Follow-up to #447. The generated-file link extraction accepted any
non-')' text before the path, so a paren-free javascript:/data: URL
embedding /api/v1/files/generated/<id> could be captured and bound to an
<a href>, enabling XSS on click. Adopt the scheme-restricted pattern
already used by SegmentSupersedeDetector and the channel adapters, on
both backend (ChatController) and frontend (useChat). Also replace the
inline fully-qualified Pattern/Matcher with imports and drop an unused
run-overview i18n key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extract generated-file download links from tool results — on the backend (persisted to message metadata for history) and on the frontend (live during SSE) — de-duplicate by URL, and render them as a Generated Files section with file-type icons and a rail badge.
Every endpoint now binds its independent id param to an authorized KB: rawId/chunkId resolve-then-workspace-check, pageId is asserted to belong to the path kbId, and slugs stay kbId-scoped. Adds unit tests for same-KB/cross-KB/unknown cases.
Pure style cleanup, zero behavior change: replace inline FQN return type in WikiRawMaterialService.listFailures with an import + simple name, and translate the new WikiRawMaterialEntity field Javadocs to English.
Propagates structured error codes through the KB processing pipeline, surfaces silent sub-step warnings as a non-failure warning state, and adds a cross-KB failure center for aggregated visibility.
Lets an employee pin an ordered fallback chain of (provider, model) entries; the same provider may appear multiple times with different models. Build-time dedup keys on exact (provider, model).
Jackson treated the @JsonCreator factory method as a properties creator
(matching the 'instructions' parameter name to the JSON field), not a
string/delegating creator, so plain-string values still failed at runtime
with "no String-argument constructor/factory method".
Replace with @JsonDeserialize + StdDeserializer that explicitly checks
VALUE_STRING vs START_OBJECT tokens, handling both shorthand strings and
full {instructions, template} objects.
- resolveAgentBasePath: the relative-override branch now normalizes the
resolved path and rejects values that escape the workspace root via "../"
(the absolute branch already did this), keeping attachment/media/tool I/O
contained when an agent's workspaceBasePath is a relative override.
- cleanAttachmentFiles: return early on a null/blank conversationId so a bare
upload root can never be walked and deleted wholesale.
- Translate the chat-upload Javadoc/comments to English (cleanAttachmentFiles,
BaseAgent image-path resolver) per code style.
- Add a resolver test for the relative-override escape fallback.
Strict OpenAI-compatible providers reject the /chat/completions request
with HTTP 400 when an assistant message in history carries a tool call
whose function.arguments is not parseable JSON. Normalize blank or
non-JSON arguments to "{}" at the send chokepoint so streaming,
history-replay, and older-persisted tool calls all stay well-formed.
SsoService / SsoStateService / SsoController / SsoProviderRegistry were
unconditional component-scanned beans, but their configuration
(SsoProperties) is only registered by the conditional auto-configuration.
With SSO disabled (the default) the services were still instantiated and
startup failed: "required a bean of type SsoProperties that could not be
found". Gate the four beans on the same mateclaw.sso.enabled=true
condition so the SSO stack loads as a unit — disabled = no beans and no
exposed endpoints; enabled = the auto-configuration provides SsoProperties
and everything wires.
Verified: backend starts clean with SSO disabled (default).
- Replace inline fully-qualified names with top-of-file imports across
SsoService / SsoStateService / FeishuSsoProvider (ObjectMapper, Autowired,
Map.of, Date, DuplicateKeyException, Mac, URLEncoder) per code style.
- createSsoUser: roll back the freshly inserted user on any non-duplicate
identity-insert failure, preventing passwordless orphan accounts. The two
inserts share no transaction — the method is self-invoked and the enclosing
callback performs a network call, so a method-level @Transactional would not
apply; an explicit rollback in the catch is the correct guard here.
* feat(sso): feishu OAuth2 single sign-on (ISSUE #405 P0)
Implements the SSO design (ISSUE #405) with feishu as the first IdP
and a generic OAuth2 provider abstraction for future dingtalk/wecom
extensions. SSO is disabled by default — existing deployments are
unaffected until mateclaw.sso.enabled=true.
Backend:
- SsoProvider interface + SsoUserInfo record: generic IdP abstraction
- FeishuSsoProvider: OAuth2 authorization-code flow (app_access_token
with Caffeine cache → user_access_token → user info). apiBase switches
between feishu.cn / larksuite.com by domain config.
- SsoProviderRegistry: conditional registration, lists enabled providers
- SsoStateService: HMAC-signed OAuth2 state + self-contained bind_token
JWT, both persisted to sso_state DB table for multi-node correctness.
State is one-time-consumable (conditional UPDATE), bind_token jti
anti-replay via PK insert. Hourly ShedLock purge (LambdaQuery + Java
time, works on all 3 dialects).
- SsoService: authorize/callback/bind, user mapping (union_id first →
external_id fallback), auto-create with concurrent idempotency
(DuplicateKeyException → rollback orphan user → re-query), link-only
mode issues bind_token for existing-account binding.
- SsoController: 4 endpoints (/providers, /authorize, /callback, /bind)
all permitAll.
- V159 migration (h2/mysql/kingbase): mate_user_external_identity,
sso_state, ALTER mate_user.password NULL (SSO-only users).
- AuthService: generateToken promoted to public; login() guards
password=null (SSO-only users cannot password-login).
- SecurityConfig: /auth/sso/** added to permitAll whitelist.
- LoginRateLimitFilter: expanded to cover /auth/sso/bind (brute-force
surface equivalent to /auth/login).
- application.yml: mateclaw.sso.* config block (all env-var driven).
Frontend:
- Login.vue: dynamic SSO buttons (only shown when providers configured),
OAuth2 callback detection (?sso=callback), link-only bind dialog,
shared applyLogin flow (localStorage + workspace + route).
- api/index.ts: ssoApi (providers, authorize, callback, bind).
Tests: SsoStateServiceTest (11) — state issue/verify/replay/tamper,
bind_token issue/verify/anti-replay/garbage. Regression: PAT (23) +
Approval resolve (13) all green.
Not in scope (P1/P2): link-only bind/unbind management endpoints,
user enable/disable endpoint, dingtalk/wecom providers, admin SSO
config page. Workspace assignment for auto-created users remains a
product decision (design doc §12 item 2).
* fix(sso): self-review fixes — P0 security + P1 quality
P0-1 BindRequired serialization: replaced the R.fail(200, Map.toString())
hack with a structured SsoCallbackResponse record. Controller no longer
catches an exception for a non-error path; frontend reads bindRequired
flag directly instead of regex-parsing a stringified map.
P0-2 createSsoUser unbounded recursion: added a retry flag — second
DuplicateKeyException (extreme race where identity was concurrently
deleted) now throws a 503 instead of recursing to stack overflow.
P0-3 state TTL not enforced: verifyState's conditional UPDATE now
includes created_at > cutoff, so a state unused for 5+ min is rejected
at consumption time, not just at the 1h purge. Without this the 5-min
window was advisory only.
P1-5 SsoStateService unused ObjectMapper: removed dead injection.
P1-6 audit JSON string concat: replaced with ObjectMapper serialization
(provider/externalId no longer risk breaking the JSON structure).
