIGH)
-MERGE INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-KEY (id)
-VALUES (
-    1000300005,
-    'shell_write_system_file',
-    'System file write requires approval',
-    'Writing to system directories like /etc or /usr via Shell requires user confirmation',
-    'ShellExecuteTool',
-    'command',
-    'shell_execution',
-    'HIGH',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '(?i)(>\s*|tee\s+|cp\s+.*\s+)(/etc/|/usr/|/bin/|/sbin/|/boot/)',
-    NULL,
-    'Please confirm the system file and content to modify before allowing execution',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 15,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-);
-
--- Security rule: ShellExecuteTool — chmod 777 requires approval (MEDIUM)
-MERGE INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-KEY (id)
-VALUES (
-    1000300006,
-    'shell_chmod_777',
-    'chmod 777 requires approval',
-    'chmod 777 grants full permissions to all users, security risk',
-    'ShellExecuteTool',
-    'command',
-    'shell_execution',
-    'MEDIUM',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '(?i)chmod\s+(777|a\+rwx|o\+rwx)',
-    NULL,
-    'Please confirm if full permissions for all users are truly needed',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 30,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-);

mateclaw-server/src/main/resources/db/data-mysql-en.sql

@@ -1719,149 +1719,22 @@ ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE agent_id=VALUES(agent_id), filename=VALUES(filename), co
 
 -- ==================== ToolGuard Default Config & Rule Seed Data ====================
 
--- Global security config (single row)
+-- Global security config (single row, insert only if not exists, never overwrite user config)
-INSERT INTO mate_tool_guard_config (id, enabled, guard_scope, guarded_tools_json, denied_tools_json,
+-- Note: tool names in guarded_tools_json must match @Tool method names (execute_shell_command / write_file / edit_file)
-    file_guard_enabled, sensitive_paths_json, create_time, update_time)
+INSERT IGNORE INTO mate_tool_guard_config (id, enabled, guard_scope, guarded_tools_json, denied_tools_json,
+    file_guard_enabled, sensitive_paths_json, audit_enabled, audit_min_severity, audit_retention_days,
+    create_time, update_time)
 VALUES (
     1000000001,
     TRUE,
     'all',
-    '["WriteFileTool","EditFileTool","ShellExecuteTool"]',
+    '["write_file","edit_file","execute_shell_command"]',
     '[]',
     TRUE,
     '["/etc","/usr","/bin","/sbin","/boot","/sys","/proc","/dev"]',
+    TRUE, 'INFO', 90,
     NOW(), NOW()
-)
+);
-ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE enabled=VALUES(enabled), guard_scope=VALUES(guard_scope), guarded_tools_json=VALUES(guarded_tools_json), denied_tools_json=VALUES(denied_tools_json), file_guard_enabled=VALUES(file_guard_enabled), sensitive_paths_json=VALUES(sensitive_paths_json), update_time=VALUES(update_time);
 
