Two P0 fixes from ISSUE #413 — both address workflow await_approval
approvals that silently failed in production:
B1 — AwaitApprovalStepAdapter now dispatches the approval notice to
every channel in approverChannels that carries a target. Previously
approverChannels was write-only metadata: a workflow that declared
["feishu:oc_xxx"] silently dropped the notice and the IM group never
learned an approval was waiting. Element format is "channelType"
(no push, operator uses admin console) or "channelType:targetId".
Each channel failure is logged and skipped — it must not fail the step.
B2 — requestWorkflowApproval now registers the wf- approval into the
in-memory map via registerRecovered. Previously it only did
approvalMapper.insert, so getPending("wf-...") returned null,
performResolve short-circuited at the not-pending guard, the
WorkflowApprovalResolvedEvent was never published, and
ApprovalResumeBridge was dead code. With this fix, resolving a wf-
approval walks the full two-phase contract and the bridge fires.
Tests:
- WorkflowApprovalResumeBridgeTest (3): map registration, event
publish on resolve, safe no-op for unregistered wf- ids.
- AwaitApprovalNotifyTest (2): targeted channels dispatched, bare
"web" skipped, channel failure non-fatal.
Regression: ApprovalWorkflowServiceResolveTest (13), AwaitApprovalRuntimeTest (3),
DispatchChannelRuntimeTest (3), GcTest (7), RecoveryTest (7) — all green.
- explicit SecurityConfig authorization for /swagger-ui*, /v3/api-docs*, /webjars/**
- public for local/default profile; admin-only (ROLE_ADMIN) by default in production DB profiles
- override via MATECLAW_OPENAPI_EXPOSE_UI; add RANDOM_PORT integration tests and docs
execute_code (bash/sh/shell) bypassed the workspace boundary guard, so shell
code run through it could read/write/delete paths outside the workspace sandbox
(e.g. cat /etc/passwd) while the same paths were blocked for read_file and the
shell tools. Bring execute_code under the guard (scan only shell-language code,
report the code param), and trust the tool-result spill roots so a legitimate
spilled result stays readable. Adds regression tests.
Backend (SourceEvidenceLedger):
- appendWikiSourceTable now normalizes existing source lines in-place to
canonical "[N] Title - section - page N" format instead of skipping them
- Added replaceSourceLine helper that matches a full source line by regex
and replaces it with the canonical form
- When source lines exist without a "来源：" header, automatically insert
one so the frontend preprocessor can locate the source table
Frontend (useMarkdownRenderer):
- Added data-citation-index / data-citation-title to DOMPurify whitelist
- Added preprocessWikiCitations preprocessor: parses the canonical source
table to build an index-to-title map, replaces [n] markers in the answer
body with clickable <a> links, and wraps entire source-table rows so the
full line is clickable
- Integrated into the render pipeline after wikilink substitution and
before Marked parsing
Frontend (useGlobalWikilinkClick):
- Extended the click delegation selector to match both .wiki-link and
.wiki-citation elements
- Title extraction falls back: data-citation-title || data-wiki-title
Tests: added three test cases for source-line normalization, idempotency,
and automatic header insertion
Issue #304. Operators who want an agent with NO knowledge base had no
way to express it: leaving the KB picker empty fell through to "inherit
workspace-wide" (every KB visible), so the agent ended up ingesting
every KB's context. This adds the same opt-out toggle that
skills_disabled (V126) / tools_disabled already provide.
Backend:
- V154 migration (h2 + mysql + kingbase): mate_agent.wiki_disabled
BOOLEAN/TINYINT/SMALLINT NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE. Legacy agents stay
bit-identical.
- AgentEntity.wikiDisabled: Boolean field, @TableField("wiki_disabled").
- AgentBindingService.getBoundKbIds: short-circuit at the top —
wiki_disabled=true returns Set.of() regardless of binding rows. Mirrors
the precedence contract of getBoundSkillIds vs skills_disabled.
- AgentBindingService.setKbBindings: a non-empty save auto-clears a
stale wiki_disabled flag (same contract as setSkillBindings /
setToolBindings on their respective flags). Empty saves leave the flag
untouched — the UI toggle owns the bit, not the binding writer.
- AgentBindingServiceWikiDisabledTest: 5 cases covering all three
return states + the stale-flag auto-clear + empty-save no-op.
Frontend:
- Agents.vue KB picker: add the "此智能体不使用任何知识库" /
"This agent uses no knowledge bases" toggle, mirroring the skills /
tools picker layout. Tab badge shows "Off" when the toggle is on.
- types/index.ts: add Agent.wikiDisabled?: boolean.
- Save logic: when wikiDisabled is on, send an empty KB list (the
setKbs contract then leaves the flag alone server-side, exactly as
setSkills / setTools behave for their opt-out flags).
- i18n (zh + en): new strings for toggle label, hint, badge, and the
scope description shown when the toggle is on.
Stacked on top of #382 (which introduced AgentBindingResolver
.getBoundKbIds). No agent-runtime changes — wiki tools already degrade
cleanly when getBoundKbIds returns Set.of().
Add GET /api/v1/channels/webchat/wiki/pages mirroring /skills, so
downstream integrators can build a [[slug]] picker UI that points the
LLM at specific wiki pages. The picker token format is the universal
Obsidian/Wikipedia wikilink convention; the LLM consumes [[slug]] via
the existing wiki_read_page(slug=...) tool, so no agent-runtime changes
are needed.
- AgentBindingResolver.getBoundKbIds(agentId): three-state mirror of
getBoundSkillIds. null = no rows (fall through to workspace-wide KBs),
Set.of() = explicitly scoped to zero KBs, non-empty = explicit scope.
- WebChatController.listWikiPages: API Key + visitorToken auth chain,
agentId workspace anti-escalation, visibility excludes pageType=
synthesis (LLM intermediate artifacts), 100-page cap forces keyword
filter, response carries only display-level metadata.
- WebChatWikiPageView DTO: kbId/kbName/slug/title/summary/pageType;
content/embedding/sourceRawIds deliberately stay admin-console-only.
- WikiTool.wiki_read_page @Tool description: document the [[slug]]
convention so the LLM treats each token as a wiki-page reference.
- WebChatWikiPageListTest: 8 cases covering happy path, keyword filter,
synthesis exclusion, anti-escalation, auth failures, cap behavior,
and the no-binding → workspace-wide fallback.