P1-7 LoginRateLimitFilter shared counter: documented the intentional
decision that login + bind share a per-IP counter (same brute-force
surface) with guidance on switching to per-path if finer isolation
is needed.
* feat(webchat): add approval resolve + replay for API-Key channel (ISSUE #413 P1)
Before this, a WebChat (API-Key) channel that hit a ToolGuard-protected
tool parked the turn in a pending approval the visitor could never
clear — it hung for 30 min until the GC timeout and the turn was
wasted. This PR closes the loop, mirroring the web ChatController.
A1 — no code change. tool_approval_requested already reaches the SDK
via ToolExecutionGuardHelper's streamTracker.broadcastObject (direct
SSE push, bypassing the StreamDelta path). Adding it to
forwardVisitorEvent would double-deliver; the default-drop is correct.
A2 — new /sessions/approve and /sessions/deny REST endpoints. Auth is
the existing visitorToken + conversationId ownership guard; the actor
is webchatUsername(visitorId), which resolves the 'no MateClaw
username' blocker noted in the old stopSession javadoc. Both broadcast
tool_approval_resolved so the SDK clears its banner in real time.
A3 — approve returns an SSE stream: resolveAndConsume (atomic DB +
metadata + memory), restoreChatOrigin (recovers the webchat origin
captured at createPending), then chatWithReplayStream replays the
tool call and continues the turn. Replay may re-trigger approvals,
which the existing tool_approval_requested direct push handles.
A4 — stopSession now sweeps pending approvals (denyAllByConversation)
and broadcasts each resolution, so stopping a stream no longer leaves
approvals lingering for the GC.
Tests: WebChatApprovalInteractionTest (7) — deny resolves + broadcasts,
deny auth/ownership guards, idempotent unknown-pending, stop sweep
clears pending, stop no-op when nothing pending.
Regression: WebChatStopStreamTest (5), WebChatArchivePinTest (6),
WebChatSchemaFieldsTest (5), WebChatWikiPageListTest (8),
ApprovalWorkflowServiceResolveTest (13), GcTest (7), RecoveryTest (7).
* fix(webchat): IDOR guard + SSE hang fix (PR #415 review)
Addresses all review feedback from mateaix:
P0 IDOR (security): /sessions/approve and /sessions/deny accepted a
client-supplied pendingId without cross-checking it belonged to the
caller's conversation. A visitor could resolve / replay another
visitor's guarded tool call. Fix: getPending(pendingId) then assert
conversationId matches before resolving. Added getPending delegate on
ApprovalWorkflowService so the webchat controller (which holds the
workflow facade) can do the precise lookup.
SSE hang: approveSession's already-resolved / error branches broadcast
'done' before streamTracker.register/attach, so the event had no
subscriber and the SSE hung to the 10-min timeout. Fix: register+attach
first, then resolveAndConsume. Removed the now-duplicate register/attach
in the replay branch.
Tests: +2 IDOR cases (cross-visitor pendingId rejected 404; mismatched
pendingId rejected 404). denyResolvesPending now asserts via getPending
(findPendingByConversation returns the earliest pending, polluted by
cross-test map state). denyUnknownPendingIsSafe updated to expect 404
(no longer leaks pendingId existence). Isolated IDOR victim/attacker
visitor IDs to avoid cross-test conversationId collisions.
Regression: WebChatStopStreamTest (5), WebChatArchivePinTest (6),
ApprovalWorkflowServiceResolveTest (13), GcTest (7), RecoveryTest (7).
* style(webchat): use simple ChatOrigin name in approveSession (PR #415 review)
Reviewer flagged fully-qualified inline types (ResolveOutcome was fixed
in the prior commit; ChatOrigin was missed). Add the import and switch
the 3 FQN references in approveSession to the simple name, matching the
ResolveOutcome cleanup. chatStream's pre-existing FQN usages are out of
this PR's scope and left untouched.
Before this, a workflow await_approval step whose approverChannels
pointed at feishu/wecom was effectively dead for IM interaction. Even
after PR #414 (B1) pushed the notice to the IM group, clicking the
card's Approve/Deny buttons did nothing useful:
- Identity check (requester==clicker) failed-closed: wf- approvals
have userId=null (system-initiated), so every click was rejected.
- Even if it passed, the synthetic /approve injection was a dead end:
the router routes by conversationId, but wf- ids use a synthetic
workflow:run:{runId} key that no IM conversation matches, so
findPendingByConversation returned null and the /approve was fed
to the LLM as plain text.
B3 fix: both ToolGuardCardHandlers now detect the wf- prefix and
resolve inline (approvalService.resolve), bypassing the synthetic
injection entirely. The WorkflowApprovalResolvedEvent published
inside resolve is picked up by ApprovalResumeBridge (activated in
PR #414 B2), which resumes the paused run. This mirrors the Web /
WebChat resolve path (PR #415).
Identity policy: any audience member may resolve a wf- approval.
The card only reaches channels declared in await_approval's
approverChannels, so whoever sees it is a designated approver.
Regular tool approvals keep the strict requester==clicker guard.
Tests:
- wecom ToolGuardCardHandlerTest: +2 wf- cases (inline resolve, no
synthetic injection; already-resolved renders expired). Existing 6
cases updated for the new 3-arg constructor.
- feishu FeishuCardDispatcherTest: updated for the new factory
constructor signature.
Regression: ApprovalWorkflowServiceResolveTest (13), GcTest (7),
RecoveryTest (7), feishu dispatcher (4), button value (7),
renderer (3+3) — all green.
Two P0 fixes from ISSUE #413 — both address workflow await_approval
approvals that silently failed in production:
B1 — AwaitApprovalStepAdapter now dispatches the approval notice to
every channel in approverChannels that carries a target. Previously
approverChannels was write-only metadata: a workflow that declared
["feishu:oc_xxx"] silently dropped the notice and the IM group never
learned an approval was waiting. Element format is "channelType"
(no push, operator uses admin console) or "channelType:targetId".
Each channel failure is logged and skipped — it must not fail the step.
B2 — requestWorkflowApproval now registers the wf- approval into the
in-memory map via registerRecovered. Previously it only did
approvalMapper.insert, so getPending("wf-...") returned null,
performResolve short-circuited at the not-pending guard, the
WorkflowApprovalResolvedEvent was never published, and
ApprovalResumeBridge was dead code. With this fix, resolving a wf-
approval walks the full two-phase contract and the bridge fires.
Tests:
- WorkflowApprovalResumeBridgeTest (3): map registration, event
publish on resolve, safe no-op for unregistered wf- ids.
- AwaitApprovalNotifyTest (2): targeted channels dispatched, bare
"web" skipped, channel failure non-fatal.
Regression: ApprovalWorkflowServiceResolveTest (13), AwaitApprovalRuntimeTest (3),
DispatchChannelRuntimeTest (3), GcTest (7), RecoveryTest (7) — all green.
