Two new session-state mutations, both following the rename endpoint's
shape (PUT + {flag: true|false} body + visitorId/sessionId query):
- PUT /api/v1/channels/webchat/sessions/pinned — flips mate_conversation.pinned
- PUT /api/v1/channels/webchat/sessions/archive — flips mate_conversation.archived
Archive complements delete as a "soft-close" — the thread stays on disk
(history preserved, addressable, downloadable) but is hidden from the
default /sessions listing. Pin makes a thread sort first in the visitor's
listing, mirroring the admin-console behavior.
Archive dominates pin: an archived+pinned thread is still hidden by
default. Callers opt back in via includeArchived=true (added in PR 1).
ConversationService gains setArchived(), mirroring the existing
setPinned() pattern.
WebChatArchivePinTest (@SpringBootTest, 6 cases):
- pin flips column + view reflects pinned=1
- archive hides from default listing, includeArchived=true shows it,
un-archive restores
- archived+pinned still hidden (archive dominates)
- malformed body / wrong type → 400
- unknown sessionId → 404
- bad token → 401
Part of epic #355.
Closes the "no way to ban a single visitor without burning the global
JWT secret" gap from the epic. Two changes:
1. Token format: HMAC payload now includes exp, format is
`<base64sig>.<expEpochSec>`. Default TTL 7 days (VISITOR_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS).
Expiry participates in the HMAC, so bumping it client-side invalidates
the signature. /stream still mints fresh tokens on first contact — a
revoked visitor can start a new /stream (gets a new token), they just
can't use the old one on management endpoints.
2. WebChatTokenRevocationService — DB-backed registry (webchat_revoked_visitor
table from V148) with a 5-minute Caffeine cache in front. revoke() /
unrevoke() / isRevoked(). The cache accepts up to 10min eventual
consistency across instances — webchat is low-volume, and a fresh node
sees revocations immediately on cold cache. DB remains source of truth.
WebChatController.verifyVisitorToken becomes an instance method that chains
verifyVisitorTokenSignature (static, HMAC + exp) with isRevoked (instance,
DB + cache). All 9 management endpoints now check revocation transitively.
Admin endpoint: POST /api/v1/admin/webchat/revoked-visitor (and DELETE to
un-revoke). Mounted under /api/v1/admin/** so it requires a MateClaw JWT
— visitors can't reach it. Records an audit row (action=webchat.revoke-
visitor, resourceType=CHANNEL) via AuditEventService.
Tests:
- WebChatTokenRevocationTest (@SpringBootTest, 7 cases): revoke blocks
/sessions with 401, un-revoke restores, double-revoke idempotent,
expired token rejected even without revocation, /stream unaffected
(signature still verifies), admin endpoint inserts row + audit.
- WebChatVisitorTokenTest extended to 16 cases — added expired-token,
tampered-exp, and "differs when exp differs" coverage; existing
verify_* cases moved to verifyVisitorTokenSignature (the static half).
Regression: WebChatSchemaFieldsTest (5/5), WebChatCreateSessionTest (9/9),
WebChatSessionManagementTest (5/5), WebChatStopStreamTest (5/5).
Part of epic #355.
Schema foundations for the rest of the epic. Three additions:
1. mate_conversation.archived — INT default 0. Lets a visitor "soft-close"
a thread: stays on disk (history preserved, addressable, downloadable)
but excluded from default /sessions listing. Pinned/archived are
orthogonal; archive dominates (archived+pinned still hidden by default).
2. webchat_revoked_visitor — registry table consumed in PR 2 by the
WebChatTokenRevocationService. Unique on (channel_id, visitor_id, deleted)
so re-revoke is idempotent and deleted=1 un-revokes. Migration written
for all three DBs (h2 IF NOT EXISTS, MySQL INFORMATION_SCHEMA guard,
KingbaseES native IF NOT EXISTS) following the V147 pattern.