Closes#381.
- per-KB entity-type whitelist (config UI + persistence; empty = built-in defaults)
- entity graph: legend grouped by type with click-to-filter; nodes colored by type
- always show entity names on graph nodes (not only on hover)
- earthy categorical palette aligned to the app theme, shared by entity & page graphs
- theme-aware graph label color (resolve CSS var for canvas, light/dark correct)
- manual extract = full rebuild: idempotent force re-extraction + orphan pruning,
guarded against data loss on a fully-failed run
- regression test for force re-extraction; zh/en i18n
GET /api/v1/channels/webchat/skills?agentId=<optional>&visitorId=<required>
Headers: X-MC-Key + X-MC-Visitor-Token
Downstream systems integrating via the webchat SSE endpoint have no way
today to enumerate the skills a visitor can invoke — the existing
GET /api/v1/skills is JWT + workspace-role gated, unreachable from the
API-Key-authenticated webchat channel. Without a list, integrators
can't render a slash picker UI; visitors have to know skill slugs by
heart.
The new endpoint mirrors the /stream auth chain (resolveChannel +
verifyVisitorToken) and reuses AgentBindingResolver.getBoundSkillIds
to scope visibility. Only enabled skills explicitly bound to the agent
surface; agents with no explicit bindings return an empty list rather
than inheriting the global pool (the agent config stays the source of
truth for what surfaces in visitor UI). The agentId anti-escalation
guard from /stream is reused verbatim — an explicit agentId must
belong to the channel's workspace.
Returns WebChatSkillView (id / name / nameZh / nameEn / description /
icon). Deliberately omits SKILL.md content, configJson and
securityScanResult: those never leave the admin console.
Issue: #373
The previous notLike(column, "%:") form auto-wraps the value with extra %
on both sides AND escapes the user-supplied %, producing a %%:% pattern
that matches any id CONTAINING a colon — silently filtering out every
webchat:<key>:<visitor>, feishu:<chatId>, cron:<jobId> conversation from
the admin list / page. The frontend sidebar ends up empty.
Switch to notLikeLeft(column, ":") which only prepends the wildcard,
giving the intended NOT LIKE '%:' (does not end with a colon).
Strengthen the three malformedIdGuard tests to assert on the bound param
value ("%:" — ends-with colon) in addition to the SQL keyword, so this
regression cannot return silently. The assertions must call
getTargetSql() first to trigger MyBatis-Plus's nested-wrapper param
merge — getParamNameValuePairs() is empty on the parent until then.
conversationId ending in ":" (e.g. webchat:<key8>: with empty visitorId,
from older webchat versions) leaks into the admin console via the
'webchat:%' username LIKE, then 500/403s on open because the trailing ":"
makes some reverse proxies strip the path tail — landing a GET on the
@DeleteMapping variant of /{conversationId} (issue #369).
Add applyMalformedIdGuard — a NOT LIKE '%:' clause — to both listConversations
(lenient + strict overloads) and pageConversations so these rows never
surface. isConversationOwner already rejects unknown ids with 403, so no
change is needed on the direct-access endpoints; once the rows are out of
the lists, admin can no longer reach them.
The two existing strict/non-admin assertions changed from "no LIKE keyword"
to "no webchat:% param value" — applyMalformedIdGuard emits a NOT LIKE
itself, so the LIKE keyword is now present in every query.
Tests cover the guard on lenient, page, and strict paths.
Spring's default lets HttpRequestMethodNotSupportedException escape to the
catch-all @ExceptionHandler(Exception.class), surfacing as a 500 with a full
stack trace. Return a clean 405 so the client gets a structured R body and
the log stays at WARN.
This is also the second line of defence against malformed path segments that
confuse reverse proxies — e.g. a conversationId ending in ":" can make a
proxy strip the trailing path, landing a GET /api/v1/conversations/<id> on
the @DeleteMapping variant and triggering exactly this exception (issue #369).
Align the conversation list/page with the isConversationOwner cross-workspace
guard: only a global admin can open a webchat-owned conversation, so only
admins should see those rows. Previously listConversations / pageConversations
surfaced webchat principals to every authenticated user, who would then 403 on
opening them (list-vs-access asymmetry).
Also fixes ConversationServiceWebchatVisibilityTest, which still asserted the
pre-guard owner behavior and never mocked AuthService, so it threw NPE at
runtime once isConversationOwner started resolving the requester. The owner
matrix is covered by ConversationServiceOwnershipWorkspaceTest; this test now
pins the admin-gated list visibility for both admin and non-admin callers.
Closes the authorization asymmetry between list endpoints (which filter
by workspaceId) and direct-access endpoints (which did not): a logged-in
user could reach another workspace's system / IM / webchat-owned
conversation by id and run any of messages / delete / rename / pin /
setModel / clear / chat-files download on it.
Per the maintainer's guidance on issue #344, workspaces are now treated
as untrusted isolation boundaries — the fix is the cross-cutting
hardening, kept out of feature work.
Behavior change (only for shared, non-direct convs):
- requester is a global admin (user.role=admin) → pass
- requester is a member of the conversation's workspace → pass
- otherwise → deny
Preserved to avoid regressions:
- direct owner (username == conv.username) → pass without lookup
- convs without workspace_id (legacy rows) → legacy system-owner check
- anonymous user (authService returns null, e.g. permitAll reconnect)
→ legacy system-owner check
Callers in ConversationController / ChatController / SubagentController /
GoalController / ApprovalController (18 sites) are unchanged — the
signature stays isConversationOwner(conversationId, username). The
workspace membership check is done via WorkspaceService.hasPermissionCached
(Caffeine-backed, same cache the WorkspaceAccessInterceptor uses) and
ignores the X-Workspace-Id header, which is client-controlled.
Tests: 11 cases in ConversationServiceOwnershipWorkspaceTest covering
each branch of the new logic. No caller-side test changes — the 66
caller tests (ConversationService*Test, ChatController*Test,
SubagentController*Test, GoalController*Test, ApprovalController*Test)
still pass.
Previously WebChatController.chatStream silently dropped every agent
lifecycle event except _usage_final (and content_delta / thinking_delta
derived from delta.payload). Visitors sat with nothing between the
meta event and the first content chunk — typically 3–10s when the
agent plans / recalls memory / runs tools, longer when the agent
chained multiple tool calls. The JWT chat path (ChatController) had
this wiring; webchat did not.