Add an async export feature on the Dashboard page -- global admins can
generate and download a multi-sheet operational data report (.xlsx
packaged as .zip). The export covers 9 sheets:
1. Overview - interval KPIs, system snapshot, 7-day trend, period comparison,
model details (configured providers only), agent activity ranking top 10
2. Token Usage - daily breakdown by runtime_provider with avg tokens/msg
3. Skill Stats - skill list with usage count, last-call time, bound agents
4. User Stats - per-(workspace, user) aggregated tokens, duration, last active
5. User Conversations - detail rows pairing user-asst messages
6. Security and Audit - unified view across 6 sources (guard rules, audit logs,
approvals, grants, config, business audit events)
7. Channel Stats - per-channel conversation count, tokens, unique users
8. Model Config - enabled plus API-key-configured models with parameters
9. Cron Jobs - execution records with duration and token usage
Backend highlights:
- generate/progress/download endpoints guarded by PreAuthorize hasRole ADMIN
- single AtomicBoolean lock (409 when busy), 90-day frontend cap, 5-min deadline
- metadata-based tool-call counting, deleted=0 filtering everywhere
- value label mapping (chat to dialogue, TRUE to enabled, etc.)
- one-time downloadToken, file auto-cleanup after 24h or download
Frontend highlights:
- SVG ring progress bar with smooth dashoffset transition plus slow rotation
- visibility gated by workspaceStore.isGlobalAdmin (v-if on button)
- 1-second polling driving progress state machine (idle/generating/done)
- Element Plus date-picker (30-day default, 90-day max)
- explicit SecurityConfig authorization for /swagger-ui*, /v3/api-docs*, /webjars/**
- public for local/default profile; admin-only (ROLE_ADMIN) by default in production DB profiles
- override via MATECLAW_OPENAPI_EXPOSE_UI; add RANDOM_PORT integration tests and docs
execute_code (bash/sh/shell) bypassed the workspace boundary guard, so shell
code run through it could read/write/delete paths outside the workspace sandbox
(e.g. cat /etc/passwd) while the same paths were blocked for read_file and the
shell tools. Bring execute_code under the guard (scan only shell-language code,
report the code param), and trust the tool-result spill roots so a legitimate
spilled result stays readable. Adds regression tests.
- Remove mateclaw-ui/package-lock.json and yarn.lock. This is a pnpm
monorepo where pnpm-lock.yaml is the only lockfile; the npm/yarn locks
were stray duplicates. Add a .gitignore rule so they are not committed
again by mistake.
- SourceEvidenceLedger: reference Pattern/Matcher by their imported
simple names instead of inline fully-qualified names.
Backend (SourceEvidenceLedger):
- appendWikiSourceTable now normalizes existing source lines in-place to
canonical "[N] Title - section - page N" format instead of skipping them
- Added replaceSourceLine helper that matches a full source line by regex
and replaces it with the canonical form
- When source lines exist without a "来源：" header, automatically insert
one so the frontend preprocessor can locate the source table
Frontend (useMarkdownRenderer):
- Added data-citation-index / data-citation-title to DOMPurify whitelist
- Added preprocessWikiCitations preprocessor: parses the canonical source
table to build an index-to-title map, replaces [n] markers in the answer
body with clickable <a> links, and wraps entire source-table rows so the
full line is clickable
- Integrated into the render pipeline after wikilink substitution and
before Marked parsing
Frontend (useGlobalWikilinkClick):
- Extended the click delegation selector to match both .wiki-link and
.wiki-citation elements
- Title extraction falls back: data-citation-title || data-wiki-title
Tests: added three test cases for source-line normalization, idempotency,
and automatic header insertion
Live lifecycle board (grid<->board toggle) plus an assignee-swimlane plan
board that groups follow-up re-runs of one goal into a single xN card.
Custom right-side detail/goal panels with markdown output. Fixes plans
being persisted under the per-run trace id so the board actually populates.
Closes#385
Issue #304. Operators who want an agent with NO knowledge base had no
way to express it: leaving the KB picker empty fell through to "inherit
workspace-wide" (every KB visible), so the agent ended up ingesting
every KB's context. This adds the same opt-out toggle that
skills_disabled (V126) / tools_disabled already provide.
Backend:
- V154 migration (h2 + mysql + kingbase): mate_agent.wiki_disabled
BOOLEAN/TINYINT/SMALLINT NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE. Legacy agents stay
bit-identical.
- AgentEntity.wikiDisabled: Boolean field, @TableField("wiki_disabled").
- AgentBindingService.getBoundKbIds: short-circuit at the top —
wiki_disabled=true returns Set.of() regardless of binding rows. Mirrors
the precedence contract of getBoundSkillIds vs skills_disabled.
- AgentBindingService.setKbBindings: a non-empty save auto-clears a
stale wiki_disabled flag (same contract as setSkillBindings /
setToolBindings on their respective flags). Empty saves leave the flag
untouched — the UI toggle owns the bit, not the binding writer.
- AgentBindingServiceWikiDisabledTest: 5 cases covering all three
return states + the stale-flag auto-clear + empty-save no-op.
Frontend:
- Agents.vue KB picker: add the "此智能体不使用任何知识库" /
"This agent uses no knowledge bases" toggle, mirroring the skills /
tools picker layout. Tab badge shows "Off" when the toggle is on.
- types/index.ts: add Agent.wikiDisabled?: boolean.
- Save logic: when wikiDisabled is on, send an empty KB list (the
setKbs contract then leaves the flag alone server-side, exactly as
setSkills / setTools behave for their opt-out flags).
- i18n (zh + en): new strings for toggle label, hint, badge, and the
scope description shown when the toggle is on.
Stacked on top of #382 (which introduced AgentBindingResolver
.getBoundKbIds). No agent-runtime changes — wiki tools already degrade
cleanly when getBoundKbIds returns Set.of().
Add GET /api/v1/channels/webchat/wiki/pages mirroring /skills, so
downstream integrators can build a [[slug]] picker UI that points the
LLM at specific wiki pages. The picker token format is the universal
Obsidian/Wikipedia wikilink convention; the LLM consumes [[slug]] via
the existing wiki_read_page(slug=...) tool, so no agent-runtime changes
are needed.
- AgentBindingResolver.getBoundKbIds(agentId): three-state mirror of
getBoundSkillIds. null = no rows (fall through to workspace-wide KBs),
Set.of() = explicitly scoped to zero KBs, non-empty = explicit scope.
- WebChatController.listWikiPages: API Key + visitorToken auth chain,
agentId workspace anti-escalation, visibility excludes pageType=
synthesis (LLM intermediate artifacts), 100-page cap forces keyword
filter, response carries only display-level metadata.
- WebChatWikiPageView DTO: kbId/kbName/slug/title/summary/pageType;
content/embedding/sourceRawIds deliberately stay admin-console-only.
- WikiTool.wiki_read_page @Tool description: document the [[slug]]
convention so the LLM treats each token as a wiki-page reference.
- WebChatWikiPageListTest: 8 cases covering happy path, keyword filter,
synthesis exclusion, anti-escalation, auth failures, cap behavior,
and the no-binding → workspace-wide fallback.
Closes#381.
