Let skill Python scripts install packages from a configurable pip index instead of the default PyPI. docker-compose passes PIP_INDEX_URL / PIP_TRUSTED_HOST into the container; for the desktop app (host JVM, no Docker env) SkillScriptExecutionService falls back to mateclaw.pip.index-url / trusted-host Spring config and injects them into the subprocess, auto-deriving the trusted host for plain-HTTP LAN mirrors. The runtime image gains pip and a build toolchain (with the PEP 668 marker removed so on-the-fly installs work), and the script timeout ceiling is raised to accommodate large installs.
Remove the planning document that landed at the repo root — design notes
belong in the design-doc tree, not the shipped repo root. Also recycle the
per-conversation snapshot map once its last tool-call entry is removed, and
translate a leftover non-English comment.
Wire MCP standard notifications/progress into the existing SSE stream so long-running MCP tool calls surface live progress instead of a bare spinner. A per-call progressToken maps back to (conversationId, toolCallId); ProgressAwareMcpToolCallback injects it into tools/call _meta and calls McpSyncClient directly (falling back to the delegate on error, and applying identity forwarding first). Progress events skip the ring buffer and are replayed from a latest-value snapshot on SSE reconnect. Frontend renders a gradient progress bar in ToolCallSegment when a running tool reports progress.
- Shell scan: a token normalizing to the filesystem root (//, /., /..) is
only skipped when the command carries no destructive verb; with
rm/rmdir/shred/srm present the scan fails closed, so 'rm -rf //' is
refused while sed empty replacements (s/pattern//) stay allowed.
- Chat-upload fallback: a boundary violation is waived only when the
requested path itself normalizes inside one of the conversation's
candidate upload directories; a basename match against a stored
attachment no longer clears the violation. Resolver/DB failures keep
the BLOCK finding. The unused candidate-roots resolve overload is
removed.
- Regression tests for destructive root tokens, sed allowance, the
fail-closed compound case, stored-upload-path allowance, basename
collisions, cross-conversation paths, and resolver failure.
Skip absolute-path tokens that normalize to the filesystem root in the shell boundary scan (shell syntax like sed's s/pattern// was misread as a path outside the workspace), and add a DB-backed chat-upload fallback in WorkspaceBoundaryGuardian: when a file-tool path triggers a boundary violation, resolve the conversation's real candidate upload roots so attachments stored in workspace-scoped directories are found even when the thread-local workspaceBasePath is null.
- ProgressLedgerService.upsert: the reserved-prefix guard rejects the write; the
comment said 'strip the prefix and continue', which no longer matches. Rewrite
it to describe the actual reject behavior.
- ActionNode: translate the class javadoc (including the B2 pinned-constraints and
B5 auto-backfill notes) to English per code style.
Adds a read-only GET /api/v1/settings/search-providers catalog (admin-gated, no secrets), grouped collapsible provider cards, and a schema-driven plugin config form. Breaks a SystemSettingService<->PluginManager circular dependency via parameter @Lazy (with a context smoke test), and fixes PluginManager.updateConfig to merge instead of overwrite so omitted/blank secret fields are preserved. Hardens plugin search-provider id validation (reject-not-trim, case-insensitive conflict) and insulates the provider bridge hot path from throwing plugin code.
- Remove "(issue #477)" internal planning references from shipped Java
(SearchProviderRegistry, PluginSearchBridge, and the two new tests) — code
should describe what it does, not point at issue trackers.
- Drop "openclaw" external-project attribution from the search provider
comments (SearchProviderRegistry, SearchCache, SearchQuery), restating them
as objective functional descriptions.
- requireSessionOwnership now also checks session.kbId() == path kbId (404 on
mismatch), so a research session started under one KB cannot be addressed via
another KB path even when the caller's key is bound to both — defense-in-depth
on top of the keyId ownership check.
- Drop internal "R7" / "review #446" markers from the controller Javadoc in
favour of functional wording.
- Import Set/Map/concurrent types and static any() instead of inline FQNs in the
new kb-open research/auth tests, per code style.