--- Security rule: WriteFileTool — any path write requires approval (HIGH)
+-- Security rules are managed by ToolGuardRuleSeedService (Java) as single source of truth.
-INSERT INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
+-- Removed 6 legacy SQL rules. Their superset is registered in ToolGuardRuleSeedService.buildBuiltinRules() with correct tool names.
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-VALUES (
-    1000300001,
-    'write_file_any',
-    'File write requires approval',
-    'Any file write operation requires user confirmation to prevent accidental overwrite of important files',
-    'WriteFileTool',
-    'path',
-    'file_write',
-    'HIGH',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '.+',
-    NULL,
-    'Please confirm write path and content are correct before allowing execution',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 10,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-)
-ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE rule_id=VALUES(rule_id), name=VALUES(name), description=VALUES(description), tool_name=VALUES(tool_name), param_name=VALUES(param_name), category=VALUES(category), severity=VALUES(severity), decision=VALUES(decision), pattern=VALUES(pattern), exclude_pattern=VALUES(exclude_pattern), remediation=VALUES(remediation), builtin=VALUES(builtin), enabled=VALUES(enabled), priority=VALUES(priority), update_time=VALUES(update_time), deleted=VALUES(deleted);
-
--- Security rule: EditFileTool — any file edit requires approval (HIGH)
-INSERT INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-VALUES (
-    1000300002,
-    'edit_file_any',
-    'File edit requires approval',
-    'Any file content replacement operation requires user confirmation',
-    'EditFileTool',
-    'path',
-    'file_write',
-    'HIGH',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '.+',
-    NULL,
-    'Please confirm edit path and replacement content are correct before allowing execution',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 10,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-)
-ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE rule_id=VALUES(rule_id), name=VALUES(name), description=VALUES(description), tool_name=VALUES(tool_name), param_name=VALUES(param_name), category=VALUES(category), severity=VALUES(severity), decision=VALUES(decision), pattern=VALUES(pattern), exclude_pattern=VALUES(exclude_pattern), remediation=VALUES(remediation), builtin=VALUES(builtin), enabled=VALUES(enabled), priority=VALUES(priority), update_time=VALUES(update_time), deleted=VALUES(deleted);
-
--- Security rule: ShellExecuteTool — delete commands require approval (HIGH)
-INSERT INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-VALUES (
-    1000300003,
-    'shell_rm_approval',
-    'rm command requires approval',
-    'rm / rmdir commands may cause permanent file loss, requires user confirmation',
-    'ShellExecuteTool',
-    'command',
-    'shell_execution',
-    'HIGH',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '(?i)(^|[;&|]|\s)rm\s',
-    NULL,
-    'Consider using trash command instead of rm, or confirm file list before allowing execution',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 20,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-)
-ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE rule_id=VALUES(rule_id), name=VALUES(name), description=VALUES(description), tool_name=VALUES(tool_name), param_name=VALUES(param_name), category=VALUES(category), severity=VALUES(severity), decision=VALUES(decision), pattern=VALUES(pattern), exclude_pattern=VALUES(exclude_pattern), remediation=VALUES(remediation), builtin=VALUES(builtin), enabled=VALUES(enabled), priority=VALUES(priority), update_time=VALUES(update_time), deleted=VALUES(deleted);
-
--- Security rule: ShellExecuteTool — forced recursive delete blocked (CRITICAL)
-INSERT INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-VALUES (
-    1000300004,
-    'shell_rm_rf_block',
-    'rm -rf blocked',
-    'rm -rf forced recursive delete is extremely dangerous, blocked directly',
-    'ShellExecuteTool',
-    'command',
-    'shell_execution',
-    'CRITICAL',
-    'BLOCK',
-    '(?i)rm\s+(-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f[a-z]*|-[a-z]*f[a-z]*r[a-z]*)\s+(/|~|\$HOME|\*|\.\s*$)',
-    NULL,
-    'Absolutely forbidden to execute rm -rf on root directory, Home directory, or wildcards',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 5,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-)
-ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE rule_id=VALUES(rule_id), name=VALUES(name), description=VALUES(description), tool_name=VALUES(tool_name), param_name=VALUES(param_name), category=VALUES(category), severity=VALUES(severity), decision=VALUES(decision), pattern=VALUES(pattern), exclude_pattern=VALUES(exclude_pattern), remediation=VALUES(remediation), builtin=VALUES(builtin), enabled=VALUES(enabled), priority=VALUES(priority), update_time=VALUES(update_time), deleted=VALUES(deleted);
-
--- Security rule: ShellExecuteTool — writing system config files requires approval (HIGH)
-INSERT INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-VALUES (
-    1000300005,
-    'shell_write_system_file',
-    'System file write requires approval',
-    'Writing to system directories like /etc or /usr via Shell requires user confirmation',
-    'ShellExecuteTool',
-    'command',
-    'shell_execution',
-    'HIGH',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '(?i)(>\s*|tee\s+|cp\s+.*\s+)(/etc/|/usr/|/bin/|/sbin/|/boot/)',
-    NULL,
-    'Please confirm the system file and content to modify before allowing execution',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 15,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-)
-ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE rule_id=VALUES(rule_id), name=VALUES(name), description=VALUES(description), tool_name=VALUES(tool_name), param_name=VALUES(param_name), category=VALUES(category), severity=VALUES(severity), decision=VALUES(decision), pattern=VALUES(pattern), exclude_pattern=VALUES(exclude_pattern), remediation=VALUES(remediation), builtin=VALUES(builtin), enabled=VALUES(enabled), priority=VALUES(priority), update_time=VALUES(update_time), deleted=VALUES(deleted);
-
--- Security rule: ShellExecuteTool — chmod 777 requires approval (MEDIUM)
-INSERT INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-VALUES (
-    1000300006,
-    'shell_chmod_777',
-    'chmod 777 requires approval',
-    'chmod 777 grants full permissions to all users, security risk',
-    'ShellExecuteTool',
-    'command',
-    'shell_execution',
-    'MEDIUM',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '(?i)chmod\s+(777|a\+rwx|o\+rwx)',
-    NULL,
-    'Please confirm if full permissions for all users are truly needed',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 30,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-)
-ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE rule_id=VALUES(rule_id), name=VALUES(name), description=VALUES(description), tool_name=VALUES(tool_name), param_name=VALUES(param_name), category=VALUES(category), severity=VALUES(severity), decision=VALUES(decision), pattern=VALUES(pattern), exclude_pattern=VALUES(exclude_pattern), remediation=VALUES(remediation), builtin=VALUES(builtin), enabled=VALUES(enabled), priority=VALUES(priority), update_time=VALUES(update_time), deleted=VALUES(deleted);