- per-KB entity-type whitelist (config UI + persistence; empty = built-in defaults)
- entity graph: legend grouped by type with click-to-filter; nodes colored by type
- always show entity names on graph nodes (not only on hover)
- earthy categorical palette aligned to the app theme, shared by entity & page graphs
- theme-aware graph label color (resolve CSS var for canvas, light/dark correct)
- manual extract = full rebuild: idempotent force re-extraction + orphan pruning,
guarded against data loss on a fully-failed run
- regression test for force re-extraction; zh/en i18n
GET /api/v1/channels/webchat/skills?agentId=<optional>&visitorId=<required>
Headers: X-MC-Key + X-MC-Visitor-Token
Downstream systems integrating via the webchat SSE endpoint have no way
today to enumerate the skills a visitor can invoke — the existing
GET /api/v1/skills is JWT + workspace-role gated, unreachable from the
API-Key-authenticated webchat channel. Without a list, integrators
can't render a slash picker UI; visitors have to know skill slugs by
heart.
The new endpoint mirrors the /stream auth chain (resolveChannel +
verifyVisitorToken) and reuses AgentBindingResolver.getBoundSkillIds
to scope visibility. Only enabled skills explicitly bound to the agent
surface; agents with no explicit bindings return an empty list rather
than inheriting the global pool (the agent config stays the source of
truth for what surfaces in visitor UI). The agentId anti-escalation
guard from /stream is reused verbatim — an explicit agentId must
belong to the channel's workspace.
Returns WebChatSkillView (id / name / nameZh / nameEn / description /
icon). Deliberately omits SKILL.md content, configJson and
securityScanResult: those never leave the admin console.
Issue: #373
The previous notLike(column, "%:") form auto-wraps the value with extra %
on both sides AND escapes the user-supplied %, producing a %%:% pattern
that matches any id CONTAINING a colon — silently filtering out every
webchat:<key>:<visitor>, feishu:<chatId>, cron:<jobId> conversation from
the admin list / page. The frontend sidebar ends up empty.
Switch to notLikeLeft(column, ":") which only prepends the wildcard,
giving the intended NOT LIKE '%:' (does not end with a colon).
Strengthen the three malformedIdGuard tests to assert on the bound param
value ("%:" — ends-with colon) in addition to the SQL keyword, so this
regression cannot return silently. The assertions must call
getTargetSql() first to trigger MyBatis-Plus's nested-wrapper param
merge — getParamNameValuePairs() is empty on the parent until then.
conversationId ending in ":" (e.g. webchat:<key8>: with empty visitorId,
from older webchat versions) leaks into the admin console via the
'webchat:%' username LIKE, then 500/403s on open because the trailing ":"
makes some reverse proxies strip the path tail — landing a GET on the
@DeleteMapping variant of /{conversationId} (issue #369).
Add applyMalformedIdGuard — a NOT LIKE '%:' clause — to both listConversations
(lenient + strict overloads) and pageConversations so these rows never
surface. isConversationOwner already rejects unknown ids with 403, so no
change is needed on the direct-access endpoints; once the rows are out of
the lists, admin can no longer reach them.
The two existing strict/non-admin assertions changed from "no LIKE keyword"
to "no webchat:% param value" — applyMalformedIdGuard emits a NOT LIKE
itself, so the LIKE keyword is now present in every query.
Tests cover the guard on lenient, page, and strict paths.
Spring's default lets HttpRequestMethodNotSupportedException escape to the
catch-all @ExceptionHandler(Exception.class), surfacing as a 500 with a full
stack trace. Return a clean 405 so the client gets a structured R body and
the log stays at WARN.
This is also the second line of defence against malformed path segments that
confuse reverse proxies — e.g. a conversationId ending in ":" can make a
proxy strip the trailing path, landing a GET /api/v1/conversations/<id> on
the @DeleteMapping variant and triggering exactly this exception (issue #369).
Align the conversation list/page with the isConversationOwner cross-workspace
guard: only a global admin can open a webchat-owned conversation, so only
admins should see those rows. Previously listConversations / pageConversations
surfaced webchat principals to every authenticated user, who would then 403 on
opening them (list-vs-access asymmetry).
Also fixes ConversationServiceWebchatVisibilityTest, which still asserted the
pre-guard owner behavior and never mocked AuthService, so it threw NPE at
runtime once isConversationOwner started resolving the requester. The owner
matrix is covered by ConversationServiceOwnershipWorkspaceTest; this test now
pins the admin-gated list visibility for both admin and non-admin callers.
Closes the authorization asymmetry between list endpoints (which filter
by workspaceId) and direct-access endpoints (which did not): a logged-in
user could reach another workspace's system / IM / webchat-owned
conversation by id and run any of messages / delete / rename / pin /
setModel / clear / chat-files download on it.
Per the maintainer's guidance on issue #344, workspaces are now treated
as untrusted isolation boundaries — the fix is the cross-cutting
hardening, kept out of feature work.
Behavior change (only for shared, non-direct convs):
- requester is a global admin (user.role=admin) → pass
- requester is a member of the conversation's workspace → pass
- otherwise → deny
Preserved to avoid regressions:
- direct owner (username == conv.username) → pass without lookup
- convs without workspace_id (legacy rows) → legacy system-owner check
- anonymous user (authService returns null, e.g. permitAll reconnect)
→ legacy system-owner check
Callers in ConversationController / ChatController / SubagentController /
GoalController / ApprovalController (18 sites) are unchanged — the
signature stays isConversationOwner(conversationId, username). The
workspace membership check is done via WorkspaceService.hasPermissionCached
(Caffeine-backed, same cache the WorkspaceAccessInterceptor uses) and
ignores the X-Workspace-Id header, which is client-controlled.
Tests: 11 cases in ConversationServiceOwnershipWorkspaceTest covering
each branch of the new logic. No caller-side test changes — the 66
caller tests (ConversationService*Test, ChatController*Test,
SubagentController*Test, GoalController*Test, ApprovalController*Test)
still pass.
Previously WebChatController.chatStream silently dropped every agent
lifecycle event except _usage_final (and content_delta / thinking_delta
derived from delta.payload). Visitors sat with nothing between the
meta event and the first content chunk — typically 3–10s when the
agent plans / recalls memory / runs tools, longer when the agent
chained multiple tool calls. The JWT chat path (ChatController) had
this wiring; webchat did not.
Curated 4-event subset (per design review):
- phase — high-level phase transition (planning / generating /
summarizing / ...). SDK shows a "AI is thinking..."
typing indicator before the first token.
- tool_start — agent invoked a tool. SDK shows a localized badge
("Searching...", "Reading file.pdf", ...).
- tool_end — tool completed. SDK clears the badge.
- plan — Plan-Execute agents expose their step list. SDK can
render a checklist.
Deliberately NOT forwarded (internal noise / leak risk):
- _usage_final, _routing_decision — consumed internally
- finish_reason — implicit in `done`
- feedback_event — visitor can't retry/regenerate anyway
- perf_summary, iteration_* — internal metrics
- plan_step_started/completed — too granular; the plan event covers
the visitor's needs
Critical safety constraint: tool_start / tool_end carry ONLY the tool
name. Tool arguments and results are dropped — agent tool calls can
contain PII (file paths, user queries, credentials), and relaying
those to a 3rd-party website frontend is a data leak. The SDK maps
tool name → localized label via its own lookup.