3. WebChatSessionView gains pinned/archived/streamStatus so the visitor-
side listing surfaces the same state the admin console sees. Closes
the "field exposure" gap from the epic.
loadVisitorSessions gains an includeArchived flag (default false) — the
default hides archived threads and excludes them from the empty-session
quota, since the visitor already declared they're done with them.
GET /sessions and GET /sessions/page thread an `includeArchived=true`
query param through.
Tests (WebChatSchemaFieldsTest, @SpringBootTest + H2 + V148):
- revoked-visitor table is queryable
- archived column is read/write
- view exposes pinned/archived/streamStatus
- archived hidden by default, visible with includeArchived=true
- archived empty threads don't saturate the 5-thread quota
Regression: WebChatCreateSessionTest (9/9), WebChatSessionManagementTest
(5/5) — both updated for the new includeArchived param.
Part of epic #355.
Until now webchat had no way to actually interrupt a running stream —
ChatController's /api/v1/chat/{id}/stop was technically permitAll'd but
silently no-op'd on webchat streams because WebChatController.chatStream
dropped the subscribe() return value, so ChatStreamTracker.requestStop
had no Disposable to dispose. Visitors could only "stop" client-side by
closing the SSE connection; the server-side LLM call kept running,
burning tokens and firing any side-effecting tools to completion.
Two changes (issue #353):
1. WebChatController.chatStream: keep the Disposable and register it
with streamTracker.setDisposable, mirroring ChatController#chatStream
line 495. Now requestStop actually disposes the Flux.
2. New endpoint POST /api/v1/channels/webchat/sessions/stop:
- Auth mirrors the other session-management endpoints: X-MC-Key +
X-MC-Visitor-Token + ownsConversation (404 on unknown sessionId,
so callers can't probe the namespace).
- Returns {stopped: true|false}; false means no active stream
(idempotent, not an error).
- No approval sweep — webchat has no MateClaw username and exposes
no approval UI today; defer until that surfaces.
WebChatStopStreamTest (@SpringBootTest, H2, V147) — 5 cases:
- stopActiveStream registers a real Flux.never() Disposable on the
tracker and asserts both stopped=true AND disposable.isDisposed(),
proving the chatStream wiring change is what makes the endpoint work.
- noActiveStreamReturnsFalse — idempotent path.
- bad token / bad API key → 401.
- unknown sessionId → 404.
Complements the implicit getOrCreate in /stream: lets a caller pre-create
an empty thread (message_count = 0) and receive sessionId / conversationId /
visitorToken up front, then decide when to send the first message via
/stream. Mirrors how downstream CRM/ticketing systems model "create the
conversation object first, message later".
Auth is the visitor's first touch — only X-MC-Key is required (no
X-MC-Visitor-Token, which the visitor can't have yet); the server signs
and returns a fresh visitorToken the caller must echo back on subsequent
GET/PUT/DELETE.
Behavior (issue #351):
- Idempotent on sessionId collision → returns the existing thread 200,
does NOT clobber title.
- Empty-session quota ≤ 5 per (channel, visitor); 409 with a clear
message when exceeded. Existing rows are exempt (re-create is idempotent).
- Caller-supplied title (1-100 chars) is persisted; absent title leaves
the default "新对话" so the first /stream user message still derives
it. getOrCreateWebchatConversation now accepts an optional title and
only writes it on insert (existing rows untouched).
- agentId override mirrors /stream's workspace check.
ConversationService.getOrCreateWebchatConversation gains a title-aware
overload; the original 5-arg signature delegates with title = null.
End-to-end coverage in WebChatCreateSessionTest (@SpringBootTest, H2
with V147 migration): happy path, caller-title survives first user
message, default-title still derived, idempotent collision, quota 409,
bad API key 401, illegal sessionId/title 400, listed after creation.