Curated 4-event subset (per design review):
- phase — high-level phase transition (planning / generating /
summarizing / ...). SDK shows a "AI is thinking..."
typing indicator before the first token.
- tool_start — agent invoked a tool. SDK shows a localized badge
("Searching...", "Reading file.pdf", ...).
- tool_end — tool completed. SDK clears the badge.
- plan — Plan-Execute agents expose their step list. SDK can
render a checklist.
Deliberately NOT forwarded (internal noise / leak risk):
- _usage_final, _routing_decision — consumed internally
- finish_reason — implicit in `done`
- feedback_event — visitor can't retry/regenerate anyway
- perf_summary, iteration_* — internal metrics
- plan_step_started/completed — too granular; the plan event covers
the visitor's needs
Critical safety constraint: tool_start / tool_end carry ONLY the tool
name. Tool arguments and results are dropped — agent tool calls can
contain PII (file paths, user queries, credentials), and relaying
those to a 3rd-party website frontend is a data leak. The SDK maps
tool name → localized label via its own lookup.
Backward compat: existing clients ignore unknown event types per the
SSE spec, so adding these is non-breaking.
Tests: 5 new cases in WebChatStreamE2ETest covering each event type
+ a regression case asserting internal events are silently dropped.
85/85 webchat tests green.
Docs: docs/zh/webchat.md gains a "实时进度事件" subsection.
Stack: feat/webchat-attachment-e2e → feat/webchat-stream-phase-events
Follow-up to epic #355.
Adds WebChatAttachmentE2ETest — second HTTP-level test in the webchat
suite. Boots RANDOM_PORT, drives Spring's multipart parser for real,
and verifies the cross-endpoint wiring that turns an upload into an
agent-addressable attachment.
Coverage (7 tests):
- upload + /stream round-trip: persisted user message's content_parts
carries the file part with a server path that points into the
conversation's upload dir; bytes on disk match what was uploaded
- unknown attachmentId → silently dropped (no error, text-only parts)
- foreign visitor cannot reference another visitor's fileId
(consume() is conversation-scoped)
- upload without visitorToken → HTTP 401
- upload with disallowed extension → HTTP 400
- GET /files streams back the uploaded bytes
- GET /files without visitorToken → HTTP 401
AgentService is @MockBean'd so /stream returns instantly; what we
assert is the persisted user-message shape (DB row content_parts),
not the agent's actual file consumption (which would need a real
agent + tool runtime — out of scope for the wire-format focus).
Worth noting: RHttpStatusAdvice maps R.fail(401/400) to the matching
HTTP status, so 4xx assertions are on the HTTP status, not the body.
Stack: feat/webchat-stream-e2e-test → feat/webchat-attachment-e2e
Follow-up to PR #363.
Adds WebChatStreamE2ETest — first test in the suite to boot a real
servlet container (RANDOM_PORT) and exercise /stream over actual HTTP,
parsing the SSE wire format that any third-party SDK would see.
AgentService is swapped with a Mockito @MockBean so chatStructuredStream
returns canned StreamDeltas — fast, deterministic, no real LLM.
Coverage:
- happy path: meta → content_delta* → done, assistant reply persisted
- multi-chunk reply with thinking_delta + _usage_final event
(verifies persisted prompt_tokens / completion_tokens / runtime_model)
- bad API key → SSE error event "Invalid API Key"
- blank message → SSE error event "Message is required"
- channel with no bound agent → SSE error event "No agent configured"
- explicit sessionId → meta echoes it + seeds conversation namespace
- invalid visitorId charset → SSE error event
7 tests, ~5s. Mid-stream stop is covered by WebChatStopStreamTest at
the controller level; attachment ingestion is left for a follow-up
since it requires POST /upload first.
Stack: feat/webchat-docs → feat/webchat-stream-e2e-test
Epic issue: #355
AuditEventService gains recordAs(actor, workspaceId, ...) — an overload
that takes an explicit actor string instead of deriving one from
SecurityContext. Used for non-MateClaw principals (currently just
webchat visitors), where there is no Spring Security auth and the
default record() path would write "system".
WebChatController injects AuditEventService and adds an audit() helper
that constructs the canonical actor string "webchat:<channelId>:<visitorId>"
so audit-event searches can filter by channel or visitor. Eight write
endpoints now log an audit row on success:
webchat.create-session, webchat.rename-session, webchat.pin-session,
webchat.archive-session, webchat.delete-session, webchat.stop-session,
webchat.regenerate-session, webchat.upload-file
/stream is intentionally NOT audited — message-volume noise, and
conversationService.saveMessage already leaves a durable trail.
Each row carries:
- username = webchat:<channelId>:<visitorId>
- action = webchat.<verb>
- resource = CONVERSATION / <conversationId>
- detailJson = {sessionId, ...action-specific fields}
WebChatAuditTrailTest (@SpringBootTest, 2 cases):
- createSession lands a row with the exact actor string + action
- rename + pin + archive + stop each leave a row (4 distinct actions)
Audit insert is async; tests poll up to 3s for the row to appear.
Regression: 9 webchat test classes (64 tests) green.
Part of epic #355.
New endpoint POST /api/v1/channels/webchat/sessions/regenerate. Behavior:
1. Auth (API Key + visitorToken + ownsConversation — same chain as the
other session mutations).
2. streamTracker.requestStop() — kill any in-flight stream first so its
doOnComplete doesn't race the delete/save below.
3. Find last role=user message (seed) and last role=assistant message
(target).
4. Delete the last assistant message if present.
5. Reuse chatStream by handing it a synthetic WebChatRequest whose
message is the seed user content. chatStream saves a fresh user
message (new id, same content) and starts the agent turn.
Trade-off: chatStream saves a new user message rather than replaying the
existing one in place, so the user-side message count grows by 1 per
regenerate. Acceptable — the alternative (refactoring chatStream into
reusable chunks) is a 4-hour distraction from the actual feature, and the
extra row is harmless (history still reads naturally: user, asst, user,
asst, user, asst instead of user, asst, asst).
ConversationService gains findLastMessageByRole() and deleteMessageById()
helpers; both are scoped exactly to what regenerate needs.