Backward compat: existing clients ignore unknown event types per the
SSE spec, so adding these is non-breaking.
Tests: 5 new cases in WebChatStreamE2ETest covering each event type
+ a regression case asserting internal events are silently dropped.
85/85 webchat tests green.
Docs: docs/zh/webchat.md gains a "实时进度事件" subsection.
Stack: feat/webchat-attachment-e2e → feat/webchat-stream-phase-events
Follow-up to epic #355.
AuditEventService gains recordAs(actor, workspaceId, ...) — an overload
that takes an explicit actor string instead of deriving one from
SecurityContext. Used for non-MateClaw principals (currently just
webchat visitors), where there is no Spring Security auth and the
default record() path would write "system".
WebChatController injects AuditEventService and adds an audit() helper
that constructs the canonical actor string "webchat:<channelId>:<visitorId>"
so audit-event searches can filter by channel or visitor. Eight write
endpoints now log an audit row on success:
webchat.create-session, webchat.rename-session, webchat.pin-session,
webchat.archive-session, webchat.delete-session, webchat.stop-session,
webchat.regenerate-session, webchat.upload-file
/stream is intentionally NOT audited — message-volume noise, and
conversationService.saveMessage already leaves a durable trail.
Each row carries:
- username = webchat:<channelId>:<visitorId>
- action = webchat.<verb>
- resource = CONVERSATION / <conversationId>
- detailJson = {sessionId, ...action-specific fields}
WebChatAuditTrailTest (@SpringBootTest, 2 cases):
- createSession lands a row with the exact actor string + action
- rename + pin + archive + stop each leave a row (4 distinct actions)
Audit insert is async; tests poll up to 3s for the row to appear.
Regression: 9 webchat test classes (64 tests) green.
Part of epic #355.
Two cleanups promised in the plan, kept narrow to avoid cascading churn:
1. New WebChatErrors enum — single source of truth for the visitor-facing
HTTP error codes + messages. All future R.fail() calls can reference
WebChatErrors.INVALID_API_KEY etc. instead of bare literals. This PR
doesn't migrate every existing call site (that's a noisy sweep better
done in a follow-up); the enum just needs to exist so audit/OpenAPI
work in PR 7/8 can quote canonical messages.
2. pageSessions now delegates auth to listSessions instead of duplicating
the resolveChannel + verifyVisitorToken block. Same external behavior;
-15 lines of duplication. The pagination/keyword logic stays where it
is (it's specific to the /page variant and doesn't belong in
listSessions).
Visitor-token `required=true` migration from plan §6 was dropped: changing
it would flip missing-token responses from 401 to 400, which violates the
current error-code contract that visitors and tests rely on. The
`required=false` + explicit-verify pattern stays.
Regression: 7 webchat test classes, 42/42 green.
Part of epic #355.
New endpoint POST /api/v1/channels/webchat/sessions/regenerate. Behavior:
1. Auth (API Key + visitorToken + ownsConversation — same chain as the
other session mutations).
2. streamTracker.requestStop() — kill any in-flight stream first so its
doOnComplete doesn't race the delete/save below.
3. Find last role=user message (seed) and last role=assistant message
(target).
4. Delete the last assistant message if present.
5. Reuse chatStream by handing it a synthetic WebChatRequest whose
message is the seed user content. chatStream saves a fresh user
message (new id, same content) and starts the agent turn.
Trade-off: chatStream saves a new user message rather than replaying the
existing one in place, so the user-side message count grows by 1 per
regenerate. Acceptable — the alternative (refactoring chatStream into
reusable chunks) is a 4-hour distraction from the actual feature, and the
extra row is harmless (history still reads naturally: user, asst, user,
asst, user, asst instead of user, asst, asst).
ConversationService gains findLastMessageByRole() and deleteMessageById()
helpers; both are scoped exactly to what regenerate needs.
WebChatRegenerateTest (@SpringBootTest, 5 cases):
- empty thread (no user message) → error event, no DB change
- deletes the last assistant reply (count strictly decreases)
- bad token → no DB change (auth fails before mutation)
- unknown sessionId → returns emitter without throwing
- seeds from the LAST user message when multiple exist
Tests don't assert on the actual LLM stream content — that's left for
PR 5's WebChatStreamE2ETest, which mocks the chat model.
Part of epic #355.
Two new session-state mutations, both following the rename endpoint's
shape (PUT + {flag: true|false} body + visitorId/sessionId query):
- PUT /api/v1/channels/webchat/sessions/pinned — flips mate_conversation.pinned
- PUT /api/v1/channels/webchat/sessions/archive — flips mate_conversation.archived
Archive complements delete as a "soft-close" — the thread stays on disk
(history preserved, addressable, downloadable) but is hidden from the
default /sessions listing. Pin makes a thread sort first in the visitor's
listing, mirroring the admin-console behavior.
Archive dominates pin: an archived+pinned thread is still hidden by
default. Callers opt back in via includeArchived=true (added in PR 1).
ConversationService gains setArchived(), mirroring the existing
setPinned() pattern.
WebChatArchivePinTest (@SpringBootTest, 6 cases):
- pin flips column + view reflects pinned=1
- archive hides from default listing, includeArchived=true shows it,
un-archive restores
- archived+pinned still hidden (archive dominates)
- malformed body / wrong type → 400
- unknown sessionId → 404
- bad token → 401
Part of epic #355.
Closes the "no way to ban a single visitor without burning the global
JWT secret" gap from the epic. Two changes:
1. Token format: HMAC payload now includes exp, format is
`<base64sig>.<expEpochSec>`. Default TTL 7 days (VISITOR_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS).
Expiry participates in the HMAC, so bumping it client-side invalidates
the signature. /stream still mints fresh tokens on first contact — a
revoked visitor can start a new /stream (gets a new token), they just
can't use the old one on management endpoints.
2. WebChatTokenRevocationService — DB-backed registry (webchat_revoked_visitor
table from V148) with a 5-minute Caffeine cache in front. revoke() /
unrevoke() / isRevoked(). The cache accepts up to 10min eventual
consistency across instances — webchat is low-volume, and a fresh node
sees revocations immediately on cold cache. DB remains source of truth.
WebChatController.verifyVisitorToken becomes an instance method that chains
verifyVisitorTokenSignature (static, HMAC + exp) with isRevoked (instance,
DB + cache). All 9 management endpoints now check revocation transitively.
Admin endpoint: POST /api/v1/admin/webchat/revoked-visitor (and DELETE to
un-revoke). Mounted under /api/v1/admin/** so it requires a MateClaw JWT
— visitors can't reach it. Records an audit row (action=webchat.revoke-
visitor, resourceType=CHANNEL) via AuditEventService.
Tests:
- WebChatTokenRevocationTest (@SpringBootTest, 7 cases): revoke blocks
/sessions with 401, un-revoke restores, double-revoke idempotent,
expired token rejected even without revocation, /stream unaffected
(signature still verifies), admin endpoint inserts row + audit.
- WebChatVisitorTokenTest extended to 16 cases — added expired-token,
tampered-exp, and "differs when exp differs" coverage; existing
verify_* cases moved to verifyVisitorTokenSignature (the static half).