Two webchat hardening fixes:
- Session listing no longer pulls every system-owned conversation into
memory. listSessions/pageSessions went through listConversations(owner)
whose `username IN (owner, system)` loaded all IM/cron rows just to show
one visitor's handful of threads. New listWebchatConversations(username)
queries only the visitor's own rows; the channel prefix is matched
in-memory with a literal startsWith (so a '_'/'%' in the api key's first
8 chars can't act as a LIKE wildcard).
- Upload now enforces a per-conversation quota (file count + total bytes,
both configurable) so a visitor can't fill the disk with many
individually-under-cap files. Pairs with the existing staging TTL sweep.
When webchat:<key8>:<visitorId>:<sessionId> exceeds 64 chars the
conversationId folds visitorId+sessionId into an unrecoverable hash, so
the thread fell outside listSessions' conversationId-prefix filter and its
sessionId could not be recovered — the thread was invisible and
unaddressable (common with a UUID visitorId + a >10-char sessionId).
Persist the sessionId on creation (new nullable webchat_session_id column)
and enumerate by username + channel prefix (webchat:<key8>:), which also
matches the hashed form. sessionId is read from the column, falling back to
parsing the conversationId only for legacy rows.
Adds a @SpringBootTest covering listing (incl. the hashed thread), message
pagination, session paging/search, rename, and token rejection end-to-end.
Refs matevip/mateclaw#346
Bring the webchat visitor session API closer to the admin console's:
- GET /sessions/messages gains beforeId + limit. With a limit it returns
{messages, hasMore} (latest N, then pull-up for older) using the
external path-stripped view; without it, the full list as before.
- GET /sessions/page paginates + keyword-searches a visitor's threads
(in-memory: a visitor's thread set is bounded to its own namespace).
- PUT /sessions/title renames a thread (1-100 chars).
All keep the webchat auth model (API key + visitor token, server-derived
conversationId, ownership guard). Message views go through the shared
toExternalMessageViews helper so the paginated path is sanitized too.
Refs matevip/mateclaw#346
WebChat had no file support: the /stream body carried only text, and
agent-produced files had no visitor-reachable download path (the JWT
/chat/files endpoint is unreachable for API-key visitors).
Add webchat-authenticated file transfer, reusing MessageContentPart +
the existing upload dir + agent multimodal injection:
- WebChatFileService: validate (size cap, extension whitelist, filename
sanitize), store under the conversation's upload dir, stage by opaque
fileId, traversal-safe resolve. Untrusted-uploader hardening lives here.
- POST /upload (multipart) and GET /files, both authed by API key +
visitor token with a server-derived conversationId (never client paths).
Downloads send non-images as attachment + X-Content-Type-Options:nosniff.
- /stream gains attachmentIds; the server resolves each id from the
staging registry (client metadata is never trusted), builds parts, and
persists them on the user message so the agent's multimodal/file tools
pick them up from history — same path as the JWT web chat.
- Strip server-side file paths from the visitor-facing message view
(listMessageViewsExternal + includePath flag) so the filesystem layout
is not disclosed.
Refs matevip/mateclaw#342
The disk fallback's catch block logged at debug, so a failed scan
silently dropped recovered files — reproducing the same 'bot can't see
the file' symptom the fallback was added to fix. Promote to warn with
the full stack trace, matching cacheRecentFile's logging.
loadRecentFilesFromDisk now filters out files older than RECENT_FILE_TTL_MINUTES
(60 min) so the disk fallback matches the Caffeine cache TTL and does not inject
stale attachments into future conversations.