mateclaw-server/src/main/resources/db/data-mysql-zh.sql

@@ -1721,149 +1721,22 @@ ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE agent_id=VALUES(agent_id), filename=VALUES(filename), co
 
 -- ==================== ToolGuard 默认配置与规则种子数据 ====================
 
--- 全局安全配置（只有一行）
+-- 全局安全配置（只有一行，仅首次初始化时插入，不覆盖用户修改）
-INSERT INTO mate_tool_guard_config (id, enabled, guard_scope, guarded_tools_json, denied_tools_json,
+-- 注意：guarded_tools_json 中的工具名必须与 @Tool 方法名一致（execute_shell_command / write_file / edit_file）
-    file_guard_enabled, sensitive_paths_json, create_time, update_time)
+INSERT IGNORE INTO mate_tool_guard_config (id, enabled, guard_scope, guarded_tools_json, denied_tools_json,
+    file_guard_enabled, sensitive_paths_json, audit_enabled, audit_min_severity, audit_retention_days,
+    create_time, update_time)
 VALUES (
     1000000001,
     TRUE,
     'all',
-    '["WriteFileTool","EditFileTool","ShellExecuteTool"]',
+    '["write_file","edit_file","execute_shell_command"]',
     '[]',
     TRUE,
     '["/etc","/usr","/bin","/sbin","/boot","/sys","/proc","/dev"]',
+    TRUE, 'INFO', 90,
     NOW(), NOW()
-)
+);
-ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE enabled=VALUES(enabled), guard_scope=VALUES(guard_scope), guarded_tools_json=VALUES(guarded_tools_json), denied_tools_json=VALUES(denied_tools_json), file_guard_enabled=VALUES(file_guard_enabled), sensitive_paths_json=VALUES(sensitive_paths_json), update_time=VALUES(update_time);
 