Regression: WebChatSchemaFieldsTest (5/5), WebChatCreateSessionTest (9/9),
WebChatSessionManagementTest (5/5), WebChatStopStreamTest (5/5).
Part of epic #355.
Schema foundations for the rest of the epic. Three additions:
1. mate_conversation.archived — INT default 0. Lets a visitor "soft-close"
a thread: stays on disk (history preserved, addressable, downloadable)
but excluded from default /sessions listing. Pinned/archived are
orthogonal; archive dominates (archived+pinned still hidden by default).
2. webchat_revoked_visitor — registry table consumed in PR 2 by the
WebChatTokenRevocationService. Unique on (channel_id, visitor_id, deleted)
so re-revoke is idempotent and deleted=1 un-revokes. Migration written
for all three DBs (h2 IF NOT EXISTS, MySQL INFORMATION_SCHEMA guard,
KingbaseES native IF NOT EXISTS) following the V147 pattern.
3. WebChatSessionView gains pinned/archived/streamStatus so the visitor-
side listing surfaces the same state the admin console sees. Closes
the "field exposure" gap from the epic.
loadVisitorSessions gains an includeArchived flag (default false) — the
default hides archived threads and excludes them from the empty-session
quota, since the visitor already declared they're done with them.
GET /sessions and GET /sessions/page thread an `includeArchived=true`
query param through.
Tests (WebChatSchemaFieldsTest, @SpringBootTest + H2 + V148):
- revoked-visitor table is queryable
- archived column is read/write
- view exposes pinned/archived/streamStatus
- archived hidden by default, visible with includeArchived=true
- archived empty threads don't saturate the 5-thread quota
Regression: WebChatCreateSessionTest (9/9), WebChatSessionManagementTest
(5/5) — both updated for the new includeArchived param.
Part of epic #355.
Until now webchat had no way to actually interrupt a running stream —
ChatController's /api/v1/chat/{id}/stop was technically permitAll'd but
silently no-op'd on webchat streams because WebChatController.chatStream
dropped the subscribe() return value, so ChatStreamTracker.requestStop
had no Disposable to dispose. Visitors could only "stop" client-side by
closing the SSE connection; the server-side LLM call kept running,
burning tokens and firing any side-effecting tools to completion.
Two changes (issue #353):
1. WebChatController.chatStream: keep the Disposable and register it
with streamTracker.setDisposable, mirroring ChatController#chatStream
line 495. Now requestStop actually disposes the Flux.
2. New endpoint POST /api/v1/channels/webchat/sessions/stop:
- Auth mirrors the other session-management endpoints: X-MC-Key +
X-MC-Visitor-Token + ownsConversation (404 on unknown sessionId,
so callers can't probe the namespace).
- Returns {stopped: true|false}; false means no active stream
(idempotent, not an error).
- No approval sweep — webchat has no MateClaw username and exposes
no approval UI today; defer until that surfaces.
WebChatStopStreamTest (@SpringBootTest, H2, V147) — 5 cases:
- stopActiveStream registers a real Flux.never() Disposable on the
tracker and asserts both stopped=true AND disposable.isDisposed(),
proving the chatStream wiring change is what makes the endpoint work.
- noActiveStreamReturnsFalse — idempotent path.
- bad token / bad API key → 401.
- unknown sessionId → 404.
Complements the implicit getOrCreate in /stream: lets a caller pre-create
an empty thread (message_count = 0) and receive sessionId / conversationId /
visitorToken up front, then decide when to send the first message via
/stream. Mirrors how downstream CRM/ticketing systems model "create the
conversation object first, message later".
Auth is the visitor's first touch — only X-MC-Key is required (no
X-MC-Visitor-Token, which the visitor can't have yet); the server signs
and returns a fresh visitorToken the caller must echo back on subsequent
GET/PUT/DELETE.
Behavior (issue #351):
- Idempotent on sessionId collision → returns the existing thread 200,
does NOT clobber title.
- Empty-session quota ≤ 5 per (channel, visitor); 409 with a clear
message when exceeded. Existing rows are exempt (re-create is idempotent).
- Caller-supplied title (1-100 chars) is persisted; absent title leaves
the default "新对话" so the first /stream user message still derives
it. getOrCreateWebchatConversation now accepts an optional title and
only writes it on insert (existing rows untouched).
- agentId override mirrors /stream's workspace check.
ConversationService.getOrCreateWebchatConversation gains a title-aware
overload; the original 5-arg signature delegates with title = null.
End-to-end coverage in WebChatCreateSessionTest (@SpringBootTest, H2
with V147 migration): happy path, caller-title survives first user
message, default-title still derived, idempotent collision, quota 409,
bad API key 401, illegal sessionId/title 400, listed after creation.
Two webchat hardening fixes:
- Session listing no longer pulls every system-owned conversation into
memory. listSessions/pageSessions went through listConversations(owner)
whose `username IN (owner, system)` loaded all IM/cron rows just to show
one visitor's handful of threads. New listWebchatConversations(username)
queries only the visitor's own rows; the channel prefix is matched
in-memory with a literal startsWith (so a '_'/'%' in the api key's first
8 chars can't act as a LIKE wildcard).
- Upload now enforces a per-conversation quota (file count + total bytes,
both configurable) so a visitor can't fill the disk with many
individually-under-cap files. Pairs with the existing staging TTL sweep.
When webchat:<key8>:<visitorId>:<sessionId> exceeds 64 chars the
conversationId folds visitorId+sessionId into an unrecoverable hash, so
the thread fell outside listSessions' conversationId-prefix filter and its
sessionId could not be recovered — the thread was invisible and
unaddressable (common with a UUID visitorId + a >10-char sessionId).
Persist the sessionId on creation (new nullable webchat_session_id column)
and enumerate by username + channel prefix (webchat:<key8>:), which also
matches the hashed form. sessionId is read from the column, falling back to
parsing the conversationId only for legacy rows.
Adds a @SpringBootTest covering listing (incl. the hashed thread), message
pagination, session paging/search, rename, and token rejection end-to-end.
Refs matevip/mateclaw#346
Bring the webchat visitor session API closer to the admin console's:
- GET /sessions/messages gains beforeId + limit. With a limit it returns
{messages, hasMore} (latest N, then pull-up for older) using the
external path-stripped view; without it, the full list as before.
- GET /sessions/page paginates + keyword-searches a visitor's threads
(in-memory: a visitor's thread set is bounded to its own namespace).
- PUT /sessions/title renames a thread (1-100 chars).
All keep the webchat auth model (API key + visitor token, server-derived
conversationId, ownership guard). Message views go through the shared
toExternalMessageViews helper so the paginated path is sanitized too.
Refs matevip/mateclaw#346
WebChat had no file support: the /stream body carried only text, and
agent-produced files had no visitor-reachable download path (the JWT
/chat/files endpoint is unreachable for API-key visitors).
Add webchat-authenticated file transfer, reusing MessageContentPart +
the existing upload dir + agent multimodal injection:
- WebChatFileService: validate (size cap, extension whitelist, filename
sanitize), store under the conversation's upload dir, stage by opaque
fileId, traversal-safe resolve. Untrusted-uploader hardening lives here.