Testability refactoring:
- recentFileCache: private → package-private (tests can seed the cache directly)
- chatUploadsRoot: new package-private Path field (tests redirect to @TempDir)
- loadRecentFilesFromDisk: add (Path dir, long cutoffMs) package-private overload;
private (String) wrapper delegates to it
- injectRecentFiles: private → package-private
New test class FeishuRecentFileCacheTest (14 cases):
- loadRecentFilesFromDisk: non-existent dir, empty dir, fresh files sorted
newest-first, stale files excluded by TTL, mixed fresh+stale, >5 files capped,
timestamp-prefix stripping, MIME guessing from extension
- injectRecentFiles: Caffeine cache hit, cache-miss disk fallback, empty disk,
duplicate-path dedup, image vs file part typing, null textContent guard
Relates to #325
The per-chat recent file cache (Caffeine, 60 min TTL) is purely
in-memory. After a process restart, GC eviction, or TTL expiry the
cache is empty, but the staged copies under data/chat-uploads/ survive
on disk. A follow-up text message that should have seen the cached file
instead found nothing — the bot replied as if no file was ever sent.
Changes:
- injectRecentFiles(): fall back to scanning data/chat-uploads/{id}/
when the Caffeine cache misses, sorted by last-modified time, capped
at RECENT_FILE_MAX_PER_CHAT (5).
- cacheRecentFile(): promote catch log from debug → warn with full
stack trace so silent download failures are visible in production
logs. Add entry-level info log for correlation.
- New helper loadRecentFilesFromDisk() + guessContentType().
Closes#325
Relates to #201
Add KingbaseES support as an opt-in profile: dedicated migration tree, bilingual seed data, runtime DbType detection (KINGBASE_ES / POSTGRE_SQL), and JDBC URL handling in the datasource manager.
The webchat conversationId (webchat:<key8>:<visitorId>[:<sessionId>]) and the
derived username (webchat:<visitorId>) are written to VARCHAR(64) columns, but
visitorId had no validation and sessionId allows 64 chars — so a long visitorId,
or a legitimate 64-char sessionId, overflows the column and the getOrCreateConversation
INSERT throws (500 on /stream). Validate visitorId (charset + blank->UUID) and
fold the variable part into a stable hash when the derived id/username would
exceed 64 chars, keeping short ids byte-identical (backward compatible). Also
make listSessions filter on exact owner username, not just the conversationId
prefix, so system-owned rows can never leak via a crafted visitorId. Adds
boundary regression tests.
Add per-visitor session management for the WebChat Web/API access mode:
list a visitor's conversation threads, fetch a thread's messages, and
delete a thread.
Authorization: visitorId is a client-asserted request param, so it cannot
be trusted on its own — deriving conversationId from it and then checking
ownership against it is tautological (any caller passes). Instead, /stream
issues a per-visitor token = HMAC-SHA256(jwtSecret, channelId:visitorId),
returned in the meta event; the management endpoints require it back via
the X-MC-Visitor-Token header and verify it in constant time. The signing
secret is server-only (unlike the public channel API key) and the channelId
in the payload makes tokens non-portable across channels.
Includes regression tests for token issuance/verification semantics
(forged visitorId rejected, cross-visitor and cross-channel tokens rejected,
tampered tokens rejected).
The WebChat stream endpoint resolves agentId only when the
(visitorId + sessionId) conversation is first created; later requests
with a different agentId reuse the existing conversation's agent and
silently ignore the new value. Document this on WebChatRequest.agentId
so integrators know to use a new sessionId to reach another agent.
The mention alias-learning fed every identifier of every mention in a
delivery into the per-chat alias cache. A single delivery of "@bot @alice"
matched the bot by its global id and then learned alice's openId as a bot
alias, so every later "@alice" message was misdetected as @bot and the agent
replied to messages never addressed to it.
Only single-mention deliveries are unambiguous bot identities, so restrict
alias learning to them — a multi-mention delivery mixes the bot with
co-mentioned humans, and Feishu's dual-delivery alias form is itself a single
mention, so this is safe and keeps the learning feature working. Also cap the
per-chat alias set size. Adds a [bot, human] co-mention regression test.