--- 安全规则：WriteFileTool — 任意路径写入需要审批（HIGH）
+-- 安全规则由 ToolGuardRuleSeedService (Java) 统一种子化，不在 SQL 中重复维护
-INSERT INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
+-- 已移除旧的 6 条 SQL 规则，其超集已在 ToolGuardRuleSeedService.buildBuiltinRules() 中以正确的工具名注册。
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-VALUES (
-    1000300001,
-    'write_file_any',
-    '文件写入需审批',
-    '任何文件写入操作都需要用户确认，防止意外覆盖重要文件',
-    'WriteFileTool',
-    'path',
-    'file_write',
-    'HIGH',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '.+',
-    NULL,
-    '请确认写入路径和内容正确后再允许执行',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 10,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-)
-ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE rule_id=VALUES(rule_id), name=VALUES(name), description=VALUES(description), tool_name=VALUES(tool_name), param_name=VALUES(param_name), category=VALUES(category), severity=VALUES(severity), decision=VALUES(decision), pattern=VALUES(pattern), exclude_pattern=VALUES(exclude_pattern), remediation=VALUES(remediation), builtin=VALUES(builtin), enabled=VALUES(enabled), priority=VALUES(priority), update_time=VALUES(update_time), deleted=VALUES(deleted);
-
--- 安全规则：EditFileTool — 任意文件编辑需要审批（HIGH）
-INSERT INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-VALUES (
-    1000300002,
-    'edit_file_any',
-    '文件编辑需审批',
-    '任何文件内容替换操作都需要用户确认',
-    'EditFileTool',
-    'path',
-    'file_write',
-    'HIGH',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '.+',
-    NULL,
-    '请确认编辑路径和替换内容正确后再允许执行',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 10,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-)
-ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE rule_id=VALUES(rule_id), name=VALUES(name), description=VALUES(description), tool_name=VALUES(tool_name), param_name=VALUES(param_name), category=VALUES(category), severity=VALUES(severity), decision=VALUES(decision), pattern=VALUES(pattern), exclude_pattern=VALUES(exclude_pattern), remediation=VALUES(remediation), builtin=VALUES(builtin), enabled=VALUES(enabled), priority=VALUES(priority), update_time=VALUES(update_time), deleted=VALUES(deleted);
-
--- 安全规则：ShellExecuteTool — 删除命令需审批（HIGH）
-INSERT INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-VALUES (
-    1000300003,
-    'shell_rm_approval',
-    'rm 命令需审批',
-    'rm / rmdir 命令可能导致文件永久丢失，需要用户确认',
-    'ShellExecuteTool',
-    'command',
-    'shell_execution',
-    'HIGH',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '(?i)(^|[;&|]|\s)rm\s',
-    NULL,
-    '考虑使用 trash 命令替代 rm，或确认要删除的文件列表后再允许执行',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 20,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-)
-ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE rule_id=VALUES(rule_id), name=VALUES(name), description=VALUES(description), tool_name=VALUES(tool_name), param_name=VALUES(param_name), category=VALUES(category), severity=VALUES(severity), decision=VALUES(decision), pattern=VALUES(pattern), exclude_pattern=VALUES(exclude_pattern), remediation=VALUES(remediation), builtin=VALUES(builtin), enabled=VALUES(enabled), priority=VALUES(priority), update_time=VALUES(update_time), deleted=VALUES(deleted);
-
--- 安全规则：ShellExecuteTool — 强制递归删除直接拦截（CRITICAL）
-INSERT INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-VALUES (
-    1000300004,
-    'shell_rm_rf_block',
-    'rm -rf 直接拦截',
-    'rm -rf 强制递归删除极度危险，直接拦截',
-    'ShellExecuteTool',
-    'command',
-    'shell_execution',
-    'CRITICAL',
-    'BLOCK',
-    '(?i)rm\s+(-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f[a-z]*|-[a-z]*f[a-z]*r[a-z]*)\s+(/|~|\$HOME|\*|\.\s*$)',
-    NULL,
-    '绝对禁止对根目录、Home 目录或通配符执行 rm -rf',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 5,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-)
-ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE rule_id=VALUES(rule_id), name=VALUES(name), description=VALUES(description), tool_name=VALUES(tool_name), param_name=VALUES(param_name), category=VALUES(category), severity=VALUES(severity), decision=VALUES(decision), pattern=VALUES(pattern), exclude_pattern=VALUES(exclude_pattern), remediation=VALUES(remediation), builtin=VALUES(builtin), enabled=VALUES(enabled), priority=VALUES(priority), update_time=VALUES(update_time), deleted=VALUES(deleted);
-
--- 安全规则：ShellExecuteTool — 写入系统配置文件需审批（HIGH）
-INSERT INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-VALUES (
-    1000300005,
-    'shell_write_system_file',
-    '写入系统文件需审批',
-    '通过 Shell 向 /etc / /usr 等系统目录写入内容需要用户确认',
-    'ShellExecuteTool',
-    'command',
-    'shell_execution',
-    'HIGH',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '(?i)(>\s*|tee\s+|cp\s+.*\s+)(/etc/|/usr/|/bin/|/sbin/|/boot/)',
-    NULL,
-    '请确认要修改的系统文件和内容后再允许执行',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 15,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-)
-ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE rule_id=VALUES(rule_id), name=VALUES(name), description=VALUES(description), tool_name=VALUES(tool_name), param_name=VALUES(param_name), category=VALUES(category), severity=VALUES(severity), decision=VALUES(decision), pattern=VALUES(pattern), exclude_pattern=VALUES(exclude_pattern), remediation=VALUES(remediation), builtin=VALUES(builtin), enabled=VALUES(enabled), priority=VALUES(priority), update_time=VALUES(update_time), deleted=VALUES(deleted);
-
--- 安全规则：ShellExecuteTool — chmod 777 需审批（MEDIUM）
-INSERT INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-VALUES (
-    1000300006,
-    'shell_chmod_777',
-    'chmod 777 需审批',
-    'chmod 777 给予所有用户完全权限，存在安全风险',
-    'ShellExecuteTool',
-    'command',
-    'shell_execution',
-    'MEDIUM',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '(?i)chmod\s+(777|a\+rwx|o\+rwx)',
-    NULL,
-    '请确认是否真的需要给予所有用户完全权限',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 30,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-)
-ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE rule_id=VALUES(rule_id), name=VALUES(name), description=VALUES(description), tool_name=VALUES(tool_name), param_name=VALUES(param_name), category=VALUES(category), severity=VALUES(severity), decision=VALUES(decision), pattern=VALUES(pattern), exclude_pattern=VALUES(exclude_pattern), remediation=VALUES(remediation), builtin=VALUES(builtin), enabled=VALUES(enabled), priority=VALUES(priority), update_time=VALUES(update_time), deleted=VALUES(deleted);