* feat(kb-open): Deep Research open API (start/SSE/status/cancel)
Implements the async Deep Research endpoint for the KB Open API (#443).
Research is a multi-step LLM pipeline (plan → retrieve+draft → compose)
that runs asynchronously and broadcasts progress via SSE.
Endpoints:
- POST /{kbId}/research start (returns sessionId + streamUrl)
- GET /{kbId}/research/{id}/stream SSE progress (?token= for EventSource)
- GET /{kbId}/research/{id}/status query status / final report
- POST /{kbId}/research/{id}/cancel cancel running session
Components:
- KbOpenResearchController: 4 endpoints, @RequireKbScope("kb:search")
- KbResearchSessionRegistry: in-memory session tracking with keyId
ownership (a caller can only query/cancel their own sessions)
Security:
- R7: SSE uses ?token= query param (KbOpenApiAuthFilter already supports
this fallback for EventSource which can't set Authorization headers)
- Session ownership: status/cancel/stream all verify keyId match
- Cancel checks session is RUNNING (409 otherwise)
Reuses existing WikiResearchService.research() + ChatStreamTracker for
the actual research pipeline and SSE broadcasting.
Tests (6 new, all green):
- KbResearchSessionRegistryTest: register/complete/fail/cancel lifecycle,
cancel-on-completed no-op, unknown session returns empty
Closes#443
* fix(kb-open-research): cooperative cancel, sticky terminal, TTL, concurrency cap
Review #446 — address all 4 job-lifecycle/cost blockers + nits:
1. Cooperative cancellation (was: cancel only flipped status, pipeline ran
to completion). Cancel endpoint now calls streamTracker.requestStop();
WikiResearchService.ensureNotCancelled() checks isStopRequested at each
stage boundary (plan→draft, draft→compose) and inside the parallel draft
fan-out — so cancel actually halts the expensive LLM calls, not just the
SSE stream. Throws ResearchCancelledException (caught locally, no error
broadcast).
2. Sticky CANCELLED terminal. complete()/fail() now no-op on a CANCELLED
session, so a user who cancelled never sees a COMPLETED report surface
via /status.
3. Session registry TTL. Terminal sessions get an updatedAt timestamp and
are evicted by a @Scheduled sweep after
mate.kbopen.research.session-ttl (default 30m). RUNNING sessions are
never evicted. Prevents unbounded memory growth.
4. Per-key concurrency cap. startIfAllowed() rejects new research when a
key already has mate.kbopen.research.max-concurrent-per-key (default 3)
RUNNING sessions → 429. Stops one key from spawning ~60 parallel
multi-step LLM pipelines per minute under the per-min rate limiter.
5. Inline FQN → import (controller LinkedHashMap, test List.of).
Nits (inherited from P0-A rebase):
- V162→V164, prefix VARCHAR(12), design doc moved to rfcs/.
- Design doc: kb:search scope row now documents it covers /research/**.
31 tests pass (12 registry incl. sticky-cancel/concurrency/TTL +
13 service + 4 rate limiter + 4 controller + ...).
* fix(kb-open): scope-limited ?token= SSE auth fallback in KbOpenApiAuthFilter
R7: the SSE progress stream (/research/{id}/stream) is consumed by browser
EventSource, which cannot set an Authorization header. The filter's
extractBearerToken() never read ?token= (still a TODO), so the SSE endpoint
was unreachable from the browser — the headline use case got 401.
Fix: accept ?token= ONLY on SSE stream paths (isSseStreamPath, suffix
/stream), reject it everywhere else so the API key does not leak into
access/proxy logs for normal calls (R5). Matches the JwtAuthFilter convention
(getRequestURI logs carry no query string).
Also bypass the per-minute rate limiter on the SSE path: EventSource
reconnects/heartbeats would otherwise burn the key's window and 429 its own
POST /research start. Rate limiting belongs on the cost-producing endpoints.