Rename the webchat channel from "embed widget" to "Web / API access" (key
unchanged, docs/i18n only) and extend the backend SSE endpoint for pure
backend integration:
- WebChatRequest gains optional agentId (route one Key to multiple agents;
rejected unless the agent shares the channel's workspace) and sessionId
(one visitor, multiple isolated threads).
- sessionId is validated ([A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}) and only composed into the
server-derived conversationId — raw conversationIds are never accepted, so
the key+visitor namespace still bounds every thread.
- A `meta` SSE event echoes the effective sessionId/conversationId at stream
start so callers can persist and re-address a thread.
- Memory stays attributed per visitor (api:<visitorId>), shared across that
visitor's sessions.
All new fields are optional; omitting them reproduces the prior behaviour
byte-for-byte. Refs matevip/mateclaw#295.
ChannelMessageEventBridge.onChannelMessage() ran synchronously on the Lark
SDK WebSocket dispatch thread; when the DB pool was saturated its ingest
query blocked that thread and subsequent messages were silently dropped.
- @Async moves trigger ingest onto the (vthread + SecurityContext-propagating)
async executor, freeing the WS dispatch thread.
- Add a 10s timeout to the refreshTenantAccessToken() HTTP request, which
previously had none.
Scope narrowed per review to only fix#208: the @mention alias learning and
session-id changes are dropped (to be raised as separate PRs), and dev's
existing message dedup is left untouched.
Closes#208
Same-message attachment reads failed on Feishu: the content part carried the sandbox-external ~/.mateclaw/media/ path, so read_file/extract_document_text were rejected by WorkspacePathGuard and ChatUploadResolver's basename fallback missed (media names {messageId}_{key} vs chat-uploads {millis}_{fileName}). cacheRecentFile already copies the attachment into the per-conversation data/chat-uploads/ dir; return that absolute path and stamp it onto the current message's image/file/audio/media parts so the path surfaced to the LLM is resolver-reachable. Reuses the existing copy — no extra I/O, no new state. Rich-text post multi-image and other channels sharing the media dir are noted as follow-ups.
Closes#278
Streaming chat ran render tools on an async thread with no bound request,
so download links lost their host and arrived without a domain. Resolve the
host on the request thread and carry it through ChatOrigin/ToolContext;
falls back to a configurable public-base-url, then a relative path.
stopWebSocket() only nullified the wsClient reference without calling
disconnect() on the SDK client. This left the old WebSocket connection's
pingLoop thread and ExecutorService running, leaking file descriptors
and threads on each reconnect. Over time, accumulated leaks prevented
new connections from being established, causing the Feishu channel to
silently stop receiving messages.
Fix: use reflection to access the SDK's protected `conn` field and call
close(1000) on the OkHttp WebSocket, triggering the SDK's onClosed →
disconnect() cleanup chain.
Note: oapi-sdk 2.7.1 adds a public close() method that would make this
reflection unnecessary. Consider upgrading as a follow-up.
Closes#220
IM channels (Feishu, DingTalk, WeCom, etc.) and the WebChat widget were
calling saveMessage without token usage parameters, causing promptTokens
and completionTokens to default to 0. This made the Token Statistics
module report significantly lower numbers than actual usage.
Root cause: the _usage_final event (containing promptTokens /
completionTokens) emitted by the agent graph at stream end was not being
captured in these paths, unlike ChatController's StreamAccumulator which
already handles it correctly.
Fix: capture _usage_final events in doOnNext handlers for:
- ChannelMessageRouter sync path (non-streaming IM adapters)
- ChannelMessageRouter streaming path (DingTalk, etc.)
- WebChatController SSE stream
Refs #214 (remaining String-API paths covered by follow-up).
The Lark SDK throws HandlerNotFoundException for any event type without
a registered handler. This exception is caught internally by the SDK's
WebSocket client, which then sends a 500 response to the Feishu server.
The server may close the connection as a result, and the exception is
swallowed — never reaching the application layer.
