- Shell scan: a token normalizing to the filesystem root (//, /., /..) is
only skipped when the command carries no destructive verb; with
rm/rmdir/shred/srm present the scan fails closed, so 'rm -rf //' is
refused while sed empty replacements (s/pattern//) stay allowed.
- Chat-upload fallback: a boundary violation is waived only when the
requested path itself normalizes inside one of the conversation's
candidate upload directories; a basename match against a stored
attachment no longer clears the violation. Resolver/DB failures keep
the BLOCK finding. The unused candidate-roots resolve overload is
removed.
- Regression tests for destructive root tokens, sed allowance, the
fail-closed compound case, stored-upload-path allowance, basename
collisions, cross-conversation paths, and resolver failure.
Skip absolute-path tokens that normalize to the filesystem root in the shell boundary scan (shell syntax like sed's s/pattern// was misread as a path outside the workspace), and add a DB-backed chat-upload fallback in WorkspaceBoundaryGuardian: when a file-tool path triggers a boundary violation, resolve the conversation's real candidate upload roots so attachments stored in workspace-scoped directories are found even when the thread-local workspaceBasePath is null.
- explicit SecurityConfig authorization for /swagger-ui*, /v3/api-docs*, /webjars/**
- public for local/default profile; admin-only (ROLE_ADMIN) by default in production DB profiles
- override via MATECLAW_OPENAPI_EXPOSE_UI; add RANDOM_PORT integration tests and docs
execute_code (bash/sh/shell) bypassed the workspace boundary guard, so shell
code run through it could read/write/delete paths outside the workspace sandbox
(e.g. cat /etc/passwd) while the same paths were blocked for read_file and the
shell tools. Bring execute_code under the guard (scan only shell-language code,
report the code param), and trust the tool-result spill roots so a legitimate
spilled result stays readable. Adds regression tests.
- Fail closed to a global fallback sandbox root when a conversation has no
per-workspace base path, instead of leaving file/shell tools unconstrained
- Refuse shell commands that delete the workspace root directory itself
- Block workspace-boundary escapes at the policy layer before the approval
prompt, not only at execution time
- Approval bar now shows the actual command / target path being approved
Add an execute_code built-in tool that runs python/bash/node code the agent
writes on the fly, so a documentation-only skill (a SKILL.md with no bundled
scripts) can be acted on. Scoped runs inject the skill's secrets and run in
the skill directory; otherwise a private scratch directory is used. Host
secret env vars are scrubbed from the subprocess. execute_code is an
agent-wide capability, registered in the tool catalog (V143), and screened
by the tool guard with a dedicated set of destructive-pattern rules.
Tests cover python/bash/node execution, scratch-dir fallback, env scrubbing,
argument decoding, and guard gating.
1. Relative parent traversal in shell commands (HIGH)
validateShellCommand only scanned absolute path tokens, so commands
like `cat ../mateclaw/CLAUDE.md`, `cd .. && cat foo`, or
`ln -sf ../bar breakout` had no absolute path to trip the check.
From a workspace cwd that's a real escape — `..` segments resolve
against the JVM cwd at file-tool time and reach anywhere the user
can read.
Add a second pass: any token containing `..` as a path segment is
resolved against the workspace root via root.resolve(token).
normalize(); reject when the result falls outside. In-workspace
traversal like `subdir/../sibling` normalizes back inside and
passes. Identifiers without slashes (e.g. version strings with
`1.2..3`) are not treated as paths.
2. Shell validation and process working directory used different
context sources (MEDIUM)
execute_shell_command validated with the explicit ToolContext, but
buildShellProcess called WorkspacePathGuard.getWorkingDirectory()
(no-arg), which only sees the ThreadLocal fallback. Today the
ToolExecutionExecutor sets both so the discrepancy is latent, but
a future direct Spring AI invocation passing only ToolContext would
validate against one basePath and exec against another. Thread ctx
through buildShellProcess and call getWorkingDirectory(ctx) so
validation and execution agree on a single source of truth.
3. Absolute agent override could disable workspace scoping (MEDIUM)
resolveAgentBasePath accepted an absolute override verbatim, even
when it pointed outside the workspace root. An admin (or any
account with agent-edit permission) could set workspaceBasePath="/"
or another team's repo and bypass workspace boundaries entirely.
When a workspace has its own basePath, require absolute overrides
to sit underneath it. The caller in build() catches the rejection,
logs WARN, and falls back to the workspace basePath so chat stays
available rather than crashing agent construction. When the
workspace has no basePath there's no boundary to enforce, so legacy
behavior is preserved.
Test coverage: WorkspacePathGuardShellTest grows from 17 to 23 (six
new cases for `cd ..`, relative parent traversal, relative symlink
escape, deeper traversal, in-workspace normalization, and the
identifier false-positive guard). AgentGraphBuilderBasePathResolutionTest
grows from 7 to 10 (three new cases for in-workspace absolute,
outside-workspace absolute rejection, and no-workspace legacy
behavior). All 45 sandbox-area tests pass with no regressions.
The PRIVATE_ITEMS list contained the bare 'test' entry, which rsync
interprets as 'any directory named test at any depth' — so it caught
the root-level /test/ scratch directory (intended) AND every src/test/
under each module (not intended).
Pattern is already anchored to /test (root-only). This commit rsyncs
the accumulated src/test/ tree forward so opensource has the unit tests
that have been written / updated against existing src/main/ code since
the pattern regression. Going forward each per-commit sync will carry
src/test/ files along with the main change.
Full-stack AI assistant built on Spring AI Alibaba.
Features: ReAct Agent, Plan-and-Execute, MCP Protocol, Multi-Model, Multi-Channel.
Apache-2.0 License