Tests (6 new, KbOpenApiAuthFilterTest):
- non-SSE: header passes, ?token= rejected (no authenticate call)
- SSE: ?token= authenticates, missing token → 401
- SSE: bypasses rate limiter; non-SSE still hits it
* fix(kb-open-research): make per-key concurrency cap atomic (no check-then-act race)
startIfAllowed() did stream-and-count then put() — not atomic. Two
concurrent starts for the same key could both pass the count check (both
see < cap) and both put, admitting more sessions than the cap. On the
virtual-thread start endpoint this is a real DoS/cost-bypass path.
Fix: maintain a per-key AtomicInteger running counter (runningPerKey),
incremented atomically on start (incrementAndGet + rollback on overflow)
and decremented on each RUNNING→terminal transition (complete/fail/cancel).
The counter is kept in lock-step with status==RUNNING; since terminal
states are sticky, each session decrements exactly once.
cancel() also rewritten to capture the pre-transition state cleanly (the
old return check relied on Map.computeIfPresent returning the new value,
which worked but read as 'before.status==CANCELLED').
Tests (+2): cancelled/failed release slot (counter consistency), and a
concurrent-start test (12 virtual threads, cap=3) asserting exactly cap
admits — would be flaky/fail under the old impl.
* refactor(kb-open-research): remove unused register() back-compat method
register() was left over from the initial impl — it bypassed the per-key
concurrency cap (no startIfAllowed check) and, after the atomic-counter fix,
incremented runningPerKey without any overflow rollback. With no production
caller (the start endpoint uses startIfAllowed), it only existed for tests to
set up a RUNNING session. Drop it and route the tests through startIfAllowed
so nothing can accidentally ship a path that ignores the cap.
After the workspace-aware chat-uploads change, the upload root became
absolute (the resolver normalizes via toAbsolutePath/normalize, and the
autoconfiguration rewrites baseDir to an absolute path). ChatController.upload
then set ChatUploadResponse.path to that absolute path — despite the inline
comment promising a relative path "to avoid exposing the server's absolute
path". The field is rendered into the LLM prompt ("附件: foo (path)") and
returned to the client, so this leaked the server filesystem layout into both
the prompt and the response, and broke portability if the deploy dir moves.
Extract toRelativeUploadPath(uploadRoot, convId, storedName) which makes the
path relative to the upload root's parent (preserving the trailing sub-dir
name, e.g. chat-uploads/{convId}/{storedName}) and normalizes separators to
'/'. Retrieval is unaffected: it goes through the basename-based
ChatUploadResolver and the /api/v1/chat/files/... URL, not this field.
Adds ChatControllerUploadPathTest (default root, absolute workspace-scoped
root, custom base-dir name) asserting the result is relative and leak-free.
Addresses the blocker item in #452.
Adversarial review of PR #464 found that classify() promoted an absent
channelType to the 'authenticated' trust branch, stamping an untrusted
ThreadLocal username (e.g. stale value on a reused thread, or internal
tasks like SkillConsolidation/Reflection that carry no channel) with
authenticated trust — contradicting the fail-closed contract the service
documents.
- classify(): channel==null/blank now resolves to NONE (no injection);
only the explicit 'web' channel may yield authenticated. Unrecognised
non-web channels downgrade to external, never authenticated.
- signingKey(): replace the one-shot keyParseAttempted latch with
lastAttemptedPem so a corrected/hot-reloaded PEM re-parses on the next
call without an app restart. Still fail-closed when PEM is unchanged.
- Tests: 4 new cases lock the regression (null+dirty-ThreadLocal->NONE,
blank->NONE, novel channel->external, self-heal after config fix).
- .gitignore: exclude local .codebase-memory/ agent index.
MCP+identity suite: 93/93 green.
The first cut of the per-request interceptor called route.resume() for every
request. Playwright follows server-side 3xx redirects internally on resume()
WITHOUT re-invoking the route handler, so a public page that 302s to a
metadata IP still reached it — verified via runtime E2E (the handler only ever
saw the httpbin.org URLs, never the 169.254.169.254 redirect target).
Fix: for navigation requests, fetch with maxRedirects=0 and validate the
Location of each hop through UrlSafetyChecker before fulfilling; abort when a
hop resolves to a blocked host. Subresources/fetches keep the direct per-URL
check + resume path. Non-navigation and non-http(s) requests are unaffected.