Added empty handlers for all remaining IM event types:
- P2MessageReadV1 (read receipts)
- P2MessageRecalledV1 (message recall)
- P2ChatMemberBotDeletedV1 (bot removed from chat)
- P2ChatMemberUserAddedV1 / UserDeletedV1 / UserWithdrawnV1
- P2ChatUpdatedV1 (chat info update)
- P2ChatDisbandedV1 (chat disbanded)
- P2ChatAccessEventBotP2pChatEnteredV1 (bot entered p2p chat)
Also added explicit logback config for com.lark.oapi at WARN level
to ensure SDK internal errors are not silently filtered.
Refs: larksuite/oapi-sdk-java#185
Closes#162
require_mention=true previously degraded to a no-op when botPrefix was unset:
shouldProcess() returned true for all messages and checkAccess() fell through
unconditionally, so any group message would be answered — including ones where
the @mention targeted another user.
FeishuChannelAdapter now consults the Feishu SDK's mentions field directly:
- WebSocket: read EventMessage.getMentions(); webhook: read mentions[] from the
JSON payload. In both paths each mention's id.open_id is compared against the
bot's own open_id.
- Bot open_id is fetched lazily via /open-apis/bot/v3/info and cached on the
adapter instance. If the call fails the message is allowed through, matching
the previous behaviour.
- The require_mention gate is applied at the top of handleFeishuMessage so 1:1
chats are unaffected.
Tests: 15 unit cases covering null/empty inputs, bot mentioned, only-other
mentioned, bot among multiple mentions, and malformed payloads.
Register a no-op handler for the bot-added-to-chat event on the Feishu WebSocket EventDispatcher. Without it, adding the bot to a group chat raises HandlerNotFoundException and drops the long connection. Mirrors the existing reaction-event handlers. Fixes#153.
The Feishu SDK EventDispatcher had no handler registered for im.message.reaction.created_v1 / deleted_v1, so adding or removing an emoji reaction raised HandlerNotFoundException and logged an ERROR stack trace. Register no-op handlers to silently ignore these events.
Group-chat reply slot fallback:
- The platform blocks proactive sends in group chats; outbound paths
(cron summaries, async-task completions, generated image/music/3D
delivery, TTS audio) silently failed because they fell through to
the proactive-send command. New bounded LRU maps each group chat
to its most recent inbound frame id; the dispatcher prefers that
reply slot and falls through to proactive only for single chats.
- Centralised text and media dispatch through a single helper so the
group rule never has to be re-implemented per outbound path.
Upload size pre-check + auto-downgrade:
- Without client-side limits, oversized uploads streamed for ~1 minute
before the server rejected at the finish step — users saw nothing
arrive in their chat. The new decision layer mirrors the platform's
hard limits and produces three outcomes: rejected with a friendly
reason, downgraded to a generic file delivery with an inline note,
or pass-through unchanged.
- Files over 20MB reject. Images / videos over their 10MB limit
downgrade to file. Voice content that isn't AMR or exceeds 2MB
downgrades. AMR voice within 2MB stays native.
appmsg inbound parsing:
- Forwarded complex messages (document transfers, article links,
miniprogram cards) used to fall into the inbound switch's default
branch and silently drop. The new branch flattens four sub-types
into a text marker the agent reads plus any media that needs to
reach downstream tools — document forwards reuse the same magic-
byte sniff and per-conversation upload layout as native file
inbound, so extension recovery and chat-uploads serving work
identically.
- Article links produce "[链接] title\ndescription\nurl" so the agent
can summarize without round-tripping. Miniprograms surface their
title. Unknown sub-types still emit a generic marker so the agent
is never blind.
WeCom quoted-message context:
- Parse the body.quote field that arrives alongside any inbound message
(text / image / voice / file / mixed sub-types). When a user long-
presses a previous bot bubble and types a follow-up like "解释一下",
the agent now sees both the user's new text and the referenced
content as proper context — replies stay on topic instead of
guessing what was being explained.
