Complements the implicit getOrCreate in /stream: lets a caller pre-create
an empty thread (message_count = 0) and receive sessionId / conversationId /
visitorToken up front, then decide when to send the first message via
/stream. Mirrors how downstream CRM/ticketing systems model "create the
conversation object first, message later".
Auth is the visitor's first touch — only X-MC-Key is required (no
X-MC-Visitor-Token, which the visitor can't have yet); the server signs
and returns a fresh visitorToken the caller must echo back on subsequent
GET/PUT/DELETE.
Behavior (issue #351):
- Idempotent on sessionId collision → returns the existing thread 200,
does NOT clobber title.
- Empty-session quota ≤ 5 per (channel, visitor); 409 with a clear
message when exceeded. Existing rows are exempt (re-create is idempotent).
- Caller-supplied title (1-100 chars) is persisted; absent title leaves
the default "新对话" so the first /stream user message still derives
it. getOrCreateWebchatConversation now accepts an optional title and
only writes it on insert (existing rows untouched).
- agentId override mirrors /stream's workspace check.
ConversationService.getOrCreateWebchatConversation gains a title-aware
overload; the original 5-arg signature delegates with title = null.
End-to-end coverage in WebChatCreateSessionTest (@SpringBootTest, H2
with V147 migration): happy path, caller-title survives first user
message, default-title still derived, idempotent collision, quota 409,
bad API key 401, illegal sessionId/title 400, listed after creation.
Two webchat hardening fixes:
- Session listing no longer pulls every system-owned conversation into
memory. listSessions/pageSessions went through listConversations(owner)
whose `username IN (owner, system)` loaded all IM/cron rows just to show
one visitor's handful of threads. New listWebchatConversations(username)
queries only the visitor's own rows; the channel prefix is matched
in-memory with a literal startsWith (so a '_'/'%' in the api key's first
8 chars can't act as a LIKE wildcard).
- Upload now enforces a per-conversation quota (file count + total bytes,
both configurable) so a visitor can't fill the disk with many
individually-under-cap files. Pairs with the existing staging TTL sweep.
When webchat:<key8>:<visitorId>:<sessionId> exceeds 64 chars the
conversationId folds visitorId+sessionId into an unrecoverable hash, so
the thread fell outside listSessions' conversationId-prefix filter and its
sessionId could not be recovered — the thread was invisible and
unaddressable (common with a UUID visitorId + a >10-char sessionId).
Persist the sessionId on creation (new nullable webchat_session_id column)
and enumerate by username + channel prefix (webchat:<key8>:), which also
matches the hashed form. sessionId is read from the column, falling back to
parsing the conversationId only for legacy rows.
Adds a @SpringBootTest covering listing (incl. the hashed thread), message
pagination, session paging/search, rename, and token rejection end-to-end.
Refs matevip/mateclaw#346
WebChat had no file support: the /stream body carried only text, and
agent-produced files had no visitor-reachable download path (the JWT
/chat/files endpoint is unreachable for API-key visitors).
Add webchat-authenticated file transfer, reusing MessageContentPart +
the existing upload dir + agent multimodal injection:
- WebChatFileService: validate (size cap, extension whitelist, filename
sanitize), store under the conversation's upload dir, stage by opaque
fileId, traversal-safe resolve. Untrusted-uploader hardening lives here.
- POST /upload (multipart) and GET /files, both authed by API key +
visitor token with a server-derived conversationId (never client paths).
Downloads send non-images as attachment + X-Content-Type-Options:nosniff.
- /stream gains attachmentIds; the server resolves each id from the
staging registry (client metadata is never trusted), builds parts, and
persists them on the user message so the agent's multimodal/file tools
pick them up from history — same path as the JWT web chat.
- Strip server-side file paths from the visitor-facing message view
(listMessageViewsExternal + includePath flag) so the filesystem layout
is not disclosed.
Refs matevip/mateclaw#342
loadRecentFilesFromDisk now filters out files older than RECENT_FILE_TTL_MINUTES
(60 min) so the disk fallback matches the Caffeine cache TTL and does not inject
stale attachments into future conversations.
Testability refactoring:
- recentFileCache: private → package-private (tests can seed the cache directly)
- chatUploadsRoot: new package-private Path field (tests redirect to @TempDir)
- loadRecentFilesFromDisk: add (Path dir, long cutoffMs) package-private overload;
private (String) wrapper delegates to it
- injectRecentFiles: private → package-private
New test class FeishuRecentFileCacheTest (14 cases):
- loadRecentFilesFromDisk: non-existent dir, empty dir, fresh files sorted
newest-first, stale files excluded by TTL, mixed fresh+stale, >5 files capped,
timestamp-prefix stripping, MIME guessing from extension
- injectRecentFiles: Caffeine cache hit, cache-miss disk fallback, empty disk,
duplicate-path dedup, image vs file part typing, null textContent guard
Relates to #325
The webchat conversationId (webchat:<key8>:<visitorId>[:<sessionId>]) and the
derived username (webchat:<visitorId>) are written to VARCHAR(64) columns, but
visitorId had no validation and sessionId allows 64 chars — so a long visitorId,
or a legitimate 64-char sessionId, overflows the column and the getOrCreateConversation
INSERT throws (500 on /stream). Validate visitorId (charset + blank->UUID) and
fold the variable part into a stable hash when the derived id/username would
exceed 64 chars, keeping short ids byte-identical (backward compatible). Also
make listSessions filter on exact owner username, not just the conversationId
prefix, so system-owned rows can never leak via a crafted visitorId. Adds
boundary regression tests.