WebChatRegenerateTest (@SpringBootTest, 5 cases):
- empty thread (no user message) → error event, no DB change
- deletes the last assistant reply (count strictly decreases)
- bad token → no DB change (auth fails before mutation)
- unknown sessionId → returns emitter without throwing
- seeds from the LAST user message when multiple exist
Tests don't assert on the actual LLM stream content — that's left for
PR 5's WebChatStreamE2ETest, which mocks the chat model.
Part of epic #355.
Two new session-state mutations, both following the rename endpoint's
shape (PUT + {flag: true|false} body + visitorId/sessionId query):
- PUT /api/v1/channels/webchat/sessions/pinned — flips mate_conversation.pinned
- PUT /api/v1/channels/webchat/sessions/archive — flips mate_conversation.archived
Archive complements delete as a "soft-close" — the thread stays on disk
(history preserved, addressable, downloadable) but is hidden from the
default /sessions listing. Pin makes a thread sort first in the visitor's
listing, mirroring the admin-console behavior.
Archive dominates pin: an archived+pinned thread is still hidden by
default. Callers opt back in via includeArchived=true (added in PR 1).
ConversationService gains setArchived(), mirroring the existing
setPinned() pattern.
WebChatArchivePinTest (@SpringBootTest, 6 cases):
- pin flips column + view reflects pinned=1
- archive hides from default listing, includeArchived=true shows it,
un-archive restores
- archived+pinned still hidden (archive dominates)
- malformed body / wrong type → 400
- unknown sessionId → 404
- bad token → 401
Part of epic #355.
Closes the "no way to ban a single visitor without burning the global
JWT secret" gap from the epic. Two changes:
1. Token format: HMAC payload now includes exp, format is
`<base64sig>.<expEpochSec>`. Default TTL 7 days (VISITOR_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS).
Expiry participates in the HMAC, so bumping it client-side invalidates
the signature. /stream still mints fresh tokens on first contact — a
revoked visitor can start a new /stream (gets a new token), they just
can't use the old one on management endpoints.
2. WebChatTokenRevocationService — DB-backed registry (webchat_revoked_visitor
table from V148) with a 5-minute Caffeine cache in front. revoke() /
unrevoke() / isRevoked(). The cache accepts up to 10min eventual
consistency across instances — webchat is low-volume, and a fresh node
sees revocations immediately on cold cache. DB remains source of truth.
WebChatController.verifyVisitorToken becomes an instance method that chains
verifyVisitorTokenSignature (static, HMAC + exp) with isRevoked (instance,
DB + cache). All 9 management endpoints now check revocation transitively.
Admin endpoint: POST /api/v1/admin/webchat/revoked-visitor (and DELETE to
un-revoke). Mounted under /api/v1/admin/** so it requires a MateClaw JWT
— visitors can't reach it. Records an audit row (action=webchat.revoke-
visitor, resourceType=CHANNEL) via AuditEventService.
Tests:
- WebChatTokenRevocationTest (@SpringBootTest, 7 cases): revoke blocks
/sessions with 401, un-revoke restores, double-revoke idempotent,
expired token rejected even without revocation, /stream unaffected
(signature still verifies), admin endpoint inserts row + audit.
- WebChatVisitorTokenTest extended to 16 cases — added expired-token,
tampered-exp, and "differs when exp differs" coverage; existing
verify_* cases moved to verifyVisitorTokenSignature (the static half).
Regression: WebChatSchemaFieldsTest (5/5), WebChatCreateSessionTest (9/9),
WebChatSessionManagementTest (5/5), WebChatStopStreamTest (5/5).
Part of epic #355.
Schema foundations for the rest of the epic. Three additions:
1. mate_conversation.archived — INT default 0. Lets a visitor "soft-close"
a thread: stays on disk (history preserved, addressable, downloadable)
but excluded from default /sessions listing. Pinned/archived are
orthogonal; archive dominates (archived+pinned still hidden by default).
2. webchat_revoked_visitor — registry table consumed in PR 2 by the
WebChatTokenRevocationService. Unique on (channel_id, visitor_id, deleted)
so re-revoke is idempotent and deleted=1 un-revokes. Migration written
for all three DBs (h2 IF NOT EXISTS, MySQL INFORMATION_SCHEMA guard,
KingbaseES native IF NOT EXISTS) following the V147 pattern.
3. WebChatSessionView gains pinned/archived/streamStatus so the visitor-
side listing surfaces the same state the admin console sees. Closes
the "field exposure" gap from the epic.
loadVisitorSessions gains an includeArchived flag (default false) — the
default hides archived threads and excludes them from the empty-session
quota, since the visitor already declared they're done with them.
GET /sessions and GET /sessions/page thread an `includeArchived=true`
query param through.
Tests (WebChatSchemaFieldsTest, @SpringBootTest + H2 + V148):
- revoked-visitor table is queryable
- archived column is read/write
- view exposes pinned/archived/streamStatus
- archived hidden by default, visible with includeArchived=true
- archived empty threads don't saturate the 5-thread quota
Regression: WebChatCreateSessionTest (9/9), WebChatSessionManagementTest
(5/5) — both updated for the new includeArchived param.
Part of epic #355.
Until now webchat had no way to actually interrupt a running stream —
ChatController's /api/v1/chat/{id}/stop was technically permitAll'd but
silently no-op'd on webchat streams because WebChatController.chatStream
dropped the subscribe() return value, so ChatStreamTracker.requestStop
had no Disposable to dispose. Visitors could only "stop" client-side by
closing the SSE connection; the server-side LLM call kept running,
burning tokens and firing any side-effecting tools to completion.
Two changes (issue #353):
1. WebChatController.chatStream: keep the Disposable and register it
with streamTracker.setDisposable, mirroring ChatController#chatStream
line 495. Now requestStop actually disposes the Flux.
2. New endpoint POST /api/v1/channels/webchat/sessions/stop:
- Auth mirrors the other session-management endpoints: X-MC-Key +
X-MC-Visitor-Token + ownsConversation (404 on unknown sessionId,
so callers can't probe the namespace).
- Returns {stopped: true|false}; false means no active stream
(idempotent, not an error).
- No approval sweep — webchat has no MateClaw username and exposes
no approval UI today; defer until that surfaces.
WebChatStopStreamTest (@SpringBootTest, H2, V147) — 5 cases:
- stopActiveStream registers a real Flux.never() Disposable on the
tracker and asserts both stopped=true AND disposable.isDisposed(),
proving the chatStream wiring change is what makes the endpoint work.