- Quoted images / files are downloaded through the same pipeline as
inbound new media (magic-byte sniff, ZIP container peek for
DOCX / XLSX / PPTX recovery, chat-uploads layout) so the vision
sidecar and document tools can actually analyse what was quoted.
- Reading order in the assembled prompt: "[引用消息: ...]\n<user text>"
first, then quoted media parts, then the user's own current-message
media. Mixed quotes flatten into a space-joined summary.
Multimodal sidecar settings preservation:
- The bulk settings PUT used to unconditionally overwrite the vision /
video sidecar model ids — null in a partial payload became "" in
the DB, silently wiping the configured sidecar every time a user
saved an unrelated settings page (System / Music / Image / etc.).
Symptom: "I picked a vision model, saved a different settings tab,
now the bot can't see images anymore."
- Bulk save now guards both keys with non-null checks, matching the
pattern used for music / 3D / image / video / tts / stt blocks.
- A dedicated /settings/sidecar endpoint always writes both keys, so
the sidecar UI can still explicitly clear via null without leaking
the write-on-null semantics into every other settings save.
- Frontend sidecar card switches to the dedicated endpoint; other
settings pages keep their existing partial-payload behaviour.
Inbound (WeCom):
- Save uploaded media under data/chat-uploads/{conversationId}/ with full
fileName/path/fileUrl/storedName/fileSize on the content part. Web mirrors
of an IM conversation now show real thumbnails instead of "未命名".
- Magic-byte sniff (PDF / PNG / JPEG / GIF / Office / ODF / archives /
audio / video) recovers a real extension when the platform omits filename
for forwarded files — no more PDFs labelled "file.bin".
- ZIP container peek distinguishes DOCX / XLSX / PPTX / VSDX / ODT / ODS /
ODP / EPUB / JAR from a plain zip via discriminator paths and the OASIS
mimetype entry.
Outbound (WeCom):
- Chunk upload field name corrected so server-side actually stores the
bytes — file messages used to arrive with correct filename/size but
empty content, breaking every PDF / DOCX / PPTX recipient.
- Scan agent text for served-file URLs in both the text-reply and
content-parts paths; fetch bytes from the in-memory generated-file
cache and dispatch through the native chunk upload + media message
protocol so users receive a tappable file card instead of an
unopenable markdown link. Cache miss surfaces a clear retry hint.
Async tool result forwarding:
- New AsyncTaskMediaDispatcher routes generation completions (image,
video, music, 3D model) to whichever IM channel the conversation is
bound to via ChannelSessionStore + ChannelManager. Web / webchat
conversations are intentionally skipped — their SSE stream already
renders the result.
- Wired into all four generation services so IM users actually receive
generated media as native attachments. Each part now carries an
absolute disk path so adapters read bytes locally instead of round-
tripping through an authenticated served URL.
Slack native file upload:
- SlackChannelAdapter overrides the content-parts dispatch. Image /
audio / video / file / model3d parts ride filesUploadV2 so users see a
file card with preview thumbnail bound to the same thread as the
originating message. Text parts continue through chat.postMessage.
- Resolves bytes from the part's local path, falls back to an HTTP fetch
of fully-qualified URLs.
IM approval hint visibility:
- IM-driven approve / deny / auto-cancel / replay-error hints now go
through saveMessage + tracker broadcast in addition to the channel
adapter, so a Web mirror viewing the same conversationId sees the
resolution. Previously hints reached only the IM channel; the Web
admin console had no record of the outcome.
Adaptive paste-merge debounce:
- WeCom and other IM clients silently split long pasted prompts into
fragments that arrive 0.5-2 seconds apart, missing the existing 500ms
merge window. The agent then saw torn context and emitted multiple
conflicting replies.
- When the merged buffer crosses a content-length threshold, extend the
debounce window so subsequent fragments arrive in time. Default
500ms unchanged for normal short messages.