mateclaw-server/src/main/resources/db/data-zh.sql

@@ -1724,149 +1724,26 @@ VALUES (
 
 -- ==================== ToolGuard 默认配置与规则种子数据 ====================
 
--- 全局安全配置（只有一行）
+-- 全局安全配置（只有一行，仅首次初始化时插入）
-MERGE INTO mate_tool_guard_config (id, enabled, guard_scope, guarded_tools_json, denied_tools_json,
+-- 注意：guarded_tools_json 中的工具名必须与 @Tool 方法名一致（execute_shell_command / write_file / edit_file）
-    file_guard_enabled, sensitive_paths_json, create_time, update_time)
+-- 使用 SELECT + INSERT 确保已存在时不覆盖（H2 的 MERGE 会覆盖所有列，会重置用户修改的配置）
-KEY (id)
+INSERT INTO mate_tool_guard_config (id, enabled, guard_scope, guarded_tools_json, denied_tools_json,
-VALUES (
+    file_guard_enabled, sensitive_paths_json, audit_enabled, audit_min_severity, audit_retention_days,
+    create_time, update_time)
+SELECT
     1000000001,
     TRUE,
     'all',
-    '["WriteFileTool","EditFileTool","ShellExecuteTool"]',
+    '["write_file","edit_file","execute_shell_command"]',
     '[]',
     TRUE,
     '["/etc","/usr","/bin","/sbin","/boot","/sys","/proc","/dev"]',
+    TRUE, 'INFO', 90,
     NOW(), NOW()
-);
+FROM DUAL
+WHERE NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM mate_tool_guard_config WHERE id = 1000000001);
 