- noActiveStreamReturnsFalse — idempotent path.
- bad token / bad API key → 401.
- unknown sessionId → 404.
Complements the implicit getOrCreate in /stream: lets a caller pre-create
an empty thread (message_count = 0) and receive sessionId / conversationId /
visitorToken up front, then decide when to send the first message via
/stream. Mirrors how downstream CRM/ticketing systems model "create the
conversation object first, message later".
Auth is the visitor's first touch — only X-MC-Key is required (no
X-MC-Visitor-Token, which the visitor can't have yet); the server signs
and returns a fresh visitorToken the caller must echo back on subsequent
GET/PUT/DELETE.
Behavior (issue #351):
- Idempotent on sessionId collision → returns the existing thread 200,
does NOT clobber title.
- Empty-session quota ≤ 5 per (channel, visitor); 409 with a clear
message when exceeded. Existing rows are exempt (re-create is idempotent).
- Caller-supplied title (1-100 chars) is persisted; absent title leaves
the default "新对话" so the first /stream user message still derives
it. getOrCreateWebchatConversation now accepts an optional title and
only writes it on insert (existing rows untouched).
- agentId override mirrors /stream's workspace check.
ConversationService.getOrCreateWebchatConversation gains a title-aware
overload; the original 5-arg signature delegates with title = null.
End-to-end coverage in WebChatCreateSessionTest (@SpringBootTest, H2
with V147 migration): happy path, caller-title survives first user
message, default-title still derived, idempotent collision, quota 409,
bad API key 401, illegal sessionId/title 400, listed after creation.
Two webchat hardening fixes:
- Session listing no longer pulls every system-owned conversation into
memory. listSessions/pageSessions went through listConversations(owner)
whose `username IN (owner, system)` loaded all IM/cron rows just to show
one visitor's handful of threads. New listWebchatConversations(username)
queries only the visitor's own rows; the channel prefix is matched
in-memory with a literal startsWith (so a '_'/'%' in the api key's first
8 chars can't act as a LIKE wildcard).
- Upload now enforces a per-conversation quota (file count + total bytes,
both configurable) so a visitor can't fill the disk with many
individually-under-cap files. Pairs with the existing staging TTL sweep.
When webchat:<key8>:<visitorId>:<sessionId> exceeds 64 chars the
conversationId folds visitorId+sessionId into an unrecoverable hash, so
the thread fell outside listSessions' conversationId-prefix filter and its
sessionId could not be recovered — the thread was invisible and
unaddressable (common with a UUID visitorId + a >10-char sessionId).
Persist the sessionId on creation (new nullable webchat_session_id column)
and enumerate by username + channel prefix (webchat:<key8>:), which also
matches the hashed form. sessionId is read from the column, falling back to
parsing the conversationId only for legacy rows.
Adds a @SpringBootTest covering listing (incl. the hashed thread), message
pagination, session paging/search, rename, and token rejection end-to-end.
Refs matevip/mateclaw#346
Bring the webchat visitor session API closer to the admin console's:
- GET /sessions/messages gains beforeId + limit. With a limit it returns
{messages, hasMore} (latest N, then pull-up for older) using the
external path-stripped view; without it, the full list as before.
- GET /sessions/page paginates + keyword-searches a visitor's threads
(in-memory: a visitor's thread set is bounded to its own namespace).
- PUT /sessions/title renames a thread (1-100 chars).
All keep the webchat auth model (API key + visitor token, server-derived
conversationId, ownership guard). Message views go through the shared
toExternalMessageViews helper so the paginated path is sanitized too.
Refs matevip/mateclaw#346
WebChat had no file support: the /stream body carried only text, and
agent-produced files had no visitor-reachable download path (the JWT
/chat/files endpoint is unreachable for API-key visitors).
Add webchat-authenticated file transfer, reusing MessageContentPart +
the existing upload dir + agent multimodal injection:
- WebChatFileService: validate (size cap, extension whitelist, filename
sanitize), store under the conversation's upload dir, stage by opaque
fileId, traversal-safe resolve. Untrusted-uploader hardening lives here.
- POST /upload (multipart) and GET /files, both authed by API key +
visitor token with a server-derived conversationId (never client paths).
Downloads send non-images as attachment + X-Content-Type-Options:nosniff.
- /stream gains attachmentIds; the server resolves each id from the
staging registry (client metadata is never trusted), builds parts, and
persists them on the user message so the agent's multimodal/file tools
pick them up from history — same path as the JWT web chat.
- Strip server-side file paths from the visitor-facing message view
(listMessageViewsExternal + includePath flag) so the filesystem layout
is not disclosed.
Refs matevip/mateclaw#342
WebChat conversations are owned by an external visitor principal
(webchat:<visitorId>) so each visitor's threads stay isolated for the
self-service session API. But the console list/page/owner-check only
recognized the current user + system owners, so these conversations were
invisible in the sidebar and the Sessions page — and would 403 on open
even if surfaced.
Treat webchat: owners like system owners for the console: include them in
the lenient list/page queries and in isConversationOwner. The strict
listConversations overload (used by the visitor self-service path) is
unchanged, so a visitor's own access is not widened.
Refs matevip/mateclaw#340
Add an opt-in named-entity extraction pass so the wiki knowledge graph
captures fine-grained entities (people, organizations, locations, ...)
and their relations, not just page-level link relations.
- new tables mate_wiki_entity / _mention / _relation (h2/mysql/kingbase)
- structured LLM extraction per chunk with entity resolution
(normalized-key dedup + embedding near-merge), mention/relation
persistence and page linking via chunk citations
- per-KB opt-in toggle (off by default); async dispatch after embedding
- read API: entity list, KB graph, entity ego-graph, manual extract
- UI: entity-layer toggle in the graph view + KB config toggle
- replace inline fully-qualified class names with imports in WikiProcessingService
Closes#336
Always-on memory (structured user/feedback blocks, PROFILE.md, MEMORY.md) is injected into every system prompt but only ever grew, inflating per-turn context over time. This adds deterministic size control across all always-on sources:
- Injection budget: cap the always-on structured block by total chars and per-type entry count, keeping the most-recently-updated entries (LRU by Updated date) and disclosing how many were omitted
- Nightly consolidation: a dedicated scheduled pass merges duplicate/stale user & feedback entries via the LLM, preserving each entry's original Updated date; runs per owner bucket (shared + personal) with a per-run cap and a never-grow safety guard
- File ceilings: deterministic backstop truncates PROFILE.md / MEMORY.md at a section boundary when a rewrite overruns its budget
- Manual trigger endpoint for the consolidation maintenance task
All knobs under mate.memory.*; covered by unit tests.