- POST /upload (multipart) and GET /files, both authed by API key +
visitor token with a server-derived conversationId (never client paths).
Downloads send non-images as attachment + X-Content-Type-Options:nosniff.
- /stream gains attachmentIds; the server resolves each id from the
staging registry (client metadata is never trusted), builds parts, and
persists them on the user message so the agent's multimodal/file tools
pick them up from history — same path as the JWT web chat.
- Strip server-side file paths from the visitor-facing message view
(listMessageViewsExternal + includePath flag) so the filesystem layout
is not disclosed.
Refs matevip/mateclaw#342
The permitAll comment claimed a 10-minute TTL, but GeneratedFileCache.TTL
is 7 days. The stale figure could mislead future security reasoning about
how long an unauthenticated capability URL stays live. Align the comment
with the actual value; the unguessable UUID remains the access guard.
Refs matevip/mateclaw#344
WebChat conversations are owned by an external visitor principal
(webchat:<visitorId>) so each visitor's threads stay isolated for the
self-service session API. But the console list/page/owner-check only
recognized the current user + system owners, so these conversations were
invisible in the sidebar and the Sessions page — and would 403 on open
even if surfaced.
Treat webchat: owners like system owners for the console: include them in
the lenient list/page queries and in isConversationOwner. The strict
listConversations overload (used by the visitor self-service path) is
unchanged, so a visitor's own access is not widened.
Refs matevip/mateclaw#340
Turn a single natural-language requirement into a ready-to-review
employee: the model proposes name, persona, runtime type and a
validated set of skills/tools/knowledge base, which the user confirms
or tweaks before the agent is created.
- backend: POST /api/v1/agents/generate builds a draft from the
workspace's real capability catalog; every suggested tool/skill/KB is
re-validated against the catalog so nothing hallucinated is offered
- frontend: 3-step wizard at /agents/create reusing the existing
create + binding endpoints; reusable capability picker shows selected
items as compact chips with an on-demand searchable catalog
Add an opt-in named-entity extraction pass so the wiki knowledge graph
captures fine-grained entities (people, organizations, locations, ...)
and their relations, not just page-level link relations.
- new tables mate_wiki_entity / _mention / _relation (h2/mysql/kingbase)
- structured LLM extraction per chunk with entity resolution
(normalized-key dedup + embedding near-merge), mention/relation
persistence and page linking via chunk citations
- per-KB opt-in toggle (off by default); async dispatch after embedding
- read API: entity list, KB graph, entity ego-graph, manual extract
- UI: entity-layer toggle in the graph view + KB config toggle
- replace inline fully-qualified class names with imports in WikiProcessingService
Closes#336
Always-on memory (structured user/feedback blocks, PROFILE.md, MEMORY.md) is injected into every system prompt but only ever grew, inflating per-turn context over time. This adds deterministic size control across all always-on sources:
- Injection budget: cap the always-on structured block by total chars and per-type entry count, keeping the most-recently-updated entries (LRU by Updated date) and disclosing how many were omitted
- Nightly consolidation: a dedicated scheduled pass merges duplicate/stale user & feedback entries via the LLM, preserving each entry's original Updated date; runs per owner bucket (shared + personal) with a per-run cap and a never-grow safety guard
- File ceilings: deterministic backstop truncates PROFILE.md / MEMORY.md at a section boundary when a rewrite overruns its budget
- Manual trigger endpoint for the consolidation maintenance task
All knobs under mate.memory.*; covered by unit tests.
- goal: continue (not skip) on max-iterations and evidence-insufficient turns.
A max-iterations turn grants a fresh iteration budget ("hard continuation"),
bounded per run and sized into the graph recursion ceiling, so a task too big
for one budget keeps going instead of stalling until the next user message.
- plan-execute: re-plan the remaining work on a step exception, and on a
signature-based stall (repeated failures / identical results / no usable
result) instead of advancing dependent steps with junk; bounded by a per-run
re-plan cap, with a graduated change-strategy nudge before the hard stop.
- plan-execute: auto-derive a goal from a genuine multi-step plan, seeding the
acceptance criteria from the plan steps, so the goal subsystem engages without
the model calling setGoal; broadcast goal_created so the UI hydrates.
- react: refund the iteration for setup-only rounds (load_skill / enable_tool)
so a tight budget is not eaten by the load-then-use two-step.
- ui: re-fetch the active goal when a turn finishes so a goal created or mutated
mid-conversation surfaces without depending on an SSE event.
- streaming: make retry backoff / total-time budget instance fields with a
test-only seam; clarify that the wall-clock budget (not max-retries) bounds a
sustained SERVER_ERROR loop to ~8 attempts, fixing the slow/flaky retry test.
The knowledge-base trust verification recorded wiki citations from every
non-readFile tool response by sniffing its JSON for a top-level title /
pages / chunks field. Tools like getGoalStatus return a top-level title,
which falsely populated the citation set and then forced [n] citations on
the final answer (otherwise flagged EVIDENCE_INSUFFICIENT). Gate citation
mining on the wiki_* tool name instead.
Likewise, the grounded answer contract (cite-or-refuse) was appended to
every ReasoningNode call unconditionally, degrading general agents that
have no knowledge base. Append it only when the agent has a wiki_* tool
bound, scoping the strict regime to KB-grounded scenarios.
Adds a regression test asserting a non-wiki tool with a top-level title
creates no wiki citations.
- rescan: keep the KB id as a string end to end so the 19-digit snowflake id
isn't truncated past Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER (rescan no longer 404s)
- lint: resolve [[...]] targets against page slugs AND titles like the viewer,
so a title reference to an existing page is no longer reported broken
- ingest: derive the slug deterministically from the title (no inconsistent
romanization), auto-recompute broken links once a KB finishes importing,
and reconcile dangling [[concept]] links — redirect to the covering page via
declared aliases, or demote to plain text when uncovered
- add the page aliases column migration for h2 / mysql / kingbase
Surface the connected database product as a subtle chip in the Dashboard
header. SystemHealthService now reports a database label on /system/health
(reused by the front-end — no extra request), derived from a new
DatabaseBootstrapRunner.getDatabaseLabel() that reads the JDBC product name
once and normalizes it to a canonical label (MySQL / MariaDB / PostgreSQL /
H2, and 人大金仓 for the KingbaseES family), collapsing driver version noise.
Add ErrorClassificationTest regression cases for the AI-gateway retry
hardening: 5xx-before-4xx ordering (a proxy 502 whose body says
"bad request" stays retryable), Chinese / numeric provider billing
patterns, and DNS / TLS infrastructure-fatal detection.
Fix the cert-trust pattern while adding its test: Java's ValidatorException
emits "PKIX path building failed" with an uppercase PKIX and the error
chain is not lower-cased, so the previous lowercase pattern never matched
— an untrusted/expired cert chain fell through to the retryable
SERVER_ERROR bucket and was retried in vain instead of failing over.
The disk fallback's catch block logged at debug, so a failed scan
silently dropped recovered files — reproducing the same 'bot can't see
the file' symptom the fallback was added to fix. Promote to warn with
the full stack trace, matching cacheRecentFile's logging.
openAiCompatibleClientBuilder() was creating a new java.net.http.HttpClient
per request. Each instance spawns a selector thread and connection pool that
are never closed, exhausting the OS thread limit under frequent model-test
calls (e.g. DeepSeek provider).