--- 安全规则：WriteFileTool — 任意路径写入需要审批（HIGH）
+-- 安全规则由 ToolGuardRuleSeedService (Java) 统一种子化，不在 SQL 中重复维护
-MERGE INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
+-- 已移除旧的 6 条 SQL 规则（rule_id: write_file_any, edit_file_any, shell_rm_approval,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
+-- shell_rm_rf_block, shell_write_system_file, shell_chmod_777），
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
+-- 它们的超集已在 ToolGuardRuleSeedService.buildBuiltinRules() 中以正确的工具名注册。
-KEY (id)
-VALUES (
-    1000300001,
-    'write_file_any',
-    '文件写入需审批',
-    '任何文件写入操作都需要用户确认，防止意外覆盖重要文件',
-    'WriteFileTool',
-    'path',
-    'file_write',
-    'HIGH',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '.+',
-    NULL,
-    '请确认写入路径和内容正确后再允许执行',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 10,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-);
-
--- 安全规则：EditFileTool — 任意文件编辑需要审批（HIGH）
-MERGE INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-KEY (id)
-VALUES (
-    1000300002,
-    'edit_file_any',
-    '文件编辑需审批',
-    '任何文件内容替换操作都需要用户确认',
-    'EditFileTool',
-    'path',
-    'file_write',
-    'HIGH',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '.+',
-    NULL,
-    '请确认编辑路径和替换内容正确后再允许执行',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 10,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-);
-
--- 安全规则：ShellExecuteTool — 删除命令需审批（HIGH）
-MERGE INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-KEY (id)
-VALUES (
-    1000300003,
-    'shell_rm_approval',
-    'rm 命令需审批',
-    'rm / rmdir 命令可能导致文件永久丢失，需要用户确认',
-    'ShellExecuteTool',
-    'command',
-    'shell_execution',
-    'HIGH',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '(?i)(^|[;&|]|\s)rm\s',
-    NULL,
-    '考虑使用 trash 命令替代 rm，或确认要删除的文件列表后再允许执行',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 20,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-);
-
--- 安全规则：ShellExecuteTool — 强制递归删除直接拦截（CRITICAL）
-MERGE INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-KEY (id)
-VALUES (
-    1000300004,
-    'shell_rm_rf_block',
-    'rm -rf 直接拦截',
-    'rm -rf 强制递归删除极度危险，直接拦截',
-    'ShellExecuteTool',
-    'command',
-    'shell_execution',
-    'CRITICAL',
-    'BLOCK',
-    '(?i)rm\s+(-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f[a-z]*|-[a-z]*f[a-z]*r[a-z]*)\s+(/|~|\$HOME|\*|\.\s*$)',
-    NULL,
-    '绝对禁止对根目录、Home 目录或通配符执行 rm -rf',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 5,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-);
-
--- 安全规则：ShellExecuteTool — 写入系统配置文件需审批（HIGH）
-MERGE INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-KEY (id)
-VALUES (
-    1000300005,
-    'shell_write_system_file',
-    '写入系统文件需审批',
-    '通过 Shell 向 /etc / /usr 等系统目录写入内容需要用户确认',
-    'ShellExecuteTool',
-    'command',
-    'shell_execution',
-    'HIGH',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '(?i)(>\s*|tee\s+|cp\s+.*\s+)(/etc/|/usr/|/bin/|/sbin/|/boot/)',
-    NULL,
-    '请确认要修改的系统文件和内容后再允许执行',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 15,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-);
-
--- 安全规则：ShellExecuteTool — chmod 777 需审批（MEDIUM）
-MERGE INTO mate_tool_guard_rule (id, rule_id, name, description, tool_name, param_name,
-    category, severity, decision, pattern, exclude_pattern, remediation,
-    builtin, enabled, priority, create_time, update_time, deleted)
-KEY (id)
-VALUES (
-    1000300006,
-    'shell_chmod_777',
-    'chmod 777 需审批',
-    'chmod 777 给予所有用户完全权限，存在安全风险',
-    'ShellExecuteTool',
-    'command',
-    'shell_execution',
-    'MEDIUM',
-    'NEEDS_APPROVAL',
-    '(?i)chmod\s+(777|a\+rwx|o\+rwx)',
-    NULL,
-    '请确认是否真的需要给予所有用户完全权限',
-    TRUE, TRUE, 30,
-    NOW(), NOW(), 0
-);

mateclaw-server/src/main/resources/db/schema-mysql.sql

@@ -347,6 +347,9 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS mate_tool_guard_config (
     denied_tools_json    TEXT,
     file_guard_enabled   TINYINT(1)   NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
     sensitive_paths_json TEXT,
+    audit_enabled        TINYINT(1)   NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
+    audit_min_severity   VARCHAR(16)  NOT NULL DEFAULT 'INFO',
+    audit_retention_days INT          NOT NULL DEFAULT 90,
     create_time          DATETIME     NOT NULL,
     update_time          DATETIME     NOT NULL
 ) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4 COLLATE=utf8mb4_unicode_ci;

