mateclaw/mateclaw-server
matevip c95df54949 harden(browser): re-check SSRF on every request + make metadata block unbypassable
Two SSRF hardenings on top of the private-network deployment mode:

1. Redirect / subresource re-validation. The SSRF guard previously ran only on
   the initial navigation URL in the tool layer, so a public page that 302s to
   169.254.169.254 (or a script fetch / img to a metadata IP) reached the target
   unchecked — worse now that private-network mode exists. Install a per-context
   request interceptor (BrowserLauncher.applyContextDefaults) that re-runs
   UrlSafetyChecker on every http(s) request and aborts blocked ones. Non-network
   schemes (data:/blob:/about:) pass through; unexpected checker faults fail open
   so a transient error cannot wedge the page (the initial URL was already checked).

2. Allowlist can no longer open a cloud-metadata endpoint. Metadata hostnames and
   IPs are now checked BEFORE the allowlist short-circuits, so an operator entry
   like 169.254.0.0/16 or metadata.google.internal can never expose instance
   metadata. Ordinary private-host allowlisting is unaffected (regression-tested).

Also correct the 192.0.0.192 comment (Oracle Cloud IMDS, not Azure).
2026-07-02 09:43:35 +08:00
..
src harden(browser): re-check SSRF on every request + make metadata block unbypassable 2026-07-02 09:43:35 +08:00
Dockerfile fix(docker): honor SPRING_PROFILES_ACTIVE instead of pinning the mysql profile 2026-06-14 16:47:16 +08:00
pom.xml fix(db): make KingbaseES driver opt-in and restore default SSRF guard 2026-06-14 10:34:35 +08:00
settings.xml build(maven): declare US + CN repositories in pom.xml, drop opaque mirror 2026-04-25 09:56:17 +08:00