Runtime-verified: httpbin.org 302 -> 169.254.169.254 is now aborted
(net::ERR_FAILED; log "blocked redirect ... cloud-metadata endpoint"), while
example.com and wikipedia.org (rich subresources) still load with no false
blocks.
Two SSRF hardenings on top of the private-network deployment mode:
1. Redirect / subresource re-validation. The SSRF guard previously ran only on
the initial navigation URL in the tool layer, so a public page that 302s to
169.254.169.254 (or a script fetch / img to a metadata IP) reached the target
unchecked — worse now that private-network mode exists. Install a per-context
request interceptor (BrowserLauncher.applyContextDefaults) that re-runs
UrlSafetyChecker on every http(s) request and aborts blocked ones. Non-network
schemes (data:/blob:/about:) pass through; unexpected checker faults fail open
so a transient error cannot wedge the page (the initial URL was already checked).
2. Allowlist can no longer open a cloud-metadata endpoint. Metadata hostnames and
IPs are now checked BEFORE the allowlist short-circuits, so an operator entry
like 169.254.0.0/16 or metadata.google.internal can never expose instance
metadata. Ordinary private-host allowlisting is unaffected (regression-tested).
Also correct the 192.0.0.192 comment (Oracle Cloud IMDS, not Azure).
The per-context setIgnoreHTTPSErrors was gated on ignoreHttpsErrors alone,
while the Chromium command-line cert flags require both ignoreHttpsErrors AND
allowPrivateNetwork. Setting only PLAYWRIGHT_IGNORE_HTTPS_ERRORS therefore
disabled certificate validation for all browser traffic, including the public
internet (MITM exposure). Gate the per-context bypass on allowPrivateNetwork
too, so ignoring HTTPS errors is scoped to LAN deployments — matching the
command-line path and the documented intent.
Also correct a comment: 192.0.0.192 is Oracle Cloud's IMDS address, not Azure.
The identity forwarded to opt-in MCP servers was a one-dimensional string
(ChatOrigin.requesterId): a MateClaw username for web logins, but a webchat
visitorId for visitors and an IM sender id for IM — indistinguishable to the
REST backend. The signed-token mode (d204b702) made this worse: an RS256
signature over an unauthenticated visitorId reads as "MateClaw authenticated
this user" to any backend that trusts the signature.
Introduce an identity-typing dimension at McpIdentityForwardService:
- classify() branches on ChatOrigin: authenticated (web login, sub=immutable
userId), anonymous (webchat visitor, trust=anonymous), external (IM sender,
trust=external), or none (cron/system → nothing injected, fail-closed).
- mint() adds `trust` and `channel_type` claims; plaintext value is prefixed
`trust:subject` so backends can tell the kinds apart without a JWT.
The immutable userId reaches resolve() without coupling it to the user store:
JwtAuthFilter stamps user.id into auth.setDetails() (both JWT and PAT paths),
and ChatController.memoryOrigin carries it on a new ChatOrigin.requesterUserId
field (only-add, per the record's evolution rule).
Resolves the webchat semantic mismatch raised in #459 and the "sub should be
an immutable user id" follow-up. 82 tests green (4 identity classes covered
with claim assertions + full ChatOrigin/MCP regression).
(cherry picked from commit b5d2cfbf98b39848d7139c743a0b81fea71e8ffe)
Replace java.util.Set.of / java.util.Map.of inline fully-qualified calls with
top-of-file imports per code style (test sources sync to the open-source repo).
* feat(mcp): forward authenticated user identity to opt-in STDIO MCP servers
A STDIO MCP server is one shared subprocess per configuration; its env is fixed
at spawn and STDIO has no per-request header channel, so per-user identity must
travel in-band with each tool call. Previously nothing carried it, so an MCP
server could not call its downstream REST backend on behalf of the acting user.
Inject the authenticated username (from ToolExecutionContext) into each tool
call's JSON arguments under the reserved key `__mateclaw_user__`, for servers an
operator explicitly opts in via `mateclaw.mcp.identity-forward.servers` (by name
or id). The MCP server reads/strips it and forwards on-behalf-of alongside its
own backend API key.