mateclaw-server/src/main/resources/db/schema.sql

@@ -357,6 +357,9 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS mate_tool_guard_config (
     denied_tools_json    TEXT,
     file_guard_enabled   BOOLEAN      NOT NULL DEFAULT TRUE,
     sensitive_paths_json TEXT,
+    audit_enabled        BOOLEAN      NOT NULL DEFAULT TRUE,
+    audit_min_severity   VARCHAR(16)  NOT NULL DEFAULT 'INFO',
+    audit_retention_days INT          NOT NULL DEFAULT 90,
     create_time          DATETIME     NOT NULL,
     update_time          DATETIME     NOT NULL
 );

mateclaw-ui/src/i18n/locales/en-US.ts

@@ -488,6 +488,15 @@ export default {
     audit: {
       title: 'Audit Logs',
       desc: 'View tool security check records',
+      config: {
+        title: 'Audit Configuration',
+        enabled: 'Enable Audit Logging',
+        enabledHint: 'When disabled, tool invocation audit logs will not be recorded',
+        minSeverity: 'Minimum Severity',
+        minSeverityHint: 'Only record audit events at this severity level and above',
+        retentionDays: 'Retention Days',
+        retentionDaysHint: 'Audit logs older than this will be auto-cleaned (0=never)',
+      },
       stats: {
         total: 'Total Checks',
         blocked: 'Blocked',

mateclaw-ui/src/i18n/locales/zh-CN.ts

@@ -488,6 +488,15 @@ export default {
     audit: {
       title: '审计日志',
       desc: '查看工具安全检查记录',
+      config: {
+        title: '审计配置',
+        enabled: '启用审计日志',
+        enabledHint: '关闭后将不再记录工具调用审计日志',
+        minSeverity: '最低记录等级',
+        minSeverityHint: '仅记录达到此等级及以上的审计事件',
+        retentionDays: '保留天数',
+        retentionDaysHint: '超过此天数的审计日志将被自动清理（0=永不清理）',
+      },
       stats: {
         total: '总检查',
         blocked: '已阻止',

mateclaw-ui/src/types/index.ts

@@ -584,6 +584,9 @@ export interface GuardConfig {
   deniedToolsJson?: string
   fileGuardEnabled: boolean
   sensitivePathsJson?: string
+  auditEnabled?: boolean
+  auditMinSeverity?: string
+  auditRetentionDays?: number
 }
 
 export interface AuditLogEntry {

mateclaw-ui/src/views/Security/AuditLogs/index.vue

@@ -7,6 +7,46 @@
       </div>
     </div>
 
+    <!-- Audit Config -->
+    <div class="config-panel">
+      <h3 class="config-title">{{ t('security.audit.config.title') }}</h3>
+      <div class="config-grid">
+        <div class="config-item">
+          <div class="config-label-row">
+            <label>{{ t('security.audit.config.enabled') }}</label>
+            <label class="toggle-switch">
+              <input type="checkbox" v-model="auditConfig.auditEnabled" @change="saveAuditConfig" />
+              <span class="toggle-slider"></span>
+            </label>
+          </div>
+          <p class="config-hint">{{ t('security.audit.config.enabledHint') }}</p>
+        </div>
+        <div class="config-item">
+          <label>{{ t('security.audit.config.minSeverity') }}</label>
+          <select v-model="auditConfig.auditMinSeverity" @change="saveAuditConfig" class="filter-select">
+            <option value="INFO">{{ t('security.severity.INFO') }}</option>
+            <option value="LOW">{{ t('security.severity.LOW') }}</option>
+            <option value="MEDIUM">{{ t('security.severity.MEDIUM') }}</option>
+            <option value="HIGH">{{ t('security.severity.HIGH') }}</option>
+            <option value="CRITICAL">{{ t('security.severity.CRITICAL') }}</option>
+          </select>
+          <p class="config-hint">{{ t('security.audit.config.minSeverityHint') }}</p>
+        </div>
+        <div class="config-item">
+          <label>{{ t('security.audit.config.retentionDays') }}</label>
+          <input
+            type="number"
+            v-model.number="auditConfig.auditRetentionDays"
+            @change="saveAuditConfig"
+            class="filter-input retention-input"
+            min="0"
+            max="3650"
+          />
+          <p class="config-hint">{{ t('security.audit.config.retentionDaysHint') }}</p>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+
     <!-- Stats Cards -->
     <div class="stats-grid">
       <div class="stat-card">
@@ -148,6 +188,37 @@ const auditTotal = ref(0)
 const auditFilters = reactive({ toolName: '', decision: '' })
 const expandedRows = ref(new Set<number>())
 