- goal: continue (not skip) on max-iterations and evidence-insufficient turns.
A max-iterations turn grants a fresh iteration budget ("hard continuation"),
bounded per run and sized into the graph recursion ceiling, so a task too big
for one budget keeps going instead of stalling until the next user message.
- plan-execute: re-plan the remaining work on a step exception, and on a
signature-based stall (repeated failures / identical results / no usable
result) instead of advancing dependent steps with junk; bounded by a per-run
re-plan cap, with a graduated change-strategy nudge before the hard stop.
- plan-execute: auto-derive a goal from a genuine multi-step plan, seeding the
acceptance criteria from the plan steps, so the goal subsystem engages without
the model calling setGoal; broadcast goal_created so the UI hydrates.
- react: refund the iteration for setup-only rounds (load_skill / enable_tool)
so a tight budget is not eaten by the load-then-use two-step.
- ui: re-fetch the active goal when a turn finishes so a goal created or mutated
mid-conversation surfaces without depending on an SSE event.
- streaming: make retry backoff / total-time budget instance fields with a
test-only seam; clarify that the wall-clock budget (not max-retries) bounds a
sustained SERVER_ERROR loop to ~8 attempts, fixing the slow/flaky retry test.
The knowledge-base trust verification recorded wiki citations from every
non-readFile tool response by sniffing its JSON for a top-level title /
pages / chunks field. Tools like getGoalStatus return a top-level title,
which falsely populated the citation set and then forced [n] citations on
the final answer (otherwise flagged EVIDENCE_INSUFFICIENT). Gate citation
mining on the wiki_* tool name instead.
Likewise, the grounded answer contract (cite-or-refuse) was appended to
every ReasoningNode call unconditionally, degrading general agents that
have no knowledge base. Append it only when the agent has a wiki_* tool
bound, scoping the strict regime to KB-grounded scenarios.
Adds a regression test asserting a non-wiki tool with a top-level title
creates no wiki citations.
- rescan: keep the KB id as a string end to end so the 19-digit snowflake id
isn't truncated past Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER (rescan no longer 404s)
- lint: resolve [[...]] targets against page slugs AND titles like the viewer,
so a title reference to an existing page is no longer reported broken
- ingest: derive the slug deterministically from the title (no inconsistent
romanization), auto-recompute broken links once a KB finishes importing,
and reconcile dangling [[concept]] links — redirect to the covering page via
declared aliases, or demote to plain text when uncovered
- add the page aliases column migration for h2 / mysql / kingbase
Surface the connected database product as a subtle chip in the Dashboard
header. SystemHealthService now reports a database label on /system/health
(reused by the front-end — no extra request), derived from a new
DatabaseBootstrapRunner.getDatabaseLabel() that reads the JDBC product name
once and normalizes it to a canonical label (MySQL / MariaDB / PostgreSQL /
H2, and 人大金仓 for the KingbaseES family), collapsing driver version noise.
Add ErrorClassificationTest regression cases for the AI-gateway retry
hardening: 5xx-before-4xx ordering (a proxy 502 whose body says
"bad request" stays retryable), Chinese / numeric provider billing
patterns, and DNS / TLS infrastructure-fatal detection.
Fix the cert-trust pattern while adding its test: Java's ValidatorException
emits "PKIX path building failed" with an uppercase PKIX and the error
chain is not lower-cased, so the previous lowercase pattern never matched
— an untrusted/expired cert chain fell through to the retryable
SERVER_ERROR bucket and was retried in vain instead of failing over.
loadRecentFilesFromDisk now filters out files older than RECENT_FILE_TTL_MINUTES
(60 min) so the disk fallback matches the Caffeine cache TTL and does not inject
stale attachments into future conversations.
Testability refactoring:
- recentFileCache: private → package-private (tests can seed the cache directly)
- chatUploadsRoot: new package-private Path field (tests redirect to @TempDir)
- loadRecentFilesFromDisk: add (Path dir, long cutoffMs) package-private overload;
private (String) wrapper delegates to it
- injectRecentFiles: private → package-private
New test class FeishuRecentFileCacheTest (14 cases):
- loadRecentFilesFromDisk: non-existent dir, empty dir, fresh files sorted
newest-first, stale files excluded by TTL, mixed fresh+stale, >5 files capped,
timestamp-prefix stripping, MIME guessing from extension
- injectRecentFiles: Caffeine cache hit, cache-miss disk fallback, empty disk,
duplicate-path dedup, image vs file part typing, null textContent guard
Relates to #325
* feat(wiki): unify raw materials & source watcher into a Sources tab with per-KB auto-sync
The raw-material directory scan and the Advanced "source watcher" sub-tab were
the same engine (same kb.sourceDirectory, same WikiDirectoryScanService) split
across two surfaces with two editable directory inputs. Merge them into one
"Sources" tab (upload / paste / directory manual scan + auto-sync toggle +
the raw-material list) and drop the watcher sub-tab from Advanced.
Auto-sync is now per-KB opt-in: a new watcher_enabled column (V146) gates the
periodic scan per knowledge base. The server-global mate.wiki.watcher-enabled
stays as an ops master switch — a KB is auto-scanned only when both are on
(AND). Manual scans are unaffected. Scan interval stays global for now
(tracked separately).
Closesmatevip/mateclaw#314
* docs(wiki): document source-watcher global switch env vars
Expose MATE_WIKI_WATCHER_ENABLED / MATE_WIKI_WATCHER_INTERVAL_MS as
explicit placeholders in application-mysql.yml, .env.example and
docker-compose.yml, mirroring MATE_WIKI_ALLOWED_SOURCE_ROOTS. Notes the
AND semantics (global ops gate + per-KB toggle) so operators know the
global switch alone is not sufficient.