- McpIdentityForwardProperties: per-server opt-in allowlist (name or id).
- IdentityForwardingToolCallback: wraps an MCP callback, merges the username
into the args; injected by trusted code, overwrites any LLM-supplied value
(no spoofing); forwards unchanged when there is no user or args aren't an
object/are malformed.
- McpClientManager: captures server names; wraps opt-in servers' callbacks
inside the prefix wrapper (so name-prefixing / return-direct still see the raw
delegate). Non-opt-in servers are untouched — username never leaks to them.
- Tests: injection, LLM-value overwrite, empty/non-object/malformed inputs,
no-user passthrough, opt-in matching by id/name.
- Docs (zh/en mcp.md): opt-in config, `__mateclaw_user__` contract, FastMCP
Python skeleton, trust model.
Default off (empty allowlist) — zero behavior change for existing servers.
Plaintext username suits a trusted-network REST backend keyed by an API key;
a signed short-lived token is noted as the stronger-isolation follow-up.
* feat(mcp): add signed-token trust model for MCP identity forwarding
Plaintext username forwarding makes the REST backend trust an unverifiable
assertion from the (shared, LLM-adjacent) MCP service — a confused-deputy model.
Add an opt-in signed-token mode so identity crosses the trust boundary as a
short-lived RS256 JWT the backend can verify with a public key.
- McpIdentityForwardProperties: nested `token` config (enabled, issuer,
ttl-seconds, key-id, private-key-pem, audiences) + USER_ARG/TOKEN_ARG keys.
- McpIdentityForwardService: resolves the injection — plaintext username
(__mateclaw_user__) when token mode off, else a minted RS256 JWT
(__mateclaw_token__) with sub=user, aud=server, short exp, jti. Lazy key
parse; fail-closed when token mode is on but the key is missing/unparseable
(no silent downgrade to plaintext). Signs with MateClaw's private key so the
backend only needs the public key (cannot mint/impersonate).
- IdentityForwardingToolCallback: now delegates the what-to-inject decision to
the service (keyed by per-server audience); static withClaim() keeps the
JSON-merge logic (overwrites LLM-supplied key, leaves non-object/malformed
args untouched).
- McpClientManager: injects the service; passes service + audience through the
wrap path for opt-in servers only.
- Tests: token mint+verify (with an in-test RSA keypair, asserting sub/aud/iss/
exp/jti), plaintext mode, no-user and no-key fail-closed, audience resolution.
- Docs (zh/en): token config, key generation, claims, REST-side verification
example, public-key distribution + JWKS-endpoint follow-up.
Default unchanged: token.enabled=false → plaintext (back-compat); whole feature
still opt-in per server and off by default.
mate_memory_recall.filename is VARCHAR(256), but the snippet-level recall
tracker assembles the key as `path + '#' + H2-heading-slug`. When the LLM
writes an over-long daily-note heading (the summarize prompt placed no
length cap on the `##` title), the CJK-preserving slug pushes the filename
past the column, and writes fail with Data too long / string too long.
Three layers of defence, root cause + hard caps:
1. prompt (source) — summarize-system.txt now asks for short (≤30 chars)
`##` titles; details go in the body, not the heading.
2. slug cap (close to source) — MemoryRecallTracker.sanitizeSectionKey
caps the slug at MAX_SECTION_SLUG=200, leaving path+'#' well under 256.
3. write-side cap (catches every path) — MemoryRecallService.recordRecall
truncates filename to MAX_FILENAME_LENGTH=255 at the entry point, so
the select/insert/update branches share one value and the dup-key
concurrency fallback still matches. Covers trackActiveRetrieval too,
which bypasses sanitizeSectionKey.
Tests: MemoryRecallFilenameTruncationTest covers both caps (over-long CJK
heading, normal heading untouched, ascii slug, date prefix survives) plus
an end-to-end assertion that the stored value fits VARCHAR(256). Existing
memory-suite unit tests still green.