+// Audit config
+const auditConfig = reactive({
+  auditEnabled: true,
+  auditMinSeverity: 'INFO',
+  auditRetentionDays: 90,
+})
+
+async function loadAuditConfig() {
+  try {
+    const res: any = await securityApi.getGuardConfig()
+    const data = res.data || {}
+    auditConfig.auditEnabled = data.auditEnabled ?? true
+    auditConfig.auditMinSeverity = data.auditMinSeverity || 'INFO'
+    auditConfig.auditRetentionDays = data.auditRetentionDays ?? 90
+  } catch {
+    // ignore
+  }
+}
+
+async function saveAuditConfig() {
+  try {
+    await securityApi.updateGuardConfig({
+      auditEnabled: auditConfig.auditEnabled,
+      auditMinSeverity: auditConfig.auditMinSeverity,
+      auditRetentionDays: auditConfig.auditRetentionDays,
+    })
+  } catch {
+    // ignore
+  }
+}
+
 async function loadAuditLogs() {
   try {
     const params: any = {
@@ -183,7 +254,7 @@ function toggleExpand(id: number) {
 }
 
 onMounted(async () => {
-  await Promise.all([loadAuditLogs(), loadAuditStats()])
+  await Promise.all([loadAuditConfig(), loadAuditLogs(), loadAuditStats()])
 })
 </script>
 
@@ -192,6 +263,95 @@ onMounted(async () => {
 </style>
 
 <style scoped>
+/* Config Panel */
+.config-panel {
+  background: var(--mc-bg-elevated);
+  border: 1px solid var(--mc-border-light);
+  border-radius: 10px;
+  padding: 20px;
+  margin-bottom: 24px;
+}
+
+.config-title {
+  font-size: 14px;
+  font-weight: 600;
+  color: var(--mc-text-primary);
+  margin: 0 0 16px;
+}
+
+.config-grid {
+  display: grid;
+  grid-template-columns: repeat(3, 1fr);
+  gap: 20px;
+}
+
+.config-item {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-direction: column;
+  gap: 6px;
+}
+
+.config-item label {
+  font-size: 13px;
+  font-weight: 500;
+  color: var(--mc-text-primary);
+}
+
+.config-label-row {
+  display: flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  justify-content: space-between;
+}
+
+.config-hint {
+  font-size: 11px;
+  color: var(--mc-text-tertiary);
+  margin: 0;
+}
+
+.retention-input {
+  max-width: 120px;
+}
+
+/* Toggle Switch */
+.toggle-switch {
+  position: relative;
+  display: inline-block;
+  width: 40px;
+  height: 22px;
+}
+
+.toggle-switch input { opacity: 0; width: 0; height: 0; }
+
+.toggle-slider {
+  position: absolute;
+  cursor: pointer;
+  inset: 0;
+  background: var(--mc-border);
+  border-radius: 22px;
+  transition: 0.2s;
+}
+
+.toggle-slider::before {
+  content: '';
+  position: absolute;
+  width: 16px;
+  height: 16px;
+  left: 3px;
+  bottom: 3px;
+  background: white;
+  border-radius: 50%;
+  transition: 0.2s;
+}
+
+.toggle-switch input:checked + .toggle-slider {
+  background: var(--mc-accent, #3b82f6);
+}
+
+.toggle-switch input:checked + .toggle-slider::before {
+  transform: translateX(18px);
+}
+
 /* Stats Grid */
 .stats-grid {
   display: grid;