- Fail closed to a global fallback sandbox root when a conversation has no
per-workspace base path, instead of leaving file/shell tools unconstrained
- Refuse shell commands that delete the workspace root directory itself
- Block workspace-boundary escapes at the policy layer before the approval
prompt, not only at execution time
- Approval bar now shows the actual command / target path being approved
The webchat conversationId (webchat:<key8>:<visitorId>[:<sessionId>]) and the
derived username (webchat:<visitorId>) are written to VARCHAR(64) columns, but
visitorId had no validation and sessionId allows 64 chars — so a long visitorId,
or a legitimate 64-char sessionId, overflows the column and the getOrCreateConversation
INSERT throws (500 on /stream). Validate visitorId (charset + blank->UUID) and
fold the variable part into a stable hash when the derived id/username would
exceed 64 chars, keeping short ids byte-identical (backward compatible). Also
make listSessions filter on exact owner username, not just the conversationId
prefix, so system-owned rows can never leak via a crafted visitorId. Adds
boundary regression tests.
Add per-visitor session management for the WebChat Web/API access mode:
list a visitor's conversation threads, fetch a thread's messages, and
delete a thread.
Authorization: visitorId is a client-asserted request param, so it cannot
be trusted on its own — deriving conversationId from it and then checking
ownership against it is tautological (any caller passes). Instead, /stream
issues a per-visitor token = HMAC-SHA256(jwtSecret, channelId:visitorId),
returned in the meta event; the management endpoints require it back via
the X-MC-Visitor-Token header and verify it in constant time. The signing
secret is server-only (unlike the public channel API key) and the channelId
in the payload makes tokens non-portable across channels.
Includes regression tests for token issuance/verification semantics
(forged visitorId rejected, cross-visitor and cross-channel tokens rejected,
tampered tokens rejected).
The multimodal sidecar selector change made resolveSidecar honour an explicit
sidecar selection even when the built-in capability heuristics don't recognize
the model (it now logs a diagnostic and returns the model instead of rejecting
to NONE). The test still asserted the old reject->NONE path. Update it to assert
SIDECAR and the honoured model, matching the current production behavior.
Both failed on dev independently of the recent merges (confirmed against a
pre-merge baseline):
- MemorySummarizationStructuredRoutingTest reflected applyStructuredEntries by
its old (Long, JsonNode) signature; owner-isolation added a trailing ownerKey
param. Update the reflective lookup to (Long, JsonNode, String) and the
remember() verifications to the 6-arg overload.
- ToolGuardCardHandlerTest still asserted the old 'system-owned pending accepts
any clicker' behavior, but the handler now rejects a group click on a
system/cron-owned approval fail-closed (no human requester to match), routing
it to the admin console. Assert no synthetic injection + the unauthorized card
render instead.
Decoupling the channel-message event bridge onto an @Async listener means the
downstream workflow run is produced off the event-publishing thread. The test
read the run table synchronously right after publishEvent, racing the listener
— the positive cases failed and the negative cases passed for the wrong reason.
Poll briefly for the run (positive) / give the listener time then assert none
(negative) so the test reflects the async dispatch semantics.
The mention alias-learning fed every identifier of every mention in a
delivery into the per-chat alias cache. A single delivery of "@bot @alice"
matched the bot by its global id and then learned alice's openId as a bot
alias, so every later "@alice" message was misdetected as @bot and the agent
replied to messages never addressed to it.
Only single-mention deliveries are unambiguous bot identities, so restrict
alias learning to them — a multi-mention delivery mixes the bot with
co-mentioned humans, and Feishu's dual-delivery alias form is itself a single
mention, so this is safe and keeps the learning feature working. Also cap the
per-chat alias set size. Adds a [bot, human] co-mention regression test.
Add an execute_code built-in tool that runs python/bash/node code the agent
writes on the fly, so a documentation-only skill (a SKILL.md with no bundled
scripts) can be acted on. Scoped runs inject the skill's secrets and run in
the skill directory; otherwise a private scratch directory is used. Host
secret env vars are scrubbed from the subprocess. execute_code is an
agent-wide capability, registered in the tool catalog (V143), and screened
by the tool guard with a dedicated set of destructive-pattern rules.
Tests cover python/bash/node execution, scratch-dir fallback, env scrubbing,
argument decoding, and guard gating.
Add 5-arg buildContextMessage overload that emits [system-context] Model:
for every origin (web/cron/IM). Legacy 3/4-arg overloads delegate to the
new one with null model args, keeping their output byte-identical.
Also fix pre-existing FeishuMentionTest compile error caused by removed
mentionMatchesAnyAlias/collectMentionIdentifiers methods.
The base directory is canonicalized via toRealPath before walking, so the
walked files carry the symlink-resolved prefix. The PathMatcher was built
from the literal pattern, so a symlinked base never matched and files were
silently dropped. Rebuild the glob against the resolved scan root, escaping
glob metacharacters in the base so a real directory name containing */?/{}/[]
is treated literally.
The #254 fix changed resolveConventionPath to {name}-{hashCode} and folded
hyphens to underscores, which re-pathed every existing skill (browser-cdp ->
browser_cdp-<hash>) with no migration, orphaning already-created workspaces and
breaking SkillWorkspaceManagerApplyBundleTest. Drop the hash suffix and keep
hyphens: the bare Unicode-preserving sanitized name already prevents the
non-ASCII collision (distinct CJK names map to distinct dirs) and leaves ASCII
kebab-case paths identical to the legacy scheme. Add path regression tests.
LLMs routinely emit malformed Markdown (missing heading spaces, glued `---`, unaligned table pipes) that prompt rules cannot reliably prevent. Add a zero-token, regex-only MarkdownNormalizer applied on the FinalAnswerNode convergence path before persistence / channel delivery. It is code-fence aware, idempotent, and conservative (em-dash `---`, `#5`-style refs, stray prose pipes are left untouched). RETURN_DIRECT verbatim output and approval-wait paths return earlier and are unaffected.
Closes#274
Streaming chat ran render tools on an async thread with no bound request,
so download links lost their host and arrived without a domain. Resolve the
host on the request thread and carry it through ChatOrigin/ToolContext;
falls back to a configurable public-base-url, then a relative path.
Agents now have a per-agent primary wiki KB stored on
mate_agent.primary_kb_id. KBs remain workspace-shared — selecting one in
the agent editor only chooses the default wiki target for that agent, it
does not change the KB's ownership or visibility.