Elevate the HttpClient to a static singleton so all OpenAI-compatible
provider requests share one connection pool and one selector thread.
Closesmatevip/mateclaw#328
loadRecentFilesFromDisk now filters out files older than RECENT_FILE_TTL_MINUTES
(60 min) so the disk fallback matches the Caffeine cache TTL and does not inject
stale attachments into future conversations.
Testability refactoring:
- recentFileCache: private → package-private (tests can seed the cache directly)
- chatUploadsRoot: new package-private Path field (tests redirect to @TempDir)
- loadRecentFilesFromDisk: add (Path dir, long cutoffMs) package-private overload;
private (String) wrapper delegates to it
- injectRecentFiles: private → package-private
New test class FeishuRecentFileCacheTest (14 cases):
- loadRecentFilesFromDisk: non-existent dir, empty dir, fresh files sorted
newest-first, stale files excluded by TTL, mixed fresh+stale, >5 files capped,
timestamp-prefix stripping, MIME guessing from extension
- injectRecentFiles: Caffeine cache hit, cache-miss disk fallback, empty disk,
duplicate-path dedup, image vs file part typing, null textContent guard
Relates to #325
The per-chat recent file cache (Caffeine, 60 min TTL) is purely
in-memory. After a process restart, GC eviction, or TTL expiry the
cache is empty, but the staged copies under data/chat-uploads/ survive
on disk. A follow-up text message that should have seen the cached file
instead found nothing — the bot replied as if no file was ever sent.
Changes:
- injectRecentFiles(): fall back to scanning data/chat-uploads/{id}/
when the Caffeine cache misses, sorted by last-modified time, capped
at RECENT_FILE_MAX_PER_CHAT (5).
- cacheRecentFile(): promote catch log from debug → warn with full
stack trace so silent download failures are visible in production
logs. Add entry-level info log for correlation.
- New helper loadRecentFilesFromDisk() + guessContentType().
Closes#325
Relates to #201
The KingbaseES change removed usingDbTime() unconditionally, which made
every deployment (MySQL/H2/PostgreSQL) fall back to app-server time for
distributed lock timing — reintroducing node clock-drift risk in
multi-instance setups. Re-enable usingDbTime() for databases in ShedLock's
built-in dialect map and skip it only for KingbaseES, which is not covered
and would otherwise throw at lock acquisition.
Add KingbaseES support as an opt-in profile: dedicated migration tree, bilingual seed data, runtime DbType detection (KINGBASE_ES / POSTGRE_SQL), and JDBC URL handling in the datasource manager.
* feat(wiki): unify raw materials & source watcher into a Sources tab with per-KB auto-sync
The raw-material directory scan and the Advanced "source watcher" sub-tab were
the same engine (same kb.sourceDirectory, same WikiDirectoryScanService) split
across two surfaces with two editable directory inputs. Merge them into one
"Sources" tab (upload / paste / directory manual scan + auto-sync toggle +
the raw-material list) and drop the watcher sub-tab from Advanced.
Auto-sync is now per-KB opt-in: a new watcher_enabled column (V146) gates the
periodic scan per knowledge base. The server-global mate.wiki.watcher-enabled
stays as an ops master switch — a KB is auto-scanned only when both are on
(AND). Manual scans are unaffected. Scan interval stays global for now
(tracked separately).
Closesmatevip/mateclaw#314
* docs(wiki): document source-watcher global switch env vars
Expose MATE_WIKI_WATCHER_ENABLED / MATE_WIKI_WATCHER_INTERVAL_MS as
explicit placeholders in application-mysql.yml, .env.example and
docker-compose.yml, mirroring MATE_WIKI_ALLOWED_SOURCE_ROOTS. Notes the
AND semantics (global ops gate + per-KB toggle) so operators know the
global switch alone is not sufficient.
- Fail closed to a global fallback sandbox root when a conversation has no
per-workspace base path, instead of leaving file/shell tools unconstrained
- Refuse shell commands that delete the workspace root directory itself
- Block workspace-boundary escapes at the policy layer before the approval
prompt, not only at execution time
- Approval bar now shows the actual command / target path being approved
Closes#289 — after an MCP server (re)connects, chat queries kept replying
"from memory" instead of calling MCP tools.
Root cause: agents snapshot their tool set at build time and are cached in
AgentService.agentInstances, but MCP server lifecycle changes never
invalidated that cache (unlike model-config / tool-guard changes which do).
A stale, tool-less agent graph survived until process restart.
Changes:
- Add McpServerChangedEvent; McpServerService publishes it on connect /
disconnect / reconnect / delete / (re)connect-failure / batch refresh /
startup init. AgentService listens and calls refreshAllAgents(), so the
next turn rebuilds against the live MCP tool set. Also closes the boot
race where the web server accepts requests before the @Order(200) MCP
init runner finishes.
- Make create/update/toggle connect asynchronously on a dedicated pool
("mcp-connect") so a slow/unreachable server can no longer freeze the
admin request; status returns immediately as "connecting".
- UI: render the new "connecting" status (pulsing amber dot), show a
friendly "connecting in background" toast, and poll until the status
settles (window widened to ~40s to outlast the default connect timeout).
- UI: MCP config modal no longer closes on outside/backdrop click — only
the × and Cancel buttons close it, so an accidental click can't discard
unsaved config.
Verified E2E: ckjia-shopping (参考价) MCP server connected at runtime with
no backend restart; the cached 通用助手 agent immediately enabled and called
ckjia_shopping_recommend, returning real product cards.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The webchat conversationId (webchat:<key8>:<visitorId>[:<sessionId>]) and the
derived username (webchat:<visitorId>) are written to VARCHAR(64) columns, but
visitorId had no validation and sessionId allows 64 chars — so a long visitorId,
or a legitimate 64-char sessionId, overflows the column and the getOrCreateConversation
INSERT throws (500 on /stream). Validate visitorId (charset + blank->UUID) and
fold the variable part into a stable hash when the derived id/username would
exceed 64 chars, keeping short ids byte-identical (backward compatible). Also
make listSessions filter on exact owner username, not just the conversationId
prefix, so system-owned rows can never leak via a crafted visitorId. Adds
boundary regression tests.
Add per-visitor session management for the WebChat Web/API access mode:
list a visitor's conversation threads, fetch a thread's messages, and
delete a thread.
Authorization: visitorId is a client-asserted request param, so it cannot
be trusted on its own — deriving conversationId from it and then checking
ownership against it is tautological (any caller passes). Instead, /stream
issues a per-visitor token = HMAC-SHA256(jwtSecret, channelId:visitorId),
returned in the meta event; the management endpoints require it back via
the X-MC-Visitor-Token header and verify it in constant time. The signing
secret is server-only (unlike the public channel API key) and the channelId
in the payload makes tokens non-portable across channels.
Includes regression tests for token issuance/verification semantics
(forged visitorId rejected, cross-visitor and cross-channel tokens rejected,
tampered tokens rejected).