Add per-visitor session management for the WebChat Web/API access mode:
list a visitor's conversation threads, fetch a thread's messages, and
delete a thread.
Authorization: visitorId is a client-asserted request param, so it cannot
be trusted on its own — deriving conversationId from it and then checking
ownership against it is tautological (any caller passes). Instead, /stream
issues a per-visitor token = HMAC-SHA256(jwtSecret, channelId:visitorId),
returned in the meta event; the management endpoints require it back via
the X-MC-Visitor-Token header and verify it in constant time. The signing
secret is server-only (unlike the public channel API key) and the channelId
in the payload makes tokens non-portable across channels.
Includes regression tests for token issuance/verification semantics
(forged visitorId rejected, cross-visitor and cross-channel tokens rejected,
tampered tokens rejected).
Both failed on dev independently of the recent merges (confirmed against a
pre-merge baseline):
- MemorySummarizationStructuredRoutingTest reflected applyStructuredEntries by
its old (Long, JsonNode) signature; owner-isolation added a trailing ownerKey
param. Update the reflective lookup to (Long, JsonNode, String) and the
remember() verifications to the 6-arg overload.
- ToolGuardCardHandlerTest still asserted the old 'system-owned pending accepts
any clicker' behavior, but the handler now rejects a group click on a
system/cron-owned approval fail-closed (no human requester to match), routing
it to the admin console. Assert no synthetic injection + the unauthorized card
render instead.
The mention alias-learning fed every identifier of every mention in a
delivery into the per-chat alias cache. A single delivery of "@bot @alice"
matched the bot by its global id and then learned alice's openId as a bot
alias, so every later "@alice" message was misdetected as @bot and the agent
replied to messages never addressed to it.
Only single-mention deliveries are unambiguous bot identities, so restrict
alias learning to them — a multi-mention delivery mixes the bot with
co-mentioned humans, and Feishu's dual-delivery alias form is itself a single
mention, so this is safe and keeps the learning feature working. Also cap the
per-chat alias set size. Adds a [bot, human] co-mention regression test.
Closes#162
require_mention=true previously degraded to a no-op when botPrefix was unset:
shouldProcess() returned true for all messages and checkAccess() fell through
unconditionally, so any group message would be answered — including ones where
the @mention targeted another user.
FeishuChannelAdapter now consults the Feishu SDK's mentions field directly:
- WebSocket: read EventMessage.getMentions(); webhook: read mentions[] from the
JSON payload. In both paths each mention's id.open_id is compared against the
bot's own open_id.
- Bot open_id is fetched lazily via /open-apis/bot/v3/info and cached on the
adapter instance. If the call fails the message is allowed through, matching
the previous behaviour.
- The require_mention gate is applied at the top of handleFeishuMessage so 1:1
chats are unaffected.
Tests: 15 unit cases covering null/empty inputs, bot mentioned, only-other
mentioned, bot among multiple mentions, and malformed payloads.
The PRIVATE_ITEMS list contained the bare 'test' entry, which rsync
interprets as 'any directory named test at any depth' — so it caught
the root-level /test/ scratch directory (intended) AND every src/test/
under each module (not intended).
Pattern is already anchored to /test (root-only). This commit rsyncs
the accumulated src/test/ tree forward so opensource has the unit tests
that have been written / updated against existing src/main/ code since
the pattern regression. Going forward each per-commit sync will carry
src/test/ files along with the main change.
- ConversationWindowManager: cap reserve token at 50% of effective max
to prevent negative historyBudget on small-context models (8K/16K)
- common.security.SecretEquals: new constant-time comparison utility
(MessageDigest.isEqual wrapper) for secrets/tokens/signatures
- WeixinChannelAdapter: migrate context_token comparison to SecretEquals
- FeishuChannelAdapter: fail-fast on empty encrypt_key when connection_mode=webhook
- TelegramChannelAdapter: sanitize attachment captions — strip control bytes
(\p{Cc} except \t\r\n) + format chars (\p{Cf}) + 4096 char cap
- AgentGraphBuilder: fallback Anthropic max_tokens to 4096 on null/0/negative
Tests: SecretEqualsTest (5) + TelegramCaptionSanitizeTest (5) — all green.