Backend
- AgentEntity: add primary_kb_id field (FieldStrategy.ALWAYS so the UI
can clear it back to "no primary")
- AgentController#update: switch body to Map<String, Object> so we can
tell "field missing" apart from "explicit null" via containsKey, then
convertValue back to AgentEntity
- WikiKnowledgeBaseService:
- new resolvePrimaryKb(agentId): prefers agent.primary_kb_id when it
points to a workspace-visible KB; falls back to legacy
kb.agent_id marker, then to most-recently-updated workspace KB
- listByAgentId now returns the full workspace set (KBs are
workspace-shared under the new model)
- update(id, name, description) no longer touches agent_id
- WikiController: new GET /knowledge-bases/bindable for the UI picker;
PUT /knowledge-bases/{id} no longer reads agentId
- WikiKnowledgeBaseEntity: add FieldStrategy.ALWAYS on embeddingModelId
and configContent so explicit nulls actually unbind/clear instead of
being silently skipped by MyBatis-Plus's NOT_NULL default
- Migrations V129 (H2 + MySQL): add primary_kb_id column + index, backfill
from legacy kb.agent_id, MySQL uses INFORMATION_SCHEMA guard +
PREPARE/EXECUTE for idempotency
- WikiKnowledgeBaseServiceTest: 13 cases, all passing
Frontend
- Agents.vue: new "Knowledge Base" tab, radio-select bindable KBs
- API: listBindableKBs() + Agent.primaryKbId typed string | number | null
- IDs handled as strings throughout (Snowflake-safe)
- i18n keys for the new tab in zh-CN and en-US
Some OpenAI-compatible providers (LM Studio's built-in server, certain
strict-mode vLLM / SGLang deployments) reject 400 "System message must
be at the beginning" when SystemMessages appear after user / assistant
/ tool messages. The reasoning loop currently emits four SystemMessage
segments — main prompt at index 0, skill catalog inserted at index 1,
progress-ledger snapshot and stale-reminder appended at the end of
nonHistoryPrefix after the runtime-context UserMessage. The latter two
violate the strict shape, so conversations on LM Studio 400 on the
first turn (reported in #218).
Add MessageNormalizer: collects every SystemMessage in the outbound
prompt regardless of position, joins their text with a blank-line
separator, and emits a single SystemMessage at index 0. Non-system
messages keep their relative order, so AssistantMessage(tool_calls) ↔
ToolResponseMessage adjacency is preserved verbatim (required by strict
pair validators).
Wire it into doStreamCall as the first pre-egress step so every node
(reasoning, step-execution, summarizing, plan-generation, limit-exceeded)
inherits the fix without per-node changes, and any future node that
emits multiple SystemMessages stays compliant.
The transformation is semantically equivalent on permissive providers
(OpenAI, DashScope, Ollama, DeepSeek, Kimi, Doubao, GLM) — the merged
token sequence matches what they would have seen across N SystemMessages
— and safe on non-OpenAI protocols (Anthropic, Vertex / Gemini), whose
adapters already extract SystemMessages into a top-level system field
and receive an identical payload.
Kill switch: -Dmateclaw.llm.message-normalizer.enabled=false reverts to
the prior behavior for emergency rollback.
Tests: 11 unit tests on MessageNormalizer cover empty / no-system /
canonical / mid-list / tail / blanks / tool-pair preservation / Prompt
option-reference preservation / kill switch. 1 wiring test pins the
call site in doStreamCall. Full vip.mate.agent.** suite (504 tests)
stays green.
Closes#218.
1. Relative parent traversal in shell commands (HIGH)
validateShellCommand only scanned absolute path tokens, so commands
like `cat ../mateclaw/CLAUDE.md`, `cd .. && cat foo`, or
`ln -sf ../bar breakout` had no absolute path to trip the check.
From a workspace cwd that's a real escape — `..` segments resolve
against the JVM cwd at file-tool time and reach anywhere the user
can read.
Add a second pass: any token containing `..` as a path segment is
resolved against the workspace root via root.resolve(token).
normalize(); reject when the result falls outside. In-workspace
traversal like `subdir/../sibling` normalizes back inside and
passes. Identifiers without slashes (e.g. version strings with
`1.2..3`) are not treated as paths.
2. Shell validation and process working directory used different
context sources (MEDIUM)
execute_shell_command validated with the explicit ToolContext, but
buildShellProcess called WorkspacePathGuard.getWorkingDirectory()
(no-arg), which only sees the ThreadLocal fallback. Today the
ToolExecutionExecutor sets both so the discrepancy is latent, but
a future direct Spring AI invocation passing only ToolContext would
validate against one basePath and exec against another. Thread ctx
through buildShellProcess and call getWorkingDirectory(ctx) so
validation and execution agree on a single source of truth.
3. Absolute agent override could disable workspace scoping (MEDIUM)
resolveAgentBasePath accepted an absolute override verbatim, even
when it pointed outside the workspace root. An admin (or any
account with agent-edit permission) could set workspaceBasePath="/"
or another team's repo and bypass workspace boundaries entirely.
When a workspace has its own basePath, require absolute overrides
to sit underneath it. The caller in build() catches the rejection,
logs WARN, and falls back to the workspace basePath so chat stays
available rather than crashing agent construction. When the
workspace has no basePath there's no boundary to enforce, so legacy
behavior is preserved.
Test coverage: WorkspacePathGuardShellTest grows from 17 to 23 (six
new cases for `cd ..`, relative parent traversal, relative symlink
escape, deeper traversal, in-workspace normalization, and the
identifier false-positive guard). AgentGraphBuilderBasePathResolutionTest
grows from 7 to 10 (three new cases for in-workspace absolute,
outside-workspace absolute rejection, and no-workspace legacy
behavior). All 45 sandbox-area tests pass with no regressions.
Closes#162
require_mention=true previously degraded to a no-op when botPrefix was unset:
shouldProcess() returned true for all messages and checkAccess() fell through
unconditionally, so any group message would be answered — including ones where
the @mention targeted another user.
FeishuChannelAdapter now consults the Feishu SDK's mentions field directly:
- WebSocket: read EventMessage.getMentions(); webhook: read mentions[] from the
JSON payload. In both paths each mention's id.open_id is compared against the
bot's own open_id.
- Bot open_id is fetched lazily via /open-apis/bot/v3/info and cached on the
adapter instance. If the call fails the message is allowed through, matching
the previous behaviour.
- The require_mention gate is applied at the top of handleFeishuMessage so 1:1
chats are unaffected.
Tests: 15 unit cases covering null/empty inputs, bot mentioned, only-other
mentioned, bot among multiple mentions, and malformed payloads.
